Think Defence hopes to start sensible conversations about UK defence issues, no agenda or no campaign but there might be one or two posts on containers, bridges and mexeflotes!
Sadly ours seems to be badly out of date (and very descriptive, without much prescription… isn’t that what doctrines are for?)which might be a reflection of the likelihood of actually having to counter the threat
“(Joint Doctrine for Countering Air and Missile Threats) (http://www.fas.org/spp/starwars/docops/jp3_01.pdf) endorsed by the US Navy, USMC, US Army and US Air Force”
Observer
@James
Schwerpunkt and CoGravity is a fundamental concentration of force, and indirectly, of capability or function (through high concentration of strength) and not a direct concentration of capabilities (i.e Carrier air, infantry etc.)
A Schwerpunkt (spearpoint) would usually have fundamental troops like aircraft support, infantry and tanks, not a single troop type only, and more importantly, have it in large numbers to allow for a big effect on the field when unleashed. I’d say the concepts you brought up are more related to troop concentration/supplies than a single unit type.
Might I suggest we stop looking at the Falklands and look more towards 2012 for possible problem areas? Why not use our current biggest headache, Iran, as a force comparison target? Makes more sense than fighting a battle already won 30 years back.
That would be
~40 F-14s, 60 F-5s, 35 Mig-29s and 30 Su-24s
3 Armoured brigades and 7 Infantry Divisions
~74 gunboats, 5 frigates, 3 corvettes, 3 subs.
If they threw the armour and 2-3 Inf Div at you along with 1/2 of the aircraft, what would be a resonable defending force that can endure till help arrives?
Simon
A dozen Apache working under the umbrella cover of 2 x Daring with 2 x Astute making life difficult for their subs/ships and chucking the odd TLAM at their bases?
Alex
I suggest that there would have been even more emphasis on taking out the Pucaras that were on the islands (more SF raids, and NGS onto the grass airstrips), and that the landings would have been made in north east Falkland, a further 50 miles away from the Argentine bases on the mainland. The biggest single mistake the Argentines made was not to put fast air on the islands themselves
A landing in NE Falkland was the No.2 option in COMAW and Thompson’s planning. It was eventually ruled out because there were too many no-landing days due to the surf, as a result more helicopter movements would be needed and there weren’t enough helis. Also, after the task force arrived, the Argentines realised the Mk8 guns on the ships outranged their 105mm and flew in 4x 155mm, which could reach the proposed beach head. They held the option quite late on, which makes me think there was a special forces recce of the site and that made their minds up.
Anixtu
Chris.B.,
“I cant imagine people actually joing certain services because they plan to just sit around in Oxford for the next few years or because they don’t want to get their hands dirty.”
I can. Taking the comforts of home everywhere you deploy is one of the benefits of a career at sea. I went RFA because the comforts are a few notches higher than in the RN.
x
Chris B said “I cant imagine people actually joing certain services because they plan to just sit around in Oxford for the next few years or because they don’t want to get their hands dirty.”
Yes they do. People like you and I on the outside of the services perhaps have too an idealistic view of how servicemen see their job. Well I would if I hadn’t spent a lot of time around service bods. One of my best cadets joined the RAF because he wasn’t going to live in a messdeck. Bobbing up and down on the oggin wasn’t for him. Another cadet joined the RM and seemed only to be happy at -20 living in a snow hole. I am always surprised by how many join the services without an apparent interest in the services before hand.
ArmChairCivvy
Hi Observer,
As the country is so big, you can see that the “outer edge” here
“~40 F-14s, 60 F-5s, 35 Mig-29s and 30 Su-24s
3 Armoured brigades and 7 Infantry Divisions
~74 gunboats, 5 frigates, 3 corvettes, 3 subs”
capable of any offensive action, is quite thin
Take it out and there is only a non-manoeuvre force left, to be dealt with
- Bush I was properly advised, and did not run into any Stalingrads
- Bush II probably got sound advise, but had an inner circle of fanatics… and the rest of history
BTW: 90% of CIA and other intelligence services staff never leave the good old USA; so if you have fanatics, believing in something, in the inner circle – and the next circle out is feeding them “BS” as “the facts”… what is bound to happen?
Topman
@ X
I doubt that many will have such exacting views of where their career will take them so I doubt many plan to join the RAF so they can be posted to brize. However being a ‘service bod’ I would agree with you on the last part I include myself in that, I wouldn’t say say nil as I have did have an interest in the RAF beforehand but it wasn’t very strong, no family members, no cadets or anything like that . I assume you work with sea cadets how many join the navy from what you see. Last figures I saw had 30% for air cadets.
x
@ Chris B (found your comment now)
Well yes a good number of air cadets join the cadets and the the RAF because they like planes. And many do join the RLC or RE for their tickets. There are lots of reasons why recruits join. And some are very calculating in in selecting their career path. Even down to accident (miss the bus walked pass the recruiting office) or on a whim. Oddly enough while RAF new entrant intakes or Army new entrants intakes will have a good number of ex-ATC or ex-ACF kids surprisingly few Sea Cadets go on to join the RN. I think there are reasons for that, but I am not up with current situation. Though strictly speak SC isn’t a pre-service organisation.
James
Good afternoon all,
I can see that I’m fighting a one-man campaign on the SHARS being “vital” (everyone else), or “useful” (me). I suspect no one will change their minds from this point on, so probably not worth pursuing. However, a few general thoughts pulled out from the last 24 hours of discussion.
1. Given that we had carriers and SHARS, it would have been ridiculous not to have taken them – I’ll very happily concede that point.
2. Having got carriers and SHARS into the S Atlantic, they performed creditably in their primary mission, and I’ll bet that British lives and ships were saved by the being there, and that is an excellent thing.
3. I do honestly believe that more ships and lives could have been saved if the carriers had been closer to the landings, and that the extra risk of moving therm closer was not as great as Sandy Woodward thought. There was a point in time (pretty much when the first landings were made, 1st May IIRC) when the balance of the force changed, and our centre of gravity became the landing site, not the carriers. When this balance changed, so should have our force posture. Given that intelligence was available that there were no Argentine fast jets on the islands, and combat radii for all Argentine aircraft were known, plus the ability to know of launches from Argentine air bases (radar and sub detections), it seems incredible to me that we could not have been more intelligent in our positioning of the carriers.
4. On a general point, of course air superiority / supremacy is something any force will seek to achieve. However, only having air parity, or in some cases no aircraft at all (if we’d not had SHARS and we’d have landed in the NE so too far for the Argentines) should not by itself rule out other military operations.
5. I must come across as some form of anti-carrier fundamentalist. I assure people that is not the case, but merely that in a time of very tight budgets, there are other capabilities we’d have been better spending our limited funds upon. Unlike some people, I don’t want all funds to go on my own old service, in fact I have made a case repeatedly for money to be spent on something (a proper ARG, not the half-measure we currently have) that would be operated by the Navy.
6. However, foolishly Gordon Brown did not listen to me, and placed the order for QEC and F35, so that’s what we’ll get. And if we do and Carlos Fandango decides he wants our islands again, you will find me insisting that we use the QEC and F35 as part of our force package to go and kick him off again. See Point 1.
7. I really am bewildered that I have not been able to get my point across that in the end, there is always one thing that we cannot do without to achieve strategic success, and everything else, while probably hugely important, is in that sense secondary. All conflicts have this characteristic, but it varies depending on circumstances. For instance in WW2 it was sea control of the Atlantic that ultimately decided that Hitler was unable to concentrate his land forces in Eastern Europe and thus hold back the Russians, and American sea control in the Pacific that ultimately delivered the capture of a single small island from which the atomic raids were launched. Arguably, as we saw with the Doolittle raid, they did not even need the island, merely dominance of some sea and airspace close to Japan.
x
@ Topman
I am slightly guilty of conflating “reasons for joining” and “career path”. We both know all three services have “trades” that aren’t exactly popular. If F35 maintaining means considerable sea time beyond the novelty that it was with JFH do you think it will be a positive for take-up and retention with the RAF OR? Or will they be scrambling for Typhoon, C17 or whatever squadrons? Perhaps my view of the problem is to holistic? As always I speak as I find. If I am guilty of using this to argue for RN pulling the majority manning weight for F35 perhaps those saying I am wrong are guilty of not understanding how much life at sea impacts on a person’s job satisfaction or work life balance.
Topman
@ X
Horses for course to be honest. It’s only one real area for the raf OR that relates to what you mentioned, aircraft techies as they are usually kept for a while on type to ‘payback’ training costs. Other areas tend to matter less, supply for example.
Like anything it’s what you get used to, if all a person had done was SH then living in a tent or working at FOBs and the such like becomes the norm. ‘Mafias’ tend to spring up and people can get boxed into fj/sh/at, although people still move around. I think it’s quite to get across online without sounding like I’m contriditing myself.
I guess it depends on how much and what the plus side is in other areas in the manning and basing of the F35. Basing the F35 somewhere popular would help for example decent MQ so the OH isn’t upset and so on.
James
X / Topman,
maybe we are prisoners of our own thinking, in this case that FJ and the maintainers should always go together in Squadron terms. Would it be possible to have a “Maintenance Squadron” of FAA permanently based on QEC, and they service any F35 that happens to be aboard, whether it be RAF or FAA?
I can certainly see X’s point that for some people, being at sea is not what they want to do, so will find ways to avoid it. That’s the flow, maybe we should go with it. Equally, for some being at sea frequently is what they wanted so joined the Navy.
Oddly enough, from the perspective of being in my late 40s and so with some hindsight, I would not have minded joining the old Andrew*** back when I had left school. I’m not at all unhappy with what I did do (join the Army), but there cannot be much wrong with the Queen paying you shillings and sending you around the world to see exotic places. Really, not a bad life at all. Once you get trapped into marriage and the rug rats arrive, maybe life changes and you look for something else, but by and large people of all three services spend significant time away from home anyway, at least until you are in your early 40s and not so useful in either a ship, tank or cockpit.
*** The RAF was never an option. You can fly if that’s what you like in both the Army and Navy, but in the Air Force you have to wear polyester and put up with everyone being called Kevin.
Topman
@ James
Possibly, it can work in some but not in others. It needs to be carefully managed, it worked for the RAF at Lyneham (and now at Brize) where all GC are in an Eng Sqn. Yet it was tried at Lossie and was a bit of a disaster and canned after a couple of months. I think that sort of centralised Engineering lends itself to AT rather than FJ. But there may well be plans to do that. I think that F35 for the GC will be a big change in a good way from anything else in service, although the manufacturers always say that.
Just read your edit, it wouldn’t have been that bad, you could have been a cavalryman of the skies
James
Topman,
I’m not sure any of my friends would have spoken with me or made available their spare rooms for some serious shagging on returns to London if I’d let the side down by joining the RAF. Plus, there was that incident with the Puma in the wrong field and the helpful Schermuly to alert the dozy Kevin at the controls that he was in the wrong place – I do believe that Air Commodore Kevin took a very dim view of that and thus my cards would have been marked.
Simon
James,
1. Agree.
2. Agree.
3. Agree with the exception that I don’t think we did truly know the capability of the Argentine jets. However, once we’d discovered their limitations we whould have “pushed”.
4. Sort of disagree but will bow to any examples you have where a large land force has been successful with the enemy having “the edge” in the air.
5. You are not anti-carrier (JC is a carrier) you are an anti-naval-jet fundamentalist
6. Agree.
7. What “one thing” do you refer to?
James
Simon,
Russia never had any form of air superiority (there may have been the odd local occasion when they did – I’m talking generally across a huge expanse of land and over 3 years), and yet pushed the Germans all the way from Moscow to Berlin. Similarly, the Viet Cong didn’t own the skies in Vietnam, and yet sent the US packing. The Iraqi militias and Terry Taliban don’t own the air either, and yet their “waiting game” appears to have been successful in achieving their primary aim of not having us around, even if I would not agree that there has been a military defeat.
I would not agree that I am anti-naval jet. I am anti spending money on number 73 in the list of priorities when we have not funded numbers 1-72. If we were awash with cash, then let the Andrew fill their boots with whatever type of jet takes their fancy, and great numbers of floaty little boats to launch them from.
x
@ James
During the Cold War when the Navy was approaching a half decent size there were many “sailors” who clocked up more seatime on the Gosport or Torpoint ferries than in destroyers or frigates.
As for an FAA maintenance squadron that is what I was driving at. It is the pilots that are difficult to find. The FAA goes ashore and works ashore always has done.
Simon
James,
Okay, Russia, but they paid a huge price in lives doing it. Hardly really a victory, just that they had more resources to throw at the problem.
Ah, the Viet Cong. I’ll yield because what I’m about to write seems like playing with semantics, but I don’t see these examples as a true representation of victory simply because they didn’t win the battle – they just outlasted the attack. They are, however, examples where air-power was not the deciding factor.
Perhaps I should have asked for examples where an aggressor was successful without dominant air-power?
x
@ Topman
I still think there is difference between even living in a tent and being at sea.
Everybody gets seasick at sometime. Some odd bods even adore rougher weather. And accommodation afloat has improved beyond Jed’s days when you were shackled to the oar at the start of the commission. Joining the RN means sea time. Joining the RAF means dry land, the Home Counties, and perhaps getting home a couple of times a month. I would hope those joining the services way these factors up.
Retention is important. I think everything has to be done to facilitate retention. The important issue here is getting F35 to sea not what uniform the maintainers wear. That argument runs both ways which means isn’t shouldn’t matter to pro-RAF bods if the F35 squadrons are dark blue heavy.
James
Simon,
off the top of my head, the first half of the Korean War, when the NKs jammed the UN right down into a small southern perimeter. It was sea-power that reversed that situation when a second front was opened up at Inchon.
The Sino-Soviet war, and also in the same area, the defeat of the Japs in Manchuria.
The Cuban Revolution, and for that matter the Rhodesia conflict (yes there was a peace settlement and ceasefire, but it was only going to end one way).
Mostly, however, air power is with the victor.
Chris.B.
@ Anixtu
Fair play fella!
@ x
Aye, lots of horses for many different courses. In addition to the afforementioned engineer and RAF bod that I went to school with, a college friend joined the Navy because he wanted to travel, someone I used to work with in a bar has recently joined the Navy and did so because there is some technical trade that he wants to get into that apparently only the Navy can provide, a mates mate joined the Infantry because he thought it would be a laugh, got sent to Afghanistan, and has since stopped laughing having lost people he knows, a doorman I once worked with joined the infantry because he thought it “would be a blast like” (scouser), ended up with the Anglians and nearly got blown up in Iraq when his mate was supposed to throw a red smoke and instead threw a live frag without telling anyone about his mistake (the whizzing shrapnel eventually gave it away, but luckily no one was harmed) and I once did the door with a Marine who I can’t remember what made him chose the Marines, all I remember is his bizarre aversion to punching people in the face (a bizarre trait for someone wanting to be a bouncer at least).
@ James,
“I can see that I’m fighting a one-man campaign on the SHARS being “vital” (everyone else), or “useful” (me)”
– Budge up then fella, I’ll come and sit with you. I get what you’re saying; a SHAR-less Falklands would have been bloody and more difficult, but possible. The ships actually shot down more of the attacking Hawks than the Harriers did, and I believe in some cases were even called off targets because of the promximity of friendly aircraft. If you’re asking me personally would I have sent the task force down without air support, I’m afraid the answer would have been absolutely. There is no way the government can just sit back and do nothing because it fears it might lose some personnel. It must do what it must do.
I also agree with your sentiments that if the MoD had a bottomless pit of cash then by all means, let the Navy knock itself out and get drunk with Carriers. But while budgets are tight and so much stuff needs funding, I agree that Carriers are a low priority.
wf
@James, the VC didn’t “win” the war, the NVA did, because the VC were crippled by Tet and had gradually melted away by 71 or so. The NVA invaded in 72 because the VC was incapable of another Tet, and US airpower provided both CAS and wiped out half their supplies up North (see Linebacker II). They then waited until the US was out (including it’s airpower) before starting again…
All Politicians are the Same
I thought CNN won the Vietnam war on behalf of the North Vietnamese Spelling much easier sans Vin Rouge.
x
As I understand we weren’t involved in Vietnam because North Vietnamese were doing well enough without our help.
jedibeeftrix
“I get what you’re saying; a SHAR-less Falklands would have been bloody and more difficult, but possible.”
I am happy to accept that it might have been [possible], however i don’t think politicians would have given it a “go”.
James
Not re SHARS, but GR3s in the FI.
How much usage did we get from them, and were they effective? I’m aware of some post Black Buck raids on various positions in / around Stanley airport, and a couple of strikes on Goose Green. But what about the other battles – Longdon, Two Sisters, Tumbledown, etc?
Wiki has this page, which if the data is correct shows only 126 sorties by the 10 GR3s, in comparison with 1435 by the 28 SHARs. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/British_air_services_in_the_Falklands_War . There is also this page on another blog which – to my suspicious mind at least – appears to get pretty anti-RAF as it goes on, so it may have an agenda and take it with a pinch of salt fellers. http://grandlogistics.blogspot.co.uk/2011/01/sea-harriers-and-harriers-in-falklands.html . However, buried down at the bottom are a few comments on “sorties” – to me a sortie is one aimed at either doing the Air Defence, or doing the CAS or Deep Strike. However, “sorties” could be counted as including pretty routine admin moves between ships, which don’t really count in my book.
Basically, I’m trying to identify how much British fast air was involved in offensive vs defensive air support. Both are needed of course in a campaign, but the balance between the two is interesting.
Jed
X said
“Some odd bods even adore rougher weather. And accommodation afloat has improved beyond Jed’s days when you were shackled to the oar at the start of the commission. Joining the RN means sea time.”
Ahhh well, as you mentioned me….
I done Leanders, T42′s, Hunt class MCMV, HMS Herald and RFA Diligence. All except Diligence (2 man cabin) would be considered “rough” compared to a T45 !!
Also spent 6 months at RAF Cosford, far, far better accomodation than any RN shore posting I ever had, far far better food too ! From that 6 months (21 years ago) I have lasting friendships with RAF people (well mostly ex-RAF people now) and I am sorry Topman, but I still consider the RAF to largely be a shirt sleeve service that has life easy. This also based on my 8 years in the TA living in bivvy bags (and my first OC in the Army was RAF Regiment too !).
It is only personal opinion, and I have not been around on the other threads lately as I am bored to death with the current conversations, but please note while I will take every chance and opportunity as an ex-Matelot AND an ex-part-time-Pongo, to bash the hell out of the Crabs, I am NOT one of those calling for the disbandment of the RAF.
Finally – to X point, and this is aimed at TD Admin’s comments from earlier up the thread – there is a massive difference between signing up for a life at sea, and signing up for a life in accom block at “RAF Flatlands” even if the young airman / woman now gets to rough it occasionally at Bagram / Kandahar or wherever. A quick exercise deployment on a carrier for RAF Harrier aircrew or Army Air Corps Apache crews is not the same as spending 10, 12, 22 or however many years on the bouncy blue stuff…..
Chris.B.
@ JEDIBFTRX,
I dunno. Not defending the territory would have been a pretty serious failure of the Government. I suspect they would have had to send them off with a “at least give a try” type mentality.
An intriguing question from there is would the TF’s plans have changed based on a lack of SHAR? Pickets further out? Air attack placed as a much higher priority? Any aircraft flying over 200 knots would have been easily identifiable as Argentine, so maybe a change of ROE? Deploying more T42 to the west in the clear oceans?
All the stuff of much debate.
All Politicians are the Same
Chris B, a blockade to begin with maybe? Open season on Argentinian naval shipping? Fascinating exercise.
James
@ JDBTx,
I read a bio of Maggie, which I don’t have to hand so will have to summarise. As far as I remember, most of the concern she had – and addressed to both CDS and CNS – was in what the Argentine Navy were capable of, not their Air Force. So losses of ships, yes, but the losses coming from sea or submarine action, not being bombed. It’s quite possible that others in MoD or Northwood at lower levels really understood about the Argentine air threat, but if so that never appears to have percolated upwards to No 10. Assuming the bio is accurate, we were either lucky (probably), or foolish (possibly) in basing a strategic deployment decision on the wrong premise, and by luck we were not caught with our pants down.
x
@ Jed
Thank you.
Chris.B.
@ James,
Well the Sheffield BoI indicates that the submarine threat was considered a higher priority and more likely than an air attack, so I guess that must have been a general opinion?
@ APATS,
A blockade of where, The main naval yard? Could have been worth a shot. I wonder how the Argentine Navy would have responded to a lack of SHAR? Might they have pressed home more aggressively with their carrier in the search for the British TF?
James
Jed,
I’m impressed. How did you manage to confront the mortal terror that I certainly felt on my few months attached to the Andrew, of the Captain crashing the bloody boat (seems normal for RN Captains) and being trapped well under the waterline? There are too many Pinewood films of young stokers being deliberately shut into compartments fast filling with water, normally with some corny line about “Don’t worry about me, save yourself and the ship”. I demanded some accommodation well above the bouncy blue stuff, hence causing some Andrew irritation at my use of the phrase “on” Bristol, not “in” Bristol, but it is accurate in spatial terms.
(I am aware that submarines and ships are mutually ships or boats, but it has become traditional to deliberately confuse the two. As indeed the Andrew do with MICVs, AIFVs, APCs, SPGs, recce wagons and tanks, and sometimes to refer to them all as Tonka Toys. So we can all live with that).
Brian Black
Considering what was fundamental to winning the Falklands War bear in mind that there were many, many armies of the time that could muster a force of two light brigades; there were far fewer countries that could actually have pulled off a similar operation.
And when considering the shar bear in mind that with the Navy’s boats effectively controlling access to the islands, the Argentine supply line for the war was reduced to blockade running C130 – at least one of which ended up in the ocean. Had there been British air-superiority, the Argentine forces would have been totally cut-off. They’re islands, unlike examples raised previously, air and sea control entirely isolates the enemy and presents an entirely unwinable situation.
James
Brian Black,
assuming that the Navy had been able to impose a total air and sea blockade (probably achievable), how do you propose that it would have been able to advance the situation from being a stalemate? You appear to believe a blockade was an alternative solution to establishing local sea control and landing a big fighting force. You may disagree, but I’m pretty certain that Argentina being in place on the Falklands, and the Navy sailing about off the Falklands, would not have translated into a strong negotiating position for the UK, and even if some compromise (“one island each”) had eventually been hammered out in the UN or somewhere, it would have done nothing to discourage Carlos Fandango from coming back and taking the other island whenever he wanted. Having first built an airstrip on the one he did have and filled it full of jets.
Which has greater endurance: a task force of 100 odd ships daily consuming diesel and about 10,000 hungry mouths 8,000 miles from home in a south Atlantic winter, or an island of 7,000 people with 120,000 sheep? Not a pleasant prospect for either really, but less so for the task force.
Simon
I have asked for live ordnance quantities expended per type, per aircraft type, per year since 1980 from the MoD.
My last request for the costing calcs for CVF propulsion options (nuclear) were refused on the basis that they no longer had them, so I don’t hold out much hope
All Politicians are the Same
James, a blockade would have been unpleasant for the Argies but at the end of the day the best way to get rid of them was always to allow yourself and your oppos to introduce them to the Queens Bayonet. You have to do something to justify the wearing of red trousers!
James
I was wrong. Apparently there are 500,000 sheep on the Falklands. At 1/10th of a sheep per day per person, that is 5 million man days of food. Divided by 7,000 islanders plus invaders, that is 714 days of adequate if repetitive nutrition for everyone on the islands.
Does a task force of 100 ships carrying 10,000 hungry fellers carry the equivalent number of man days of food? Not to mention all of the fuel and consumables needing to keep 100 ships sailing around in circles. I’m pretty sure the RFA is not really scaled to do that for 2 years at 8,000 miles of distance.
x
Not for nothing do Falkland Islanders call mutton 365.
The Other Chris
Tip off:
New French Defence Minister, Le Drian, reviewing decision on Franco-British drones [1].
Just an aside. I took part in a week called “The Realities of War” on the combined staff course: lots of lovely old boys telling us young thrusters what war was really like, across all three services in all sorts of environments. One of the Speakers was a fantastic gentleman who had been the XO on one of the SSNs in the Falklands – not Conqueror which got the kill, but one of the others and I don’t recall which it was. However, his story was that the sub was ordered from an exercise to get down south PDQ which they did, and they spent something like 70 days submerged which at the time was some form of record. The only casualty they had was a mental breakdown, by the submarine’s Chief cook. He was overcome by the pressure of trying to eke out the onboard food they had and trying to present something a little different each day. When they did eventually surface for a replen, the poor feller had to be casevac’ed off the sub.
I’m re-telling that as accurately as I can recall the conversation, in respect to both the XO and to the Chief cook. If there is a detail that is wrong it is my fault. I have no doubt at all that it is not a “Dit”, but an honest recollection of what happened, and a salutary tale for anyone in the service that does not see unexpected problems.
All Politicians are the Same
James, you actually walk on the food in an SSN. It makes up a lot of the passageways and as it is used you gain more head room. An infinitely believable tale.
The Other Chris
Really need to work on those replicators for the SSN boys.
Gareth Jones
ahhhhh! I forgot about the 2+ links = moderation. Try again…
I’m thinking there surely must be some form of metal flaps covering the floor of the passageways, with the scoff in boxes below, and the boss cook with some form of map as to where the eggs are, and where the tinned beans? Otherwise it’s going to be like an assault course, and I don’t imagine the matelots wash their feet too much.
Came back from the Caribbean on a 40 foot cat once, and being non-nautical my job was to do the cooking. But I had it easy – a gas stove on some gimbals, and a whole spare cabin to store the scoff in. Plus a barbecue on deck. I was also OIC fishing, which was great fun – skipjack tuna ahoy! Followed by sushi.
Thanks Dunservin,
Sadly ours seems to be badly out of date (and very descriptive, without much prescription… isn’t that what doctrines are for?)which might be a reflection of the likelihood of actually having to counter the threat
“(Joint Doctrine for Countering Air and Missile Threats) (http://www.fas.org/spp/starwars/docops/jp3_01.pdf) endorsed by the US Navy, USMC, US Army and US Air Force”
@James
Schwerpunkt and CoGravity is a fundamental concentration of force, and indirectly, of capability or function (through high concentration of strength) and not a direct concentration of capabilities (i.e Carrier air, infantry etc.)
A Schwerpunkt (spearpoint) would usually have fundamental troops like aircraft support, infantry and tanks, not a single troop type only, and more importantly, have it in large numbers to allow for a big effect on the field when unleashed. I’d say the concepts you brought up are more related to troop concentration/supplies than a single unit type.
Might I suggest we stop looking at the Falklands and look more towards 2012 for possible problem areas? Why not use our current biggest headache, Iran, as a force comparison target? Makes more sense than fighting a battle already won 30 years back.
That would be
~40 F-14s, 60 F-5s, 35 Mig-29s and 30 Su-24s
3 Armoured brigades and 7 Infantry Divisions
~74 gunboats, 5 frigates, 3 corvettes, 3 subs.
If they threw the armour and 2-3 Inf Div at you along with 1/2 of the aircraft, what would be a resonable defending force that can endure till help arrives?
A dozen Apache working under the umbrella cover of 2 x Daring with 2 x Astute making life difficult for their subs/ships and chucking the odd TLAM at their bases?
I suggest that there would have been even more emphasis on taking out the Pucaras that were on the islands (more SF raids, and NGS onto the grass airstrips), and that the landings would have been made in north east Falkland, a further 50 miles away from the Argentine bases on the mainland. The biggest single mistake the Argentines made was not to put fast air on the islands themselves
A landing in NE Falkland was the No.2 option in COMAW and Thompson’s planning. It was eventually ruled out because there were too many no-landing days due to the surf, as a result more helicopter movements would be needed and there weren’t enough helis. Also, after the task force arrived, the Argentines realised the Mk8 guns on the ships outranged their 105mm and flew in 4x 155mm, which could reach the proposed beach head. They held the option quite late on, which makes me think there was a special forces recce of the site and that made their minds up.
Chris.B.,
“I cant imagine people actually joing certain services because they plan to just sit around in Oxford for the next few years or because they don’t want to get their hands dirty.”
I can. Taking the comforts of home everywhere you deploy is one of the benefits of a career at sea. I went RFA because the comforts are a few notches higher than in the RN.
Chris B said “I cant imagine people actually joing certain services because they plan to just sit around in Oxford for the next few years or because they don’t want to get their hands dirty.”
Yes they do. People like you and I on the outside of the services perhaps have too an idealistic view of how servicemen see their job. Well I would if I hadn’t spent a lot of time around service bods. One of my best cadets joined the RAF because he wasn’t going to live in a messdeck. Bobbing up and down on the oggin wasn’t for him. Another cadet joined the RM and seemed only to be happy at -20 living in a snow hole. I am always surprised by how many join the services without an apparent interest in the services before hand.
Hi Observer,
As the country is so big, you can see that the “outer edge” here
“~40 F-14s, 60 F-5s, 35 Mig-29s and 30 Su-24s
3 Armoured brigades and 7 Infantry Divisions
~74 gunboats, 5 frigates, 3 corvettes, 3 subs”
capable of any offensive action, is quite thin
Take it out and there is only a non-manoeuvre force left, to be dealt with
- Bush I was properly advised, and did not run into any Stalingrads
- Bush II probably got sound advise, but had an inner circle of fanatics… and the rest of history
BTW: 90% of CIA and other intelligence services staff never leave the good old USA; so if you have fanatics, believing in something, in the inner circle – and the next circle out is feeding them “BS” as “the facts”… what is bound to happen?
@ X
I doubt that many will have such exacting views of where their career will take them so I doubt many plan to join the RAF so they can be posted to brize. However being a ‘service bod’ I would agree with you on the last part I include myself in that, I wouldn’t say say nil as I have did have an interest in the RAF beforehand but it wasn’t very strong, no family members, no cadets or anything like that . I assume you work with sea cadets how many join the navy from what you see. Last figures I saw had 30% for air cadets.
@ Chris B (found your comment now)
Well yes a good number of air cadets join the cadets and the the RAF because they like planes. And many do join the RLC or RE for their tickets. There are lots of reasons why recruits join. And some are very calculating in in selecting their career path. Even down to accident (miss the bus walked pass the recruiting office) or on a whim. Oddly enough while RAF new entrant intakes or Army new entrants intakes will have a good number of ex-ATC or ex-ACF kids surprisingly few Sea Cadets go on to join the RN. I think there are reasons for that, but I am not up with current situation. Though strictly speak SC isn’t a pre-service organisation.
Good afternoon all,
I can see that I’m fighting a one-man campaign on the SHARS being “vital” (everyone else), or “useful” (me). I suspect no one will change their minds from this point on, so probably not worth pursuing. However, a few general thoughts pulled out from the last 24 hours of discussion.
1. Given that we had carriers and SHARS, it would have been ridiculous not to have taken them – I’ll very happily concede that point.
2. Having got carriers and SHARS into the S Atlantic, they performed creditably in their primary mission, and I’ll bet that British lives and ships were saved by the being there, and that is an excellent thing.
3. I do honestly believe that more ships and lives could have been saved if the carriers had been closer to the landings, and that the extra risk of moving therm closer was not as great as Sandy Woodward thought. There was a point in time (pretty much when the first landings were made, 1st May IIRC) when the balance of the force changed, and our centre of gravity became the landing site, not the carriers. When this balance changed, so should have our force posture. Given that intelligence was available that there were no Argentine fast jets on the islands, and combat radii for all Argentine aircraft were known, plus the ability to know of launches from Argentine air bases (radar and sub detections), it seems incredible to me that we could not have been more intelligent in our positioning of the carriers.
4. On a general point, of course air superiority / supremacy is something any force will seek to achieve. However, only having air parity, or in some cases no aircraft at all (if we’d not had SHARS and we’d have landed in the NE so too far for the Argentines) should not by itself rule out other military operations.
5. I must come across as some form of anti-carrier fundamentalist. I assure people that is not the case, but merely that in a time of very tight budgets, there are other capabilities we’d have been better spending our limited funds upon. Unlike some people, I don’t want all funds to go on my own old service, in fact I have made a case repeatedly for money to be spent on something (a proper ARG, not the half-measure we currently have) that would be operated by the Navy.
6. However, foolishly Gordon Brown did not listen to me, and placed the order for QEC and F35, so that’s what we’ll get. And if we do and Carlos Fandango decides he wants our islands again, you will find me insisting that we use the QEC and F35 as part of our force package to go and kick him off again. See Point 1.
7. I really am bewildered that I have not been able to get my point across that in the end, there is always one thing that we cannot do without to achieve strategic success, and everything else, while probably hugely important, is in that sense secondary. All conflicts have this characteristic, but it varies depending on circumstances. For instance in WW2 it was sea control of the Atlantic that ultimately decided that Hitler was unable to concentrate his land forces in Eastern Europe and thus hold back the Russians, and American sea control in the Pacific that ultimately delivered the capture of a single small island from which the atomic raids were launched. Arguably, as we saw with the Doolittle raid, they did not even need the island, merely dominance of some sea and airspace close to Japan.
@ Topman
I am slightly guilty of conflating “reasons for joining” and “career path”. We both know all three services have “trades” that aren’t exactly popular. If F35 maintaining means considerable sea time beyond the novelty that it was with JFH do you think it will be a positive for take-up and retention with the RAF OR? Or will they be scrambling for Typhoon, C17 or whatever squadrons? Perhaps my view of the problem is to holistic? As always I speak as I find. If I am guilty of using this to argue for RN pulling the majority manning weight for F35 perhaps those saying I am wrong are guilty of not understanding how much life at sea impacts on a person’s job satisfaction or work life balance.
@ X
Horses for course to be honest. It’s only one real area for the raf OR that relates to what you mentioned, aircraft techies as they are usually kept for a while on type to ‘payback’ training costs. Other areas tend to matter less, supply for example.
Like anything it’s what you get used to, if all a person had done was SH then living in a tent or working at FOBs and the such like becomes the norm. ‘Mafias’ tend to spring up and people can get boxed into fj/sh/at, although people still move around. I think it’s quite to get across online without sounding like I’m contriditing myself.
I guess it depends on how much and what the plus side is in other areas in the manning and basing of the F35. Basing the F35 somewhere popular would help for example decent MQ so the OH isn’t upset and so on.
X / Topman,
maybe we are prisoners of our own thinking, in this case that FJ and the maintainers should always go together in Squadron terms. Would it be possible to have a “Maintenance Squadron” of FAA permanently based on QEC, and they service any F35 that happens to be aboard, whether it be RAF or FAA?
I can certainly see X’s point that for some people, being at sea is not what they want to do, so will find ways to avoid it. That’s the flow, maybe we should go with it. Equally, for some being at sea frequently is what they wanted so joined the Navy.
Oddly enough, from the perspective of being in my late 40s and so with some hindsight, I would not have minded joining the old Andrew*** back when I had left school. I’m not at all unhappy with what I did do (join the Army), but there cannot be much wrong with the Queen paying you shillings and sending you around the world to see exotic places. Really, not a bad life at all. Once you get trapped into marriage and the rug rats arrive, maybe life changes and you look for something else, but by and large people of all three services spend significant time away from home anyway, at least until you are in your early 40s and not so useful in either a ship, tank or cockpit.
*** The RAF was never an option. You can fly if that’s what you like in both the Army and Navy, but in the Air Force you have to wear polyester and put up with everyone being called Kevin.
@ James
Possibly, it can work in some but not in others. It needs to be carefully managed, it worked for the RAF at Lyneham (and now at Brize) where all GC are in an Eng Sqn. Yet it was tried at Lossie and was a bit of a disaster and canned after a couple of months. I think that sort of centralised Engineering lends itself to AT rather than FJ. But there may well be plans to do that. I think that F35 for the GC will be a big change in a good way from anything else in service, although the manufacturers always say that.
Just read your edit, it wouldn’t have been that bad, you could have been a cavalryman of the skies
Topman,
I’m not sure any of my friends would have spoken with me or made available their spare rooms for some serious shagging on returns to London if I’d let the side down by joining the RAF. Plus, there was that incident with the Puma in the wrong field and the helpful Schermuly to alert the dozy Kevin at the controls that he was in the wrong place – I do believe that Air Commodore Kevin took a very dim view of that and thus my cards would have been marked.
James,
1. Agree.
2. Agree.
3. Agree with the exception that I don’t think we did truly know the capability of the Argentine jets. However, once we’d discovered their limitations we whould have “pushed”.
4. Sort of disagree but will bow to any examples you have where a large land force has been successful with the enemy having “the edge” in the air.
5. You are not anti-carrier (JC is a carrier) you are an anti-naval-jet fundamentalist
6. Agree.
7. What “one thing” do you refer to?
Simon,
Russia never had any form of air superiority (there may have been the odd local occasion when they did – I’m talking generally across a huge expanse of land and over 3 years), and yet pushed the Germans all the way from Moscow to Berlin. Similarly, the Viet Cong didn’t own the skies in Vietnam, and yet sent the US packing. The Iraqi militias and Terry Taliban don’t own the air either, and yet their “waiting game” appears to have been successful in achieving their primary aim of not having us around, even if I would not agree that there has been a military defeat.
I would not agree that I am anti-naval jet. I am anti spending money on number 73 in the list of priorities when we have not funded numbers 1-72. If we were awash with cash, then let the Andrew fill their boots with whatever type of jet takes their fancy, and great numbers of floaty little boats to launch them from.
@ James
During the Cold War when the Navy was approaching a half decent size there were many “sailors” who clocked up more seatime on the Gosport or Torpoint ferries than in destroyers or frigates.
As for an FAA maintenance squadron that is what I was driving at. It is the pilots that are difficult to find. The FAA goes ashore and works ashore always has done.
James,
Okay, Russia, but they paid a huge price in lives doing it. Hardly really a victory, just that they had more resources to throw at the problem.
Ah, the Viet Cong. I’ll yield because what I’m about to write seems like playing with semantics, but I don’t see these examples as a true representation of victory simply because they didn’t win the battle – they just outlasted the attack. They are, however, examples where air-power was not the deciding factor.
Perhaps I should have asked for examples where an aggressor was successful without dominant air-power?
@ Topman
I still think there is difference between even living in a tent and being at sea.
Everybody gets seasick at sometime. Some odd bods even adore rougher weather. And accommodation afloat has improved beyond Jed’s days when you were shackled to the oar at the start of the commission. Joining the RN means sea time. Joining the RAF means dry land, the Home Counties, and perhaps getting home a couple of times a month. I would hope those joining the services way these factors up.
Retention is important. I think everything has to be done to facilitate retention. The important issue here is getting F35 to sea not what uniform the maintainers wear. That argument runs both ways which means isn’t shouldn’t matter to pro-RAF bods if the F35 squadrons are dark blue heavy.
Simon,
off the top of my head, the first half of the Korean War, when the NKs jammed the UN right down into a small southern perimeter. It was sea-power that reversed that situation when a second front was opened up at Inchon.
The Sino-Soviet war, and also in the same area, the defeat of the Japs in Manchuria.
The Cuban Revolution, and for that matter the Rhodesia conflict (yes there was a peace settlement and ceasefire, but it was only going to end one way).
Mostly, however, air power is with the victor.
@ Anixtu
Fair play fella!
@ x
Aye, lots of horses for many different courses. In addition to the afforementioned engineer and RAF bod that I went to school with, a college friend joined the Navy because he wanted to travel, someone I used to work with in a bar has recently joined the Navy and did so because there is some technical trade that he wants to get into that apparently only the Navy can provide, a mates mate joined the Infantry because he thought it would be a laugh, got sent to Afghanistan, and has since stopped laughing having lost people he knows, a doorman I once worked with joined the infantry because he thought it “would be a blast like” (scouser), ended up with the Anglians and nearly got blown up in Iraq when his mate was supposed to throw a red smoke and instead threw a live frag without telling anyone about his mistake (the whizzing shrapnel eventually gave it away, but luckily no one was harmed) and I once did the door with a Marine who I can’t remember what made him chose the Marines, all I remember is his bizarre aversion to punching people in the face (a bizarre trait for someone wanting to be a bouncer at least).
@ James,
“I can see that I’m fighting a one-man campaign on the SHARS being “vital” (everyone else), or “useful” (me)”
– Budge up then fella, I’ll come and sit with you. I get what you’re saying; a SHAR-less Falklands would have been bloody and more difficult, but possible. The ships actually shot down more of the attacking Hawks than the Harriers did, and I believe in some cases were even called off targets because of the promximity of friendly aircraft. If you’re asking me personally would I have sent the task force down without air support, I’m afraid the answer would have been absolutely. There is no way the government can just sit back and do nothing because it fears it might lose some personnel. It must do what it must do.
I also agree with your sentiments that if the MoD had a bottomless pit of cash then by all means, let the Navy knock itself out and get drunk with Carriers. But while budgets are tight and so much stuff needs funding, I agree that Carriers are a low priority.
@James, the VC didn’t “win” the war, the NVA did, because the VC were crippled by Tet and had gradually melted away by 71 or so. The NVA invaded in 72 because the VC was incapable of another Tet, and US airpower provided both CAS and wiped out half their supplies up North (see Linebacker II). They then waited until the US was out (including it’s airpower) before starting again…
I thought CNN won the Vietnam war on behalf of the North Vietnamese Spelling much easier sans Vin Rouge.
As I understand we weren’t involved in Vietnam because North Vietnamese were doing well enough without our help.
“I get what you’re saying; a SHAR-less Falklands would have been bloody and more difficult, but possible.”
I am happy to accept that it might have been [possible], however i don’t think politicians would have given it a “go”.
Not re SHARS, but GR3s in the FI.
How much usage did we get from them, and were they effective? I’m aware of some post Black Buck raids on various positions in / around Stanley airport, and a couple of strikes on Goose Green. But what about the other battles – Longdon, Two Sisters, Tumbledown, etc?
Wiki has this page, which if the data is correct shows only 126 sorties by the 10 GR3s, in comparison with 1435 by the 28 SHARs. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/British_air_services_in_the_Falklands_War . There is also this page on another blog which – to my suspicious mind at least – appears to get pretty anti-RAF as it goes on, so it may have an agenda and take it with a pinch of salt fellers. http://grandlogistics.blogspot.co.uk/2011/01/sea-harriers-and-harriers-in-falklands.html . However, buried down at the bottom are a few comments on “sorties” – to me a sortie is one aimed at either doing the Air Defence, or doing the CAS or Deep Strike. However, “sorties” could be counted as including pretty routine admin moves between ships, which don’t really count in my book.
Basically, I’m trying to identify how much British fast air was involved in offensive vs defensive air support. Both are needed of course in a campaign, but the balance between the two is interesting.
X said
“Some odd bods even adore rougher weather. And accommodation afloat has improved beyond Jed’s days when you were shackled to the oar at the start of the commission. Joining the RN means sea time.”
Ahhh well, as you mentioned me….
I done Leanders, T42′s, Hunt class MCMV, HMS Herald and RFA Diligence. All except Diligence (2 man cabin) would be considered “rough” compared to a T45 !!
Also spent 6 months at RAF Cosford, far, far better accomodation than any RN shore posting I ever had, far far better food too ! From that 6 months (21 years ago) I have lasting friendships with RAF people (well mostly ex-RAF people now) and I am sorry Topman, but I still consider the RAF to largely be a shirt sleeve service that has life easy. This also based on my 8 years in the TA living in bivvy bags (and my first OC in the Army was RAF Regiment too !).
It is only personal opinion, and I have not been around on the other threads lately as I am bored to death with the current conversations, but please note while I will take every chance and opportunity as an ex-Matelot AND an ex-part-time-Pongo, to bash the hell out of the Crabs, I am NOT one of those calling for the disbandment of the RAF.
Finally – to X point, and this is aimed at TD Admin’s comments from earlier up the thread – there is a massive difference between signing up for a life at sea, and signing up for a life in accom block at “RAF Flatlands” even if the young airman / woman now gets to rough it occasionally at Bagram / Kandahar or wherever. A quick exercise deployment on a carrier for RAF Harrier aircrew or Army Air Corps Apache crews is not the same as spending 10, 12, 22 or however many years on the bouncy blue stuff…..
@ JEDIBFTRX,
I dunno. Not defending the territory would have been a pretty serious failure of the Government. I suspect they would have had to send them off with a “at least give a try” type mentality.
An intriguing question from there is would the TF’s plans have changed based on a lack of SHAR? Pickets further out? Air attack placed as a much higher priority? Any aircraft flying over 200 knots would have been easily identifiable as Argentine, so maybe a change of ROE? Deploying more T42 to the west in the clear oceans?
All the stuff of much debate.
Chris B, a blockade to begin with maybe? Open season on Argentinian naval shipping? Fascinating exercise.
@ JDBTx,
I read a bio of Maggie, which I don’t have to hand so will have to summarise. As far as I remember, most of the concern she had – and addressed to both CDS and CNS – was in what the Argentine Navy were capable of, not their Air Force. So losses of ships, yes, but the losses coming from sea or submarine action, not being bombed. It’s quite possible that others in MoD or Northwood at lower levels really understood about the Argentine air threat, but if so that never appears to have percolated upwards to No 10. Assuming the bio is accurate, we were either lucky (probably), or foolish (possibly) in basing a strategic deployment decision on the wrong premise, and by luck we were not caught with our pants down.
@ Jed
Thank you.
@ James,
Well the Sheffield BoI indicates that the submarine threat was considered a higher priority and more likely than an air attack, so I guess that must have been a general opinion?
@ APATS,
A blockade of where, The main naval yard? Could have been worth a shot. I wonder how the Argentine Navy would have responded to a lack of SHAR? Might they have pressed home more aggressively with their carrier in the search for the British TF?
Jed,
I’m impressed. How did you manage to confront the mortal terror that I certainly felt on my few months attached to the Andrew, of the Captain crashing the bloody boat (seems normal for RN Captains) and being trapped well under the waterline? There are too many Pinewood films of young stokers being deliberately shut into compartments fast filling with water, normally with some corny line about “Don’t worry about me, save yourself and the ship”. I demanded some accommodation well above the bouncy blue stuff, hence causing some Andrew irritation at my use of the phrase “on” Bristol, not “in” Bristol, but it is accurate in spatial terms.
(I am aware that submarines and ships are mutually ships or boats, but it has become traditional to deliberately confuse the two. As indeed the Andrew do with MICVs, AIFVs, APCs, SPGs, recce wagons and tanks, and sometimes to refer to them all as Tonka Toys. So we can all live with that).
Considering what was fundamental to winning the Falklands War bear in mind that there were many, many armies of the time that could muster a force of two light brigades; there were far fewer countries that could actually have pulled off a similar operation.
And when considering the shar bear in mind that with the Navy’s boats effectively controlling access to the islands, the Argentine supply line for the war was reduced to blockade running C130 – at least one of which ended up in the ocean. Had there been British air-superiority, the Argentine forces would have been totally cut-off. They’re islands, unlike examples raised previously, air and sea control entirely isolates the enemy and presents an entirely unwinable situation.
Brian Black,
assuming that the Navy had been able to impose a total air and sea blockade (probably achievable), how do you propose that it would have been able to advance the situation from being a stalemate? You appear to believe a blockade was an alternative solution to establishing local sea control and landing a big fighting force. You may disagree, but I’m pretty certain that Argentina being in place on the Falklands, and the Navy sailing about off the Falklands, would not have translated into a strong negotiating position for the UK, and even if some compromise (“one island each”) had eventually been hammered out in the UN or somewhere, it would have done nothing to discourage Carlos Fandango from coming back and taking the other island whenever he wanted. Having first built an airstrip on the one he did have and filled it full of jets.
Which has greater endurance: a task force of 100 odd ships daily consuming diesel and about 10,000 hungry mouths 8,000 miles from home in a south Atlantic winter, or an island of 7,000 people with 120,000 sheep? Not a pleasant prospect for either really, but less so for the task force.
I have asked for live ordnance quantities expended per type, per aircraft type, per year since 1980 from the MoD.
My last request for the costing calcs for CVF propulsion options (nuclear) were refused on the basis that they no longer had them, so I don’t hold out much hope
James, a blockade would have been unpleasant for the Argies but at the end of the day the best way to get rid of them was always to allow yourself and your oppos to introduce them to the Queens Bayonet. You have to do something to justify the wearing of red trousers!
I was wrong. Apparently there are 500,000 sheep on the Falklands. At 1/10th of a sheep per day per person, that is 5 million man days of food. Divided by 7,000 islanders plus invaders, that is 714 days of adequate if repetitive nutrition for everyone on the islands.
Does a task force of 100 ships carrying 10,000 hungry fellers carry the equivalent number of man days of food? Not to mention all of the fuel and consumables needing to keep 100 ships sailing around in circles. I’m pretty sure the RFA is not really scaled to do that for 2 years at 8,000 miles of distance.
Not for nothing do Falkland Islanders call mutton 365.
Tip off:
New French Defence Minister, Le Drian, reviewing decision on Franco-British drones [1].
[1] http://www.aviationweek.com/Article.aspx?id=/article-xml/awx_05_31_2012_p0-463344.xml
1st The Queen’s Dragoon Guards march in Swansea:
http://www.thisissouthwales.co.uk/Soldiers-greeted-crowds-challenging-tour/story-16236679-detail/story.html
and camapign to save the regiment:
http://www.thisissouthwales.co.uk/Rugby-star-support-regiment-facing-axe/story-16236680-detail/story.html
Just an aside. I took part in a week called “The Realities of War” on the combined staff course: lots of lovely old boys telling us young thrusters what war was really like, across all three services in all sorts of environments. One of the Speakers was a fantastic gentleman who had been the XO on one of the SSNs in the Falklands – not Conqueror which got the kill, but one of the others and I don’t recall which it was. However, his story was that the sub was ordered from an exercise to get down south PDQ which they did, and they spent something like 70 days submerged which at the time was some form of record. The only casualty they had was a mental breakdown, by the submarine’s Chief cook. He was overcome by the pressure of trying to eke out the onboard food they had and trying to present something a little different each day. When they did eventually surface for a replen, the poor feller had to be casevac’ed off the sub.
I’m re-telling that as accurately as I can recall the conversation, in respect to both the XO and to the Chief cook. If there is a detail that is wrong it is my fault. I have no doubt at all that it is not a “Dit”, but an honest recollection of what happened, and a salutary tale for anyone in the service that does not see unexpected problems.
James, you actually walk on the food in an SSN. It makes up a lot of the passageways and as it is used you gain more head room. An infinitely believable tale.
Really need to work on those replicators for the SSN boys.
ahhhhh! I forgot about the 2+ links = moderation. Try again…
1st The Queen’s Dragoon Guards march in Swansea:
http://www.thisissouthwales.co.uk/Soldiers-greeted-crowds-challenging-tour/story-16236679-detail/story.html
… and the camapign to save the regiment:
http://www.thisissouthwales.co.uk/Rugby-star-support-regiment-facing-axe/story-16236680-detail/story.html
@ Toc – not surprised about the french backtracking, always thought merging the potential of son-of-taranis and son-of-taxation.
RE: Sub Food. Vaccumn packing might help:
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/femail/food/article-1362795/Heston-Blumenthal-creates-seafood-sub.html
APATS,
I’m thinking there surely must be some form of metal flaps covering the floor of the passageways, with the scoff in boxes below, and the boss cook with some form of map as to where the eggs are, and where the tinned beans? Otherwise it’s going to be like an assault course, and I don’t imagine the matelots wash their feet too much.
Came back from the Caribbean on a 40 foot cat once, and being non-nautical my job was to do the cooking. But I had it easy – a gas stove on some gimbals, and a whole spare cabin to store the scoff in. Plus a barbecue on deck. I was also OIC fishing, which was great fun – skipjack tuna ahoy! Followed by sushi.