Is the UK C3 a Littoral Combat Vessel?
When I started looking at the type of tasks that the proposed C3 or Future Mine Countermeasures/Hydrographic/Patrol Vessel (FMHPV) was to carry out there was a lot of crossover with what might be called a littoral combat ship, perhaps it is an artificial distinction, a ship that has utility in the littoral environment is just as useful elsewhere and most ships in a fleet have to operate inshore at some point anyway.
So beyond the wider debate of what exactly is a littoral ship, in this post I revisit the C3/minor combatant/FMHPV concept. Interestingly the RN has disassociated the former C3 programme from the word combat, wouldn’t want it getting confused with C1/C2!
For the purpose of the rest of the post I will call it a C3, just because its a term we all know.
Some of my blogging contemporaries like New Wars, Eaglespeak and Information Dissemination have been advocating a new approach for a long time, well before I started, this is my contribution to the debate they and others have well underway.
Thanks for the inspiration fellas!
Background
The argument between few/expensive and many/cheap seems to be swinging firmly to the few/expensive camp; CVF the Type 45 and Type 26 continue to travel upwards on the cost escalator. Type 26 may well be over £400 million each, Type 45 is likely to work out at over £1.2billion each when fully operational and CVF close to £3billion.
High cost means only a small number can be afforded, each one then becomes a strategic asset, almost too precious to use and catastrophic to lose. The Royal Navy has suffered at the hands of the archetypical procurement death spiral as much as any other. The desire to be at the cutting edge of capability forms an unholy alliance with political meddling and industrial issues results in over inflated costs and reduced numbers. As costs rise, numbers are inevitably reduced and the fixed development costs have to be spread over a decreasing number of production hulls. With limited export potential to spread the development costs and drive economies of scale, the whole thing spirals out of control; ladies and gentleman, I give you the Type 45, a design with plenty of potential but falling short of the superlatives heaped on it because of a lack of cash. It should have CEC, a larger and location diverse silo fit and a proper CIWS, but there is just no money for them and likely will not be.
Ray Mabus, the US Secretary of the Navy made a rather brilliant observation recently;
if we keep building ever more expensive, ever more exotic, ever longer build times for ships, we are unilaterally disarming ourselves
However, there is an entirely understandable desire for any naval vessel to be as capable as possible, have the latest technology and be at the cutting edge. After all, one of the many factors that made the Royal Navy the worlds pre eminent maritime force was its approach to technology and innovation. Another way to reduce costs is to standardise on a single design and purchasing in quantity to simplify training, streamline logistics but even this seems like a compromise too far for the Royal Navy. The design for the Type 26 might have been based on the Type 45 but whilst the final configuration has yet to be realised, it would seem that a new design is the preferred option.
One might be tempted to say that high cost is just the price of doing business, defence equipment is expensive and that’s that. This is to some extent a reasonable argument, but ignores the very real fact that all military forces have a finite budget.
Of course, breaking the link between naval vessels and eye watering cost is easier said than done.
The Royal Navy recognised that there is a need to tackle cost escalation with the various studies around the Future Surface Combatant programme and its predecessors, out of which came the concept of a three tier surface fleet.C1 and C2 would be ‘warlike’ and C3 would replace the plethora of smaller ships performing less warlike roles like survey, mines countermeasures and offshore patrol but has this been realised?
In a previous post I suggested collapsing C1 and C2 into a single design based on the Type 45 hull form to squeeze out maximum cost savings by enforcing commonality. My proposal was to have a smaller number overall but to make the resultant design, extremely capable, supplementing that smaller core with a larger number of C3’s. Pegging the Type 45 and Type 26 at six each creates a small but highly effective central core around which we can then surround with larger numbers of much cheaper designs to create a resilient and ‘good enough’ force for missions other than high intensity combat. Rather than burdening the C1/Type 45 with routine patrol taskings they can be used to surge, reacting as needed.
This smaller, high specification core, allows perishable skills to be retained and provides a hedge against emergent strategic threats but frees up funding for more relevant capabilities that are needed today. In a ‘hot war’ we would need every ounce of capability offered by a fully specced up Type 45 or Type 26 and we must not lose sight of that but the old saying that when all you have is a hammer, everything looks like a nail, is particularly relevant here and we don’t have enough hammers either!
Like a child in a sweetshop unwilling to decide what to buy but wanting everything, the Royal Navy needs a mother to come and deliver a clip around the ear, reminding it that money doesn’t grow on trees.
We use frigates and destroyers for tasks they are not particularly well suited to, placing great strain on crews and equipment alike. The overall effect is one of decline, gapping patrol slots and generally robbing Peter to pay Paul.
The Royal Navy needs hulls in the water and to do that it needs low cost hulls and a healthy dose of pragmatism.
Holding out for the promised land of more money is simply naive, a revolution in thinking more than design needs to take place and this thinking should be that the start AND end point for such a vessel should be its cost, not capability. Any resultant design must be single minded in its cost driven approach.
This type of vessel might be called a minor warship or naval auxiliary but we should not get too hung up on names, its a vessel for today’s operations.
Although the Royal Navy C3 concept seems to have gone quite as everyone gets over exercised about the Type 26, I think C3 has the ability to transform the RN. It is interesting to note that the Army and RAF have changed to some extent in the face of changing realities, protected patrol vehicles or specialist SIGINT turboprops for example, yet the RN seems unwilling to face the same reality, insisting on exquisite platforms and tacitly accepting a reducing vessel count yet complaining about the smallest navy since forever ago.
Missions and Requirements
Looking at the missions for such a vessel they are quite varied but I think the RN needs to shed itself of is fisheries protection, anti immigration and home water EEZ protection, these missions should really be carried out by the coastguard, police or the borders agency. Their only value to the RN is to provide training and career development so in this post I make the assumption that the job of checking fishing net sizes and stopping immigrants or smugglers sailing across the channel is carried out by others.
The majority of these missions therefore, become out of area.
The types of operation we could reasonably expect such a design to carry out are;
- Patrol, presence and diplomacy
- Mine countermeasures
- Piracy and smuggling interdiction
- Special Forces and intelligence support
- Survey
- Disaster response
- Aviation training
- Light maintenance and repair
- Non combatant evacuation
Most of these would be in a relatively benign environment. Where the threat is greater, they would be carried out in a larger task group and under the protection of the big boys.
Design Choices
Most of the C3 proposals seem to be a mini frigate, with space for 2 or 3 ISO containers and a couple of small boats, we have to be more imaginative because these inevitably become corvette capable but frigate cost. Many of its operations are carried out in relatively benign environments, yet because we must always (it would seem) make any design able to operate in a hot war, costs rise; yet for the most part, the capabilities that allow it to operate at the high end of the threat spectrum are seldom used.
When I last looked at the C3 I touched on the possibility of using a heavily modified offshore platform support vessel rather than a traditional naval design, when looking into the ship to shore logistics posts I did some more thinking on this and maybe it is worth taking further but in a related post, Jed made an excellent case for a more conventional design.
Speed
Speed is never a bad thing in itself, it supports rapid reaction, manoeuvring for tactical advantage, shortened mission times and protection against a range of threats. Unfortunately it comes with a significant price tag; to support high speeds in medium sized vessels, the extra propulsion and fuel space needed reduces volume for other things like aviation, sensors, crew space and weapons. Fuel consumption at high speed means that should that speed be utilised, the vessels endurance will be hugely reduced, so a long logistics tail simply transfers problems elsewhere. Dual propulsion systems can negate some of these disadvantages but at the cost of even more volume reduction, cost and weight. Speed also has a large bearing on capital and running costs, high speed engines and fuel are not cheap, maintenance requirements are likely to be high and when taken in the round, a fast ship is likely to be much more expensive than a slower ship of similar capabilities and capacities.
There are no wrong or right answers on speed, merely competing priorities that designers and users must balance, so whilst speed is useful, it comes with a high price tag in more ways than one. The fundamental question one must ask is, is speed worth the space and endurance penalty in this context?
For this application, I think not.
So instead of fast and sexy, I favour slow and frumpy, if there is a need for speed, we should rely on helicopters and embarked small craft.
Base Design
One of my recurring themes is that there exists in the civilian market, technologies, concepts and ideas that should be fully exploited by the military yet often are not.
The sturdy, simple, offshore Platform Supply Vessel (PSV) and its more powerful and complex Anchor Handling Tug Supply Vessel (AHTS) relative form the basis for my proposed C3 or naval auxiliary. In the harsh conditions of the North Sea and other areas the designs have been refined over the decades, they are sturdy, versatile, capable and more than able to handle high sea states and bad weather. Above all else though, they are cheap to buy and even cheaper to operate, it is this that draws me to favour a PSV as the base design.
Competition amongst yards, sustained by a steady demand, evolving designs based on operational experience, common machinery and increasing automation have relentlessly driven costs down. This commercial imperative to reduce cost kept the pressure on in a way that simply does not happen with military designs.
There are many variations on the theme; the Platform Supply Vessel is the simplest, designed to carry bulk and liquid supplies like containers, pipes and drilling fluids, prices range from as little as £20million for a small Rolls Royce UT755 to £60million for the largest designs. Equipped with anchor handling cranes, greater engine power and powerful winches, the Anchor Handling Tug Supply Vessel can range from between £25million to as much as £200 million for the very largest designs. The Multi Purpose Service Vessel is the Swiss Army Knife of the offshore industry and these large designs incorporate extensive diver support equipment, ROV handling and heave compensated heavy lift cranes. In addition to the three basic types there are also a number of specialist types including dedicated rescue, seismic survey and even coastal patrol vessels. They key to their success is an evolutionary approach to change and adapting the basic design to specialist requirements as needed. They show an interesting approach to innovation, one might imagine there is an inbuilt conservatism but this is not the case; diesel electric power, combined propulsion/steering, the Ulstein X Bow and even LNG engines demonstrate that if innovation has a practical advantage, usually related to cost, it will be adopted.
There are many manufacturing yards and design houses,including Rolls Royce, STX and Ulstein.
Going against the small is beautiful mantra, I propose to create a class of vessels built around a roomy medium sized platform supply vessel with an open equipment architecture that decouples the means of transport from the payload.
With excellent sea keeping the basic design should have a very long range, typical figures for this type of design are between 10 and 20 thousand nautical miles. Many people state that naval construction is much more sturdy and can only provide the kind of NBC protection and damage control that a naval vessel requires. This is not the case though, BMT have produced a number of papers that show how civilian build techniques can be adapted for military use. Offshore vessels are certainly sturdy enough so as little design change as possible should be allowed, remember, cost is the primary driver.
Using offshore vessels as the base for coastguard and naval vessels is not a new concept, Rolls Royce have sold a number of UT designs for coastguard use and the Turkish submarine rescue tender project has attracted a number of interesting designs from Istanbul Shipyards and Meteksan, the latter based an an Ulstein X Bow design.
Propulsion, manoeuvre and power generation will be a direct lift from existing designs, nothing exotic. Sacrificing speed for low cost and endurance, a speed range of between 12 and 18 knots would be sufficient
Approximate dimensions would be 100m length, 20m breadth with a draught between 6m and 8m and a deadweight between 4,000 and 5,000 tonnes. Of course, this is a large vessel, much larger than the Sandown or Clyde class but we should not equate size with cost. Large and simple vessels, without high speed propulsion systems and over expensive weapons can be very cheap.
It should also be fitted with an off the shelf, open architecture, combat management system and accommodation spaces for approximately 30 people, although hotel services (food prep, ablutions etc) should be scaled for 100 personnel. An offshore support vessel usually has large bulk fluid and dry powder storage tanks under the main deck. Some of these clearly will not be needed and could be replaced with dry stores or magazines but excess potable water, fuel and other liquid storage facilities increase flexibility and would also come in handy, so worth retaining.
The base vessel is therefore, quite simply, a maritime truck.
Equipment Fit
This is normally were we start piling on the pounds but we must be disciplined.
Straight away I am going against my low cost mantra (see how easy it is) and wanting a reasonable sensor/communications fit, sensors are perhaps ones of the capabilities that are difficult to just add on.
The Thales i-Mast is a plug and play family of integrated sensor and communication masts that are designed to provide significant through life cost savings by making maximum use of an open source architecture and off the shelf components. Masts are delivered as a complete, fully integrated and tested package, that is simply fixed and connected by the shipbuilder. The benefits of using a standardised mast are self evident, a little over specified for this basic vessel but it can be selectively upgraded from a baseline fit, rather than having top of the line sensors from day one.
Each vessel would be equipped with a medium calibre weapon, the MSI SIGMA A2 would be the obvious choice, a remote controlled system that mounts a 30mm ATK Bushmaster cannon and a 7 cell launcher for the Thales Lightweight Multirole Missile. It is a compact, relatively low cost mount, already in service (in its basic form) with the Royal Navy and appropriate in terms of firepower. In a previous post on littoral concepts I proposed a containerised SIGMA mount for use on a gunboat variant of the LCVP and it would be sensible to reuse the same.
A couple of pintle mounts for miniguns or GPMG’s should also be fitted but nothing more. In a recent post from the Combat Fleet of the World blog, just how ineffective automatic weapons can be against high speed small craft is bought into stark focus, so the LMM is a vital addition.
Although normally operating in low threat environments a modular fit of self defence soft kill systems should also be allowed for.
Mission Decks
Some of the emerging C3 concepts make room for a mission deck or flex deck, mission modules are container sized and the deck includes handling facilities. The only problem with these is their small size, it almost looks like they have taken a corvette design and hastily tacked on some space for 3 or 4 containers and a couple of RHIBS and called that job done.
We need more than this
In a typical 100m offshore design the shelter deck is usually around 60m long and 20m wide. In this proposal a large open deck would still be very useful but would limit helicopter operations so the simple answer is to build a mezzanine deck.
At approximately 40m length, the helicopter mezzanine deck could support large helicopters like Merlin or Chinook and a telescoping hangar fitted to provide shelter for a small/medium sized helicopter like a Wildcat or AW139. This type of telescoping hangar has seen widespread service with many military and civilian operators, available from a number of manufacturers including Indal Technologies and Aljo.
The single 60m main deck would still be retained but 40m would now be covered and protected from the elements by roller shutter doors. The open deck area would therefore be approximately 20m long.
The full length of the cargo deck would have multiple ‘docking’ spots for payload containers; each spot having power, water, waste water, compressed air and network/combat system connectivity. A gantry crane will support container handling in the sheltered area and a larger, heave compensated crane, on a travelling rail will be provided for the open work deck. This crane should be able to transfer equipment and containers from the helicopter deck or shore facility. In addition to the main and gantry cranes there would be a loading RORO ramp and even a stern ramp for easier loading and unloading of small ships. Some container space could be sacrificed for side loading davits.
Height of the sheltered deck should be at least 4.5m to accommodate large vehicles, small surface craft and HiCube containers.
The BMT Venator is a good example of the type of flexibility on offer from such configuration and the second video shows the Austal Multi Role Vehicle with its large hangar and RORO ramp, much food for thought.
In a high density cargo only configuration the 60mx20m deck could accommodate about 50 20 foot ISO containers or TEU’s. Even allowing for the partition door, RORO ramp, small craft davits, deck crane, stern ramp and a 2 container width full length gangway there is still capacity for a comfortable 20 TEU. If helicopter operations were sacrificed yet more containers could be carried and experimenting with different container length and stowage configurations reveals incredible flexibility and capacity.
There are endless possibilities.
Modules and Payload
The reason the base vessel will be cheap is self evidently because it can’t actually do much!
This is where the payload modules come into play.
For ease of transport and handling, payload modules should be based on standard ISO container sizes. Although BMT have studied this and concluded that the optimal solution is based on a bespoke design the approach of this proposal is to drive cost down, the cost benefits of adopting civilian standard sizes are obvious. They can be transported easily, and handled by the vast majority of port facilities.
Mission payload modules have had rather a poor press with the USN LCS but the concept is sound and there is no reason why, with perhaps a less ambitious specification, the UK could not succeed in this area, learning from the problems that have plagued the LCS. The most basic of modules would be derived from commercial off the shelf designs commonly used, again, in the offshore industry. Basic accommodation, tank containers, dry stores storage, refrigerated, laboratory, office, waste handling, ablutions, galley, mess rooms, washroom/laundry, battery charging, gyms, workshop, medical, diver support (inc decompression chambers), helicopter fuelling and ROV control are all available from a variety of manufactures including Asian Offshore, Diogenes, Ferguson Modular, VG Offshore Containers, Workfox, EPS and Strongbox Marine
For disaster support, containerised water purification and bottling plants, hospital and transportable radio equipment are all available.
Moving into the military domain, a plethora of containerised systems either exist or could be manufactured for small arms stores, ROV and UAS/USV/UUSV control cabins, survey, EOD, ESM/SIGINT, command and control, briefing rooms and even data centres.
For the type of missions that the payload modules described above would be used for, there is a distinct lack of direct surface or air threat i.e. they would be carried out where only a limited threat exists (anti piracy, survey or disaster support) or where it would be carried out under the protection of other forces (mine countermeasures for example) The lack of firepower reflects this, after all, the basic armament tops out at a 30mm cannon, a handful of short range missiles and a couple of manually trained miniguns.
Could it be better armed or equipped for combat operations?
Perhaps so, again the modular containerised concept could be considered; a containerised towed sonar array might provide some limited anti submarine capability when used in conjunction with an embarked helicopter. It would be an austere capability but could be used to provide greater sensor coverage, screening or deterrence.
Containerised weapons are not a new concept but looking forward there is no reason why CAMM, the Fireshadow Loitering Attack Munition and GMLRS could not be containerised and placed on the open work deck toward the stern. The Lightweight Mobile Artillery System – Rocket (LIMAWS(R)) could easily be resurrected and fitted within the confines of a 20foot ISO container.
These might be land based designs but would still be suitable for limited maritime use.
There would be little point in trying to turn this vessel into a frigate by bolting on traditional naval weapons like anti ship missiles but that is exactly the point, it doesn’t need to be.
Combat Support Boats, Offshore Raiding Craft, the LCAC(L)(R) and even an LCVP could be carried to support anti piracy/smuggling and special forces operations. The larger LCVP would have to be carried on the open rear deck but the ORC, CSB and even LCAC(L)(R) would fit in the covered deck area.
A range of airborne, surface or sub surface unmanned system could also easily be operated from the open spaces.
Crewing and Basing
By decoupling the mission from transport elements we raise the possibility of innovative crewing and basing arrangements. Could we use sponsored reserves or Royal Fleet Auxiliary crews for the basic ships crew and a mixture of RN, RM and Army personnel for the payload?
Forward basing and rotating crews in and out of the vessel is not the panacea many might think it is but again, worthy of serious consideration. Belize, Gibraltar, Cyprus and Oman might for example, provide valuable opportunities for defence diplomacy in addition to the practical benefits of forward basing. Transit times to patrol areas are more or less eliminated, fuel consumption is dramatically reduced and maximum use can be made of time for training and mission execution. The less warlike nature of this proposed design would support the political acceptance of forward basing.
By splitting the mission crew and ‘transport’ crew we also create opportunity for significant cost reduction. If for example, we send a Type 23 on an anti pirate mission in the Indian Ocean, not only do we take the crew that operate the ship but also all manner of weapon specialists, anti submarine crew and even those that operate and maintain the 4.5″ gun. Many of the ships crew therefore, are over trained and under used, each of those crew will be getting paid, have welfare and pension obligations and have been very expensively trained. If we now send one of these on an anti pirate mission we only send what is absolutely needed.
Missions
One of the main strengths of the large deck is the ability to carry a wide range of modules or stores.
If it was on APT(N) then the deck would be filled with vehicles, plant, ISO containers, palletised stores and small craft for the anti smuggling and disaster support mission. Personnel accommodation for Royal Marines and Royal Engineers field troop or two.
If it were on a mine clearance operation; diver support, accommodation, small craft and UUV’s storage/preparation would be the order of the day.
Want to conduct littoral operations like the type carried out in Iraq by the Royal Marines; simply load up half a dozen Offshore Raiding Craft, a couple of LCAC(L)(R), accommodation/stores, a Wildcat helicopter and a couple of Scan Eagle UAV’s.
Capacity makes an enormous difference, instead of stand off mine hunting using one Hydroid Remus 600 or Talisman we could go into overmatch mode and have a dozen on the go, including accommodation, command&control, diver support, maintenance and 4 Combat Support Boats.
Instead of thinking small, we need to think big.
Cost Estimates
Estimating costs is of course a very difficult business, but by keeping modifications to the core design to a minimum and adding only off the shelf or simple additions we should be able to get the basic vessels for less than £50million each. A recent order for 4 STX PSV 06 CD, a typical 95m Platform Supply Vessel, was posted at £37million each
The price for the mission modules will vary widely but given that most are fairly simple and again, off the shelf, should be modestly priced.
Summary
Where does this proposal start?
It starts at the need for a low cost solution because that is the reality, wishing for more more more is simply not a viable strategy.
It is not intended to be a replacement for a frigate or destroyer and so does not seek to match their capabilities. Down that road lies cost escalation and inevitable reductions in numbers, defeating the whole objective.
The key to this approach is decoupling the payload from the means of transport i.e. a low cost maritime ‘truck’ with swappable mission and accommodation modules.
The UK must be relentless in its pursuit of a such a low cost solution, a solution that can meet the majority of the non high intensity operations that are in fact the bread and butter of the Royal Navy.
In doing this we allow the expensive, yet still vital, destroyers and frigates, to be marshalled, preserved at a high readiness and resources concentrated on making sure they are the best they can be because when we do need them, they have to be at the top of their game.
To end with, here is a question.
Would you prefer 8 C1 or 6 C1 and 8 of these, 16 if you think we can keep the cost below £50million.
The FDR littoral series of posts is summarised below;
Part 2 – Hover and Raiding Craft
“There would be little point in trying to turn this vessel into a frigate by bolting on traditional naval weapons like anti ship missiles but that is exactly the point, it doesn’t need to be.”
I’m not sure I agree. Exactly how many of those 50lb bombs would it take to send a T23 or HMS Ark Royal scurrying back to port for repair?
Then theres more developed systems like
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/3M-54_Klub
The shipping container launched version of that.
It wouldnt make a C3 a “warship”, but they would be militarily useful in a lot more situations.
It doesnt even have to be that developed, since modern warships arent armoured to any great standard, how many ATGM’s would it take to render a carrier inoperable?
If you can stick 10 in a 20 FEU container, could spoil your day.
I’m ignoring the majority of the post for now simply to say that T45 will have CIWS, they’re coming off T42 as they retire. Does Block 1B Phalanx not count as a proper CIWS?
Aren’t the 1B’s on trailers in sandy places?
But on the general question, I think a mix of gun and ultra close range missiles (beyond Aster 15) would be ideal
All of the sets are being upgraded to 1B’s. So the ones on T42 will probably get the upgrade during transfer to T45.
Are our Phalanxes actually deployed to Afghanistan? I know ours were in Iraq but I’ve never seen what nationality the ones at Kandahar (and Bastion?) are.
Great in depth look there, some really good outside the box thinking. Forsaking 2 CS1 for 8 of those seems a no brainer.
Grim
Phalanx is rather showing its age now compared to goalkeeper, a bigger gun, thats networked across the ship (possibly fleet) with a much higher probability of killing an incoming missile.
Theres also the Rolling Airframe Missile, which if I understood it has the ability to successfully intercept missiles that are seconds away from impact.
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My Previous Post.
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Not suggesting we should try and develop an anti ship missile to be carried by the C3 fleet now, but just be aware that the possibility exists in the future.
Maybe get someone else to buy the ships as front line combatants and develop weapons modules.
Think Defence, a lot of food for thought here which I hope to digest over the next few days. Like you, I don’t think it heresy to start thinking of warships costing in the tens of million pounds (or dollars), rather than the many billions.
Interesting idea.
After watching some of those anti-small boat videos, I’m starting to wonder if even a 30mm plus small missiles is enough. One video showed a near miss of a small boat drone by a Sea Sparrow. The drone continued on.
It was finally finished off by a few rounds of 76mm.
Maybe the baseline armament should be a 57mm/76mm.
Yes it would be heavier, more expensive and require more crew, but the smaller guns just don’t seem very effective.
admin, tapping into your knowledge of all things maritime i have just read that the contract for ocean was a farce with vsel putting in a low bid over swan hunter as they uilt a civvy ship to “bolt” on the military bits. This therefore has reduced it’s shelf life and it’s due out is 2015. is this true? and if so what should we do for a replacement?
I got on to this via 2 blokes having a pop at each other on youtube but one of the suggestions for top helicopter carrier was the new japanese one (13,500t) and the one being built which 248m and 19,000t. maybe a good thread to debate i know people have mooted the french mistral on here but the new jap one looks good capacity to be a refueller or carry 4000 troops!!!
Paulg
Its not really a secret, its on wikipedia.
To be fair, a ship the size of sn Invincible capable of doing everything Invincible can, for less than a T23
I think all of our ships should be built to that standard
excellent article, thanks for the mention ? You start by asking if the C3 should be our LCS – I would say the first question is, what is our definition of the littorals and why do we want to be there ?
If we keep our RM / RN amphib capability as a niche we do well and can declare as a capability to NATO, then we need to get these vessels reasonably close in shore and then we need MCM and shallow water ASW. So the C3 becomes a mother ship for unmanned surface or sub-surface vehicles – OK a cheap civilian ‘sea frame’ can do for that.
Modular weapons systems, well that is gonna bump up the cost, by the main point of my article and my sticking with a “more conventional” design, was that we cannot afford a “high-low” mix where the low end vessels are pointless / useless in high end operations. They must have a role across the potential spectrum of use cases, and as electronics (sensors and weapons systems) are where the real cost is, I am not sure you will end up with a cheaper overall solution.
One last thing, ref: “If for example, we send a Type 23 on an anti pirate mission in the Indian Ocean, not only do we take the crew that operate the ship but also all manner of weapon specialists, anti submarine crew and even those that operate and maintain the 4.5″ gun. Many of the ships crew therefore, are over trained and under used”
I am sorry, but as ex-RN, take my word for it, that’s just not true ! If you send a T23 on an anti-pirate op in the Indian Ocean, then the “unused” (?) “TAS-apes” (sorry, sonar ops) form the core of your Visit Search and Board teams, they are the ones who go on the fast roping course prior to deployment. By the way, warm water ASW has a skill set of its own, and they can conduct valuable training while the ships trolls up and down its anti-pirate patrol line, as can the radar and EW operators. No one is unused, I can assure you (well, apart perhaps from the Wardroom Stewards, but now I am showing my bias against Supply & Secretariat ratings….)
Jed
How is using a Weapons Systems Operator on a frigate as a low grade royal marine not wasting him?
Jed,
“we cannot afford a “high-low” mix where the low end vessels are pointless / useless in high end operations. ”
We cannot afford a high-low mix where High end ships are pointless / useless/ not really suitable in low end operations either.
C3 should be a low end ship with a limited scope. Not a small frigate but n Ocean Patrol Vessel with a hangar / helicopter that can undertake expeditionary MCM and Survey with a third of the crew of Tyoe 23. No more than that.
C3 should be given priority over Tyoe 26. We could build them now, let’s say 8 of them and rebalance the fleet by withdrawing the Tyoe 22s earlier than planned.
Regarding Hi/Lo mix and the madness of Lewis Page.
Looking at Our Admins helicopter numbers, a C3 should be capable of operating two or three Apache should it not?
How much ground support do your carriers no longer need to provide?
How much CAP and fleet killing can they now do?
Interesting thought Dominic, not sure if it could ‘sustain’ operations for three Apache but it would certainly be fun trying!
Dominic
Ref: “Jed – How is using a Weapons Systems Operator on a frigate as a low grade royal marine not wasting him?”
Because we are not the Yanks, we are not ultra specialists, we are (sorry were, in my case) multi-role sailors, so just because your not being used in your primary role does not mean your being wasted !
I had many roles:
1. Primary role – Tactical Communications specialist
2. Secondary role – General Communications
3. Tertiary role – Gunner – both GPMG and 20mm courses!
4. Naval Gunnery Support specialist
5. Fast roper boarding party
6. Ships photographer
7. Fire fighting and damage control – like all Matelots, but I once did a specialist flight deck fire fighting course too.
8. General upper deck monkey able to help handle lines and bring the ship alongside, work with the Seamen during a RAS etc
The list could go on, I could have been a swimmer of the watch, or a ships diver, a marksman, etc etc…
Also ref the “low grade Royal Marine” – since when does the Navy have to rely on Marines to man every boarding party ?? So with all due respect, I re-iterate using a highly trained WSO as a member of a boarding party is normal, and not wasteful
Jed,
Good points about roles, I wasn’t inferring that we take specialists along and have them do nothing but that their very expensive specialist training is not always utilised fully.
“Because we are not the Yanks, we are not ultra specialists, we are (sorry were, in my case) multi-role sailors, so just because your not being used in your primary role does not mean your being wasted !”
I suppose it depends how you define waste.
I’ll spend 4 or 5 hours today doing data input.
I’m a management accountant.
Thats a waste of my time.
Unfortuantly, theres no one else available to do it, so virtualy every tuesday, I’ll spend 4 or 5 hours doing a task a 16 year old with a vague understanding of excel could do for minimum wage.
Thats a waste of my time.
Its an unavoidable waste, but still.
“I wasn’t inferring that we take specialists along and have them do nothing but that their very expensive specialist training is not always utilised fully.”
Thats what I was trying to say.
Admin
If it can operate a Chinook and a Lynx, presumably it can operate two Apaches, even if its only one, its something that the rest of the fleet doesnt have to do. It certainly appears to have covered deck space for three, although it might not leave a lot of room for working, so if we say it can operate two, and we have 8 of these out with na landing fleet. Thats 16 gunships available to answer calls for air support, those are calls that dont have to be answered by Harriers/JCA’s operating off the Carriers, which means the Carriers can provide more longer range strike and fleet air defence.
Even if it just operates a chinook, it can carry soldiers in its mission modules.
If we go for the middle number and say 12 of these.
Thats 12 more launcing pads for helicopter infantry, so a full company extra to be deployed with every wave.
Dominic,
Like your thinking
The thing about having something as flexible as this concept is that we would be constantly finding interesting ways of using them. The diagram by the way, the dimensions for helicopters were with their blades folded but I don’t think it would be difficult to operate a pair of Apache’s for a reasonable amount of time as long as the weather wasn’t too bad and they could fly to another, larger ship, for maintenance. This would be a useful way of providing aviation support closer inshore without having to risk a larger vessel like Ocean or even CVF.
Dom and Admin, my last comment on this, honest
Ref: “I wasn’t inferring that we take specialists along and have them do nothing but that their very expensive specialist training is not always utilised fully.”
But it never is, thats the nature of the RN ! Engineers go on watch and do routine maintenance on engines, but they are also Damage Control experts, however they rarely have to utilize these skills for real.
Communicators man ship shore and satellite links every day, but rarely have to work under battle conditions, chopping nets from freq to freq, re-organizing around battle damage.
Radar ops man the plot in peace time cruising, practicing their skills by keeping an eye on civillian air and sea traffic, but thats hardly the same as “managing the air-sea battle”
Sonar might be the worse example of all, sonar ops do not close up during normal peacetime cruising.
So, while what you think is wasteful is standard naval practice, your C3 should indeed be modular, and the Sonar team embark when configured in ASW role, your Muppets (MCM ratings) when its configured for MCM etc, but hey guess what, who do you think is going to fill the ranks of the boarding parties when its configured for maritime policing ops ? Yep, thats right, the sonar ops and MCM boys who are not deployed elsewhere in their specialist roles !
Jed
I suppose from our point of view, it looks like you’ve got Typhoon pilots chopping potatos.
From your point of view, the pilot isnt needed to fly at the moment, so he might as well chop veg.
Your right, it just looks messy
Jed, no need to stop disagreeing with us
I would rather those perishable, but jolly useful, skills like sonar operators and missile specialists reside in people who do nothing else (within reason) and not diluted by having to man boarding parties.
Wouldn’t it be better if we had a solid core of very high skilled personnel, constantly in training and available at high readiness rather than spreading those skills around and diluting them, yet still paying for them.
Surely it would be better to keep you skilled team in the C1 fleet and to enable them to be skilled, practice and be at high readiness by not sending them on missions that use neither their skills or specialist equipment.
This comes back to my central argument, keep a core of high skilled, high capability equipment and surround it with the cheaper but more numerous types that can do the bread and butter.
As for boarding parties, isn’t that a bootneck job?
Admin
The UK view of things is very much that if your a sailor, your a sailor. Your suggestions would take us down the US Navy path, look at their crew sizes compared to ours, huge in comparison because they hyper-specialize (in my day we used to be mean and say that was because they were all thick ! Not true I am sure……) Your not diluting core skills as much as multi-skilling, which is why in the 1980′s the RN had two types of communications ratings where as the USN had – 1 guy to type the signals, one guy to do crypto (and nothing else) one guy to tune the radios, 1 guy to man the voice nets, 1 guy to do visual signalling etc etc In the 90′s the RN collapsed that further, first merging the two halves of the comms branch and then merging the operations branch with the weapons electrical branch to create “Operator Maintainers”. Also with modern tech we have a penchant towards ‘lean’ manning, ships with smaller crews – this actually requires more multi-skilling not less.
With modern computers and simulation technology, as singe ship, not in company can run its own drills and fight as part of a full on task group – virtually !
Why do we need RM for boarding parties ? I know they are “sea solders”, but these are world class, premier amphibious light infantry, better than many of the worlds so called “Special Forces” – sure you might need them for maritime counter terrorism ops, but you don’t need the Green Machine on every patrol boat for standard visit, board and search ops, that is real waste of resources !!
p.s. lots of my bootie contemporaries did not like detached sea duty on frigates – not one bit !
This seemed like the best post in which to delurk, both because of the topic and because the way in which it’s handled shows why you all (admin and commenters both) are among the class of defence blogs. Just wanted to say that up front ’cause it’s true.
“Low cost hulls and a healthy dose of pragmatism” is right on the mark, though I think admin may have aimed a little too low on the opening bid. Lots of points for creative pragmatism, though. This whole approach goes right back to a very practical model for naval “operational art” from the past, pre-world wars. (You can count the Cold War in that too if you count the heavy conventional bits as mission prep for World War III.) Have a large force of sloops that show the flag, handle routine missions, keep sea lanes flowing, and act as maids-of-all-work. If someone decides they’re low-hanging fruit for a bit of national chest thumping, then a full line of battle fleet held in reserve will show up to point out the United Kingdom is not at home to Mr. Sucker Punch. And even in that worst case, with the loss of a sloop you’ve limited your losses (as much as one can…) in lives, ship, and budgetary treasure. Mix this with something that worked well in the world wars — the “herbaceous borders” of light sub-hunting sloops — and there you are. This thread’s full of good ideas about how to get sloops back in service, including real thought about how to apply things that would actually be novel to a proven approach.
Definitely needs to be multi-mission (although there are some deep-ocean survey tasks that will need the Echos or equivalent no matter what) and built in strength. Get this hull form and mission specs right and it will sell itself for export like no British naval project since the Leanders. Work off the Venator (or maybe the Austal but the former’s British-designed), because Jed’s right about the need for a ship that can still function as part of an outright war, or have “escalation dominance” (business-speak, ugh) over pirates and smugglers. That means a 76mm up front (more punch against surface targets and you might buy into Dart if it takes off and development costs get absorbed by volume) and stretching the 93m hull just a bit so they can fit an 8-cell basic SLYVER launcher (probably a 43)into the back wall of the retractable hangar. Body might need to widen too — speed’s not an issue, really — to support more than one small helicopter. I’d vote for just a pair of Lynx because airborne patrol, ASW, and close air are more important novel contributions from a sloop than transport. So the ships run patrol missions, show the flag, conduct various survey jobs, fight smugglers, etc. In combat their job would be twofold. First case, if the balloon really went up, they escort convoys well out at sea where RN needs hulls in the water and the threat is really from quiet diesel-electrics rather than aicraft or swarms of missiles (guess you might still get ALCM potshots but that’s what the fitting for point defense would deal with.) Second case, more common, along the coasts they would sweep for mines and diesel-electrics while the heavy mob (carriers/LHAs with the big escorts) overwhelm small boats and missile batteries ashore with firepower. That’s more of a warship but still at a light scale (no more so in terms of heavy weapons, say, than the little Danish Flyvefiskens.) Most of the capability is back there in the MCM/ASW/other missions bay, and Venator’s designers will need to get over themselves on the civilian-scaled containers, especially with the export potential. Venator and the Austal multi-mission still probably get you in around a third of a Type 23′s crew.
Acquisitions? Trade the last for Type 22s for three more Type 45s. Leave “Type 26″ out in the long grass for a while to redistribute funds. As these sloops come on line keep nine or ten of the Type 23s tricked out with new gear (CAMM, Sonar Type 2087, Merlin deck/hangar upgrade) which will work with the Darings in carrier groups. Buy a dozen of these (at least) in place of the MCMVs. Then you’ve parried the other services on cuts with the appearance of cuts (hulls and on-board numbers) but seriously increased your real capabilities.
OK, enough rambling! Thanks to your dangerously tempting widgets at the bottom of the post I have to go build imaginary ships now
“p.s. lots of my bootie contemporaries did not like detached sea duty on frigates – not one bit !”
Did anyone tell them it was the job of the Royal Marines to stop the Captain being killed by the crew?
Being reaistic, our sloop ideal would see many more multi skilled crew, not less.
We migh have 16 sloops, and 50 mission modules
Whoops, forgot to say hello Jackstaff!!!
Hello yourself, DominicJ! You guys do good work. Very nice point about the economies of scale right under the hellos. And with all that added capacity for flag-showing it’s an entire new set of tickets to punch for ships’ masters, which will please the brass
Jackstaff
Welcome to Think Defence and thank you very much for your kind words. If you are interested in the watery stuff, click below
http://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/category/militarythemes/seacombat/
Once again, thanks for delurking!
admin,
Thank you kindly. As for the link, I’ve lurked fondly among the watery stuff and should go add a couple of comments (not so long as the first one here though!
The whole site’s an area of interest but at the level of sentiment that’s definitely home turf. Thanks for the invite.
Jackstaff, do you think the deep ocean survey job is something that could be outsourced to a civilian organisation?
I can definitely see the logic of doing inshore and close offshore survey with a military force but not so much deep ocean.
If so then thats another vessel off the books (I don’t want to sound too gleeful about it but in general, one of the underlying themes to Think Defence is ruthless commonality)
As for up arming, I can see the logic of a 76mm Super Rapid and an A35 or even A43 but aren’t we then falling into the trap of specification and scope creep which will drive costs up. When I started looking at this I decided to start with cost, not capabilities. Unusual I know but fun from an academic perspective.
I suppose it would all come down to how much extra they would cost, bang for the pound as they might say!
It is obvious that my basic design has a less than stellar capability but that is the exact point. Basing it on a large PSV means an excess of space for modules so the example I gave for APT(N) and MCM could take advantage of this excess space. At the moment we might send a handful of small mines countermeasures craft and Echo as the ‘mothership’
With this idea, you could load up a single vessel with a dozen Remus 600, diver support, accommodation and whatever else you might need. This could then force a safe lane all on its own.
For APT(N) it could have a couple of fast attack craft like the Docksta Varvet interceptors on top of 3 or 4 ORC, space for the boarding parties and a helicopter/UAS. There would even be enough space for an RE Field/Plant Troop with enough plant, vehicles and stores to be useful in Hurricane relief operations, plus a small medical facility.
Its the space that gives it its real utility
Jackstaff – Greetings ! Great comment, welcome to the fray.
Does the handle mark you as someone who may also have handled an Aldis lamp occasionally ??
Only a few minutes (pressures of work and transatlantic time zones):
admin,
It’s a very good question and in the main that may be right, although there is of course a rich backstory to the RN doing oceanography (even climate research!) and a few issues, like trench mapping for the benefit of the subs, would probably need to remain in secure hands. But otherwise that may be ripe for a PFI (or in a better world, the RFA who could use a chance to develop those skills for the Merchant Marine anyway.) Also appreciate the reasoned counter-arguments, and the plea for commonality. I have some affection for the doughty Danes and Stanflex has been a good way for them to square a lot of circles. Economies of scale make it different for a first-tier fleet like the RN but there are still good things to learn there.
Jed,
Thank you for the kind compliment, but no, any boat handling (and the few of them have definitely been boats, not ships) has been strictly in civvy street. More a mark of respect and a play on words — both for the reckoning a safe path to the dock, and the American phrase “running it up the flagpole to see if anyone salutes.” Of course, I went back through the naval-issues posts last night and noticed with pleasure and a bit of embarrassment after my ramble that someone who knows more what he’s talking about had already reached the same conclusions. And it says a lot about what a good place this is to hang around that your first thought was of Aldis lamps rather than character names in bad Danish porn from the Seventies …
Hydrographic work just isn’t map making. You have to think of it as a branch of intelligence. And it is one of the key reasons why the RN submarine arm is still one of, if not the, finest in the world.
So there’s still probably a need for Echo then, no way it could be modularised?
Thanks X and Jackstaff
I can’t speak with detail (lots of reading likely ahead …) about what Echo and her sister bring to the process specifically although X may be able to (good point about hydrography as intelligence-gathering.) But it may be useful to think in terms of layers of capability, where the C3/sloop could make big contributions on the lower layers.
Modularity is key, definitely, and the very definite strength of your argument. Perhaps it may be useful to think of a single eight-cell VLS as weapons modularity in itself? We already have the promise (fingers very crossed) about quad-packing CAMM in SYLVER cells. Something similar might be done with the skinny Lightweight Multirole Missile and even with the next version of Kongsberg’s very nice Naval Strike Missile (probably one per cell there but I’m sure they’d be very happy to get it certified for both Mk 41 and 58 and also SYLVER systems, that would cover the world market from their point of view.) Then you can mix and match a variety of good systems, or not carry at all on very low-risk missions like surveying or disaster relief, while you preserve the whole modular deckspace for other kinds of resources. The real costs, other than buying very new kit like the LMM that still has development built into the price, would probably be in a one-size-fits-all fire control but I suspect BAe or Thales Signaal would step in brochures in hand very quickly.
Quick addendum: not a knock on Thales UK’s own launch system for the LMM, but they may open up sales opportunities if you can also fire as is from the built-in systems aboard somewhat larger hulls, besides the mounts on littoral boats (like your earlier suggestion, which would be wickedly useful.)
I wrote up some notes along these lines but with an eye towards converting an existing RO-PAX ferry design into a multi role vessel (similar to the HMNZS Canterbury), that could be used for many of the same missions as the PSVs mentioned in this post.
https://docs.google.com/fileview?id=0ByVQu4lA4SjvNTY2NmFhMmUtZjUyYi00NWNhLWE1ZTctYmEwZDU1YzJiODQ2&hl=en
The artwork for my notional T-MRV is crude, so no laughing.
Ref the Echo and her sister ships, yes Hydrography is environmental intelligence gathering and a vital military skill – that fact that we can sell Admiralty charts is a bonus !
C3 is supposed to eventually replace Hydrographic ships is it not ? Believe it or not…. and I know your starting to think I have served on every type of ship in the RN, but I did do a six month deployment on HMS Herald – but when she was deployed as MCM command ship – flexibility from the White fleet !
Ref “starting to think I’ve served on every ship in the RN,”
No, you’re just the very model of the modern multirole Matelot. (Get someone in Public Affairs to say that five times fast!) And a very good advertisement for the culture of utility seamanship. Also lets you tell the kids that you were flexing before it was stan.
I’ve wondered if some of the intent (besides a depressing presumption that the RN will always lose the major procurement battles) behind C3 in the hydrographic role was to pull it away from acting as a low-end warship, and segregate it in the MCM/support direction in an effort to keep up numbers on the expensive end of the escort spectrum. But I would defer to your judgment(and others qualified at the practical level) about how C3s could adapt in the role.
Selling Admiralty/Royal Ordnance cartography definitely shouldn’t be underestimated.
B. Smitty,
No worries about your designs; anything I tried might as well be in crayon by comparison.
I don’t know about C3, but what you’ve envisioned sounds like it would supplement Fort Victoria and her sister like the dog’s marital particulars.
B Smitty, can you check that link, it doesnt work for me. Would be very interested in seeing your thoughts and post them up for discussion
Try the link again. I think I had to grant access.
I really need to spend more time writing down thoughts on the matter.
Nice long blog post and comments section with some excellent points made to get my imagination working. I’ve kind of put back on my lurkers cloak so to speak but no worries I’m still reading the blog and checking the comments daily.
A big warm welcome to Jackstaff who appears to be very well informed with excellent points to make.
You’re thinking too big, C3 is an OPV with a mission deck, not a warfighter in any way, shape or form.
The littoral arena is the most dangerous in the spectrum of naval warfare confusing C.3 with such in a high threat environment is throwing money and lives away
Air defence will be limited to Phalanx or preferably SeaRAM, CAMM is certainly out!
76mm… introducing a new calibre for an auxiliary warship isn’t the most cost effective decision ever taken, there is a huge store of Mk.8 mounts/guns, C3 isn’t expected to ever be in huge danger and even if T26/45/C.2 move to 155mm mounts there is enough 4.5″ ammunition to last until the cows come home.
Start putting more elaborate sensors that would be expected on frigates and the cost easily expands to £100mn or more (BMT Venator would be in this price range)… costs that are comparable to a T23 but capabilities that don’t come close
the only way you’re going to keep a 2500T veesel below/around £50mn is by building a no thrills, enlarged HMS Clyde.
so 8 C.1 or 6 C.1 and 8 C.3 (there may be build costs enough to cover for 16 but operational costs/maintenance is another question!)… Personally I’d rather see 13~14 C.2. This is all ignoring the fact that C.3 will be funded by money that would otherwise pay for MCMVs, survey vessels and OPVs rather than frigates [all of which being generally cheap vessels is the main reason why a £50mn limit MUST be obeyed])
@alex
No offence, but this is thinking in “units”, not in “capabilities”.
A mission-deck-equipped C3 CAN swap in CAMM-containers and other assets, if available. For anything else, the TD-proposal is a very basic design, to be built “cheap-as-chips”. It is flexible, up to that point, where it can act as a small littoral mothership, today consuming a T22-frigate with equally bad AAW.
I also cannot more disagree, that an enlarged Clyde would fit the bill. Clyde’s cost are equal to the danish Knud Rasmussen, and look what the Danes get. They get STANFLEX-modules with Harpoon or ESSM aboard it’s OPVs, IF NEEDED. Even the gun is added by STANFLEX, because on survey missions a gun is not needed. They have a helo-pad, and – should i add? – they are ice-capable.
I think, the whole modularization-issue suffers from poor press as stated, basically because the the RN follows the USN, which doesn’t get it right (question is, did they ever wanted to get it right?). Modules should add ON DECK-capabilities as well as BELOW DECK-caps. This is why the Danes are prevailing. A CAMM-container or Fireshadow-container would follow the danish approach.
McZ
I appreciate that and understand the point however how much do stanflex-esque containers cost? and can this cost be justified on an auxiliary platform?
“can this cost be justified on an auxiliary platform”
First, I think C3 will not be an “auxiliary”. If it shows capabability to do something, it will take on roles never intended for. If there is no other unit available, it must take any task if it’s capable or not.
Second, I think the question of cost is mood. The Army needs a CAMM-launcher, so does the Navy. If you can fit it in a swappable container applicable to both, you save money.
Third, with rare VLS-space on T45s given, it would be interesting to take those modules to put on the free deckspace the “fitted-for-but-not-with”-mafia has created. So, we are not going to waste precious VLS-cells.
Fourth, I think of C2 being a faster (27kn), high-seas version of C3.
Fifth, a Griffon 8100TD can take on a 20ft-ISO-container. Thats what I would call a Littoral Combat Ship. How long would it require to implement it? A week?
Sixth, modularization allows the disconnection of unit-service-life and system-service-live. This in itself will help to drive cost down.
Yes, much stuff for the frigate-navy to eat, but unavoidable.
McZ, have you read our posts on modular containerised systems?
http://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/2010/08/fdr-land-towards-vehicle-coherence-part-2/
http://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/2010/07/fdr-%E2%80%93-land-logistics-and-combat-service-support-3/
Admin,
What do you think about the UT-527 design (Havila Troll being the first in class) proposed by Rolls Royce for the French intervention and sovereignty vessels?
http://www.dexigner.com/design_news/4835.html
“The latest design, the UT527, delivers firefighting, emergency towage and pollution control capability and can hold up to 320 survivors of a marine disaster. A medium-sized helicopter and two smaller daughter craft are also available for specific missions. It can remain at sea for up to three years without return if required, changing crew and being replenished at sea.
The 92-metre long ship, powered by Rolls-Royce Bergen diesel engines, would be capable of more than 20 knots and have an unrefuelled range of 20,000 nautical miles at 16 knots.”
UT 527
Class
DNV: +1A1, Supply Vessel, Tug, Oil
Recovery, HELI DK-SH, Fi-Fi 1/2, Clean,
Dyn Pos AUTR, EO, Com F-V(3)C(3)
Technical:
Length approx. 92.0m
Beam approx. 18m
Draught (max) approx 5.8m
Speed approx. 20 knots
Bollard pull approx. 130 tonnes
Deadweight approx. 1,600 dwt
Hi Smitty, I looked at the 527 when I was researching the post and yes, its roughly in the same direction of my thinking but would like to see a clearer lower deck and a more forward superstructure to maximise space on the main deck