RUSI have published another paper on the options for the UK’s nuclear deterrent.
In the paper, Professor Chalmers assesses four possible options for maintaining both an effective nuclear deterrent and also reducing costs in light of anticipated budget restrictions.
The options include:
1. A ‘Normally-CASD’ Submarine Force – Extend the Vanguard-class submarines, delay the start of peak spending on the renewal programme until 2019/2020 and redefine what is meant by ‘CASD’ to cut the fleet of boats from four to three.
2. A ‘CASD-Capable’ Submarine Force – Abandon CASD in normal circumstances, but maintain a credible capability to reconstitute it if required. This option could cut the fleet of successor submarines from four to two and delay peak spending until 2023/2024.
3. A ‘Dual-Capable’ Submarine Force – Rationalise the submarine fleet around a single model of boat, which could be used either for conventional or deterrent roles. This new model would eventually replace both Vanguard and Astute class submarines.
4. A Non-Deployed Strategic Force – A more radical option, this would abandon the UK’s submarine-based nuclear deterrent, maintaining only a non-deployed arsenal. Offering the most substantial financial savings, this option would still aim to provide a guaranteed – but not prompt – ability to retaliate against future nuclear attacks.
To read the paper in full, please visit www.rusi.org/downloads/assets/CASD.pdf
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32 Comments
Would the Normally CASD option, with its five year deferral on the nominal 2015 date, and its in service date around 2030, be a good match for the US missile replacement program generally, and the missile diameter issue in particular?
RUSI seems to have been chugging on the Kool Aid, hehehehe.
Interesting paper, with at least moderatly well thought out ideas.
Option 3 is probably the best in the long term.
32 incoming warheads is still a lot to defend yourself against, and theres no reason we couldnt have two on patrol with nuclear arms.
That still doesnt put protected places within reach, but even if China protected Beijing, it couldnt survive multiple nuclear strikes against every other port city.
Option 1 is the second best, but CASD is what it says on the tin, its not (almost) CASD, because that still leaves a window where an attack would not be answerable.
Option 2 is really just a realitic assessment of what option 1 would become. The problem is simply that once you stop “constantly” having a nuclear deterant at sea, starting it again becomes a huge escalation that could ignite a nuclear exchange in itself.
Lets imagine an EU/Russia spat gets out of hand and shots are fired, armies begin mobilising incase of war.
If the Russians see a Vanguard MkII preparing to leave port, we’re effectivly saying, in response to this minor spat, we’re about to rain nuclear hellfire down upon you.
But if the Vanguard MkII doesnt leave port, Russia could pre empitvely destroy them with a nuclear attack on the port.
Option 4 is stupid.
Even a moderate (20% of Russian weapons) attack on the UK would kill virtualy everyone.
It would certainly destroy “secure” facilities.
Unless we think we can build a weapons storage bunker on Skye and man it for the next 25 years without a leak.
Even if that were possible, a special forces retaliation would likely be a one way trip, or would fail.
I dont think the British Army teaches the kind of crazy that gets men to sit on a bus next to a child, and then blow them up, and tens of thousands like them.
CASD, if possible whilst cutting the fleet to single standard of submarine.
Anyuthing else is at best a waste of money, at worst downright dangerous.
Addition
The Article mentions that only the UK, US and France maintain CASD.
Which is true, however, the other nations (and the US) are simply large enough to disperse there weapons so that a first strike cannot possibly destroy them all, or even enough of them, to threaten the possibility of a counter attack.
The only reason the Russians have ceased them is because they have judged the additional cost over land basing is not, for them, worthwhile.
The deterrence, along with all other aspects of the Forces, is surely about risk and reward. A key point being at what point does the impact of paying for the deterrant on the rest of the Forces (given the political reality that there is a finite budget for arms and it is going to be lower than today’s 2.5% of GDP) outweigh it’s usefulness both deterrence and politically.
The current model we are currently looking at is 4 SSBNs, with 12 tubes each. But if that comes at the price of some combination of 1 or more SSNs, a CVF, C-17s, F-35s etc etc at what point does it become a capability that is too expensive?
I would argue that the vast majority, if not all, of the usefulness of nuclear weapons comes from a nation simply having them. Their actual “useability” is actually not that important. On that basis there would appear to be two viable options –
1. The Option 3 above, although I would like to know how much that would actually save and how many of these SSBN/SSN hybrids we would actually get – I would suspect 7 max and still with significant impact on the rest of the Forces
2. An alternate, no doubt hated for being “not credible operationally”, option would still be follow on buys of Astute to give a total of 10 (wouldn’t that be nice!) and then a buy of 100 Naval Scalps with a UK warhead – we will need to replace the Trident warhead come what may anyway.
End result – an enlarged SSN force, continued ownership of a UK nuclear weapons (less “credible”, but to sane people still deterring; insane people wouldn’t be deterred by Trident either), reduced reliance on US, more money to spend on conventional forces…. What is not to like?
We seem to be heading towards a three boat policy by stealth (ionically enough).
I believe that the out of service date for Vanguard was 2017, what is the date without SLEP, anyone?
It seems (to my wildly unprofessional opinion) like there are two main strategic issues. With that there’s really two options for trying to get those in the neighborhood of financial “reality.” (I’m still not convinced that a bit of upped-spending “war Keynesianism” would really go amiss, or for that matter a capital-markets equivalent of Pitt the Younger instituting income tax on the landed in order to beat Napoleon. You want to roll at the Square Mile’s casino? Then pay up for the boats and planes and Mr. Atkins that keep it in business.)
Strategic issues:
- What’s the deterrent there for? Having it at all, as Nigel says. But it needs to be routinized enough that, as Dominic points out, it isn’t sitting around to be hit and its appearance at sea isn’t a provocation. (I don’t think it would be quite as provocative in that particular example; the United States overreacted into DEFCON 3 at the end of the Yom Kippur war and the Sovs literally thought it was a temper tantrum by Nixon.) Size? Enough to make a one-on-one exchange with an emergent nuclear power mutually assured destruction.
- Point two: in practical terms, for the last generation the Royal Navy has been the world’s largest frigate-based navy that happens to be blessed also with a world-class submarine branch and some amphibious air power. (No disrespect to the Vincis that have carried more than their weight, but a look at where numbers, commitments, and functions are.) Leverage those subs. They have disproportionate effect in actual combat, and Britain still visibly has world-class standards in the field (I know personally a handful of ex-USN squids, one a driver up past the Gap in cold war days, who considered Punisher-trained drivers and their crews the class of the Cold War submariners.) Get back to some of British naval power’s piratical roots :) (Not literally, but the capacities of subs are tactical heir to privateering.)
Approaches
- Finish up the Astutes, build to at least six preferably eight because numbers help. (More places at more times, and has anyone at the top thought that, except for local air defence against cruise-missile pot shots, subs are potentially as or more effective for convoy escort? Not so reassuring as white ensigns to your merchant crews, but set a thief etc.) If the economy does pick up *keep going* rather than with exquisite frigates, or build some AIPs for shipping lane work. SLEP the Vanguards unless cost is prohibitive, including introduction of flex tubes. Build two fresh ones, which will help take the pressure off as they age into disuse. (Vanguard numbers slowly drop back towards pure CASD role, taken up by more Astutes or Astute-successors in conventional roles.) Six boats total — three on CASD, at least one knackered at a time, and two (one on APT(S) and one surge) as massively powerful SSGNs, real fleet-killers. Lots of warheads on the at-sea deterrent (72 at least), then 2×40 with the other boats. Not lots of cost savings here.
- Second choice: stop as-is Astute production at four. They work with the carrier groups more or less exclusively. Stretch just a hair for the next boat, build the raised bridge line for four “flex” tubes, and look at extending the design so you could get six tubes instead of four. (I’ve thought about this since last remarks, in for a penny…) Eight boats, three for CASD, three SSGN, two in drydock. At-sea deterrent carries six missiles (you’ve cut back the number of D5s massively, from nearly 60 to around 20), done up as say 5×8 and 1×1 “warning shot.” Close to what the Vanguards carry. Modification of existing design, you can run separate “red” crews for nuclear-armed duty on nominated boats, and have a series of powerful SSGNs (not as loaded as modded Vanguards, but could the RN afford to stock them with all those missiles anyway?)
3. always sounds a nice option, but how do you get over the fact your enemy might think its a nuke being fired at him rather than conventional weapons?
Andy,
One thing talked over in previous deterrent threads (to which your contribution would be appreciated, truly) is having nominated boats, crewed by “red” crews (a neologism to go with nuclear tubes) when in deterrent service. Also, keeping D5 as a very different weapons system than dual-use cruise. If you’re an SSGN (crews move b/w boats according to role), then you just carry (convential) cruise, torps, SSMs, in considerable quantity (with “flex” tubes you can get nine cruise launchers in a Trident silo, for example.) And if you go for formal no-first-use rules, plus sheer practicality, keep the deterrent subs out in the deep Atlantic trenches rather than risking them by sneaking up to a coastline or an enemy fleet. Tomahawk and Harpoon/Storm Shadow/dear old Sea Eagle/Naval Strike/what have you have very different trajectories from an SLBM. Lots fewer D5s, probably a few less warheads, adaptation of an existing design and quantity to help offset cost. But all criticisms welcome; this is a concept important enough to need a murder board.
Also — no relation to the AndyMed of the Warships board, are you? Glad to meet you nonetheless but that would be a pleasure also.
Andy
“but how do you get over the fact your enemy might think its a nuke being fired at him rather than conventional weapons?”
Thats why I’m so strongly against conventional ballisitic missiles.
The SSGN subs would fire conventional cruise missiles, either tomahawk or an extended range StormShadow.
True, they could have nuclear warheads, but so could a harrier on a bombing run.
Theres no attempt to be be dishonest or hide anything here, if the UK fires a ballistic missile, its carrying a nuclear warhead at you, anything else is strictly conventional.
Theres also little advantage to us launching nuclear weapons from your coast instead of the deep ocean.
I’m still curious about my unanswered question from the previous thread, whether a warhead could be replaced with an equivalent mass of a hundred or so tungsten long-rod-penetrators, and whether a trident trajectory would be able to impart enough kinetic energy to generate a useful effect on the ground…………?
Jedi
I believe so, research has certainly been in that area, the problem is most people would retaliate before it became apparent that the warheads were none nuclear.
Impact velocity is over 6000 metres per second for a trident warhead, isnt muzzle velocity of a bullet about 300mps?
hmmm, what does a fully populated trident warhead weigh, and what would that mean for the potential weight of 80x tungsten penetrators?
ultimate question = 6000 mps (velocity) x 25kg (x80) = xxxx KJ (energy imparted) = xxxx tonnes tnt equivalent)
need some clever fellow to do the maths. :D
jackstaff, no that’s not me. Just an interested, if not very knowledgable observer!
Just seen this on another forum, looks like Osborne is playing hardball with Trident costs
http://www.businessweek.com/news/2010-07-29/osborne-rejects-nuclear-weapon-cut-exception-in-cabinet-split.html
‘I don’t think there’s anything particularly unique about the ministry of defense.’
Jedi
“need some clever fellow to do the maths. :D”
Cleverer than me, I hated Mechanics
Osborne – “The Trident costs, I have made it absolutely clear, are part of the defence budget.”
Were I Fox I would respond by selecting option four above and increasing the number of SSN’s to 12 to preserve the industrial capability.
Fox’s brief is defence, not foreign policy, and the strategic deterrent is as much a tool of foreign policy as anything else.
JBT, i’d also insist on the dept of Health picking up the tab for all military medical needs!
on the subject of long-rod-penetrators, it looks like RAND got there 60+ years ago:
http://www.popsci.com/scitech/article/2004-06/rods-god
still seems pretty plausible………….
George Osborne is a vacuous toff who should never have failed farther upwards than running the drinks tray budget at his country club.
That said, I think we have an answer here in Option 3. Cuts missile numbers by more than half (but not warhead numbers by more than about 10 percent, because you’re no longer obeying a treaty you never signed), and gives you one-and-a-half types for the sub fleet, a strong step towards “ruthless commonality.” Plus twelve boats that are all *capable* (though not always assigned) in conventional operations. The other answer, frankly, is Option 4. For most of what they’ve called “development and build costs” on Trident (twelve to fourteen frakking *billion* quid) you could do wonders with the conventional fleet, and not even dip into the sub-building budget. Then perhaps have Hague cross the courtyard to HMT and explain matters in terms Osborne may understand, to wit:
“Father Ted: For the last time, Dougal, (holds up toy cow) small … (points out window) far away.”
JBT,
“Rods from God” may have their uses, and are certainly a potential favorite with the USAF or RAF (crabs the world over have, ahem, issues about the, ahem, scope of their military potency.)
But they lack many of the civilization-ending qualities of nuclear weapons, which are a central part of their role as ultima ratio deterrent. Nukes may not destroy as much hardened infrastructure as one might think, but they can blot out civilization with non-EMP shielded civilian tech, the horrors of radiation burns and poisoning for survivors, and decades-long contamination of topsoil and surface/groundwater. (The last two really do strike at the very roots of civilization in a given area.) Plus effects on climate (I don’t mean full-on “nuclear winter,” but that which Thera, Krakatoa, etc., achieved before them through ash and dust.) If you want to destroy targets for military reasons, definitely go with tungsten. If you want to convince someone that their society as they know it will cease to exist if they go too far, you need nukes. (Or bioweapons, but those genies don’t obey their masters’ wishes. Just because you can doesn’t mean you should and all that.)
ah yes, i wasn’t thinking of replacing one with the other, two different roles entirely as you say, just curious whether redundant sub silo’s resulting from treaty obligations might render opportunities for something more effective than a conventional cruise missile………….?
JBT,
Now that’s an interesting thought. The only real hitch I can see is my assumption (made by someone who was crap at higher maths :) that they’d have a trajectory more like a ballistic missile’s than, say, TLAM/Harpoon/etc. Thence back to the “does the other side panic and overreact?” But if there are ways for that to not be an issue, then you have a way around a number of tactical/aerodynamic limitations on cruise, if you can target them for maximum effect. (Probably still want a mix of them-plus-cruise.) And then, when you absolutely positively need to give someone a bollocking overnight, prompt global strike is in the hands of the senior service and I’ll buy Jed the first round … :)
Well is this the confirmation we’ve all been dreading:
“MOD to pay for Trident Renewal”
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-10812825
Apparently Mr Osbourne has been very firm and unambiguous on the matter and has probably pissed a lot of people off
Under these circumstances (I’m not expecting the treasury to increase the MOD budget to cover the cost), with trident renewal eating up half the procurement budget, I’m moving my vote from yes to CASD to how cheaply can we keep them in a shed, otherwise the conventional forces are screwed
Sorry to cross-post, main post is in the “Or Are We?” and it’s far too long to type in again (or cut & paste). My choice is option 3, but with bells on.
Re: “Some clever fellow . . .”
JBT, you don’t half ask daft questions. Or am I just daft for trying to answer them?
Came acress a reference to “KE penetrator” payloads for Trident II in the Wikipedia entry, and others have commented on the RAND proposal from way-back. Both of them were light on facts and destructive potential, so (god help me) I thought I’d rough out some calcs. on the back of a cereal packet (I’m a non-smoker ;-)
For those of you with a low tolerance to Mathematics, skip to the bottom of the post . . :-D
The basic outline was to find the “rod from god” mass and dimensions. Then work out the terminal velocity (Vt) and from there find the Kinetic Energy (KE) release on impact. so then, here we go! By the way I really do’t like “rods from God” or “Kinetic Penetrators” so from here on in I’ll be calling them a “Dart”.
After reminding myself of conical and cylindrical volumes, and finding the density of Tungsten, I quickly realised that the limiting factor would be the payload of Trident as the initial mass calcs for a single 1.5m x 0.25m dart was 23 tonnes! Looking on the web, I quickly found no payload figures for the missile, but looking at http://www.fas.org public facing USN websites and wikipedia again, I found that the 3rd stage carries 5 W88 warheads in Mk5 RVs (over 880lbs each), a de-orbiting rocket, the baseplate and pen-aids – so I assumed that the total payload was in the 7.5 to 10 tonne range. Looking at the diagrams on the web I have assumed a total of 36 darts in two concentric rings. Running through the mass calcs iteratively I found a dart size of 750mm overall with a base diameter of 50mm with reduction to a point over the last third:
dart volume:
cyl vol : pi*r^2= 3.14159*500*sqrd(25)= 981746.875mm3
cone vol : 1/3*pi*r^2*h= 1/3*3.14159*sqrd(25)*250= 163624.479mm3
total vol : 981746.875 + 163624.479= 1145371.354mm3
dart mass:
p*v = 0.1925g/mm3*1145371.354mm3= 220483.99g= 220.484kg= 0.22tonnes
Tot. mass : 36*0.22= 7.94tonnes
Of course for maximum irony, you should really use depleted uranium for the darts, but the density of DU is .191g/mm3 so the effects are very similar to tungsten, but slightly worse and wityh a weaker material!
Dart Vt:
Next came the tricky part, finding Vt. Wikipedia and Goddard Research Centre both came up with a rough & ready calc to use (so I know it’s right):
Vt= sqrt((2*m*g)/(Cd*p*a))
- where m=mass of dart, g=gravitational acceleration, Cd= drag coeficient, p=air density & a= max crossectional area of dart.
The values I chose are p=1.2754kg/m3 (though I know it varies with altitude, but it would have made the calc integral!!!) and Cd=0.02 (about twice as slippery as an F-104. After all they’re the same shape and yet the dart has no wings, air intakes or rivet holes to worry about). A= 3.14159*sqrd(25)= 1963.49mm2= 0.00196m2
Plugging these numbers into the formula
= sqrt((2*220.484*9.81)/(0.02*1.2754*0.00196))= sqrt(4325.89608/0.00005)= 9301.50104m/s = 33485.4kmph= 18610.97 mph= Mach 24.47!!
For stat freaks Vt is reached after a free fall of 949 seconds (15 minutes 49 seconds) and a vertical distance of 9.31km (5.79 miles)
Dart Kinetic Energy:
On the home straight now, the difficult assumptions are behind us, only formulae ahead!
KE=0.5*m(v)2
- where m= mass of rod, v= Vt of rod.
= 0.5*(220.484*(9301.50104)2)= 9537918311joules= 9.538Gjoules.
As 1 tonn(e) TNT= 4.184Gjoules, thus 1 dart impact= 9.583/4.184= 2.279636711 Ton TNT
For all 36 darts total destructive effect= 36*2.28= 82.08 ton TNT or approx. 0.1Kt TNT.
Dart Penetration Depth:
Newtons penetration law for fast projectiles gives us the following formula:
D= l(a/b)
– where D= penetration depth, l= length of projectile (m), a= density of projectile (kg/m3) and b= density of target (kg/m3). The density of concrete= 2371kg/m3 and for sandstone= 1450kg/m3.
= 0.75*(19250/2371)= 6.089m in concrete
= 0.75*(19250/1450)= 9.957m in sandstone
Conclusions:
If that sounds unimpressive, it is. By conventional standards the Tall Boy earthquake bomb of WW2 was the equivalent of 3tons TNT, while Grandslam was the equivalent of 6tons TNT. Of course each of the 5*W88 fusion warheads in a Trident II are =475Kt each.
The interesting but is the penetration depth. For comparison Durandal had a penetration of 0.4m in concrete while the BLU-118 Thermobaric bomb has a penetration of 3.4m in concrete, so this weapon would make an excellent “bunker-buster.
Jackstaff has raised the “will the other side overreact” question. The Wikipedia article on Conventional Trident quoted President Putin as saying that the CIS sould be panicked into a nuclear retaliation of these weapons are used. But the low yield, lack ot blast effects (presumably in the line of impact and not spherical like a chemical explosion) and no radiation (unless you used DU for your darts), might make nuclear retaliation by the targetted country harder to defend.
The main problems with this weapon system will be stopping the dispersion of the “flock” of darts on the descent. This could be due to wind dispersion or the angle of reentry and will increase the CEP to unacceptable margins. Fitting moveable fins and a basic GPS or comms chip in the tail should fix this. if the darts keep a constant distance from eachother (radio-location), then a single master with 38 slaves should be avoided, or an ABM system could disperse the whole flock by killing one dart!
so, then. My head hurts after all that. You lot only got the finished article, not all the failed tries and refinements I iterated throuhg over the last week. Thankfully a Schools IT helpdesk is a quiet place in August!! I’m off to put a bag of peas on my head and lay down in a dark room.
Thank-you, and good-night ;-)
“After reminding myself of conical and cylindrical volumes”
dave that funny looking thing at the front of the house, you know the thing the letters come through, you really really need to go see what’s on the other side of that!!! ;-)
Bloody hell Dave!
Dave,
**Is publicly not worthy of Dave’s post**
Although you’re right Paul, at the very least Double-D needs an invite to a primitively upholstered location for communal sociability known as a “pub,” where he can catch up on his non-metric conversion tables ordering something known (in a doughty survival from Middle English) as a “pint.” After that post-in-a-post I’d buy it for him so long as he doesn’t drink shite industrial lagers ….
Also:
“a rough & ready calc to use (so I know it’s right)”
There, gentlemen, beats the heart of a true engineer.
Aww, shuck guys . . . . ;-)
And to think, I *failed* A-level maths (pure & applied; stats is for politicians).
I scraped an E by about 4 marks, god bless decision maths is all I can say.
Of course, if anyone wants to take me down the pub, mine’s a pint of Strongbow. Oh, and we may as well have a game of . . . um, 301? Nearest the bull? :-)