Change the Nameplate Above the Door

As we all know, General Stanley McChrystal has had his resignation accepted by President Obama for allowing the now infamous Rolling Stone article to go to print.

There are any number of theories floating around as to why he did this; vanity, a push for political power with an eye on the Presidency, a sneaky means of disentangling himself from the wreckage of his own/President Obama’s failed strategy or simply a good old fashioned cock up.

So depending on your point of view, the General is either relaxing today with a mission accomplished grin or packing up the wreckage of his career after the official ‘interview without coffee’

Of course he had to go but was he any more successful than his also sacked predecessor, General McKiernan, and will he be missed?

Apart from asking serious questions why a General in charge of something as serious as operations in Afghanistan has time for left leaning magazine interviews or why the cult of personality around an operational commander was allowed to grow, the real question is not why it happened but what happens now.

To some extent, we know what happens now, Lt Gen Nick Parker takes over interim command until General Petraeus is formally appointed by NATO/ISAF (there are niceties to observe you know)

The whole point of a military command structure is that it is resilient and can absorb losses. Elevating the commander to rock star status means commentators often lose sight of this point.

In one way, there should be absolutely no change, the strategy that has been decided by the military and civilian leadership team should simply be executed. Self evidently, the existing team was dysfunctional and its deliberately created ‘creative tension’ did not work as planned so the management of an already decided strategy is the issue at hand.

President Obama has said that despite the personnel change, the strategy remains the same. Whilst demoting/re assigning General Petraeus may be a sign of political strength and savvy in reasserting the primacy of the civilian in the civilian-military relationship, there are problems ahead. The ball may be firmly back in the military’s court but they will still have to deal with a corrupt Afghanistan government, diminishing support within the ranks for the softer COIN strategy and a lack of focus from the State Department. There may be some short term gain for the President but long term, he is still going to have to account for the success or failure of the mission in Afghanistan and he is running out of fall guys.

Is the strategy right then?

To steal a quote from Sir Winston, however beautiful the strategy, you should occasionally look at the results.

After 18 months of the new McChrystal approach there are some isolated signs of progress but the Taleban still hold the momentum and numerous other issues continue to erode our capability to defeat the Taleban. The restrictive rules of engagement and legal briefings before every operation do not seem to have had much impact except make a difficult job even harder. The new regime may actually be more like the old one, a loosening of the ROE and greater use of indirect fires. Despite the PR and high hopes of the COIN theorists, Marja was an all too predictable disaster and one wonders if the upcoming and oft delayed operation in Kandahar is going to be equally ineffective?

Much like the UK forces tried to apply the lessons of Northern Ireland in Basra, ISAF is applying the lessons of Iraq in Afghanistan. With our Westernised way of doing things and concern for the population we simply create opportunities for others to exploit. The ANSF are being trained in a Western style and not for their own environment and culture, ultimately dooming them to failure. We certainly have not won of the majority of Afghan population and when we are sacking our own political envoys because they don’t agree with the current US strategy then there is cause for concern about our strategy.

As I mentioned in a previous post, the Afghans seem to enjoy the status quo and milking the Western tit for as long as possible. We are being played and need to recognise that our security interests lie elsewhere. The reason the Taleban seem to enjoy so much influence is partly because we attribute it to them, when in fact they are irrelevant in the wider scheme.

There is nothing quite like being told you are irrelevant to knock the wind out of ones sails.

Most of the ‘Afghanistan is the  graveyard of empires’ talk is ridiculous hyperbole and the comparisons with the Russian occupation show very little association with fact, the Russians lost 26,000 personnel and had less in theatre than do ISAF and the Afghans had an estimated one million casualties. If there are any lessons to learn, perhaps we should look up the tactically flawless withdrawal of Soviet forces.

I have no doubt we could eventually prevail with the right strategy, sufficient resources and unity of purpose but the key question is, why do we need to prevail.

This is an opportunity missed, to have a serious rethink about Afghanistan, what are our objectives, is there unity of purpose/effort, are resources appropriate, is the strategy the right one and finally, is it worth the cost in blood and treasure?

Much of the talk is about the military desire to ‘crack on’ or wanting to win at all costs, without recognising that strategic withdrawal to go and fight somewhere more important is a valid military option.

I used to think that a precipitous withdrawal would be a big mistake, nature abhors a vacuum and the resultant inrush would pull in all manner of malignant factions, the final outcome being difficult to predict, but maybe we just have to recognise that Afghanistan needs an Afghanistan solution. We might worry endlessly about the results of such as withdrawal; an emboldened Iran, the break up Pakistan or Pakistani nuclear warheads falling into the hands of Al Qaida but if we try and hedge against every eventuality then we will be led by the nose from one engagement to the other and get suckered more and more until we have no blood or treasure left to give. Those with an interest in the outcome; India, China, Russia and Iran are all conspicuous in their absence, being forced to address the prospect of radical islamist terrorism being exported from Afghanistan to Chinese Sianking, the southern former Soviet ‘stans’ and the central Indian states might focus minds somewhat. Instead, they are happy to play games whilst the West walks all the hard yards.

The prospect of all that potential mineral wealth might also galvanise regional diplomacy.

Rather than grandiose ambitions building a nation in the mould of the West; a focussed provincial approach, supported by aggressive special operations and lots of hard nosed political deal making may be a more suitable way to find the exit door.

As we debate the finer points, yet more ISAF/Afghan soldiers and civilians are being killed and wounded, cash we don’t have is being poured into the desert and the real threats to our collective security go underfunded because of the cash hoover that is Afghanistan.

There are any number of threats that are being ignored or underfunded; the Falkland Islands, home grown Islamic terrorism, energy/water/food security, piracy on the high seas, drug smuggling, cyber attack and that is before we even look at the economic situation.

Take your pick, but they are all more important than creating a stable Afghanistan with clean water and education for girls, however laudable that goal is.

So whilst we all concern ourselves with the man, shouldn’t we actually be looking at the strategy, or more fundamentally, what are we trying to achieve with that strategy?

Tags: Afghanistan