Is Talisman Too Little Too Late?
I have held off posting anything on current IED equipment for obvious reasons, but now that the UK’s Counter Improvised Explosive Device (C-IED) capability, known as TALISIMAN, has made its public debut at the Defence Vehicle Dynamics show, I thought a bit of background might be useful.
There has been a high intensity programme within the MoD to counter the ever changing IED threat for some time now, an obvious reaction to the Taleban tactic of pushing out IED’s left, right and centre.
Southern Africa, Bosnia, Iraq and Afghanistan have presented different challenges, for a very informative look at the changing nature of IED’s in Afghanistan have a look here. Whilst those in Iraq would generally use military grade explosives/surplus munitions, Afghan IED’s tend to use ‘home brew’ explosives combined with accelerants, but are much larger. It has also been reported that the networks controlling the use of IED’s is much more sophisticated in Afghanistan.
The age old cycle of measure and countermeasure continues, we might deploy mine rollers so to counter them, bomb makers simply put the charge some distance away from the pressure plate. Larger devices are used to destroy even the best protected vehicles. As the COIN led strategy of increasing reassurance foot patrols becomes more common, directional anti personnel devices concealed in trees, walls and trails are becoming increasingly common.
We should not underestimate the scale and complexity of the problem, it is not going to be solved (if it can be ‘solved’) by the application of protected patrol vehicles and this complexity has to be recognised; the full range of military, commercial and scientific capabilities have now been aligned to meet the threat. In previous posts, here and here, I looked at the evolution of protected vehicles and the general subject of countering the IED threat, but Talisman represents a discrete capability.
The question remains though, is TALISMAN too little too late?
The story of TALISMAN is tied up with the story of mine protected vehicles, in the timeline below, their stories will crossover, this is another ‘put the kettle on post’ so apologies for the length.
Pre 1992
Particularly relevant is the Pookie, Spinnekop and its highly developed successor, the Chubby detection system from RS Dorbyl in South Africa. Chubby utilises a range of radically V shaped and open frame wheeled vehicles to both detect and disrupt mines and IED’s. They have been widely used, continually developed and are well regarded .
More on these later.
1992 to 1996
The British contribution to operation in the Balkans, UNPROFOR, IFOR and SFOR spanned this period (SFOR became EURFOR in 2005) and involved up to 10,000 UK personnel at its peak. One of the key requirements was for ordnance disposal and in particular, counter mine route proving/clearance.
The South African Mamba prototype was sent to Alvis in the UK and this ultimately became the Alvis 4, a number of long wheelbase Mambas were also supplied and these (I think) became the Alvis 8.
6 were deployed to the Balkans for use by the Royal Engineers.
Route Proving generally consisted of the vehicles driving a route immediately prior to it being opened, nice and simple! The Alvis 4 had a number of modifications including additional armour to counter TMRP 6 and 7 mines that fired an Explosively Formed Projectile, this made vehicle handling even more hair raising. They have been variously called Alvis 4’s, Alvis 8′s, Mambas, Comanche’s, Acorns and RG-31’s by different sources but for the purpose of this post, they are Alvis 4′s.
Alvis4/Mamba in the Balkans
How much might one expect six 4 speed manual gearbox vehicles with no ECM or comms cost?
Wait for it, wait for it…
£1.2million in 1990′s money.
Despite the cost, the Alvis 4’s/Mambas were a great success but the harsh climate and terrain of the Balkans combined with the extra weight imposed by additional armour exposed a number of limitations. The Alvs 4’s were disposed of and a replacement sought..
During the Balkans deployment, we purchased 3 complete sets of the Chubby route clearance system from RS Dorbyl and France also ordered a number of systems. Designed for the conditions of southern Africa the Chubby system encountered a number of problems with the weather and terrain in the Balkans, unable to cope with icy and tight mountain roads their utility was limited.
Chubby System
The systems were subsequently disposed of to a third party (if anyone knows exactly what happened to them, shout up)
UPDATE: Dr Richard North of the website Defence of the Realm informs me that they were donated to the HALO Trust, a charity that specialises in the removal of the debris of war. Richard has long been a campaigner for better equipment and the site is a mine (no pun intended) of useful information, analysis and discussion on the subject.
1997
The US tested a Chubby route clearance system from RS Dorbyl and the US company, CSI
1998
US forces start work on the development of the Interim Vehicle Mounted Mine Detector (IVMMD) system, using the 10 Chubby systems purchased from RSD Dorbyl. They were part of the Ground Standoff Mine Detection System (GSTAMIDS) Block 0 program, of which the IVMMD was designated as the Mine Detection Vehicle component.
1999
The Australian DoD purchased a complete Chubby set for evaluation at a cost of 4.66 AUS$
The US requested a demonstration of the Buffalo heavy mine protected clearance vehicle.
Another eight Alvis 4′s are procured for use in Macedonia and Kosovo for a combined cost of £3.3million
So the Alvis 4/8′s, all 14 of them cost a total of £4.5million, or more or less, a third of a million pounds each although this would have also included spares and other extras.
2000
After the poor performance of the Chubby systems in the snow, mud and close terrain of the Balkans, the MoD initiate the Mine Detection, Neutralisation and Route Marking (MINDER) programme, .
January, the MoD is up and running with MINDER, a ten year programme worth up to £100million, expressions of interest were to be in to the DPA by the third week of January. The prime contractor was to work with the MoD to produce two variants, MINDER RP (Route Proving) and the reconnaissance version, MINDER Recce.
The MINDER requirements are said to be ambitious, no surprises there, this seems to be a common problem with UK equipment programmes yet in some cases it is understandable. Recognising the likely use of IED’s and mines the UK needed a system that could operate anywhere in the world.
MINDER RP was to be a mine protected vehicle that carried a sensor suite to detect mines and IED’s, a means of neutralising them and marking a safe lane. MINDER RECCE would be fitted to the army’s Future Engineer versions of reconnaissance vehicles such as MRAV and TRACER.
November, in response to a written Parliamentary question the Chief of the Defence Procurement Agency, Robert Walmsley, stated that two contracts had been awarded to Ultra Electronics and Hunting Engineering, for the Competitive Assessment Phase (CAP) of MINDER. Each contract was worth £6 million and a bid was also received from BAE Systems, which was not successful in the detailed tender assessment process. Total expected costs have risen to £344 million and initial capability was expected to be in 2005 with incremental growth up to 2010.
BAe had partnered with Mechem (part of state owned Denel) from South Africa for their bid and included a development of Chubby.
US forces start work on a remote control option for their IVMMD systems.
2001
The Royal Engineer Alvis 4’s were replaced under an Urgent Operational Requirement with the Lion MPV made by Technical Solutions Group (a subsidiary of Force Protection) in the USA. Supacat fronted the bid with involvement from a company called Seafire and the name Tempest was selected to avoid confusion. Supacat carried out a number of modifications and 8 vehicles were obtained for a total contract price of £2.7million.
Tempest MPV
The TEMPEST MPV was based on a Peterbilt 330 unit with a Marmon Herrington 4 wheel drive running gear. The relationship between Technical Solutions Group, Force Protection, Seafire and Supacat seems a little unclear. Murray Hammick was named as owner and manager of Seafire and before joining Force Protection, was also head of business development for Alvis, a contributing editor for Janes and an ex Major in the British Army. All very complex.
The MINDER Competitive Assessment Phase continues.
The Hunting Engineering consortium includes Thompson Missile Electronics, RTS Advanced Robotics, DERA and Redifon.
It is clear that the resultant concepts envisage some form of articulated arm for disruption of devices.
As part of the MINDER programme, Pearson Engineering develop the PEROCC, the Pearson Engineering Route Opening and Clearance Capability, a heavily modified commercial wheeled loader. Videos and further information here
Pearson Engineering Route Opening and Clearance Capability (PEROCC)
2002
US armed forces ordered a number of Buffalo protected clearance vehicles from Force Protection after extensive evaluation in the preceding few years. The Buffalo is a heavy, extremely well protected and durable vehicle, designed to go into harm’s way and neutralise IED’s. The articulated claw is used to move materials and disrupt devices.
MINDER is cancelled in the Assessment Phase due to ‘technical solutions not proving adequate performance’
After several million pounds has been spent the Army is left with nothing.
2003
Tempest Mine Protected Vehicles (MPV) were deployed to Iraq in 2003 in support of operations around Basra.
Tempest MPV in desert colours
The Alvis 4/8′s are finally withdrawn from UK service in the Balkans.
November, US DoD initiated market research to meet Urgent and Operational Needs for blast protected vehicles used in route clearance and EOD operations, this was later to become the JERRV programme.
US forces deployed their Buffalo vehicles to Iraq.
The US Ground Standoff Mine Detection System (GSTAMIDS) Block 0 program is terminated and becomes the FCS GSTAMIDS.
2004
Tempest Mine Protected Vehicles (MPV) were deployed to Bosnia in 2004 in support of operations.
Although peripherally related, it’s worthwhile including here for background. The USMC requested TSG/Force Protection deliver the first 27 Cougar MRAP vehicles, these were a completely new design, not based on anything previous, although the obvious general principles of sacrificial components and hull shaping are self evident. The Cougar was actually designed by a small team including a British engineer and the first variant was called the Hardened Engineer Vehicle, first deliveries began in September.
The French armed forces start development of SOUVIM, a similar concept to the Chubby system.
Although the (GSTAMIDS) Block 0 programme was terminated, the IVMMD equipment was still in the US inventory, so was deployed to Iraq early in the year, immediately starting limited operations.
The Alvis 4′s are disposed of due to reliability and safety concerns, lack of spares and lack of road worthiness.
9 go to the Estonian armed forces, 4 to a US Security company (Blackwater) and 1 to Singapore
Total sale value for all 14, £44,000.
Some depreciation.
2005
The US subsequently adopted the Cougar HEV design with some modification and they are renamed the Joint EOD Rapid Response Vehicles (JERRV)
Force Protection receive a series of orders from the US DoD, totalling approximately $87 million for the delivery of 122 Cougar JERRV. There are a number of configurations of JERRV including a 4×4 and 6×6, subsequent orders number in the hundreds. With the earlier Buffalo, they revolutionise anti IED operations in Iraq. BAe RG31′s were also obtained by US forces.
2006
Tempest Mine Protected Vehicles (MPV) were deployed to Afghanistan in 2006 supporting a range of EOD related tasks.
March, Pearson Engineering are awarded a 2 year contract from the MoD for the Mounted Countermine Capability Concept Demonstrator (MC3D), a joint UK-Canadian programme that uses the PEROCC system described above.
July, the US 25th Infantry Division begins acceptance testing of the Honeywell T-Hawk micro UAV
The US IVMMD gets a new lease of life and the Meerkat/Husky combination is replaced with a single Husky Mk2, the resultant system becomes known as Vehicle Mounted Mine detector (VMMD)
By replacing two different vehicles (Husky and Meerkat) with a single versatile vehicle that can be used either in the detection or towing role, the logistics overhead is reduced and flexibility improved.
CSI in the US now offer the Chubby/VMMD complete system (the link includes a comprehensive system description and 2 excellent videos)
A technology improvement plan was also initiated that included installation of a Niitek Visor 2500 Ground penetrating Radar (GPR) system. The Visor 25000 is designed to counter the increasing use of low and non metallic devices and reduce false positives.
November, in response to a written Parliamentary question, the MoD confirms that
There is currently no formal UOR for the procurement of either “Buffalo” or “Husky”, which are equipments currently used by US Forces. The requirement for a route clearance capability to support current operations is being assessed by the Equipment Capability Manager and this may lead to a UOR in the future if required.
2007
January, the Channel 4 documentary from Sean Langan, Fighting the Taliban, is aired in the UK in which UK forces are seen driving around in Land Rover WMIK’s and the accompanying Estonians ride in their MRAP style vehicles. The Estonian vehicles, used to CASEVAC British soldiers, were the Alvis 4’s we used in the Balkans and subsequently got rid of.
See the documentary (in 5 parts) on YouTube here, here, here, here and here
Meanwhile, having taken delivery of 6 Husky’s, 5 Cougars and 5 Buffalo’s , Canadian forces are using them to great effect.
The technology improvement programme for the US Husky VMMD is completed and the resultant system is renamed (again) to become the Husky Mounted Detection System (HMDS)
May, the MoD announces the introduction of the Tellar munitions disposal vehicle, based on the Mowag Duro chassis already in service with the Army.
These will be deployed overseas and the image shows clearly a ‘non green’ colour scheme, they have ‘riot protection’ which might be fine for Northern Ireland but Basra and Helmand, not so sure.
The vehicle carries all equipment required by the end user to undertake conventional munitions disposal. It has also been fitted as an emergency response vehicle (blue light enabled), and is fitted with a mobile phone, force protection suite, a personal address system, and two Global Positioning Systems (GPS): a Bowman radio GPS, and a commercial GPS. It also comes fitted with a level of riot protection.
Each vehicle weighs 9.5 tonnes and costs around £415,000. 18 vehicles have been bought, with 14 to be deployed on operations, and four held in the UK for training and reserves. Tellar will deploy with the Joint Explosives Ordnance Disposal force on both Operations Herrick and Telic in the near future.
The article states they will be used by the Royal Engineers for conventional munitions disposal and deploy to both Iraq and Afghanistan. As I will show later, they will be used for Counter IED missions in Afghanistan where its protection can be easily contrasted with that provided to US EOD personnel in their Cougar HEV/JERRV’s, the vehicles that have been in service with US forces since 2005.
US forces in Iraq started using the Honeywell T-Hawk micro UAV in counter IED operations, flying ahead of convoys to examine suspect areas.
2008
US armed forces ordered their 200th Buffalo mine clearance vehicle, Italy orders four, France five and Canada, an additional fourteen
The Talisman project is born and orders placed, with BMT and PA Consulting as part of the team.
The MoD news release states
£96 million from the package will also be used to develop a specialist route clearance system known as Talisman, which will provide a new high-tech way of dealing with the IED (Improvised Explosive Device) threat. Among the Talisman vehicles to be developed will be the Buffalo mine-protected vehicle and the Engineer Excavator.
New and Hi Tech!
If that means Buffalo, used by US forces since 2002 or the JCB HMEE, again used by US forces for a number of years and a specialist military derivative of the Fast Track agricultural and construction vehicles, then fair enough.
November, the Talisman in service date is targeted at late 2009
The US Navy ordered 372 Honeywell T Hawk systems
Honeywell and Thales signed a teaming agreement for the T-Hawk
2009
February, US forces in Afghanistan commenced Operation Gateway III which involved clearing Route 515 of IED’s using the Husky system.
March, the West Lincolnshire Coroner, Stuart Fisher, speaking at the inquest of Captain Daniel Sheperd of 11 EOD Regiment Royal Logistic Corps, urges the MoD to use more robots where possible.
A video is released that highlights the scale of the Counter IED effort
September, Thales is appointed as Mission Systems Design Authority for the Talisman project, that will be £25million please. The press release states that as part of the services, Thales will supply warehousing.
October, the MoD took delivery of 14 Buffalo’s
November, the MoD took delivery of a number of Dragon Runner robotic vehicles from Automatika, a division of QinetiQ.
At a conference on defeating the IED, General Sir Richard Dannat stated
The insurgent has chosen to put his strength up against our weakness, it forces us into bigger and more protected vehicles, or even better for them, to stay in our bases and not have any access to the people. To do our job we must integrate with the people, and the insurgent wants to prevent us from doing that. It is time for expenditure on counter IED to move from UOR to core business. If we accept that we will be in Afghanistan for three to five years and beyond, there is no doubt that this is now our core business.
As he leaves his job, in August 2009, he urged the MoD to put more resources into counter IED activity.
Improvised explosive devices are a major issue at the moment. They are a major tactical battle that we have got to win and we need to roll out more equipment so that we have permanent 24/7 surveillance over the most difficult areas and so we can target the Taliban as they are laying these things
In particular, Dannatt called for the Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition, and Reconnaissance (ISTAR) programme to be accelerated, with data and images collected by planes and unmanned drones looked at and analysed by specialist staff who then pass the information on to field commanders, who are said to believe that the lack of these specialists is directly influencing the number of fatalities the British army is experiencing
In response, Liam Fox, the then Shadow Secretary of State for Defence said
Good ISTAR capability, in addition to more helicopters, earning the trust of the local population and increased armour, is the best way to counter the IED threat. If there is a shortage of this capability, the government must do everything it can to fill that gap
In the same month, Michael Yon published his excellent report from his embed with UK forces, Bad Medicine
This lays bare the shear scale of the problem, the efforts of high threat C-IED teams and the flimsy Tellar vehicle that is used by the Joint Force EOD Task Force.
CSI continued to develop the Husky system, the Mark III now includes a large number of improvements and their is also a 2 man version to handle the extra workload resulting from the Niitek Visor 2500 Ground Penetrating Radar and other sensors.
Over 500 are now in service.
December, the UK ordered 5 Honeywell T-Hawk micro UAV systems for $5.7million, each system comprises two air vehicles and ground control equipment.
2010
January, field experience with the T-Hawk micro UAV revealed a number of problems
February, whilst in Istanbul, Robert Gates, the US Defense Secretary, made the following offer
Today I told our allies that the United States will be able to offer them more intelligence, training and equipment including jammers, route clearance robots, surveillance systems and ground-penetrating radar
A BBC News at Ten report from Afghanistan is aired, a pretty harrowing account of joint USA-UK operations that resulted in the death of a Royal Engineers Warrant Officer. The report showed US forces using Husky’s and Cougar JERRV’s to clear the route. When the US Husky contacts a large IED the force has to resort to on foot detection. During this activity the soldier is killed. I don’t want to dwell on this because there was a pressing operational need to maintain momentum and we cannot know the full situation, but one is left wondering if the UK had it’s own Husky based systems, might we have used it here?
A couple of interesting reports here and here on the Task Force Thor, the US unit responsible for route clearance
March, the Express published a story claiming the MoD rejected the Niitek Visor 2500 GPR.
Commenting on the story, Tory MP, Patrick Mercer said
“This is yet another example of the Government dithering. American and Canadian forces are using this equipment now and lives are being saved.”
April, Talisman deployed to Afghanistan.
June, the French Army took delivery of the MBDA SOUVIM 2 anti mine/IED system. Similar in concept to the Husky, SOUVIM2 is claimed to be able to clear 150km of track per day and consists of two vehicles and three trailers. The first vehicle (designated VDM) carries magnetic and thermal decoys that trigger heat sensitive, trip wire and tilt-rod activated mines. The vehicle travels at a speed of 25 kmh and uses low pressure tires to reduce the chance of triggering pressure sensitive mines. These are detonated by the heavyweight trailer, towed behind the VDM. A follow-on vehicle is the VTR, which tows two additional trailers to tackle residual un-detonated mines to create a safe track up to a width of 3.9 meters.
SOUVIM 2
British bomb disposal experts have been ordered to detonate many improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in Afghanistan rather than trying to dismantle them after four members from 11 Explosive Ordnance Disposal Regiment have been killed in just over a year in Helmand, The Independent reports.
The US orders another 76 Niitek Visor 2500 ground penetrating radar sets to be fitted to their existing Husky vehicles. The contract included spares, training and maintenance support at a cost of $106.5 million, roughly £900k each. The complete set is called the Husky Mounted Detection System or HMDS
The IED threat has evolved, especially the use of low or non metallic/magnetic content so existing metal detection systems become less and less effective. Ground penetrating radar is vital in the hunt for these difficult to detect devices. US Husky’s have primarily been used for main supply routes because of its size but the NIITEK VISOR 2500 system has been miniaturised and mounted on a Talon unmanned robotic vehicle for use in closer and more difficult terrain.
US forces now have 80 systems in theatre and Canada, 21.
Niitek are now owned by the UK company, Chemring.
In the recent visit to Afghanistan, David Cameron said:
“My biggest duty as Prime Minister of the United Kingdom is to our Armed Forces and to make sure that they have all the equipment and all of the protection that they need to do the absolutely vital job that they are doing here in Afghanistan.
“I’m pleased to announce today that we will be spending an extra £67m on countering the IED threat and actually doubling the number of British teams that are there to counter the threat from those explosive devices.”
Speaking at DVD, Peter Luff MP, the new Minister for Defence Equipment Support and Technology said.
“Tackling the IED threat is vital for us to make military progress. C-IED is not just about the bomb disposal expert defusing a bomb, vital and dangerous though that role is. It is about making sure that our soldiers have a range of tools, tactics and techniques available to them.”
Research continues, UK scientists from St Andrews University are developing a laser system that detects minute quantities of ‘indicator molecules’ given off by explosives.
Talisman gets a public viewing at the DVD show.
June, MoD DSTL scientists involved with work on detection equipment are honoured by the Queen with OBE’s for two of them.
Defeating the IED
To restate what I said at the beginning of this post, it is a highly complex and difficult task.
The UK, with all its expertise gained from decades in Northern Ireland was the recognised world leader both in technology and expertise terms but as with many military subjects, we seem to have fallen behind the USA through a combination of resource constraints and what would seem to be institutional ‘drag’
This has prevented innovative technologies from being rapidly fielded and we now find ourselves having to play catch up.
Has this resulted in unnecessary casualties?
I won’t be so presumptuous to make a judgement but clearly the US and Canada have had some success with these systems whilst the UK has been prevaricating, creating project teams and appointing design authorities.
That said, it is very probable that the IED will never be completely defeated, they are simply too easy to deploy but we can minimise the threat, thus supporting an overall operational goal.
There are a wide range of technologies, tactics and equipment ranged at the IED and its supporting players. Whether it is the NATO project to support the transport and dissemination of full motion video generated by UAV’s, the comprehensive ECM equipment fitted to most UK vehicles in theatre, tri service mine awareness training, pattern analysis, Trojan breaching vehicles, mine rollers, forensic analysis of recovered devices or even a small kit to assist extraction from minefields (P-MEK) there is no doubt, the kitchen sink is now being thrown at the problem.
Our desire to minimise casualties and obtain valuable forensic and intelligence materials from deactivated devices would seem to have resulted in relatively high casualties. The High Threat C-IED trade takes several years to achieve proficiency, only the best of the best make it but these individuals are being used to the point of exhaustion and the inevitable casualties exacerbate an already resource constrained team.
The UK also has to contend with a legacy of cap badge rivalry, the Army has two organisations that deal with disposal activities and the RAF and RN one each. Although joint teams of course work seamlessly on operations the inevitable resource competition between the Royal Engineers and Royal Logistic Corps simply cannot be conducive to maximising effectiveness. When the Royal Army Ordnance Corps was merged with the Royal Corps of Transport into the Royal Logistic Corps, C-IED lost focus as other capabilities were prioritised, Northern Ireland was coming to an end and the capability might have been seen as niche. Although there are logical reasons for a difference in emphasis between the two, high tempo route clearance or deliberate neutralisation and evidence gathering, for example, this logic should not be allowed to get in the way of creating a coherent organisational approach to the problem, the IED is not going to go away.
For a glimpse into the organisational complexity of UK doctrine, have a wade through JDP2/02
A large proportion of IED casualties occur within a small radius of a FOB, self evidently we are not dominating the ground around these locations and don’t have the persistent surveillance capabilities to assist. Yet again, US forces are better equipped, UAV’s, aerostats and surveillance towers provide this constant surveillance. Perhaps the plan mooted by 16 Air Assault Battalion in 2008 to erect a network of Northern Ireland style surveillance towers wasn’t as outlandish as first thought.
And so we come to Talisman.
Talisman comprises 5 key equipment elements;
- Buffalo clearance vehicle
- Mastiff 2 command and control
- T-Hawk micro UAV
- QinetiQ/Foster Millar Talon robotic vehicle
- JCB High Mobility Engineer Excavator
All the components are well proven, effective and in service elsewhere, in some cases for several years. Buffalo has been in service with US forces since 2003, that’s 7 years. The JCB HMEE has also been in service with the US for some time, entering service with the US since 2007.
Whilst I have no doubt that the behind the scenes integration work is impressive, the speed of getting it into service is absolutely nothing to be proud of.
Talisman was announced in October 2008, which means the need statement was perhaps written 6 months earlier, that would make 2 years between need and deployment, hardly urgent. Remember, the equipment is largely off the shelf and in service with other nations, we are not pushing back the boundaries of science (we may indeed be at the cutting edge but there is nothing in the published materials to suggest this)
Critically, at least not in public announcements, the UK has not fielded an equivalent to the Husky with its ground penetrating radar, so effective for detecting low metallic content devices although other advanced sensors have been developed by DSTL.
Instead, we rely on hand detection as per the picture below, a Vallon, mine probe, 2″ paint brush and big set of balls.
The Husky is not of course a magic bullet, the picture below of a member of the Royal Engineer Search Team (REST) examining a drain for an IED shows how difficult it would be to employ a single technology; there will always be a need for brave and expert individuals like those shown in the pictures.
Effective tactics, techniques and procedures like terrain appreciation, avoiding vulnerable points and Op Barma drills using handheld Vallon detectors go a long way as well.
The overarching Counter IED strategy sits on three pillars, defeat the device, train the force and attack the network. Talisman concerns itself with the first pillar but an equal amount of effort is going into the other two. Attacking the network of individuals that make the devices, emplace them and supply materials is likely to be the most effective long term counter.
All three elements of this strategy need an intimate knowledge of what we are dealing with, for this, we need to neutralise and examine, not just destroy. With knowledge of how the devices are made, emplaced and initiated we can then adjust training, tactics and procedures to minimise risk and impact but when all we have is a limited set of tools the overall strategy becomes constrained.
Talisman increases the ‘tools in the box’ at long last but the box isn’t big enough and would seem to be missing some of the tools other forces in theatre have had for several years.
Summary
The recent UK counter IED effort is a story of missed opportunities, throwing away hard won lessons, resource starvation and piecemeal, fragmentary and over ambitious programmes that went precisely nowhere.
Talisman is surely to be welcomed, but we should not be patting ourselves on the back for speed of implementation, its constituent parts have been in service with others for many years and critically, does not include a Husky/SOUVIM type capability.
As we have been slow to adopt new technologies the UK has had to rely on the expertise and frankly huge bollocked bravery of RLC High Threat Counter IED operatives and other specialists from the Royal Engineers, RAF and RN.
And for this, we should ask if too a high price has been paid.
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Well of course we (us Brits), would have to go a long way back to claim any stake in the ownership of this technology. Aden perhaps – although there have been many attempts to minimise the possible effects of a mine blast on armoured vehicles since the end of the first world war. The British did not get involved as a nation in any of this recent mine protection effort. Certainly, and contrary to Richard North’s account, the UK had no IPR interest in the Mamba or indeed the Cougar MPV. They had, on the other hand, taken steps to try and mitigate the effects of blast on a number of in-service vehicles, but of course these were not publicised for good reasons at the time.
That said, I agree that we seem to be doomed to indifference when it comes to this sort of “cutting edge” work. I submit that one of the reasons is that as a culture we have always rather looked down on trade – and engineering is part of trade in the opinion of some of the bright lads who opt to go into the city or open up a stylish antique shop in the West End. When I think of some of the grey-men who are in senior posts in the UK defence industry or who are senior engineers in companies that are running these contracts it makes me despair. There is often a real lack of inspiration or operational knowledge and too many projects are run by people with strong vested commercial or departmental interests.
I also believe that there are not enough entrepreneurial types in the UK who are prepared to back small businesses in the defence sector. Further upstream there has been a marked lack of interest in sustaining the defence industrial base in this country as compared with the US. I was involved in a number of projects where the team I led had developed new solutions to old problems – but we were told quite specifically by the MOD not to send in any unsolicited tenders for this equipment as it would rock the boat. The system jogged along with the old and expensive proposals rather than try the new approach.
The costs of modern equipment are frequently dominated by man-hours, an expensive item in this and other developed nations. Can anyone explain to me why a large corporation should stint itself on man-hours when bidding ? Competition is not enough of an answer in my view. If you cut development time you can cut costs as it is simply impossible to spend that many hours of work in a project that takes six months rather than two or three years to complete. That said, one has to recognize that regulations are partially to blame of course; health and safety, RAM-D etc all take time to complete – and must make some other nations laugh when they see the millstones we string around our own necks.
Your comment about cost the cost of the Alvis 4 in comparison with the Bangladeshi vehicle is understandable – but not realistic. Take a good look at the Unibuffel and you see all sorts of rather nasty compromises in build quality and materials. The design is the older South African model where an armoured box is bolted to a high chassis frame with a one-man cab for the driver. Many of the components are probably either all second-hand or sourced from within stocks already in store – in which case was the cost a true reflection of the actual cost of materials ? And the labour costs ? Given that they were built in the army workshops I wonder what labour wage rate they used.
As an indication, and given that the Unibuffel is probably based upon an older Unimog chassis (possibly the 416 series), the cost of a sensible Unimog chassis which meets Euro-regs today would be well over 125,000 pounds for starters. That alone blows away the prospect of a 30K vehicle. The base price of the modern Cougar is about 450k dollars, which compares favourably with the base price of a modern 6×6 armoured vehicle at about one million apiece. (As an aside, if you go for a mil-standard engine and drive train as opposed to a commercial system, you easily treble the costs.)
And one should not oversimplify the pricing structures of defence contracts which frequently include onerous warranty terms and comprehensive spares and support packages. Not sure what sort of warranty, spares or field support you would get for your 30k UNibuffel !
But – going back to the earlier point, it demonstrably the case that we take too long to develop stuff today, which allows design-creep to set in as operational circumstances change, driving up costs and frustrating the User who can point to all sorts of “foreign” kit readily available – as happened with the Cougar/Mastiff of course.
Not sure I would characterise the post as implying anything was dodgy, just complex and it bemoans the fact that as a nation, we innovate but them seem to have a collective loss of memory, allow the grass to grow underneath us whilst other nations are exploiting some of our innovations. We then have to go back and relearn at great cost.
I did question the value for money of the Alvis 4/8′s because at over 1.2 million pounds for a handful of vehicles does not seem like a good buy if one considers the Sri Lankan’s can knock out Unibuffels for £30k apiece
Thanks for the excellent additional background, very useful.
The commercial history of involvement in the word of mine resistant vehicles is about as incestuous as any other area of the defence market – but not at all “dodgy” as slightly implied in this article.
The UK bought a few (I think 17 in all) mine protected vehicles off Alvis in the mid 1990s. By the end of the 90s Alvis had generally given up on this market as they had spent too much time banging their heads against closed doors. By 2000/2001 the MOD had also given up with the Alvis 4 and sold or mothballed them. So, when they re-discovered a need for them to act as an EOD vehicle they had to go back to the market. By this time also, Hammick had left Alvis and set up a company called Seafire which – amongst other things – worked with Technical Solutions Group in the US to market their products in the UK and Europe. Seafire, not yet set up with an engineering/development division, understood that an established UK prime would be needed and asked Supacat to act in that capacity.
The vehicle proposed was an Americanised and upgraded “Cougar” Mk1 – three earlier (GM-powered) versions of which had been sold to the US DoD. These vehicles had little in common with the later Cougar designed by the Brit at Force Protection (more of which later if of interest) as it was a South African/Mechem designed hull with a US drive train fitted to it. Supacat had to do quite a lot of work on the integration of the UK components as well as to deal with a number of quality issues to do with production control on the US side of things.
Incidentally, TSG was not a subsidiary of Force Protection at this time as FP was not even in existence.
The name Tempest was selected for the reasons you mentioned – to differentiate it from other Cougar armoured vehicles as well as the Cougar net radios in UK service. There were other major differences between the three earlier US vehicles of course, including a heavy TMRP-6 plate fitted permanently to the hull, and so the UK name change seemed appropriate.
The UK MOD considered a few candidate vehicles and decided to go for the Tempest for a number of reasons. It is probably fair to say that these included the more modern automotives (easier to support) as well as the higher protection levels and payload when compared with other vehicles in this class (of which there were remarkably few around at that time).
Hope this is of interest.
The general point I was making on that issue and in many other posts is that the UK has an abundance of military innovation but tend to see it exploited elsewhere and we have to go back to square one again. Talisman being a good example, we develop innovative techniques and equipment but lose that pre-eminence due to a range of factors and then have to catch up
Sorry – of course it is your web site !!
On the question of Hammick – it just seemed that Richard North was implying that Hammick had taken the IPR from the UK and exploited it in America. I do not believe this to be the case at all. Apart from anything else, the UK MOD never bought the IPR when it bought the vehicles.
Will get back on track with the other comments tomorrow.
Hi Leger, yes mate, its the same site. It was an attempt to try and unravel the extremely complex world of the blast protected vehicle.
Not sure I succeeded though but there is so much contradictory information out there its hard to know what is correct
Radios – yes brain freeze – I meant Clansman. But the radio fit and other internal work was still reasonable. My point was that the price was not that bad.
Have looked at that other link. Is that your web site as well ?
Don’t mind at all!!
I will collate these into the main article, as I said, I am extremely grateful if through the efforts of readers we get more accurate posts. Accuracy is one of the key planks upon which TD sits and although we always strive for first time right, we more often than not overshoot :)
Have a look here for a more ‘vehicle’ focussed post, the subject seems uniquely confusing and beset with differing opinions
http://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/2009/08/mine-and-ied-resistant-vehicles/
On a related but very minor point, I think the TUAM’s are for Clansman VRC353′s, not BOWMAN and the wiring and power fit for CLANSMAN were pretty simple and cheap; 24v power charging, some metalwork and coax. The cost would not have included the CLANSMAN sets either, which by then was long out of production.
Would you mind if I go through it in bite-sized chunks and then add bits later as I have time ?
Pre-92
In fact this might more usefully be pre-93 as this was the date when the first Mamba 4×4 MPV was produced and marked the date of the transfer of the South African technology to the UK. The Mamba 4×4 was a development of the earlier Mamba 4×2 developed by Mechem and produced for the police by TFM. For the Army order for the 4×4 version the Army’s old Unimog 416 trucks were used as parts donors and the contract was given to Reumech – which had a license agreement with Mechem but who slightly played with the design – which also upset Mechem.
The main difference between the Mamba and earlier vehicles was the flatter V. This was not the classic sharp V design any more – a change made possible by the use of more modern steels amongst other things.
The first Mamba 4 x4 prototype was tested in 1993 and pronounced a success.
1992 to 1996
In late 1993 two prototype vehicles were indeed sent to Alvis who had teamed with Mechem and then Reumech in South Africa; these were the Iron Eagle scout car (looked like a souped-up Ferret) and the first 4×4 version of the Mamba 2.9m wheelbase MPV. The Iron Eagle was renamed Project Acorn. The Mamba was called the Alvis 8 as it carried eight people. However, the South Africans were asked if they could develop a smaller vehicle which was delivered in 2004. It had a 2.3m wheelbase and was called the Alvis 4 in UK/world markets and Comanche in South Africa.
The RG-31 was a commercial copy of the earlier 4×2 Mamba built under license by TFM of South Africa after the production license for the Mamba 4×4 (or Mk2) was given to Reumech. There were many design and component differences between the Mamba Mk2 and the RG 31. And TFM never built a short-wheelbase version.
The UK MOD order for the Alvis 4 was a UOR. It was not intended principally as a route clearance vehicle but rather as an emergency rescue vehicle to go into a mined area to extract troops from disabled vehicles etc. To this end it had, amongst other things, stretcher mounting points on the bonnet in case a casualty could not be placed in the main hull. The TMRP-6 plate was a major requirement as the Army had recently lost men in a Spartan that had hit one of these mines. The Alvis 4 was selected as the plate would have been too heavy for the Unimog 416 running gear on the long-wheelbase Alvis 8.
The UOR meant that the vehicles had to be in service within a 6-month deadline and so, to help matters, Alvis lent the Army some Alvis 8s to tide them over. That is why some photos show the longer vehicles out in the Balkans.
As for cost and comms etc – the UOR vehicles were in fact fully fitted with Bowman comms. If you look at the photos on your own site you will see the wing mounted TUAMs – part of the radio fit – on an Alvs 8 (the Military Today photo). And let us not forget, the TMRP-6 plates were heavy slabs of thick ceramic and steel – not a cheap item to purchase by any stretch of the imagination.
The vehicles were in fact quite well regarded and with their Unimog automotives were able to go where others could not. The Alvis 8s were especially liked and were always being used to tow other vehicles out of the snow and mud. That said, the Alvis 4 were at the limit of their payload and this, combined with the fact that the Unimog 416 was an obsolete vehicle by the end of the 1990s made it uneconomical to keep them in the fleet.
Hi Leger, if you can point out any errors or omissions I will be happy to correct and include them. We learn and improve from the experience and knowledge of the people who read Think Defence but are obviously limited to how detailed a post can be.
Not sure what you are inferring about Mr Hamick, I certainly don’t have any axes to grind
This was a useful post – but included some curious ommissions as well as some errors. Also – what is it about this Murray Hammick that seems to attract such interest ? I note that he is treated as a pariah by Richard North and your post reflects this view. Perhaps someone could explain.
IDF and remote operated dogs:
http://www.upi.com/Top_News/International/2009/10/07/Israeli-K-9-unit-uses-remote-control/UPI-47741254925719/
This was proposed in Australia in 1971, but, of course the generals disagreed! OKETZ must have read our Army Journal…
Sensors & Software is a great manufacturer of quality Ground Penetrating Radar (GPR) equipment. Look at their equipment, it is very versatile for finding buried objects.
You are spot on with the breaching v clearing thing
Yes, they are both Mastiffs, you can tell by the spotlight above the cab and in the first one, what is behind it
Admin, you say that flails are “so Eighties”. I am just wondering whether they are that bad. They had a reasonably good press as a result of the part they played in the first Gulf War. We employed the Aardvarks, which proved quite useful in open desert terrain, clearing paths for tanks, etc. I think some are still on the books of the Royal Engineers, although I am not very up-to-date. They have certainly sold to many countries and have played quite a part in non-military humanitarian roles.
The Germans use the Keiler (“Wild Boar”), a flail fitted to the hull of a Leopard tank and that is certainly still in service. Perhaps they are more useful in minefield breaching than in mine clearance work.
Dou you know, by the way, whether the roller etc.- equipped vehicles in your photographs are British or American?
I think we do but some are command detonated or embedded in walls etc.
Flails are so eighties!
They just distribute explosive materials over a wide area making the job even harder, destroy track/road surfaces and often don’t initiate them anyway because of the nature of ground pressure they exert
One single piece of technology isnt the answer, I am just concerned we don’t have a big enough mix
kudos for another great post and discussion, here’s my two cents:
Current UAVs don’t have the wide area sensor coverage necessary to cover the huge amount of terrain that needs to be observed in Afghanistan. The number you’d need to cover even a reasonably sized area on a 24hr persistent basis is certainly beyond UK UAV operations. I have heard that the wide area sensors are coming soon but aren’t operational yet.
Aerostats and Towers increase the surveillance horizon of bases but don’t help the wide area situation that much. However given operations are less expansive now, they could be all thats necessary.
Airships would be the ideal answer, but I understand the main problem to be ground handling rather than any major performance constraints. Some of the new hybrid designs that are partially buoyant / aerodynamic lift and so can land unaided, could solve this but I haven’t heard of any successfull full scale designs
My question for this forum is this, why don’t we just have rollers/flails attached to the fronts of vehicles clearing routes on a regular basis because the devices we’re trying to counter here aren’t exactly sophisticated
Am not entirely convinced because of the practicalities of handling airships but some interesting links here
http://www.mineseeker.com/
http://www.lightships.com/otherapplications.php
http://www.americanblimp.com/index.htm
http://www.aht.ndirect.co.uk/index.html
http://www.nott.com/
http://airshipman.com/
Does anyone know what happened to Mineseeker?
http://www.airforce-technology.com/projects/mineseeker/
I would have thought that lighter-than-air UAS would make a lot of sense but the whole UAV thing seems to have gone down the fixed wing/helo high cost route.
Cost, weight, bulk and the restrictions of operating a nuclear powerplant whilst airborne
Wildly off topic.
Powering Airships.
Any reason we couldnt stick a nuclear reactor on one, sort of solves energy issues, bit expensive though.
Could we rip them out of retiring subs and refuel?
Admin,
Oh, I’ve read that excellent FRES post before, but every time I do, somewhere around the point where Big And Expensive gets its fangs into Alvis and the crib death of Tracer my eyes start to bleed. A few extra units of alcohol tend to solve that, but nevertheless….
I would stand in the terraces and sing for Mexeflotes, they’re a very good idea which appeals to my maritime-centered disposition. And I’d support aerostats and towers as a good “Ms. Right Now” solution to the situation in Afghanistan, before as well as coupled with Huskies or SOUVIM2, depending on who can demonstrate a short pipeline. In the longer term, given investments like the DoD’s, I’m not sure airships are so blue-sky or I’d wait for a less serious post. Given their potential multiplicity, and the relative varieties of them that would be useful in the military (q.v.) it seems like an excellent chance to develop platforms that can be tinkered with in various useful ways (ref. your comment about American capacity to evolve systems once deployed) and build designs that have substantial civilian crossover, playing nursemaid to a general industry. Actually not just Mexeflotes but several other of your suggestions for ship-to-shore logistics may have similar positive feedback since they’re developed out of first-generation civilian designs.
Dangerous Dave,
When you sift through more than a few decades of British defence policy, that’s a deep and telling point (i.e. binning the gear to deal with problems the services hope will just go away.)
A number of web sites noted that the MoD intend to rehull some CVR(T) to make them better able to withstand the IED threat. It makes no sense to buy FRES SV and upgrade WR, when you can’t tell them apart. The other stupidity is claiming SV replaces CVR(T) when the things are 30T different in weight. If a Warrior like vehicle could replace CVR(T) why hasn’t Warrior replaced CVR(T) in Afghanistan. The clear truth is that the troops need a smaller more vehicle
PS
Jackstaff, have a look at this post on FRES that has a similar format to this one but is equally, if not more depressing
http://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/2010/03/fres-scout-%e2%80%93-spot-the-difference/
By sheer coincidence, after I sent the previous post, I looked at the “Defense News” website. There was an item there about how IEDs remain the primary threat to soldiers in Afghanistan and have been responsible for roughly 57 percent of coalition combat deaths in Afghanistan this year. The article went on to mention how, in order to counter the threat, the U.S. Army is nearly doubling the number of NIITEK-produced Husky Mounted Detection Systems in theatre.
It mentioned that the main component of the Husky is ground-penetrating radar called the VISOR 2500, the very same radar that the “Express” (March 2010) claimed had been rejected by the MOD.
This move by the Americans lends support to the idea that we should have some of the same equipment. We do not always work closely alongside the Americans in Afghanistan so that we benefit from their kit.
The High Threat C-IED ATO’s from the RLC take years to train, they really are a precious commodity if I can be so impersonal and detached. No doubt they relish the challenge, its the job they want to do after all and hats off to them. Plus the folks in the Royal Engineer Search Teams, Navy EOD divers and RAF types as well, in fact, because we are drafting n other services kind of proves the point doesnt it.
Technology is never the only answer, I think we all know that but my argument is that we cant go about bragging how clever and cutting edge we are because the reality is, we aint.
If you remember the three legs of the strategy, education comes from knowing what you are dealing with (initiation methods etc) so there is a need for forensic dissection but like Dominic and Mike said, how far to you go?
What should we do next, I am not an expert but I think its obvious we need to do a couple of things.
First, stop sputing nonsense about Talisman being at the cutting edge and recognise there is a problem
Second, get the cheque book out and get the equipment like the mini Visors or Husky’s in theatre. Yes, we might still keep those research projects with Roke Manor and DSTL going but lets not over analyse and keep seeking the perfect solution.
It is interesting to compare and contrast the MoD with the DoD. Both have political and industrial concerns but look how fast they got Buffalos and Husky’s into use, plus they bought kit and let it evolve rather than using it once, giving up and giving it away.
Airships, very interesting but a bit blue sky. Aerostats and towers, thats going to be the subject of another post because it is achievable and cheap. Plus, it kills a couple of birds with one stone; it can loft a surveilance payload plus a TETRA/TETRAPOL transmitter which might not seem that important but one of the key elements of the next series of posts on close combat is going to be weight. One of the biggest weight problems is batteries, this is because BOWMAN is rediculously power hungry.
And finally, no one had best start dissing Mexeflotes, you know it is one of my pet obsessions
OK, four times faster than the Points at least, so if one can add the rotating laser dish on the prow then Thunderbirds are go … :)
Really first-class post. I’d agree that, on the ground, Mike W’s suggestion to shop existing (i.e. US and French) networks for buying off the shelf seems like an imperative until a clear answer to “double down or get out” emerges from MoD re: Afghanistan.
The intricacies of all the parallel projects and messy interconnections were very well handled here. Makes you yearn for the likes of Armstrong Whitworth and dear old vertical integration in yesteryear. (And, while this has not been the trend, I want my DERA back too.) This could really be a second main line for TD along with FDR posts. This post’s a perfect model: looking in detail at just how Britain’s dysfunctional development and procurement system got that way, how its wheels turns, and what human consequences result. There have been others like it I know but this one stands out for care and detail and seems to deserve a series designation like FDR.
Did someone say airships? I should then, like the youngsters say, let my freak flag fly. Unless someone comes up with a propulsion revolution that doesn’t generate obscene unit costs — and even then, there are other factors that have bedevilled the industry for over a generation –large scale production of wide-body cargo jets outside markets that pay sweatshop wages will be lucky to stay economically viable for fifteen or twenty more years. Along with ships and trains, airships are a natural replacement for much of that workhorse traffic, a good deal faster than the former and nearly as fast as the latter. And the UK, along with Germany and the US, is remarkably well placed to get in on the game. As for the military: unmanned units for standing recce and maritime patrol as DominicJ says, mid-sized units for rear area theater gear-humping, and big (seriously big) brothers for rapid delivery of medium-weight forces along protected sea/air corridors. (Slower than C-17s, but a lot more load per unit and probably three times as fast as the Points.) Let the Andrews keep their jets; roll on the Army/Fleet Airship Corps.
All right, now we can have a Mexeflote Versus Son of Skycat comedy post somewhere in the future ….
lmao off thats better than the road signs with directions to secret nuclear bunkers.
I’m not going to argue against a couple of airships hosting a few dozen int experts who can sit above the battlefield for a month tracking bomb makers with radar.
As long as it works and doesnt cost a fortune.
Could they later be repurposed as awacs or sub hunters?
d/dave,admin and dominic. Only just this week the US Govt has given the go ahead to build a football field unmanned sized airship designed to stay on station for 3 weeks in the ‘stan (lots of pilots poo poo-ing this on pprue, what a surprise).
No doubt people on here know this, however not well known is it’s been built here in britain!!! I know we trialled a version in the mid 90′s and it was bonk, but this is a different design (how i loved the irony of being gd cmmdr and making lads guard the “secret ship” all night to then watch officers wives go for a jolly in it the next day)!!!!!
HAV is the firm based in the south east so it seems we do have the technology. I’m sure (ish) that some of the wiggly amp stuff is been provided by uk firms as well
Admin, what a brilliantly researched post! I have tried to obtain such detailed information but failed abysmally.
How much I agree with DominicJ’s arguments, particularly his question: “Has the intelligence gained from disabling bombs led to a reduction in bombs, significant enough to warrant the loss of bomb disposal experts?”
Which leads me to my question, which is: What should the UK do next in terms of acquiring Counter-IED equipment? I did know that Husky was still in service with many nations, including the USA. What I did not realise was the extent to which it had been developed. Should we now be acquiring some Husky IIIs with Ground Penetrating Radar etc. under a UOR? Or perhaps the recent agreement between the UK and France on defence procurement could come into play here. The have recently bought some Viking BVS10s from us. Could we reciprocate by purchasing some SOUVIM2 systems from them?
Does anyone know what has happened to the joint UK-Canadian programme (MC3D), which uses the Pearson Engineering PEROCC system? Is it still alive?
dd
airship would be better, how much do they cost?
Exactly Dave
Yet again, we are found wanting. Aerostats really are cheap as chips in the grand scheme of things. They might not be the perfect solution but what is?
The US forces have loads of them
The only snag is, it would threaten the billion pound Watchkeeper programme, couldn’t have that could we now
@Jed
It seems to me that when HM Armed Forces come against a problem they don’t want to solve, they throw away anything that might be useful and hope it goes away. The RAF did it with the tactical Airforce after WWII, the RN did it with SeaLift assets in the 1960′s (Fearless & Intrepid being exceptions to allow RMC something to tool about it), and the Army have done it with IED protection and detection. N00bs. BTW, wouldn’t a high level arship/aerostat with IR, SLAR and high powered optics cover more ground with better endurance. UAV’s could then be tacked with following up specific leads.
Admin – superb article, well research, well written, love the time line approach !
In answer to your by-line – Too little too late? Abso-frikkin-lutely and the army brass have to carry the can on this one as much or more than MoD or Politico’s !!
You have a good point Dominic, I agree we need to look at the results of what we do and not be blinded by doctrine
Admin
I certainly understand the theory, but are the results bearing it out?
Has the intelligence gained from disabling bombs led to a reduction in bombs, significant enough to warrent the loss of bomb disposal experts.
I dont know how many bomb makers and workshops have been found and destroyed based on the evidence, but I do know that IED’s are being deployed in ever increasing numbers, so at best, the build up is slowed.
That then begs the question, are there better ways to find this information than taking the bombs apart.
A cheap, long endurance UAV with an infrared camera would be able to cover massive amounts of less densely populated terrain, if it spots a group wandering about getting up to mischief, it can follow them, or call in another UAV to follow them and call in ground forces to check out the suspicious site.
If the site has an IED, we can either raid the site they were tracked to, drop a few 2000lb bombs on it, or track where all the inhabitants move on to.
As I said, is the information we gather worth the men we lose?
Is there a cheaper way to gather the information?
I dont know, but it bears looking at.
And until someone is prepared to say, yes, dismantled IED’s have saved X lives and led to the deaths of Y bomb makers and Z bomb factories, I’m leaning to no and maybe.
I don’t thinks its as simple as that Dominic, many are complex and interlinked and the intelligence obtained from a disabled device allows other forces to go after the bomb makers or tactics/techniques and procedures to be adapted to the changing nature of the threat.
We need choices and options, at the moment, we only have a limited set
“As we have been slow to adopt new technologies the UK has had to rely on the expertise and frankly huge bollocked bravery of RLC High Threat Counter IED operatives and other specialists from the Royal Engineers, RAF and RN.
And for this, we should ask if too a high price has been paid.”
EURef is of the opinion that IED operatives were tasked with disabling IED’s in an effort to trace them, even when alternatives were available.
http://eureferendum.blogspot.com/2010/06/modern-day-barbarity.html
I can understand defusing a bomb attached to a bus load of children or a massivly important bridge, but a bomb in a corn field?
Tell the farmer if he cares about his crops that much he can try and defuse it, otherwise we’re chucking a grenade at it.
Hell in most cases just rebuild the sodding bridge, prefabbed out of scaffolding they arent expensive.
Sorry for the OT comment, but I would welcome any assistance here:
http://jedibeeftrix.wordpress.com/2010/06/29/future-army-structure-%E2%80%93-a-call-for-papers/
Kind regards
I think the consensus was on the front page they would be in full and then as posts fell onto subsequent pages I would use the ‘read more’ option
might give it a try on this one though
You remember a while back when you were debating hiding the majority of a post so we didn’t have to scroll for half an hour to get to the next post? I know people seemed against it, but might I recommend you do that when you post these mammoth posts, the other posts are fine whole but of late there seems to be a number of short posts and then one massive one.