Contents
Part 2 – The Disappointment of SDR (1998)
Defence reviews have a habit of only coming round every change of government. This simple piece of information should be taken as an immediate pointer to the nature of defence reviews: they are a statement of political intent. A review of both the likely threats and the current and future capacities to deal with those threats are a necessary add-on, but clearly of secondary importance.
Nevertheless, on first reading, the Strategic Defence Review published in July 1998 appeared to be a very solid document that had made a genuine and honest assessment of the political, security and defence situation. Moreover, it also appeared to have been produced by a genuine collaboration between the civilian politicians and the uniformed staff to arrive at a coherent and workable strategy to deal with future military challenges. It certainly had its flaws, but it was a very welcome document that seemed to tick all the right boxes.
Less than 12 months had passed before it became abundantly clear that the document was nothing but hot air. If not an outright attempt to deceive, it was certainly a clever piece of political spin. Events quickly proved that the document was more a conflation of two statements – one by New Labour and one by Chiefs of Staff – than collaboration to effect common strategy. And it wasn’t just the politics that was spun, the military element also proved to be little more than a coat of gloss to hide the rot beneath.
Bold statements I know, so I’d better put some meat on those bones. Why? Because the SDR 1998 (and subsequent add-ons) provide a perfect picture of what’s wrong at the heart of defence policy, strategy and planning. We could learn a great deal from it.
Back to the Good Points
With the decline of the Empire, British military might had been concentrated in Northern Europe and the North Atlantic. Step by step, the UK armed forces were subsumed into a multi-national attempt to prevent the Soviet Red Army marching eastwards. Even by the early-70s, what little out of area capabilities that remained were legacies from an earlier period – allowed to wither away completely as platform life expired or burned out (literally as in the case of HMS Eagle!). British defence was predisposed to achieving two simple goals: delay the Red Army on the North German Plain; and, keep the North Atlantic sea-lanes open for US reinforcement. Unfortunately, the US had other ideas and developed tactical nuclear strike capabilities and doctrine that would allow an end to hostilities without having to expend too great an effort in resources and manpower – at the expense of a few European cities!!!
Once the Soviet Union collapsed, the UK armed forces were left in a bit of a quandary: all tooled up to fight an enemy that no longer existed. What to do? The entire 90s were a period of complete stagnation and drift. Iraq and Yugoslavia kept them occupied, but at the same time also exposed and highlighted their internal weaknesses. Virtually the entire Army was robbed to place two ‘triangular’ (and bandaged) brigades into the Gulf with modern equipment. Had they needed to be replaced in the front-line, scratch formations of tired Chieftains and FV430 APCs were next up. Thankfully, they were not required. The RAF’s main strike aircraft had to be quickly re-roled from the very mission it was doctrinally built around. And the RN, the alleged prime mover in power projection beyond UK shores, was hardly the key asset in securing an Iraqi climb-down.
In Yugoslavia, the Army had major problems supporting just two small battle groups, whilst maintaining ‘deployment harmony guidelines’, on an enduring, open-ended, peace support mission. The RAF and RN were found wanting in their ability provide credible support to those meagre ground forces.
Both examples show major structural weakness in the Armed Forces regardless of political restrictions that may have hampered their performance. The Conservative government singularly failed to provide political direction and the military chiefs were more interested in their own internal turf wars. It was left to the opposition, New Labour, to pick up the baton and to provide both the political direction and the imperative/urgency to the military to get their house in order.
Coming to power in 1997, the new government did not divulge its political intent with undue haste. It appeared to consult widely and sensibly and thus published its Strategic Defence Review sensibly in July 1998. It publically – and honestly – stated that there was no longer any practical (military) threat to UK territory or sovereign independence This gave them a blank page on which to craft a defence (and security) policy around all UK interests – there was no longer any need to put all their eggs into the anti-Soviet basket.
New Labour grasped this opportunity with open arms and, rather than simply cutting the military to the bone as some anticipated, developed their ideology of foreign intervention and being a “force for good”. The military had a new purpose for which it needed new doctrine, strategy and – to the obvious delight of the military staff – new equipment.
The SDR document laid it all out in a simple and understandable manner – albeit padded by plenty of fluff. Politically, the UK was to remain firmly aligned with the US, NATO and the EU and was to encourage even greater military cooperation with these partners. At the same time, it was going to form expeditionary forces that could perform a multitude of tasks ranging from disaster relief, through peace support to putting the stick about occasionally to bring undesirables into line. Of course, this was all to be done from a firm position on the moral high-ground.
For their part, the military staff put together a coherent plan to restructure the forces then available to best tackle those political demands, and to lay out what equipment and strategy would be required in the future to even better perform the given tasks. Relatively minor alterations were made to core structures with the emphasis being placed on acquiring the logistical capacity to support these potential far off and enduring missions. But on the whole, it was hardly a bold reorganisation or reform and very little was surrendered by the services in the way of numbers, equipment or control – especially for the Army and the RAF. The RN, however, were a little more forward looking and were prepared to make immediate sacrifices in existing platform numbers with the promise of the future arrival of two new, huge ‘fleet’ carriers.
But, what was perhaps the most gratifying from the document was the apparent cooperation between the uniformed and the non-uniformed in laying out publically the manner and extent to which UK forces would be deployed and engaged. It truly looked like there had been an attempt to match what the politicians wanted to do with what the military could do – and agreement found in the middle.
Oh how we were all mistaken and the doubters and critics proven right
Where it All went Wrong
SDR 1998 clearly laid out the scale of operations that the military would be able to contemplate based upon its size and resources: namely, a “large scale” (ie division sized force) high intensity operation OR two concurrent “medium scale” (ie brigade sized force) operations with only one being, temporarily, of high intensity. Please note the capitalised ‘OR’. A “very large scale” or “full scale” effort would only be made where the UK itself, or a NATO ally, was under direct attack and the forces would be deployed in the tradition hunting grounds of the North German Plain.
Neither the Kosovo Albanian people, nor the insurgent cum terrorist organisation Kosovo Liberation Army, were NATO members or allies of the UK. Their plight may well have caused sympathy in the UK, but it was hardly crucial to UK interests let alone defence. Nevertheless, the UK government was prepared to make available virtually the entire British Army as a battering ram up the Kacanik Pass to ‘liberate’ Kosovo. At the political level, both 1st and 3rd Divisions were offered for the assault, as well as 5 Airborne and 3 Commando brigades. Fortunately, this force was not required.
Less than 12 months after SDR 1998 was published, the fundamental planning assumptions were ignored and effectively cast aside. New Labour were willing to rubber stamp a deployment at almost “full scale” – not to secure UK sovereignty or even crucial interests – but for the personal gratification of Tony Blair’s sofa committee. SDR 1998, as a guiding document was dead in the water. Just about every policy document related to military affairs subsequently produced – of which there were many – barely considered military effect; there were nothing more than political fluff.
It’s difficult to find a period since 1999 that the military has ever been within those planning assumptions!
Kosovo 1999 also showed the vast weaknesses in the military structure and capabilities extant. The relatively minor structural changes to a “balanced force structure” and the creation of an “operational cycle” across 6 similar brigades were stillborn. Various cap badges were more interested in preserving their own territory and tradition that creating an army fit for purpose. Still, the very concepts of ‘pairing’ brigades in a “balanced force structure” and the “operational cycle” were the main flaws of the military element of SDR 1998 as Op Telic 1 was to demonstrate. Almost 5 years after SDR 1998 appeared, it still required the stripping bare of almost the entire 1st Armoured Division to deploy a single ‘square’ brigade.
In 2010, the Army is barely any closer to resolving this particular conundrum despite the best efforts – much hated – by General Jackson.
Moreover, the efforts of neither the RN nor the RAF were able to provide the knock-out blow to a poor 2nd rate enemy after almost 10 years of sanctions. During Allied Force, more civilians were killed by NATO bombing that YU security forces. Democracy in Serbia brought victory in June 1999, not strategic bombing, naval power projection or even the threat of land invasion.
To knock over even a small, significantly inferior opponent requires MASSIVE forces if the blunt cudgel made of jelly is applied. The UK doesn’t have the financial resources for a small little cudgel let alone a MASSIVE one. Think Serbia, Iraq and Afghanistan.
New Labour’s ideological wet dream of deterring assorted bad guys by talking tough, deploying forces to borders in a show of strength and, if necessary, using them, had collapsed at the first point of contact.
Since 1999, the government continued to compound the problem as it disregarded all reference to their own policy documents. SDR 1998 was a valid document until, perhaps, 1 April 1999 and no longer. From then on, New Labour made up defence policy and strategy on the hoof. Or maybe, on the sofa. The military simply played catch-up, with both eyes firmly fixed on selfish cap-badge interests.
The military is inherently conservative when it comes to change. But their conservatism and aversion to change is not based upon wanting to prevent the breaking of something that is not broken, it’s about preservation of selfish cap-badge interest – keeping what’s broken rather than replacing it with new.
SDR 1998 depicted a relatively minor restructuring. The Army was incapable of even managing this due to the structural weaknesses of the regimental system and intransigence of any cap-badge to sacrifice or downsize – irrespective of merit and value to the whole. Collectively, the Army remains wedded to fighting an armoured conflict against the Red Army. If it were to drop this notion it would mean the donkey wallopers and the (big) gunners having to give up their prized possessions and competing for pre-eminence in a ‘recce’ corps – primarily with air assets that would probably better fit in the AAC!
The Navy decided, boldly, to forsake some ageing surface ships on the future promise of a pair of fleet carriers. CVF has become the Navy’s Holy Grail for which they now seem to be prepared to sacrifice anything to obtain. The Navy has done far greater damage to its own capabilities, current and future, by pursuing this dogma than the Treasury has inflicted. Its plan for the CVFs is to tramp steam around the oceans with an all FAA (ie weak) air wing. To do any meaningful intervention operations, it will require major investment from its arch enemy the RAF.
The RAF too sacrificed some older aircraft to keep its Typhoon pet project on the table. Intervention forces desperately need strategic and tactical airlift. Other than 6 C-17s, what has the RAF done to increase either its fixed wing or its rotary airlift since SDR 1998?
The RAF doesn’t want to be a taxi driver to the army.
In effect, none of the services, corps or even regiments were willing to see any significant change to what they already had/did even though they claimed to be willingly signing up to the new doctrine of intervention and expeditionary warfare. You see, a change of tasks meant lots of new equipment, which means an inter-service bun fight for the cash. Unsurprisingly, the government managed to find away to slice the cake evenly.
And even more unsurprisingly, none of these key equipment purchases has yet to appear. Where are the CVFs? It took over 10 years of New Labour government before they even signed the contracts to order the steel! Where is the strategic airlift? And where are all the lovely FRES vehicles that are going to be whisked around the world as a “force for good”?
As it now stands, the UK military will begin to receive over the next decade the hardware that had relevance for about 9 months from July 1998 to March 1999.
But it will arrive, in credible numbers, about 2020 and then handicap the military for the next 30 years.
Well done New Labour! Well done the Chiefs of Staff.
What’s happened since Kosovo 1999?
More of the same. Iraq and Helmand are nothing more than political wet dreams gone wrong. The initial air assault on Afghanistan in 2001-2 was conducted with relatively small numbers and proved essentially successful. It’s the sort of thing Britain should be aiming to be able to do, as a final resort, alone. It’s what happened since that went wrong.
Sierra Leone also stands out as an example of how it should be done: both politically and militarily. Strangely it took a 1-star military commander to actually get the policy right before setting the military element on the way to success. Again, a lot was done with a relative small and technologically outdated force.
The trick is picking the right places to intervene and applying rapier like precision to ones efforts – pretty much as SDR 1998 anticipated.
It’s when the politicians think wielding blunt cudgels made of purple jelly will reshape the world that things go wrong. This strategy seems to have made the UK less, not more, secure.
And therein lies the lesson(s) which I consider most important. The future lies in the military capacity to provide prudent rapier like incursions. Prudent being the key word in that sentence. And those incursions are not necessarily of a war fighting nature. A prompt casualty evacuation or disaster response in a hostile area is more likely to win friends than create enemies – thus enhancing (indirectly) UK security.
This is the complete opposite (cause AND effect) of New Labour efforts in the ‘Moslem’ world.
The future does not lie in a new set of politicians trying to dream up new political tasks for the military to bark at. Nor does it lie in continued intransigence of military personnel to change and reform and their dogmatic determination to fight amongst themselves to preserve their own fiefdoms.
If the UK gets the diplomacy, the intelligence and the prudence in intervention right, there is no need for massive air, land and sea forces to man siege fortifications around the British Isles.
SDR 1998 was a cleverly constructed document that came in two parts: a political statement explaining how the British Armed Forces were going to be used to satisfy Tony Blair’s sofa committee morals irrespective of capacity and capability; and, how the services were going to do their absolute utmost to prevent change and fight their way internally for a bigger slice of a diminishing defence budget.
I hope the soon to be published ConLibdem defence and security review is not another helping of the same. The omens are not good.
In Part 3, I will look at each of the services in turn as to what and where, perhaps, they should be looking to accomplish and implement as a benefit to UK national interests rather than their own self cap-badge interests.
It is of course, just my own opinion that I have hastily tapped into my laptop.
ED: Mark, great post, there is nothing wrong with hastily typed opinions, it our stock in trade here!
Your words: “The trick is picking the right places to intervene and applying rapier like precision to ones efforts – pretty much as SDR 1998 anticipated.”
My words: “The ability to reach across the globe and apply force at whatever critical nexus an enemy presents has made the perception of war in the last 350 years a series of newspaper reports….”
Not so very different.
Good article.
Interesting stuff
I think the biggest issue the services have in general is having actual, deployable formations and units. But I’m still shaking my head in amazement about the oft-repeated mantra that the army was ever, let alone today, “remains wedded to fighting an armoured conflict against the Red Army”. During the peak of late Cold War spending, the Army had 55 regular and 35 TA infantry battalions of which only 13 were armoured or mechanised and 14 armoured regiments. That would make less than 30% of the Army suited to battling the Red Army on the north german plain. The US Army had double this proportion, the Bundeswehr an even higher proportion. Whatever the army saw as it’s raison d’etre, it wasn’t armoured warfare, and we really need to understand this rather than airly talking bollocks about how the Cold War legacy has somehow skewed our defense spending. Not to that degree it didn’t, but infantry riding trucks are cheaper than spending 10 years developing substandard vehicles like Warrior and then building them at an anemic rate better suited to a Bugatti Veyron’s.
The army much prefers conflicts where the force is “light”, hence all the reluctance to deploy MRAP’s rather than Snatch. Now the light warriors are reconciled to the MRAP’s, until the Taliban accquire Kornet-E’s from Iran of course
Mmm’ not so sure about some of your reflection:
“The entire 90s were a period of complete stagnation and drift. Iraq and Yugoslavia kept them occupied, but at the same time also exposed and highlighted their internal weaknesses.”
True – but:
“And the RN, the alleged prime mover in power projection beyond UK shores, was hardly the key asset in securing an Iraqi climb-down.”
Even thought it was a “land war” this is hardly true at all, we dismantled their ‘fleet’ as such it was, largely with Lynx fired Sea Skua’s, we undertook close inshore MCM so that the even the mighty US Battleships could get in close enough to do NGS (part of the deception plan to make them think amphib ops were on the cards) etc. The ship I was on even indulged in a little NGS with its 4.5 !
Also during the late 80′s early 90′s the RN provided a considerable amount of “power projection” in one form or another, including escorting convoys during the ‘tanker wars’ and providing the core of the European MCM effort in the gulf during the Iran-Iraq war. On the way back from GW1 I also sailed up and down a racetrack off the beautiful city of Dubrovnik, waiting to pour some NGS goodness on the Serb artillery that was systematically destroying the city and killing its civillian population – but our political leadership never saw fit to make the order.
Just to add to your comment about successes – an unsung hero of our efforts in both the Balkans and Seirra Leone was our tiny, underfunded, largely reservist Psyops capability. One radio station the Army setup in the Balkans is still on air today, operating as a succesful commercial FM station.
The lack of “proper” mechanised forces was a monetary not a doctrinal choice. The Government simply wouldnt fund a warrior seat for every soldier.
Its my understanding that truck mounted infantry would use their trucks to position themselves several hours in front of a soviet push, dig in and fight as dismounted infantry.
The Armoured units would be capable of intercepting a soviet advance as both were on the move.
I just wish someone in the media would actually do some proper research and then the general public know what has really been going on with Britains armed forces. Mush has been made in the past of overspends and foul ups but the fact that whilst other Government departments gained very large increases in their budgets, the MoD actual recieved reductions and has been subject to funding restraints and cut year on year for over a decade.
Whilst I understand the countries finances need to be brough more into balance the MoD has already made its contribution many time over. Freezing the budget would barely cover most urget needs whilst the cuts proposed will cause troubles similar to to what the Canadians found in the 1990′s and the first years of teh next decade, namely their armed forces went below critical mass and bgan to steadily decline as there was insufficint funding and resources to train, bring in new recruits or replace worn out equipment.
I honestly thought that when the UK actuallly got into a long tern shooting war and people saw body bags returning home the outcry would lead to a meaningful review and an actual increase in defence funding, but the media have been half hearted in their investigations and coverage and have accepted the politicians spin and left things at that.
As a result I actually wrote to Mr Cameron before the election saying that the then management of the MoD, civil, military and MPs should be charged with criminal negligence with regard to the handing of the MoD budget and the casualties from ongoing operation. Suprisingll I didn’t get a reply.
Thank you for your comments so far.
I will address just the one point, to Rupert Fiennes.
Please take the time to scratch beneath the surface of basic, simplistic statistics.
Throughout most of its post-WW2 existence, the larger part of the British Army was focussed upon Northern Germany. As the decades passed, and draw downs from other parts of the world occurred, the proportion steadily climbed. Off the top of my head, about 70-80% of combat units were based in, or allocated to, Northern Germany. More than 50% of the TA was similarly roled.
The fact that much of this force was non-mechanised was due to funding not lack of desire for mechanised warfare. This point has already been made, but needs reinforcing.
My original post was a deconstruction of SDR 1998 and subsequent. This was almost a decade AFTER the Soviet Union had packed up and gone home.
Nevertheless, the British Army still had 3 armoured (4, 7 & 20), 2 mechanised (1 & 19) and 2 light brigades (5 & 24). No Red Army in Germany to stare down, yet still the ratio of armoured/mechanised to light is 5:2. What did SDR 1998 do? It reroled 5 into 12 mech and 24 into 16 air assault. In effect, increasing the ratio to 6:1. And, just to add extra strength to my point, 16 AA held all the AAC assets (becoming Apache) which were tasked with the anti-tank role! In effect, all 7 brigades were focussed on combating the massed ranks of non-existent threats from the Soviet Red Army.
That’s what the Army thought of restructuring itself into having capabilities across the full spectrum of intervention.
Mark, are you sure about that 50% for the TA
I thought it was much much higher
I wrote “more than 50%” which could mean 99%.
I am writing completely off the top of my head. I do not feel confident in placing any figure to this other than “more than 50%”. This implies the majority without having to pluck a large (but no more accurate) figure to impress and mislead.
You may have noticed my style is NOT to impress the reader with cherry picked statistics. I hope the reader picks up my ideas and follows them up with a little research of their own.
In Rupert’s case, it seems I failed. I just got a load of superficial statistics thrown back which didn’t tell me anything.
I think it was ‘the majority’ but we could have equally gone with more than 5% !!
Right, JBT and DominicJ were the only ones to leave neutral posts, and everyone else after seems to be defending a service or whinging about misrepresentation in the blog post. Hmm, I think you’ve missed the point a bit . . .
My first reaction was “Hear, hear! Throw everything in the cooking pot and see what comes out!”. But that might be considered a tad churlish and inflammatory (!)
To distill the post, it seems that the major roadblocks to a “proper” SDR are as follows:
1/. Political inability to face up to the capability gap. A desire to “live it large”, sit at the “big” table, make couragoeus promises to downtrodden peoples and chase the current foreign headline “outrage” du jour; while keeping as much money out of the defnce budget and protecting more politically sensitive area such as the NHS and Welfare State.
2/. Military inability to come to terms with a much different operational landscape caused by the collapse of a long term foe. As a result inter-service bickering sabotaged some projects and gold-plated others into unexpected directions, to fulfill the “old-roles” of the Cold War. This is what has resulted in the weight-gain of FRES to make it into a pseudo tank), the continued requirement of Lynx Wildcat, instead of more utility and heavy lift helo’s, the construction and puchase of Type 45 as a hard ASW asset instead of a more flexible and cheaper to deploy asset for patrol and anti-piracy.
3/. MoD inability to “see past”, or resist the above two factors. This has led to the current procurement farce. Let me re-iterate that; from what I’ve read in general, and on this blog, the procurement debacle isn’t the cause of the problems – it’s the symptom! The cause is the wrangling within the MoD for individual services to get the Toys that they want at the expense of budgets allocated to other services and in the face of analysis and evidence that says that their toys are no longer needed.
4/. The defence industry’s addiction to UK-MoD contracts. This has prevented reduction in unit cost through larger production runs and the high percentage of unit price allocated to R&D. The defence industry in the UK must be encouraged to export, if only to drive down unit cost of equipment for our own forces. In respect of R&D, I think that it was a mistake to privatise DERA as we are now not doing any “sovereign” R&D and any IP within new equipment is tied up to the (global) corporate entity that produced it.
The solution, it seems, is to provide some sort of un-spun, un-biased and credible analysis of the current Armed forces capability (what we have), what this capability means in terms of meeting threats – including novel uses for existing equipment (what we can do) and what threat are immediately apparent or are likely to emerge in the short to meduim term.
The the Heads of service then need to be made to play nice together and work out how their Arms are supporsed to interoperate and support eachother – this will need a lot of ego shedding, I think. Most on this blog will know how I would do this . . . .
Finally, the MoD needs to have a “frank” discussion with the FCO and PM’s office about what the armed services can deliver and develop a program to deliver it that they can stick to. In addition there needs to be a better way of managing projects that freezes the spec and design at the appropriate times and minimises “feature creep” – something that has been going on for decades (Avro 730, TSR2, Red Hebe, PT 428, Rapier – all just from my aeronautical area of interest). Of course if the MoD manage that, then can they tell the rest of HMG – ‘cos there are some IT projects that really need a spanking too . . .
So, now that we have all discussed how many armoured and tA battalions can dance on the head of a pin – can we please get back to the point of Mark Nixo’s post? Please?
– Sorry to be a grouch, the smell of fresh paint in the office always makes me ansty. Of course if anyone wants to correct any of my (no doubt many) misconceptions, go ahead. And if anyone wants to pick a fight – I’ll see you in the pub carpark; armed with a “large purple jelly cudgel”! Timmy Mallet eat your heart out!
Mark
I would feel a tad vulnerable storming across the north german plain in anything other than a tank or Warrior; so the idea that the “mechanised” brigades, half of which were equipped with Saxon could really participate in armoured warfare might be a little optimistic. Another superficial stat could be that post Cold War there were 3 armoured brigades, while there were 9 previously (yes, I know they were square!).
However, I think we’re getting a little bogged down here. Shouldn’t we concentrate on how the Army could improve it’s deployability by ensuring units are manned adequately and organised into deployable formations. I hear that establishment for infantry battalions will increase to 750 for example. Increasing the number of deployable brigades by ensuring units were always in one cannot hurt either….
Rupert
Thank you Rupert,
Your first paragraph requires a response in two parts:
First, my original post concerns the SDR of 1998 and subsequently. Beyond this final post to try and clear up the matter, I see no value in harking back to pre-1990 doctrine and structures. Not much can be learned from that unless we are determined to remain wedded to an anti-Soviet force.
Second, you may well have felt vulnerable outside a tank or a Warrior, but nevertheless, that’s precisely how the bulk of the British Army would have fought the Soviets. Just because Private Smith didn’t jump out of a Warrior to set up his Milan post doesn’t mean he wasn’t roled for high intensity armoured warfare. I would also goes as far as to suggest that the carefully concealed Milan post was a better anti-tank capability than an MBT viz-a-viz the ability to move undetected and fire again. The relative outcome would depend very much on the infantry support to the Soviet tanks.
As you like stats so much, I’ll take you back to the mid ‘80s for the last time. Almost the entire AAC, RA and RAC were roled for BAOR duty. Of the 55 infantry battalions, at any given time 20 were assigned to Ulster (there, just returned from or about to deploy to) and 5 were assigned to other overseas commitments (Cyprus & Hong Kong). Thus there were 30(ish) battalions available for ‘contingency’ operations: 4-5 provided a nominal ‘out-of-area’ capability (5 Inf Bde and ABTF) and the rest were effectively BAOR roled.
It doesn’t matter whether the troops were themselves equipped with heavy armour; the plain reality was that they were roled for armoured warfare on the North German Plain.
Your second paragraph has more relevance to the present and contains a couple of points with which I wholeheartedly agree. Via other means, I have been arguing for an increase in peacetime establishments and a complete restructuring. There are some genuine difficulties regarding base accommodation and facilities, but the real reason why such reforms have not occurred is due to simple cap-badge intransigence and rivalry. The traditional regimental system is not fit for purpose in the 21st century. Precisely the difficulties that I write about; the military itself has a much blame for its inadequacies as the political farce.
I absolutely agree that the Regimental system is a barrier to reform and especially a barrier to effective information dissemination to create a truly learning organisation. The MoD is patently not a learning organisation
That said, the Regimental system has a lot going for it in other areas
The trick will be to avoid throwing the baby out with the bath water
Admin – sorry I dont understand, please explain how the Regimental system is a barrier to anything anymore ? So many historic regiments have been merged / disbanded, does anyone (except perhaps Scots) care anymore ? Regimental Museums anyone….
Dangerous Dave – agree with all your last comment, but don’t hold yer breath, it aint gonna happen, Lord Levene or no Lord Levene led effort to transform the MoD !
Oh and I presume you meant AAW for T45 ?
Mark
All those battalions may have been tagged to deploy to BAOR if the balloon went up, but they would have had minimal impact; their inability to manoeuvre under direct fire would have made them rapidly irrelevant, however many Milan firing posts they disposed.
My point about the Army structure is that it was, even during the time of the Cold War, afterwards, structured primarily for post imperial counterinsurgency. After all, the main action it saw postwar until 1991 was just such work, with Malaya, Borneo, Aden, Oman, Northern Ireland et al.
The trouble with such a structure now is that before we had a robust high intensity capability to insure us against anything unexpected; now we do not, since the capabilties were deemed “obselete Cold War” ones. Furthermore, the counterinsurgency milieu is now rapidly changing, with the profusion of IED’s and shortly precision guided missles making the formerly “light” infantry structure obselete.
Trouble is, there seems to be limited recognition of these changes; we’re still in “cut the cold war” capabilities mode, despite such capabilities having been cut from 27 battalion sized units down to 12. This will not save any appreciable amount of money since the majority of the costs were spent 20 years ago.
Changing tack, the real improvements, and savings, will come from a more top down approach; eg, decided on the number of brigades and their type required to meet requirements, then proceed to attach the number of battalions and regiments necessary to fill them out properly, then redeploy the rest or disband. Frankly, there are so many “last minute” attachments of company groups for “rear area” defense I rather doubt redundancy would be required, we would merely increase readiness by filling out units to operational strength.
R
You touch on an interesting point there Rupert.
All around force protection.
In the old days where only the point of the spear could expect to get contacted they would not have any force protection or armour. Now, with the likelihood of combat happening across the entire area of operations the need to devote forces away from the main effort becomes a real drain on actual combat power for deliberate operations. A traditional brigade deployed in Afghanistan has much much less fighting strength available for operations than it has on paper so are reinforced to make up the difference. We have always had wartime and peacetime establishments but it makes me think we need fewer larger formations and the existing brigade structure might be past its sell by date
Rupert,
I fear you are conflating and confusing different ideas and concepts and thus struggling to reach a coherent conclusion. You are now starting to sound like the ‘pub’ expert who first baffles the listener with impressive ‘facts’ & figures’ and then promptly makes a concluding pronouncement that has little to do with the supposed evidence presented.
First, you equate the contents of the vehicle park with the roles and tasks of the unit concerned. Not having tanks or AIFVs in the garage does not a “post imperial counterinsurgency” force maketh. The doctrine, training and equipment available to the British Army was/is VERY much geared towards the Soviet threat NOT native bashing.
Second, you also equate heavy armoured warfare as “high intensity”, and even go as far as to suggest that those armoured formations could deal with any situation. Non-armoured formations can also experience “high intensity”, you know. The sad truth is that armoured formations are the LEAST flexible and have little value beyond a face off against a similar formation. They certainly have their place in the orbat, but equally they are not the universal tool you claim them to be.
But finally, as in your last post, you finish off with some very sensible suggestions. But what you may have missed is that the key reason why battalions are forever deploying understrength is a direct legacy of the cap-badge/regimental internal bun fight. The establishment of the battalion is NOT geared to operational necessities; it is a poor compromise that creates the maximum number of peacetime units to preserve cap badges. For evidence of this, note how the 9th Warrior platoon was removed from the 8 existing battalions to generate a ‘new’ 9th battalion some years back. For every 12,000 troops, battalions with 1,000 troops mean only 12 cap badges preserved; 600-troop battalions mean 24. Backfilling and overstretch is a product of inter-regiment/corps rivalry as much as it is political wishful thinking.
So far, I have produced two texts of my musing plus some additional commentary responding to others’ thoughts. So far, everything has been an analysis of what’s already out there. To this point, I have made NO attempt to offer up my suggestions as to how it should look. Several of you have jumped to conclusions, but wait and see if you have predicted correctly. Shortly, I will start bashing away on my lap top some of my ‘lateral’ thoughts as to some critical changes I feel necessary across the services. I’ll even plop in some specific ideas on equipment and structural organisation. However, in my opinion the key problems are of a very deep nature and massaging the surface (shall we buy aircraft X or Y, for example) fails to address the problem. In fact, it compounds it.
Aaah, Thanks Jed. Type 45 = AAW not ASW. Serves me right for not even looking at a Wiki B4 posting. Most humble apologies offered
Not many pirates or drug-runners have aircraft tho’. Well the grug runners do, but shooting down unarmed Cessna’s could be considered diplomatically irresponsible! (Joke).
Ultra long comment trails are often interesting but tend to expand until cabbages and kings are being analysed in the sort of detail that ensures you sit in the “billy no mates” corner. Glad to see I’m there already
I largely agree with your third point, although the Jackson reorg and death of the arms plot certainly made the situation much better.
For point one, I would aver that our doctrine should be driving equipment decisions. If our “soviet bashing” doctrine is still driving affairs, we see precious little evidence of that in our previous or current procurement.
For point two, I would suggest you missed my point, which was that all operations, including counterinsurgency, are rapidly becoming “heavy”. No one would deploy a pure light infantry battalion to Afghanistan. Whether they are riding Warrior or a Mastiff, their “wieght” is about the same. I would aver Warrior is more flexible, since it has more protection against direct fire weapons and more tactical mobility than Mastiff.
Rupert
The British army currently uses £75k anti tank missiles to kill Taliban at long range, because they have long range anti tank missiles instead of snipers or mortars.
They have LRATGM’s instead of long range anti personel weapons because the thinking is that the British Army will be engaging enemy armour at long range.
Warrior is more mobile than Mastiff, but the British army in afghanistan cannot make use of that mobility, because a cargo truck is not mobile, and most of our vehicles are cargo truck escorts.
Rupert,
Who’s Billy No Mates? This is a forum for thrashing out ideas, beliefs and suggestions in the (vain) hope of doing some good. Good will come from finding common ground for agreement. You seem to be a little out on a limb because some of your comments seem to have little to do with the reality out there. They often appear to me as rather ill-informed pub banter.
Regarding current procurement, there is a difference between UOR and the core equipment programme. UORs are being acquired for a specific purpose and task – current operations. They are having to be purchased because the British Army was (is) so poorly equipped for the missions it is being asked to perform. The UOR programme is perhaps the key pointer disputing your comments about the structure and role. If we look at the core equipment programme, it is certainly the equipment that SDR 1998 envisaged. But when you look closely, it is far more geared to armoured and stand-off warfare than close-in insurgency work.
Frankly, I’m struggling to see what leads you to draw the conclusions you do. I’m looking at the same informaation and reaching a completely opposite conclusion.
And finally, again you seem to misunderstand some basic elements and equate ‘protection’ with “heavy” and ‘necessity’ with ‘choice’. An insurgency mission requires human contact: either making friends or defeating enemies. You will NOT be successful in COIN if you fight from inside armoured vehicles and with stand-off weapons. The armour in both Iraq and Afghanistan is required for self-protection in transit. Warrior was used in Iraq because the UK had nothing else. It had no choice but to use Warrior. The Warrior is an Infantry FIGHTING Vehicle not a taxi. You will NOT succeed in Afghanistan by deploying heavy armour using Warrior (or similar) in a ‘fighting’ role.
Mark
Attempting to steer the conversation away from a personal direction and toward the nub of the issue with humour is obviously not working; I won’t continue.
I didn’t mention UOR’s at all, but if I understand your point correctly, we needed UOR’S because we were too focused on stand off and armoured capability post SDR 98. FRES had a malign influence over this period, which could be fairly described emphasis on standoff fires and armoured manoeuvre, but the UV that was supposed to be produced was a wheeled APC with a single machine gun rather than a fighting vehicle; it looks more like a Mastiff than anything else. However, given very little money was actually committed to FRES/TRACER/BOXER, the UOR’s seem to have been competing with a procurement holiday.
I’d agree that in COIN fighting from vehicles is the exception rather than the rule, but I fail to see why a Mastiff with a GMG is somehow fundamentally different than a Warrior with a Rarden; and both have been employed in COIN.
I will reiterate my earlier point: both COIN and armoured warfare specialised infantry vehicles have converged in wieght. Since the threat types encountered in COIN and more traditional warfare (chemical and kinetic) are becoming very similar (although the rate of fire in COIN will usually be somewhat less) we will find ourselves converging on a single vehicle. Depending on the likely terrain, this may be wheeled or tracked.
Dominic, the British Army has both snipers and mortars. But a Javelin is useful because it both ultra precise and doesn’t need a direct hit to work. The only “antitank” portion of a Javelin is the warhead, which is an insignificant portion of the cost compared to the seeker. If we want to reduce the cost, we could buy XM25′s
“Dominic, the British Army has both snipers and mortars.”
At company or even battlegroup level, not at squad level.
LFATGW (Light Forces Anti-Tank Guided Weapon, Javelin is not long ranged for an ATGW) are a Battalion asset, as are mortars, snipers and fire support weapons like GPMG, HMG and GMG. Support weapons in the infantry platoon are GPMG (Light role) and light mortars, with infantry sections using GPMG when available, LSW and LMG.
Platoon support is augmented with L96 rifles displaced from the sniper platoon by the L115 and sections now have the L129 sharpshooter rifle.
The Battalion assets are deployed to company and therefore platoon and section levels as necessary.
Regarding the thinking behind Javelin:
1) This was procured post 2003 when it was clear which way the near-future combat was going
2) It is, as noted, deployed in the ATGW platoon in an infantry Battalion, not to section level (that is the US approach)
3) Section infantry were equipped with, in order over the last two decades; LAW80 (600m range, unguided and very destructive), AT4 HPCS (Interim LAW after the LAW80 went out of life and NLAW wasn’t ready yet), and finally NLAW, another 600m weapon, but this time guided and top attack.
4) Section infantry also have LASM (Light Anti Structure Munition), a version of the M72, 300m range and will at some point get ASM (Anti Structure Munition) which is bigger and with a longer range. Both are, as the name implies, supposed to destroy structures.
Given that the infantry have a plethora of weapons to inflict hurt within 600m or so, why is Javelin so popular?
1) The Command Launch Unit is a very good ISTAR asset. You can see what’s going on very clearly, day or night and a long way out.
2) The missile has a 2.5km range, which is substantially greater than small arms. (Recalling Murphy’s Laws of Combat, “If you are in range then so is the enemy”, but since the enemy doesn’t have ATGW, then you have a significant asymmetric advantage)
3) Having spotted the enemy with your wonderful ISTAR system, do you A) try and talk other assets (air, artillery, fire support) onto it, or B) shoot it yourself with the missile attached to your spotting scope.
Rupert,
You didn’t mention UORs; I did. For the simple reason that the sheer volume of them is the very living proof that the British Army was not structured and equipped for the post imperial counter-insurgency that you claimed it to be.
Moreover, the fact that such vehicles are being acquired through the UOR programme suggests the aversion of the military brass to diverge from their original spending plans and fear that this will cause waves amongst those capbages wedded to the armoured concept.
A Mastiff is not designed or roled as an infantry fighting vehicle, it is an armoured taxi to support logistic supply runs and routes.
Re convergence: the evidence of UORs would suggest the complete opposite. If one size fits all as you suggest, why has the British Army taken delivery of about 6 different vehicles in recent years when the core programme was trying to reduce the different types?
Mark
“the sheer volume of them (UOR’s) is the very living proof that the British Army was not structured and equipped for the post imperial counter-insurgency that you claimed it to be”
Au contraire; most of the post imperial commitments really were light infantry based, with Malaya and Northern Ireland being the preeminent examples. What armoured protection that was required, the Humber Pig and the Snatch fufilled, both of which were procured in four figure amounts. I also suspect that the UOR’s would have been required whether we had say bought Stryker in 2000 for a counterinsurgency force, since the latter doesn’t have MRAP capabilities.
I’m sure a lot of army brass were very reluctant to buy Mastiff, based on their keeness for FRES. However, FRES was sold not as a replacement for Warrior/Challenger 2, but as a supplement that would “fit in the gap”, so the capbadge argument loses some of it’s force.
Mastiff may not be designed as a fighting vehicle: compared to a Warrior it’s off road mobility is low and it’s protection against direct fire weapons somewhat lacking. But it is used as one, particularly for convoy escort.
R
Rupert,
Oh dear!
Northern Ireland was of crucial national interest and thus required special attention despite any doctrinal bias within the Army. Malaya was so long ago that it occurred at a time prior to the Army wedding itself to armoured warfare in Germany.
Stryker is a fighting vehicle designed for armoured warfare not COIN. Naturally UORs would have been required to supplement this inappropriate vehicle for use in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Given that FRES was indeed not a replacement for CR2/WR, FRES represented an INCREASE in weight over the vehicles it was due to replace (FV430 & CVR(T)). It thus did not “fit any gap” at all. Once again, your poor analysis has provided the evidence to support my argument. SDR 1998 did nothing to dampen the Army’s determination to fight the extinct Red Army on the North German Plain. The Army was equipping itself to be even heavier.
I can put armoured sheets on my car and a .50 on the roof. That does NOT make it a fighting vehicle. Mastiff et all have been procured to provide protection to troops to keep the body count down. They have not been procured to ‘win’ the battles on the ground. They have been procured to ensure the UK doesn’t ‘lose’ the conflict in Iraq/Helmand on the home front. The one exception to this is the Jackal.
I will thank you for introducing many of the common misconceptions held, and thus given me the opportunity to to correct them. Nevertheless, I don’t feel we are making any forward movement with this line of discussion. I shall now bow out from this thread unless something crucial requires attention.
FRES was a response to the RMA nonsense and was ultimately seen as a successor to CR2/WR and FV430/CVR(T)
Maybe not immediately and it wasn’t sold as such, but that was the direction of travel
A medium weight answer to everything that in reality is the worse of both worlds. Sensors, precision and situational awareness don’t compensate for a lack of protection when your enemies have the audacity to not play by the PowerPoint rules and fight in close, mixed with civilians and with weapons that can be out sensored, but, they are too heavy for rapid deployment
So, vulnerable in most scenarios and too fat to deploy rapidly in others.
Stryker is also from the transformational medium weight thought pool and remember, it was an interim vehicle until FCS was fielded. Now FCS has been binned and replaced with the GCV which seems to start at 70 tonnes it seems the wheel has turned full circle.
Our version of FRES has also turned the same circle, no more Pirahna and hello ASCOD
Just a quick point before I stick to my word and retreat:
The ‘ideological gurus’ of rapid intervention outside the military did indeed see FRES as the ultimate successor to CR2/WR. The military, however, saw it all rather differently and saw FRES as merely an opportunity to replace existing and aging armour (FV430 and CVR(T)). In effect, FRES was making the heavy arm of the Army even heavier.
It should come as no surprise that FRES has become even heavier on the advice of the military – just in case the politicians pull CR2/WR from them without due consultation.
Mark
I’ll quit too; we can agree to disagree. Corrected misconceptions all around from both our points of view
Admin: I’d agree that FRES, and FCS that inspired it, were half baked ideas. The requirements pointed towards a Bradley/Warrior wieght class vehicle at one end and a CVR(T) wieght class at the other. Attempts to have both on one chassis were guarenteed to fail at exorbitant cost.
A better solution for long term value would be to order FRES as a Warrior replacement *now*, also replacing a portion of the CVR(T) fleet in use for “heavy” forces, rather than upgrade Warrior with a new turret and maintain an old hull and drive train for another 20 years
R
I’m sorry to break my promise again but, on reflection, I feel I didn’t express my points very clearly regarding the implications of FRES.
First consider three groupings of vehicle types: light, medium and heavy.
Into the light category we have Landrovers, 4-ton Bedfords etc – the sort of thing that one traditionally considered suitable for post-imperial work.
Into the medium category we had vehicles that were a cheap alternative to heavy; offering greater protection than light, but not having the adequate protection to be considered ‘fighting’ vehicles on the modern battlefield. Think Saxon and Saracen as examples.
Then there was heavy. The vehicles that offered reasonable protection on the modern battlefield: CR2 and WR. But also into this category I would put the older FV430 and CVR(T) as the first(ish) generation of such vehicles.
WR comes in at 25T, FV430 at 15T and CVR(T) at 8T.
FRES was never going to be less than 15T. It was never going to be a bridge between light and heavy. At best it was a bridge between the old and new types of the heavy category. It was making ‘heavy’ even heavier.
It seems the ‘scout’ version of FRES is the most urgent. Years ago the scout role was performed by Ferret at 4T, now Scimitar at 8T. ASCOD SV looks like it’s coming in over 30T. Where is this move to get lighter? It’s even heavier than a Warrior!!!!
The Mastiff etc procurements are ‘patrol’ vehicles not ‘fighting’. They are not a downgrade in weight from a Warrior, they are an UPGRADE in weight from a Landrover.
ASCOD is to be procured by the core equipment programme. This suggests it is what the Army wants, all things being equal, to keep in its inventory. It further suggests the the British Army remains doctrinally linked to armoured warfare. This is further reinforced by the temporary purchase of other armoured Patrol vehicles through the UOR programme. Vehicles that will most probably quickly disappear once current operations are over.
FRES was seen by the Army as an easy way to replace their ageing FV430 and CVR(T) and at the same time grab an even bigger slice of the MoD budget by chiming publically that a sooper-dooper extra expensive vehicle was the only way to meet the new governments rapidly deployable criteria. No real change in doctrine or role.
Sean Rayment makes his thoughts clear in the Military times: ‘less strategic thinking – more market trading’ http://www.military-times.co.uk/articles/strategic-defence-review.htm
Smithey – thanks for the link. While he has come to the same conclusion that most of us who hang out here have done, he is also a great example of a modern defence correspondent: to paraphrase, the RAF does not fly Typhoon in Afghanistan because (direct quote): “its hot and dusty” – seriously ? Call that journalism…… ????