Out today from RUSI is a paper from Vice-Admiral Sir Jeremy Blackham KCB and Gwyn Prins from the LSE that makes a case for spending on the Royal Navy
The defence review is occurring at a time of extreme financial pressure at home and considerable military risk in Afghanistan. Yet it would be a grave failure if it attended principally – or worse, exclusively – to the clamour of those issues. The deepest principles of national security are silent. They explain why bad things don’t happen and they must be given voice. This article also argues that geopolitics prescribe a primarily maritime framework for any British SDSR, and that the core strategic challenges are naval. The Royal Navy, however, has become dangerously weak. Urgent steps must be taken to reverse this trend before it is too late
Its timing is of course related to the pre SDSR buzz but I hope it doesn’t get get labelled as Senior Service Special Pleading because its is very interesting and relevant.
Acknowledging the dire state of the public finances, but arguing national security is not a discretionary expenditure, the paper suggests the strategic need for more surface combatants must be met through reassessing the choice of ‘seriously cost constrained’ new ships, looking closely at examples from Denmark and the Netherlands that offer a modular, adaptable design at a quarter of the price of currently planned purchases.
The paper argues for a cost constrained general purpose class of ships that make extensive use of modularity. It argues for 12-15 of these to compliment a force of 12 to 14 Type 45 and Type 26 (that’s in total, not 12-14 each)
This is a strong argument, a return to the two tier constabulary nature of forward defence with the ability to surge highly capable ships into an area should it be needed. Although the numbers and capabilities might be different it is fundamentally in line with the Think Defence position, that of a high capability core surrounded by lower capability but more numerous types.
Jed wrote a couple of great posts on this, here and here
I also looked at it from another angle with the C3 modular concept and other posts here and here.
The authors also published a similar paper in 2007 called ‘The Royal Navy at the Brink’, arguing for a 30 ship Future Surface Combatant (FSC) comprising a 10 C1, 20 C2 ratio but the new paper recognises the financial constraints we are in.
Similar to what i argued for on the warships1 forum.
I have no problem with T26 and T45 being high-end platforms, they need to be if they are to escort capital ships such as CVF, but there is no point using a billion pound vessel on constabulary duty.
My solution was:
2x CVF
6x T45
6x T26
12x C2
12x C3
C2 could easily be that cheap and cheerful 3500 tonne general purpose warship.
C3 being a 2000 tonne vessel, the minimum necessary for good seakeeping and global range.
I see your deck Jedibeeftrix and I raise you:
To protect the carriers and the amphibs, which are the jewel of our maritime capability, against high end threats, I would like to see 8 T45 and 8 T26, but as that appears fiscally unrealistic (within the farcical caveat of ringfenced DfID budgets etc) I would settle for:
6 x T45
8 x T26
12 x C2
IF the T26 is a straight T45 hull without long range 3D air search radar or SAMSON, but with a Cooperative Engagement Capability allowing T45 to control T26′s Aster 15′s (and with hangers re-arranged for 2 x AW101 and the T2087 towed array fitted).
AND the C2 is a variant of the Absalon Class patrol frigate, kept cheap and cheerful with 4.5 and other kit lifted from T23′s as they are withdrawn etc….
That is still only 26 “major surface combatant” the majority of wich are being describe as “cheap and cheerful”
Personally I think the minimum requirement is for 30 such ships (based on global deployments and task forces to defend amphibs).
well, i will double up since that is all you have to offer! :p
what i would actually like to see is classes of seven, because this is the generally accepted ratio through which one vessel will be in deep refit, leaving six in the work-up / deployed / work-down routine.
this would leave:
7x T45
7x T26
14x C2
14x C3
There is an argument for more T26, as there role is not purely HVA escort, but also sea sanitisation for trident infiltration/exfiltration from faslane, but i would prefer to see this role kept by the Nimrod MRA4′s.
The Danish STANFLEX design is often cited as a good example of a multi-role warship, but don’t forget that the Danes have stopped swapping them in and out of role. Instead they’ve locked them into one role each and will only use that role in future. The problem was the time taken to change around, and the lack of crew currency in the different areas – you could theoretically turn an MCMV into something else, but would the crew be up for the job?
I’m a big fan of emulating the French model – we need a certain number of high end combatants, and I think a future fleet of about 16-20 hulls is realistic. At the same time, we need to be more sensible about buying better OPV(H) and the like to do the ‘constabulary tasks’ such as APT(N). In other words an elite of large ships for the big stuff, and a larger number of smaller ships for the day to day stuff.
My concern about mid range vessels like C2 is that its hard to justify buying a C2 and a C1 to HMT, because they will make the point that the C2 is going to be able to do most of the C1s job. We then end up losing hulls and reducing capability. Far better to keep a C1 / C3 split, but up the numbers considerably.
I’d expect to see up to 20 C3′s as replacements for the MCMV, Survey and OPV fleets, with a fleet of around 16-20 main escorts. This gives us a versatile fleet of about 40 escorts of all types (as opposed to about 50 now) but which will provide a lot of capability.
Just for how long are we expecting to be financially constrained….forever?
The Type 23s are not due to replaced for another 10 years although I can see the need to withdraw the crew heavy Tyoe 22s earlier.
I’ve argued for a more ambitious programme. It has two tiers (collapsing C2 into C1 and C3). A Sloop programme (similar to Jed’s C3 post) based on the VT vessel (cousin of Khareef) 2 per year starting soon and a high end frigate (T26) 1 per year replacing T23.
6 x T45
16 x T26 6000 Tonnes (2021-2037)
16 x Sloop 3000 Tonnes (2013-2020)
Basically, I think we need to get back to always having one frigate/destroyer in build per year. Each new class a straight development of the previous. It would make life so much easier.
Why would we need sixteen high-end high-expense specialised ASW frigates?
The only real purpose is as a dedicated and inflexible [escort] to a CVF or ATG, and there is talk of conflating these two separate and distinct capabilities into one.
Why is the RN carrying out “constabulary” duties anyway?
The days of the British Empire controlling a third of the worlds economy are long gone.
Should the Royal Navy really be intercepting drug dealers in the Carribean?
Surely thats a law enforcement issue for the local police?
Even if the UK handles it, surely its a coast guard issue?
The RAF dont police the air and the army dont police the land, but the RN are being expected to police the oceans, all of them except the pacific apparently.
There, I’ve said it.
That also leaves one more matter.
We’ve been here before.
The T21 Frigate was designed on a somewhat similar mandate, to be a cheap general purpose vessel that wouldnt see combat.
It did of course, and a third of the squadron was destroyed in the falklands.
*****
Yes, I know I’ve been very strongly for these things, but I thought it was worth mentioning.
If we’re considering cutting the RAF to a single fast jet type and the Army to 6 small brigades, perhaps we should ask why the navy is preparing to defend singapore and raid columbian drug shipments.
*****
“Constabulary” might be the wrong word, but there is a need for a general pupose frigate to undertake non-escort duties such as APT(N) or APT(S), where a billion pound escort would be utterly wasted, especially given that we have so few of them there are none spare from their primary task; escorting HVA’s.
Maybe High End is the wrong phrase. T26 is designed to be a potentials multi-mission frigate that could be configured for ASW, AAW, ASuW. Perhaps 8 of these would be designated ASW ships. CEC and CAAMM makes them capable AAW assets. Scalp or Fire Shadow gives them powerful surface attack capability. As it happens we have 17 frigates now.
We didn’t only lose Type 21s in the Falklands. We also lost Type 42s and they we supposed to be our AAW ships.
“As it happens we have 17 frigates now.”
That is a cold war legacy if anything can be defined as such, due to the need to hold the G-I-UK gap against Soviet subs hell-bent in sinking Operation Reforger.
Now, we need high end ASW to escort CVF or ATG.
I would be amazed if options for vertical launch system for Tomahawk, SCALP or a modified GMLRS. Harpoon and a 155mm main gun are taken up.
If any ship-of-the-line requires or would most benefit from a 155mm gun then it would be C2.
I like playing fantasy navy as much as anybody but as fun as it is saying we need a dozen of these and some of those extra it won’t happen. Defence reviews aren’t about making our armed forces leaner and meaner to meet future defence needs. (Apart from ‘planes where is the real difference in the A-stan campaign now and the ones in the 19th century?)
Reviews are about reducing budgets and that is all.
What we have seen since the end of the Cold War is the invasion of the defence sphere by commercial business practices. Defence is an insurance policy and we live in a “safe” world so we can cut back on our premiums, supposedly! Also though peace movements like CND have also suffered due to the end of the Cold War. These movements have become anachronistic because also because our governments seem to have a more socialist outlook when it comes to security. Frigates are built to protect jobs and not to protect the country as war is bad (tell us something we don’t know.) Physical security takes a back seat to social security; even though without the former the latter will never be achieved. Collective public knowledge is at a low. But even worse our “political masters” seem to have even less understanding; this is despite all the junkets MPs get to Salisbury Plain and Thursday Wars. I shall overlook the influence of industry.
What I would like to see in October is the T26 scrap and replaced with orders for 2 more Darings. And the 100million that was to be wasted on design of these ships (which seems to take longer than in the ’30′s despite all the hi-tech computer aided design) to kitting out Darings with Harpoon, a CIWS, and giving Merlin an ASM capability. I would like to see civi’ subcontractors given the boot so RN specialist had to be used shore side. Hopefully this would aid retention and save money. I would like to see this happen even it meant “the Fleet” spent less time at sea. Echoing views below I would scupper deployments like WIGS (or whatever it is called this week;) it is absolutely stupid to send a frigate for these duties and it is equally stupid sending an RFA tanker (a force multiplier.) It would make more sense to deploy to the Indian Ocean………….
link to the actual paper, and not only the ‘press release’:
http://www.rusi.org/downloads/assets/blackhamprins.pdf
Thanks for that GVG, I should have linked to the PDF directly, it is on the press release!
my own response to this latest RUSI paper:
http://jedibeeftrix.wordpress.com/2010/08/23/britain%E2%80%99s-future-strategic-direction-12-%E2%80%93-naval-deterrence-presence/
It is quite clear RN will not be getting PC. Without a second carrier to worry about, less high-end escorts are needed. In fact, 2 of the last T45s can be sold off and used for cheaper vessels. The French really have the right idea by canceling the last two Horizons and going for the much cheaper FREMM. Costs on Aquitaine are dropping 25% which will allow MN to boost their orders.
Outside of the MOD there seems to be a clear consensus that a key pillar to our future defence is a balanced and well funded Royal Navy. I sincerely hope that both the MOD and Admiralty have come to the same view and have the boldness (and room for manoeuvre in these austere times) to make it a reality.
Yes we do need a two tier navy. The top tier must include both carriers even if we cannot afford the latest aircraft to put on them, that can come later if need be. We need around 16 high end T45 and T26 escorts with top end ASW / AAW / ASuW capabilities to these protect assets and other amphibious capability. Also, we need submarine force of at least 6, to assist in this fleet protection and also add to the offensive capabilities with their cruise missiles. This is our “big stick” in the world.
In my view, what we do not need are high end T26s which are flexible combat ships. To pretend that these are ever going to be built in numbers which would mean that they were not tied up on escort duties for the top tier navy is madness. Keeping the design of the T26 to this key purpose will ensure that they are effective in their primary role and should save money.
We need a navy of 30+ surface combatants to ensure that we can meet our worldwide commitments and have some backup when things go wrong (they always do). Therefore, in my view we need also around 16 light frigates which are flexible general purpose vessels capable of operating independently for long durations. The base configuration for these obviously needs to be cheap, though not so cheap as to put our forces at unacceptable risk. They also need scalable so they can be upgraded in time of a major crisis. The worldwide market is awash with £100 mil to £200 mil vessels that fit this role (probably at a 1/3 of the cost that a C2 will end up being) and should not be beyond the great naval design and construction skills this country still has.
You will note that I have not mentioned OPVs yet; yes they do have a place in a balanced fleet but only for specific tasks such as the coastal patrol of the UK. In my view, they are not and never will be serious war fighting vessels.
Anything less than this then it’s time to consign ourselves to be a regional European power, the tools for which are very different from the ones I describe.
Armand
The French and Italian Navies have considerably different needs than the Royal Navy, which is why the common frigate program fell apart in the first place.
The RN will operate primarily without land based aircover, wheres the FN operates primarily with land based air cover.
For me if I am forced to play fantasy navy ASW FREMM is the way to go over redesigning the wheel yet again. Merlin capable, Aster 15 missiles, and heck I would even buy the Otobreda 127/64 instead of throwing more money at BAE. I would want 8 frigates to match 8 T45. As long as we could have some 4 AIP SSK and a Mistral (which means we could have 2 ARG with 1 ASS, 1 LPD, & 2 Bays.)
Somebody said 6 submarines. Economics suggests that submarines are best purchase in multiples of 4. It is interesting to note that when HMG bought Polaris the plan was for 5 boats to keep one at sea all the time. Even with 2 crews per boat and 4 boats it still quite achievement for the RN to keep the deterrent patrol permanently at sea. Submarines are scarily complicated things.
PS: BAE,for the love of Neptune, how long does it take develop a 6inch gun?
I’m not a naval expert but more cuts feel intuitively wrong. Still, this game is like Thunderbirds, “Anything can happen in the next half hour.”
Step forward Iran and the Straits of Hormuz. As you know, the two sea lanes, one in and one out, which are both two miles wide and carry significant amounts of oil each day could easily be disrupted by the Iranians should Israel attack their nuclear facilities. That’s why we have minesweepers there.
If an “event,” was to occur, and we’re into the likely timing zone for such an “event,” then such would be the impact on the oil price and the subsequent economic impairment for the West then there would be an reappraisal of our sea power, or lack of it, in quick time.
Quite something though, when we have to rely on a geopolitical and economic shock for commonsense to prevail……….. just as it did post Falklands.
DominicJ said “The RN will operate primarily without land based aircover, wheres the FN operates primarily with land based air cover.”
True up to a point. Interesting though that the French have Europe’s only full sized carrier equipped with Europe’s only purpose built carrier aircraft. While the Italians have their Harriers fitted with RADAR unlike the British Harriers that are mere mud movers………..
Hunk Of Junk
I believe the SoH is a bit of a red herring.
The Oil states would likely consider it an existential attack and retaliate with everything they have.
Which in Saudi alone means a variety F15/16/Tornado/Typhoon numbering close to 400.
They cant occupy Iran, but they can bomb it until the most advanced piece of technology is the horse shoe.
If they decide to wreck Iran every powerstation could be destroyed in the first few hours.
If they “just” hit the gas network, the death toll would likely reach a million in the first winter.
X
True enough.
But lack of Radar Harriers was a recent political decision to cut costs and the cancellation of the full sized carrier was a historic cost cutting measure.
The RN has never said it doesnt want a full sized carrier operating air superiority fighters.
DominicJ said “But lack of Radar Harriers was a recent political decision to cut costs and the cancellation of the full sized carrier was a historic cost cutting measure.
The RN has never said it doesn’t want a full sized carrier operating air superiority fighters.”
Yes, I know all that. And what you said leads us back to the whole thrust of this in that our government since WW2 hasn’t placed any importance on the “sea.”
Though it could be said that even in these days of ubiquitous “air power” there are some admirals (and generals too) who are as air blind.
DominicJ said “If they “just” hit the gas network, the death toll would likely reach a million in the first winter.”
Better still hit the cracking towers at their refineries. Even though are one of the largest oil exporters they still need significant imports of refined petroleum goods.
And I agree with you that going to war doesn’t mean you have to occupy the place.
@ Armand
“It is quite clear RN will not be getting PC. Without a second carrier to worry about, less high-end escorts are needed. In fact, 2 of the last T45s can be sold off and used for cheaper vessels. The French really have the right idea by canceling the last two Horizons and going for the much cheaper FREMM. Costs on Aquitaine are dropping 25% which will allow MN to boost their orders.”
I’m not sure that it is clear at all, but if one is cancelled then it will be because a land based doctrine has been selected, similar to Global Guardian.
I personally feel that France was wrong to stop at two Horizon’s, as it means the unit cost will be massive, and FREMM can never hope to wield the same AAW capability.
Regarding fleet defence, I think the RN has shot itself in the foot over this. IT justified the loss of the SHAR stating the T45 was capable of defending the fteet with its state of the art systems, it then grudging admitted it could do the job with only 6 T45s. I can see the reasury saying “Why do you need fighters on the CVF if you have coped up until now, surely you only need attack and ISTAR platforms?”
As for the T26 I can easily see it becomming more in line with the C2 platform than C1 due to the need for cheap and cheerful platforms for the majority of roles not requireing High End capbilities. In future I can see the T26 becoming the core of a C1 platform.
“Why do you need fighters on the CVF if you have coped up until now, surely you only need attack and ISTAR platforms?”
The primary purpose of CVF is strike, but its a bit of a non issue anyway as there is no candidate for a CVF airgroup that isn’t also a competent air-defence plane, i.e. has a radar and medium range AAM’s.
About the second comment i am a little confused…….. but the name doesn’t matter at all.
If platform x receives the 2087 sonar and EH101 from decommissioning T23′s then it is a high end and specialised ASW platform.
If it gets a lynx and a bow mounted sonar it is effectively a C2 – a choke-point frigate with an appropriately cheap price-tag.
You are correct regarding the airgroup but I am worried that the Treasury might use this as leverage against the MoD when it comes to numbers and what weapons are integrated.
Regarding the C2 you have actually clarified my point. Initial C2s would be the latter configuration but space allocated for future growth and the hanger could accept a Merlin. These are the intial by followed by units fitted with hand me downs from the T23. They will still be more affordable than a dedicated platform and share maximum commonality wiith the “Choke Point” variant. I see the C2 being built with a fair amount of empty space so they could be as large as a T45 but have far more frugal systems initially. AS the funding situation improves then batches could become more capable but not at the cost of numbers.
I suppose we should be slightly glad that someone connected with the Navy ( V Admiral Blackham – joint author of the paper) concedes that the navy should be looking at cheaper equipment options. But the concession is grudging given among underlying protestations of underfunding. Bernard Gray’s assessment that one third of the current budget has been effectively wasted is acknowledged, but seemingly no blame for that falls on the navy!
Actually, it’s not beyond dispute that the navy is underfunded. In the 15 years between 2003 and 2018, assuming projects currently underway are completed, the navy will receive the T45 programme, the Astute programme, two major air craft carriers and a fleet of aircraft. Not a bad haul. If the numbers are down it’s not unrelated to the fact that the ticket price on all these items is considerable.
Yes, the frigate and destroyer fleet is much depleted and all of us would wish something be done to reverse that sorry state of affairs. Unfortunately, in our finance constrained world, a rough tote up of the numbers suggests we will not see any new surface combatants for a good long time yet – the T45 deliveries are still to be paid for, the carriers are being built with outlay falling all the way through to 2018 at least, I’m not sure of the duration and size of the Astute programme but there are some years still to pay for that. Around the end of the decade there will be an outlay dwarfing everything that has gone before to purchase the JSF. Then there is Trident. If the navy effectively has to meet one third of the cost of Trident as well I’d guess that that is the navy’s major equipment budget spent out to somewhere potentially as far away as 2025. 2025 therefore becomes the date we might first expect to see a new surface combatant enter service.
So debating what that future combatant might be is probably premature. More to the point is how the existing fleet is going to be preserved until a replacement arrives?
“but its a bit of a non issue anyway as there is no candidate for a CVF airgroup that isn’t also a competent air-defence plane, i.e. has a radar and medium range AAM’s.”
I was thinking exactly that, however…
Is there a reason why F35′s couldnt be bought without Radar?
Blue Circle Radar jumps to mind…
Or with a much cheaper one?
“Is there a reason why F35′s couldnt be bought without Radar?”
nope.
too much of the utility of F35 derives from its sensor-fusion.
DominicJ – what would be the point of buying a UK only version of F35 without radar ? It certainly would not be cheap enough to warrant it.
Anyway, ref the RUSI paper, I know they are trying to build up the GP surface fleet, but they do not mention ‘sweating’ our other assets for standing taskings.
If we had 2 x LPD (Albion class) 4 x ALSA (Bay class) plus 2 x LPH as replacement for Ocean, then you could easily use them for example as:
1 x Bay with Helo shelter and Lynx – West Indies Guard Ship (or whatever its called these days) with RHIBS in the well deck for anti-drup running ops and various supplies plus some engineering kit in the garage this would be ideal during the hurricane season.
1 x Albion as TF Command ship for Anti-piracy ops off Somalia, again with a well deck full of RHIBS (and hovercraft ?)
(note, both of the above have been done before)
1 x LPH on Atlantic (South) station, exercising with Brazil etc,
With a second Bay class available in UK waters for RM training etc. Of course all these assets could steam to wherever required for any amphibous ops if need be.
Finally if ‘high end’ is to be limited to 6 x T45 and 8 x T26 (based on T45) then T26 should retain SAMSON and Aster 15 (and maybe even Ater 30 ?) as well as providing the ‘sea frame’ for the T2087 towed array. With only 6 x T45 they are never going to be used as general purpose ‘singletons’ on patrol stations, so why not remove the 4.5inch and just fit a 76mm super-rapid – it could provide another layer of close in air defence.
However as the RUSI paper discusses ‘sea control’ in the context of (non-nuclear) deterence ALL surface combatants MUST carry at least 8 x Harpoon or its replacement (should we invest in the new Japanese supersonic ASM that is currently in test?)
The T45 has been designed for more ‘sea hours’ – it has great accomodation, and modern kit should be much more easy on the maintenance requirements, plus there are maintenance innovations in the hull itself. As the RUSI paper mentions the Absalon, lets fantasize that 12 Absalons provide the C2, plus 14 T45/T26 based on the T45 hull.
We could still cover an awful lot of operational tasking with 26 such surface combatants, that are built to spend more time at sea – perhaps the standard deployment being stretched from 6 to 8 or 9 months (with a 3 week maint. period in the middle for 1 weeks leave at home). Plus we would have enough hulls to build protective Task Forces around a CV and Amphib group if we needed to.
By the way I dont see any potential C3 flottilla helping out with this sea going political deterence role. If you build 6 as Ocean going / deployable MCM (Hunt Class replacement), plus say 4 to replace OPV, and 2 to replace Survey ships, then thats how they are going to be used. You could surge a MCM roled C3 into a patrol role in emergency, but you can’t keep doing it or they MCM specialists will loose currency in their skills. So I see a common hull type providing through life cost savings from commonality of kit, training etc but I don’t see them taking up the slack on ‘global policing’ roles.
If the principle job for a specialised ASW/AAW warship is to escort HVA’s such as carriers and amphibs then I am not sure I see much utility in having slightly more of one than the other, the same, or 50% more, or double even, but if we can manage with six T45 to carry out those duties we should be able to manage with six T26 provided they have enough individual capability.
If six T45 isn’t enough, then the same goes for the T26.
Put two ASW EH101′s on a T26 and it should be able to competently escort a task-force against submarine threats between its 2087 set and two dipping sonars.
I can accept the argument that more T26′s might be needed because they have an additional core role over escorting task-forces, i.e. they are needed to sanitise the entry and exits points for deployed SSBN’s.
However in this instance, i would rather leave that job to the MRA4′s, as this permits the retention of long-range maritime recognisances.
The additional benefit being that not buying those two extra T26′s allows one to buy four extra cheap absalon style craft.
re the C3, i accept your argument, but the new MCM capability will have to deploy from some platform, so either buy more C3 or chop down low-threat tasks accordingly.
JBT said: “If six T45 isn’t enough, then the same goes for the T26.”
Well I would agree and say that in my own RN experience, 8 would be a minimum size for any class, BUT I was working within the realistic financial constraints that appear to have things set in stone – so we only get 6 x T45 because that is what has been ordered so far.
JBT also said: ” if we can manage with six T45 to carry out those duties we should be able to manage with six T26 provided they have enough individual capability” – well there is of course some logic to that, but I am basing the number on the fact that we have purchased 8 x Sonar T2087 towed array sets. To me this means a minimum of 10 Type 26, so that vessels in deep maintenance / refit can pass their set onto another vessel, however that might not be as easy as it sounds – so, 8 towed arrays means 8 T26.
I can assure you that one towed array ship, and 2 Merlins (none of which may be available at a given time due to maintenance emergencies, weather, ‘action damage’ etc) is NOT enough to screen even a small task force from a submarine threat. Convergence zones for towed arrays, the usual thermals and other oceanic conditions etc mean you need multiple ASW vessels deployed in different positions around the HVU’s. Think of concentric circles or zones (just like AAW in this respect). The Merlins are gonna get a lot of flight hours and expend a LOT of sono-bouys…..!!
However if el-cheapo C2 is Absalon based or of similar size, it too can carry two each of Merlin “dippers” – BUT again we have the caveat that only so many Merlins (22 ?) are to be upgraded to HM2. El-cheapo GP escort can of course also have MOTS bow mounted active/passive sonar for close range use (and shipboard TT’s for Stingray).
So while you might get 2 or 3 (4 ?) El-cheapo C2 (Absalon) for the price of a T26, you will not have enough dedicated ASW dippers to fly from all those flight deck spots. By the way the Lynx, even in Wildcat mode, is NOT an ASW helo, it just a delivery system for torpedo’s under close control of its mothership, on who’s sonar it must rely.
Finally there could be the added AAW boone of a T45 based T26 carrying SAMSON and Aster 15 versus ARTEMIS radar and CAMM for point defence on the El-cheapo frigate
“I can assure you that one towed array ship, and 2 Merlins (none of which may be available at a given time due to maintenance emergencies, weather, ‘action damage’ etc) is NOT enough to screen even a small task force from a submarine threat.”
Ah, coolo, that is what i was aiming at when talking about having either same number as T45, fifty percent more, or twice as many.
If the intention is to have a carrier group and an ARG, with a single T45 to be tasked to each, then you would appear to be saying that the kind of environment a carrier enters will require at least two T26′s to provide a decent ASW screen, with the ARG perhaps needing only one given the low-threat environments its likely to operate off, e.g. west african coast.
This would set the baseline up to nine, to keep three on station, and back to the tenth if we consider deep refit.
The alternative is that we give up the means to generate a separate carrier group and ARG, because we can only protect one or the other with less than nine T26′s…….
As the the C2 and lynx, no, i wasn’t expecting them to be subhunters.
I was leaving it up to basic self defence insomuch as a bow sonar, with the ability to deploy a merlin ASW heli if the situation required.
Many thanks.
“Finally there could be the added AAW boone of a T45 based T26 carrying SAMSON and Aster 15 versus ARTEMIS radar and CAMM for point defence on the El-cheapo frigate”
A lot of the cost of a T45 apparently rests within Sampson and Pamms, so i wouldn’t expect to see this in a T26.
I can easily see the cost effectiveness of equipping T45 with CEC, and T26 with Aster 15 in addition to a cheap fire control system.
If we really don’t have enough T45, and i think everyone recognises that we dont, then this would be a great force multiplier.
with six T45 and nine T26 the carrier group would have the following:
AAW –
T45
> T26
> T26
ASW –
T26
T26
> C2 (with merlin)
likewise the ARG would have the following:
AAW –
T45
> T26
ASW –
T26
> C2 (with merlin)
With that I could just about see it being possible to sustain a separate carrier group and ARG.
thoughts?
““Finally there could be the added AAW boone of a T45 based T26 carrying SAMSON and Aster 15 versus ARTEMIS radar and CAMM for point defence on the El-cheapo frigate”
A lot of the cost of a T45 apparently rests within Sampson and Pamms, so i wouldn’t expect to see this in a T26.”
Perhaps not SAMPSON but why not SPECTAR rather than ARTISAN for Type 26.
http://www.janes.com/articles/Janes-Radar-and-Electronic-Warfare-Systems/SPECTAR-multifunction-naval-radar-United-Kingdom.html
If Sylver A50 VLS is certified for quad packed CAAM this would enable T26 so fitted to carry Aster 30/CAAMM mix (in the AAW role) and conversely, T45 to carry CAAMM/Aster 30 instead of Aster 15/30 increasing number of missiles carried.
Also if ISD for T26 is assumed to be 2020 or thereabouts, then why assume 2087 will be chosen ASW sonar. It will be 10+ years old.
I was wondering when Spectre would be suggested, it is a perennial ‘bloom’ over at Warships1.
I am not against the idea, but it comes down to a cost trade of between it an Artisan………
As to 2087 and its future beyond the refitted T23′s; it is highly capable already and i’m not sure that there is the will to sink more development budget immediately into a new ASW suite, i may be wrong, but i believe it more likely that it will receive incremental updates with a possible replacement in the late twenties, much as the 23′s are being refitted with 2087 today.
To all those who decry the low quantity of frigates/destroyers:
You should look at this in the context of either the Lisbon Treaty or North Atlantic Treaty alliance.
A frigate is a kind of basic building block for a navy – an aircraft carrier isn’t.
The Dutch navy has six modern frigates.
Norway has five AEGIS ships.
The Spanish Navy has four AEGIS ships and a small carrier – but they won’t sail on their own against a powerful opponent.
The German Navy has seven modern frigates.
The Italian Navy is in a similar situation as the Spanish one; a small aircraft carrier, five AEGIS ships.
Doctrine compatibility, interpreters, data link compatibility and generally many free-play (even life fire) exercises with these allied fleets to minimise friction might be more important for the RN’s effectiveness in war than the whole Type 45 class.
there is no doubt that NATO task-forces will play an important role in the future, more important in collective effect that Britain’s naval forces alone, but if a nation does not have complete confidence that a military response its deems essential won’t be treated as ‘discretionary’ by its allies then it needs to possess sovereign force.
If there is that lack of complete trust, for whatever reason, and the capability lies within grasp then it is only sensible to retain sovereign capability, which in this case means sufficient escorts to transit a HVA to its theatre of operation.
Sven, doctrine is largely similar within all NATO nations, English is the language of the sea, all NATO ships use the same data links and there are plenty of exercises
Admin – I fully agree / concur with your resonse to Sven.
Jason – why fit T2087 to the T26 – because in my fantasy land the T26 is just a modded T45 and the drumbeat of shipbuilding we see the first modules being built before the last T45 is launched. There are many practical reasons why retiring the T23 earlier (i.e. closer to its actual design life) would be a good idea, but of course the 4 x T22BIII would go first.
Bryan McGrath has waded in with some comments on the RUSI paper over at InformationDissemination and one of his comments got me to thinking: Admin, do we need a post on Missile Defence ?
We (as in UK / Europe / NATO) are relying on the USA for anti-ballistic missile defence, principally relying on an number of specially equipped AEGIS cruisers / destroyers. It has been written that the T45 PAAMS has anti-ballistic missile tracking capabilities, but that we need an Aster 45 with a bigger booster to actually shoot at incoming ballistic missiles. SO, would we be better off spending more on T45′s for ballistic missile defence instead of replacing the SSBN based deterrent ???
“Bryan McGrath has waded in with some comments on the RUSI paper over at InformationDissemination and one of his comments got me to thinking: Admin, do we need a post on Missile Defence ?”
Missile defence is one of the core missions being considered for the new NATO doctrine:
http://jedibeeftrix.wordpress.com/2010/05/18/britain%E2%80%99s-future-strategic-direction-8-%E2%80%93-what-should-our-nato-allies-expect-of-us/
A few scattered thoughts
Have we given up on actively destroying the enemies submarine capacity?
I would have thought a likely none discretionary war task force would be launched in two waves anyway.
The Carrier group first, the amphibious group second.
The carrier group is always ready to deploy whereas the landing force has to be organised and embarked, and the carrier has to reduce the enemy defences before the landings can commence anyway.
That also leaves the question, can a combined Carrier/Amphib fleet be protected by fewer 26′s than two seperate fleets?
Thats got a bit lost.
Should we be thinking in terms of protecting our assets or sinking theirs?
Numbers are tricky.
I still think we should be thinking in terms of the T45′s receiving the kit they were designed with, so harpoon and the bow sonar, and a towed one if that can be done.
The T26 can then be a T45 without the £500mn radar and possibly with a better ASW kit.
12 hulls would allow 4 “actives”, two with high end AAW, two with low end AAW, two with high end ASW, two with low end ASW.
Any sloops attached the fleet are then extra groovey bits.
1. “I still think we should be thinking in terms of the T45′s receiving the kit they were designed with, so harpoon and the bow sonar, and a towed one if that can be done.
The T26 can then be a T45 without the £500mn radar and possibly with a better ASW kit.”
2. “12 hulls would allow 4 “actives”, two with high end AAW, two with low end AAW, two with high end ASW, two with low end ASW.”
3. “Any sloops attached the fleet are then extra groovey bits.”
4. “Should we be thinking in terms of protecting our assets or sinking theirs?”
1. I agree about bow-sonar and harpoon, the cost difference is i believe more than £500 however, as PAMMS if extremely expensive in addition to Sampson itself.
2. Essentially what i am suggesting, but I like the self-reinforcing nature to the two types, provide CEC and allow the T26′s to network into the T45 sonar, and vice versa allow the T45′s to treat the 26′s as handily positioned Aster silo’s for its PAMMS suite.
3. Just to clarify, i don’t consider C2 a sloop, and i see it as a standalone vessel whose harpoons and gun allow it to provide a picket duty when with a task-group.
4. This is where MPA4 and Astute are particularly relevant.
Ouch, BMD! Will get very interesting, once the Iranians got their bomb. I bet, out of six T45s, two will be used as stationary BMD-assets covering London.
Back to topic; I think the writers have made a fair amount of good arguments. But – again – same failure at the last page. No vision how to fix shipbuilding and defence inflation, just some we-need-this-and-that-numbers, which look good on paper.
Isn’t adding vessels to papersheets instead of fleet-bases the problem?
Why, oh why, is it so impossible to beef up the T23-design, adding some stealthy bells and whistles, replacing the costly VLS in front of the bridge with module-space to accomodate CAMM-containers, pay £200-400m (dunno how to give a realistic number), requiring 25 or better 30 years service life? Build one each year, two if a surge is needed, and the problem is gone. And if extra funds are available in a particular FY, convert the aft section to something UXVish.
Brings me to another point. What is the current annular shipbuilding budget? Any ideas?
McZ said: “Why, oh why, is it so impossible to beef up the T23-design, adding some stealthy bells and whistles, replacing the costly VLS in front of the bridge with module-space to accomodate CAMM-containers, pay £200-400m (dunno how to give a realistic number), requiring 25 or better 30 years service life?”
So your just keeping the hull ? The hull plus the current machinery fit ??
Its all OLD – how much will it cost to redisgn the hull from an 18 year service life to 30 years ? You may as well design something new in the first place. Also accomodation is way behind that of the T45, smaller crews on longer deployments need better living spaces (its a retention thing).
Of course if we are to takle defence inflation in anyway at all, stop spending on design, and either:
1. Mod the T45 for the C1 / T26
2. Buy “off the shelf” for the C2 – Absalon or FREMM for example.
Been too busy of late to really dip into this thread until now — it’s been like that redhaired girl at school (lifelong fascination there, just ask my ginger half-Scots wife) you couldn’t work up the nerve to talk to but wished to fondly. For right now, just a preliminary comment before I come back to the thrust of what folks have been saying here.
First, loved the paper. While I might not have agreed with every single detail it was a model of clarity and purpose, and a real gem compared to the combinations of unfocused yearning and newspaper-feed fluff one gets a lot about where to go with the RN at this pass. Several fist-the-air moments too. Paging Sir Jeremy (perhaps even more than Lord West) for dusting off the First Lordship of the Admiralty? (Might be nice to bring back some of those jobs as non-politicals, interlocutors between the vote-grubbers and the cap-badgers.)
Second, it’s very interesting to me how the RN at the moment seem to be not simply “prisoners of the past” but much more specifically prisoners of the recent past. Hop in the TARDIS a moment (though you have to go to the crabs to get one
and come back to the end of the Sixties, after the RN’s worst defeat, possibly, since Beachy Head in 1690, the death of CVA-01. That, plus the growth of the Soviet fleet, collapsed several trend lines and ended a period of no less than two hundred seventy-five years (since the post-Beachy Head victories up to that moment) when the Royal Navy was either the first or the second most powerful fleet on the planet. Dazed, and also trying to keep up with a potential Third World War seascape where surface capital ships were nuke targets and Soviet subs would be death to American reinforcements, they came up with a procurement plan. Wikipedia does a nice reproduction in their “Type 22 Frigate” article which I’ll crib quickly:
- An ASW cruiser with helos for punch (the roots of the Vincis, of course)
- An air-defence ship, labeled a destroyer, to become Type 42 (“let’s do it right this time” gives us a handful of Type 45s, anyone?)
- A big-boned, destroyer-sized ASW frigate with room for lots of useful gear and adaptation to general-purpose, as Type 22 (the gold-plated fudge of Type 26, anyone?)
- A cheap-and-cheerful patrol frigate on commercial lines, as Type 21 (various C2/3 notions?)
So, basically, the RN are playing out an over-specialised, 40-year-old procurement plan, based on having a lot of over-taxed line of battle escorts on a variety of stations (some make a lot of sense, others are like claiming lordship of Calais while you should be paying attention to that big ocean behind you that you can now navigate.) And they’ve over-specialized (and so, in terrible English, “over-project-ized” as well as overengineered — created too many procurement processes that a handful of contractors can spin overcharges out of) ships for the wrong purposes. And they’ve been willing to trade them off in batches to get the carriers, which are vitally important because any sane opponent not stuck in a desert now knows “make sure you deny your high-tech Western foes any airfields,” mostly just so they can look butch to the USN and let Sir Caspar John (the charismatic 1SL who resigned in the good fight for CVA-01) rest in his grave.
There’s a bright and necessary future for the RN, and that ain’t it. I like what the paper ahd to say and I’ll try to come back to engaging with our lot here about where to go.
Admin,
Yes, boss, (hangs head) I’ll write a piece about it if you twist my arm — they sell arm-twisters at the Sapper Store don’t they
Another scattered thought.
If we have a General Purpose Warship fleet for the not really military standing deployments, do we need an In/Out/ShakeItAllAbout mix for the specialist ships?
We only have two Capital Fleets (1xQE 1xAlbion 2xBay), so why do we need three escort fleets?
If the GPW handles constabulary 365 days a year, we need three ships, but if all the high end warfighters do is escort the carriers to a full blown war, could they not be cut to two fleets?
As for Ballistic Missiles
A Ballistic Missile with eight independant warheads costs as much as four interceptor missiles.
You need eight interceptors, at least, to intercept eight warheads.
Until there is a new technology that alters that balance, its almost always going to be better to retaliate than defend.
jackstaff – “Yes, boss, (hangs head) I’ll write a piece about it if you twist my arm — they sell arm-twisters at the Sapper Store don’t they
”
I’d be very interested to read that.
DominicJ – “If we have a General Purpose Warship fleet for the not really military standing deployments, do we need an In/Out/ShakeItAllAbout mix for the specialist ships?”
The choke-point frigate (GP) are entirely engaged with standing tasks, the only one that could be considered ‘free’ is the fleet ready escort, and that is really a ready reserve, one warship.
Not quite sure what you mean re. In/Out/ShakeItAllAbout mix for the specialist ships….?
Sorry, Sleep/Caffene deprived and rather ill.
If all the “Standing” tasks are met by three General Purpose Frigate Fleets of 8 C2/3, on a one (Fleet) in work up, one on station, one in work down mix can we then have a Fourth Fleet, consisting of 1 QE, 1 Albion, 2 Bay, 2 T45+, 2 T26+, and a Fifth Fleet consisting of the same.
That would allow 4 T45′s with PAAMS, Harpoon, Bow Sonar and 4 T26′s with harpoon, bow sonar and towed sonar.
We dont need a third expeditionary fleet because, well we dont have the carrier even if we have the escorts, but the escorts arent deployed all the time, or any time.