UAV’s at a Crossroad

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The UK armed forces are stumbling towards yet another incoherent and wasteful equipment programme with absolutely no vision or integration between the three services.

At the small scale the Army is using Desert Hawk but this doesn’t have any maritime application so the RN is experimenting with the Scan Eagle.

In the middle, we are operating Predators and Hermes 450 whilst funding Mantis.The Army’s Hermes 450 derived Watchkeeper needs runways so will likely operate from exactly the same airhead as Predator.

The latest long range stealthy UCAV demonstrator, Taranis, looks very smart but can it operate from CVF?

One might think that given Watchkeeper will be operating in complex airspace it would need an air minded organisation to operate it, like the RAF or Army Air Corps, oh no, let’s give it to the Royal Artillery, with a bit on Intelligence Corps on top.

Have any RN vessels been fitted with a Watchkeeper control station, is there a common information dissemination system across the three services or is there a common control system.

What do you think.

It is a mess.

All three services have similar requirements but seem content to pull in different directions, duplicate effort and fritter away money like it was going out of fashion.

Anyone would think the MoD had plenty of it

Whilst all this is happening the most important thing to hit the US and in turn UK, unmanned aircraft space is to get rid of those confusing and pesky acronyms and replace them with another.

Remember everyone, its not UAV or even UAS anymore.

The new acronym in town is Remotely Piloted Air System (RPAS) because we wouldn’t anyone forgetting there was a bona fide pilot in charge, not an operator.

We can’t even get our acronyms, let alone ducks, in a line.

The UK needs a comprehensive, tri service review of its needs in this area and a coherent implementation plan backed up with a strong implementation programme that crushes completely and definitively any stovepiped or unnecessary empires.

Before we even look at equipment we must build a common information infrastructure, what DII(F) is supposed to be and a set of common control and exploitation architectures. Some of this is already in the system but progress seems painfully slow. RPAS/UAV can create a massive amount of data and turning this into actionable knowledge at the point of use is the main challenge we face and is not just a technology problem because however these systems evolve, they will still need human intelligence to understand and act on that information. Other ISR systems like Sentinel produce a product that needs a completely separate and un integrated control and exploitation architecture.

Project DABINET (or whatever it is called this week) is supposed to support this integration.

At the heart and start of any roadmap is the forthcoming defence review that will amongst many things, seek to look into a crystal ball and answer the burning question of what will be happening tomorrow?

Do we for example try and maintain a full spectrum of capabilities or do we concentrate on a limited set of possibilities?

What role will industrial and political concerns play, this is absolutely key because it informs our equipment choices?

The whole thing is a very difficult balancing act.

Any roadmap would likely include a range of platforms that could snap into a common information backbone and as far as possible, exploit a control architecture that makes maximum use of common sensors, control systems and handling equipment. We must get away from a service oriented stovepipe mentality, interoperability is the key to success and cost efficiency, it should be possible for an RAF ground crew to launch a system, hand over control to an RN ship where it would exploit the information and pass it onto a ground team ashore who combine the information with a feed from an orbiting Sentinel and cue a GMLRS onto the target, all this should be seamless.

There is no doubt the unmanned or remotely piloted systems have and will continue to have a profound impact on the way we conduct operations.

The US Army have just release a very sensible and comprehensive UAV strategy document, here, that seems absolutely rooted in reality and includes a range of mission requirements, timelines, formation sizes and equipment roadmaps.

The mission requirements listed are reconnaissance & surveillance, security, attack (close combat, interdiction, strike, target identification), command/control/communication, combat support and interestingly, sustainment.

The document describes classes of system

  • Class 1, typically hand launched employed at the small unit level and only ISR payloads
  • Class 2, medium sized catapult launched to support brigade level and lower operations and only ISR payloads
  • Class 3, medium sized, operating at medium altitude and medium to long endurance. ISR and weapon payload
  • Class 4, large systems, able to operate at high altitude and for extended duration. ISR and weapon payload
  • Class 5, large systems with specialised missions and payloads

Cost, logistic footprint and operating area requirements generally increase as one climbs the class ladder.

Again, this seems a sensible and pragmatic approach that could accommodate some of the more combat offensive oriented missions. However good the document is, it doesn’t include any significant mention of the USN, USAF and USMC, even the US hasn’t fully embraced the purple view.

The difference between the UK and US is that we have to look at this with a tri service head on because anything else is simply unaffordable.

The RAF Scavenger programme is seeking to get something into service in the 2015 – 2018 timeframe and of course the various manufacturers are lining up, Northrop Grumman are offering the Global Hawk with a pay per use model and may also offer an airship design. A Mantis derived design would be the obvious contender though.

Although I was rather mocking about the term RPAS, behind it is a serious issue, autonomy is a desirable objective but implementing it in an operational context with complex Rules of Engagement and air environments is extremely difficult and fraught with problems. Autonomy should not be a goal in itself but something that can be implemented independently of the designs used and introduced slowly.

The UK is making good progress in RPAS/UAV design, operation in no segregated airspace is slowly progressing,  the Autonomous Systems Technology Related Airborne Evaluation and Assessment (Astraea) programme has now secured the £30 million in funding needed to launch its delayed second phase and BAe continue to churn out competent looking designs.

Going against the grain, we have a good lead and with a concerted effort may be able to create not only an excellent set of capabilities but in the MALE and UCAV area, achieve significant export success. This may seem rather BAe and RAF centric but this is not intentional, I am just recognising the growth areas where the UK can apply its technological lead and sovereign capabilities.

If I had to have a high level think on overall direction it would be as follows

  • Obtain an ‘off the shelf’ Class 1 device, there are hundreds on the market, especially the quad rotor designs that are cheap as chips, not connected to any central information infrastructure (an advantage at this level) and can be treated as semi disposable. These should be deployed at sub unit level and not in specialised units
  • Withdraw Desert Hawk when operations cease in Afghanistan
  • Invest in the Boeing Scan Eagle for Class 2, it can be used on land and sea and is a mature and very well established design with plenty of growth potential
  • Transfer operations of UAV, Scan Eagle, to Army Air Corps and RN
  • Retain the investment in Watchkeeper infrastructure (the bulk of the costs) but cancel the air vehicle, retain the Hermes 450 as an interim solution until operations in Afghanistan finish
  • Invest in common ground station
  • Rapidly bring a production version of Mantis into service and aggressively market, consider partnership with France but no other nations
  • Seriously scale back investment in JCA, sub 40 airframes and take Taranis concept to a production variant but absolutely 110% make sure it is navalised and can operate from CVF without catapults. It might even be possible to extend the Harrier life and skip a generation, going straight to a Taranis type design circa 2025 as the Tornado is retired (bit radical that one though!)
  • Any Taranis derived system must be able to operate at high level and high altitude in the Global Hawk type role and fulfil other strike oriented missions. This might be a big ask of a single airframe so we might also consider a two track approach, Taranis for the deep strike/ISR Tornado role and one of the many high endurance systems, including airships, that seem to be just coming to fruition.
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