Think Defence hopes to start sensible conversations about UK defence issues, no agenda or no campaign but there might be one or two posts on containers, bridges and mexeflotes!
As you should be well aware, the positioning of the carriers was driven by the lack of AEW and consequent inability to run CAP on an optimised risk basis.
IIRC the SHAR component got 20+ kills – something like half the total Argentinian losses (excluding the Pucara/Skyvans destroyed on the ground at Pebble Island). That also excludes the number of A4/Mirage/Dagger that jettisoned ordnance when they saw SHARS in the area.
To suggest they were not fundamental to overall victory is stretching credulity in the extreme I’m afraid. Don’t forget that the carriers were also home to most of the helos, providing ASW as well as lift. Without the carriers, even less tactical mobility than we ended up with.
If you think they weren’t really doing very much, then I’m afraid the Joint warfare bit of the joint staff course syllabus is or was sadly lacking.
James
APATS,
(positioning) – let’s hope not, but equally let us also institute a doctrine where carrier task group commanders get repeatedly battered with baseball bats to the mantra of “it’s not about your carrier group, it is about what you are here to do, and that might involve the carrier paintwork getting scratched”.
I’m still sceptical about the political aspect of a carrier sinking. Once they were down there, we weren’t going to sail away if we lost a carrier, so the risk should have been taken. That’s a decision that should have been immediately obvious in the South Atlantic, taken by Sandy Woodward, and no need to refer back to Northwood at all, let alone Downing Street.
You want to hear Gen Julian Thompson on Sandy Woodward. Let us say that scathing does not do it justice. Also Gen Brian Pennicot, who had under command the guns (“Fires” in today’s parlance), including NGS, and the Air Defence assets.
x
Going back to what James said about the UK only needed carriers for 6 weeks since WW2. We will forget Suez, the Soviet threat…
Any how can you imagine what would have happened if we didn’t have the carriers and couldn’t get the islands back? The government would have fallen. The skids would have gone under a shakey recovery. Doesn’t bear thinking about it….
James
NAB,
you appear to have a very broad definition of “fundamental”. How were SHARS “fundamental” to victory? Were they the single point upon which everything else relied? No, they were not.
What was fundamental to victory were two Brigades of infantry. Everything else was enabling. Do not think that enabling implies some secondary status, or is not allowed to be important. But fundamental is a sole capability, one thing only, without which everything else is a waste of time. And SHARS in 1982 did not fall into that category.
I’m not much fussed about your judgement as to how much I listened to the joint staff course, after that little intervention.
All Politicians are the Same
james, I am sympathetic to your view point but remember that losing Hermes and her embarked staff and air group would have been the worst single loss since task force Z and in terms of manpower may have been worse.
Incorrectly as it may have been Hermes was seen as the UK COG by some Politicians.
x
@ James
All the brigades were weapons fired by the TF. I have no doubt the 3 RM Commandos could have walked to the FI carrying everything they needed, fought the war, invaded Argentina, and walked home again. But HMG made them take some army bods too which meant ships…..
James
APATS,
there were about 7-10,000 men potentially getting the crap bombed out of them in San Carlos Water, and 2,000 on Hermes which was nearly 300 miles east. Hermes could have been a bit closer, given that it was known by that stage that there were no fast attack jets at Stanley, the Pucaras had been pretty much wiped out, the combat radius for any Argentine jet from the mainland gave them negligible reach beyond West Falkland, and the on-station time for SHARS on CAP was ten minutes, with a total out and back transit of 80 minutes.
You will not be able to persuade me that there was a horrifying lack of judgement by Sandy Woodward. I don’t know why you try. More importantly, his subordinate commanders also felt it was a terrible lack of judgment, and they were all there and in his confidence.
X,
ha ha. Don’t forget that the Paras wanted to fly in (but too far away), the Gurkhas to crawl in sneakily but can’t swim very well, and the Guards wanted to march in open order, doing the left form on Fanning Head. But it was all a bit wet. So Andrew rules for a while, until normal service resumed when they got ashore.
All Politicians are the Same
James, the average on station time for a SHAR during the FI campaign was close to 40 mins!
Observer
@James
Think there is a bit of doublethink in your argument, if the carrier wasn’t such an important asset in the war, why then are you saying that men were being bombed due to it’s mispositioning? If it was so useless, it would not have mattered if it was parked next to Port Stanley or in the Channel. The fact that you made such a big deal of it’s positioning implies the opposite, that the carrier WAS fundamentally important in the campaign.
I for one, think that it did serve a big role then, the AAW frigates then appeared to have been a little less AAW and more “bomb target” than was initially expected, and Fleet Air did pick up some of the slack in air defence.
Of course, that was then. Now? Hard to justify the cost of a full up carrier. Wonder how a cat equipped LPH would fare? Through-deck LPH carrying a single squadron for area defence? Cheap enough that it might be risked on dangerous ops, enough planes to make a difference.
All Politicians are the Same
Observer, or a CVF launching 24 F35b from 200NM behind a TLAM strike, F35B utilising JSM and laser guided bombs to finish of the AAW and C2 network, cueing SF and satellite and then the ARG closing the coast under an F35b umbrella and T26 5 inch vulcano rounds form an Oto Breda lightweight out to 70NM. What a difference in capability.
x
@ James re Ghurkas and swimming
I remember reading a story about a platoon of Ghurkas being transported in one of HM’s ships. I think it was in the Far East. It was a nice day and the captain decided to give the ship’s company an opportunity for a swim. The ship was brought to a halt and “Hands to bathe” was piped. There was much consternation amongst the mountain men who thought they were being ordered to swim. They were up for it, but none too happy.
James
Observer,
not doublethink (I don’t think, but you’ll be the judge).
CAP was important, so therefore a carrier also important. But CAP was not vital: it cannot be demonstrated that the amphibious landings would have been impossible without CAP. So if CAP is important but not vital, let’s do it. If the balance of risk is between 7-10,000 who are the ones to actually go and win the war, and temporarily are variously offloading and ARG-ing or providing an AA screen, and 2,000 who are supporting CAP, then move the carrier closer.
APATS,
I got the 10 mins from a reasonably recent TD post (was it about the FOB? Can’t quite recall). I do know that Rupert Uloth who commanded one of the Blues Troops was incensed after being razzed up by a Pucara when a Harrier arrived about 10 minutes too late, that Arthur Denaro commanding an SAS Troop could get no air cover for a raid, and that there is a massively over-engineered story about air cover at Goose Green that is designed for political purposes to stop any discussion at all of Julian Thompson’s anger with the Fleet for leaving 2 Para balls out in the scrub. If you read the soldier’s accounts of the battle, or even the official log record kept by 2 Para of radio messages, there is literally Zip reference to air. And yet, the 2 stars claim there was. Hmmm.
X,
heard similar, delete ship insert aircraft and parachuting and not enough parachutes to go around. A cousin of mine was a Ghurka (you know what I mean), and tells of a time when he was on OP duty in the HK New Territories. He received a written report that 2 Chinese policemen were observed playing ping pong outside their guard post with no arms. Another time a Ghurka came back from a bicycle patrol along the frontier with a freshly severed human hand, and a report that a Chinese man had been trying to climb the fence, but he had “told him to go back to his village”. There’s telling, and then there’s “telling” while waving a ruddy great kukri about, I suppose.
All Politicians are the Same
James hence my earlier point about HF comms, there were relatively few aircraft covering the area. the army had persistent HF comms issues with requesting direct support via Hermes. In the age of tacsat that would not happen.
James
APATS,
actually, I think that’s a bit hopeful. Skynet struggles to provide the comms that far south and right down in the corner of the orbits (it’s all a bit single point of failure). But it is possible if all works well. You will of course tell me of fantastic data transmissions from MPA happening dozens of times daily, to which I will only say “concrete pad, constant electrical power, engineering and a large fixed dish”. It is a bit more dodgy on the side of a hill at night, under fire with some nearly futzed batteries, and the rain pissing down.
What we all need is Stratsat, a deployable comms rebro airship that sits up at 80K and is pretty much immune to any form of attack, short of dozens of suicide U2s. It’ll do 30 knots as well so can deploy above the Task Group. But it is optimised for station-keeping well above the weather.
All Politicians are the Same
James when was the last time you were down South, we have a few more satellites now!
James
APATS,
2000, and then only for a fortnight. Skynet 5 was not yet in service.
However, digging my “Schoolboy’s Guide to the Cosmos” big book of pictures out of the back of the loft, there is a difficulty with latitudes above 57 degrees north or south (please don’t ask me why 57 is important and not 58 or 56, because I will have to plead ignorance and being a Cavalryman, which is much the same). It’s pretty damn marginal, and the boffins want to start replacing the standard satellites with ones in polar orbits, but because of techno-reasons that make my head spin, that’s a pretty crap answer, and expensive, and they spin off into space after a while anyway.
So, reading those articles in the Economist about 21st century resource wars in the polar regions and also (when there’s no fighting) the new North West and North East Passages being ice-free year round, I’m suspecting that comms is going to be an issue. Maybe it’s worth investing in a company that has a decent answer to that.
x
What we want is SKYLON. And then we can put satellites where we want, when we want, and for little cost.
Of course we would have establish a Royal Space Force to operate it with its own ground troops, helicopters, and dog handlers (and dogs.)
All Politicians are the Same
Reading my little book of having been there and utilsed SCOT I guess I should nod to the economist? Bloody hell James you base an argument on an economist article?
wf
@James, 3 Cdo and 5 Brigades were the only way of finishing the war, but it’s nonsense to declare that SHAR were not fundamental. They were far and away the most effective air defence weapon, and no landing could have been made without their presence. If you think San Carlos was raining bombs with them, without them, with Rapier, Blowpipe, Sea Slug, Sea Dart and Sea Cat all effectively useless, a chronic lack of AAA other than the GPMG, and no way of interdicting aircraft before they reach visual range of the landings, it would have been the sort of disaster that makes Dieppe look like a minor learning experience.
Thompson and others (including the infamous Sharkey) have been on record for the last two decades that Woodward was the wrong man to command the carrier group, as a man who had specialised in submarines. They wanted Derek Reffell, as someone from a carrier and amphibious background. They are probably right. But he did well enough to allow a successful landing nevertheless.
Observer
@APATs
“Or a CVF launching 24 F35b from 200NM behind a TLAM strike, F35B utilising JSM and laser guided bombs to finish of the AAW and C2 network, cueing SF and satellite and then the ARG closing the coast under an F35b umbrella and T26 5 inch vulcano rounds form an Oto Breda lightweight”
I wasn’t aware carriers could launch TLAMs. As for the rest, which part of it could not be done by a pair of the budget carriers that I was suggesting? 24 F-35s are 24 F-35s, regardless of being launched from a carrier or from a rowboat. The only difference which you rapsodised about is the 5 incher, and even that is from a different platform. Unless you’re implying the QE has an inbuilt T-26. Satlink is not dependent on ship but on installations, you can even build it on the helo flight deck of a destroyer and it’ll still work. Though I won’t recommend it.
But it’s a dead issue. Despite what James thinks as “approval”, I actually see the “we’re committed” issue as resigned acceptance. Steel has been cut and assembled, going backwards is going to be more costly than going forwards, and plans with too many people’s approval have been laid out. It’s a dead issue. All we can do is hope that better decisions can be made the next time.
@X
Problem is not with delivery, problem is that recon sats don’t stay still, and after a while, they go off course.
James
WF,
no, SHAR were useful, not fundamental. It is not really too problematic to see that, nor does it demean the Navy. It does however seem to be some lodestar of faith among many people.
Most of the landings took place without a CAP. Some of the landings took place before the first CAP arrived, and most of the landings occurred at night when neither Argentina nor the UK had planes with night vision equipment. The CAP was in place for less than 90 minutes a day.
The majority of SHAR kills were achieved away from San Carlos Water, although some of the chases certainly started there.
If you really believe the FAA historiography, may I interest you in some KoolAid?
x
Neither the Argentine airforce or navy had a night capability. Seeing as the landings began at night and the Argentines didn’t know straight away where the landings were there was no need for CAP from the get go.
I can see I am going to have to get Ward’s book off the shelf.
All Politicians are the Same
Observer, i aplogise if you didn’t realise I was talking about BG capabilities. As for the rest of your post , I guess you are a Singaporean in service or retired officer, so in terms of making objective comments about RN amphibious capability you are another internet Admiral.
Observer
@APATs
And what was the difference in battlegroup capability? That was the point that puzzled me. If the only units that are different is the carrier type, launching the same number and type of aircraft, how does the change reduce the CVBG capability?
Observer
Sorry guys, my post initially was more polite until APATs editted his to be more snarky.
@APATs
Less chest thumping, more info. Rank and post reitterations do little to provide facts.
tsz52
“Thompson and others (including the infamous Sharkey) have been on record for the last two decades that Woodward was the wrong man to command the carrier group, as a man who had specialised in submarines. They wanted Derek Reffell, as someone from a carrier and amphibious background. They are probably right. But he did well enough to allow a successful landing nevertheless.”
Just to point out for fairness that Woodward’s long been on record as saying that himself, and at the time he suggested to his superiors that it would be better to wait until a better commander was available: just another problem that went with the Task Force having to sail immediately.
James
Can I retell of the result of the recent Army Navy Rugby match? Just want to get the tone back to mildly joshing, not finger pointing.
(Andrew crapped out, but the Army had about 30 Fijians. Rumour that the Sea Lords have sent around a press gang to Fiji being strongly denied)
Trying to draw conclusions from sortie rates is a favourite pastime of those with a pre formed opinion. It is a fool’s errand because the definition of a sortie can be so varied and the definition of a successful sortie even more nebulous. Then of course you have to look at a million and one things to provide context, a successful sortie for a SHAR in 1982 might well have been zero munitions expended, what about recce missions, what about shows of force/presence. Too many variables to make it a meaningful means of measuring ‘worth’
Even using comparisons of munitions expended is not a reliable indicator either, just far too many variables.
If you look at the history of aviation since the end of the war you should be able to reasonably determine when land based aviation has been used compared to sea based.
Light Blue onboard
This seems to be one of those issues which is so decisive and yet seems very simple to resolve. I tend to think people just get on with things and over a period of time, with enough training and commitment from all concerned should be resolved.
Carriers, Risk and 1982
James makes an interesting point about balancing risk. I tend to agree that with the benefit of 20:20 hindsight the decisions that led to a lack of cover for ACO, Sir Galahad and San Carlos in general were arguably incorrect, protecting the carriers rather than the logistics and amphibious forces. But would bringing the carriers in closer have prevented those incidents, dunno.
It is also very easy to see why the carriers were perceived as being so essential, two sides of the coin.
If you read the San Carlos FOB and ACO posts I did recently you should find some of the background details, the FOB in particular should (in my opinion) have been established sooner. The 10 minute time on station was in one of those, double checked sources and have seen that number a few times but of course, we know that sources can sometime be wrong.
NAB, I think most of the helicopters for tactical lift in support of ground forces were staged out of the FOB and Atlantic Causeway.
All Politicians are the Same
Obeserver, we are looking ta a BG that can have SGNs in on location CVs in an other an other and FFS in a third we can synchronise tot FOR TLAM and F35B JSM and use a 3rd wave of f35B on top then push escorts inshore to utilise oto breada 5 inch light weight whilst also bringing the ARG in, I know you guys cannot but we can.
wf
@James, come now. After all our friendly discussion as to the importance of landing of supplies, you forget that the support stores for 3 Cdo alone took a week to land, during which time the SHAR’s scored the majority of their kills. I’m all in favour of the bayonet, but it seems a little optimistic to see the RM and Paras taking the islands without ammunition after half their supplies are sunk.
I’m sure you also know that the CAP was planned specifically on the basis that it would not fly over San Carlos, which was to be a fixed wing free fire zone, unless the aircraft concerned approached in a fuel emergency with landing lights on.
x
TD said “Light Blue onboard”
Did you have much to do with recruiting arm of the Army during your time in?
I was on very good terms with the succession of CPOs and POs out our local office. I had a lot to do with an ex-WO recruiter during my time with cadets (on the UMC side.) And I know the why’s and wherefore’s of how youngsters decide on which service they are going to join. And IMHO based on all that is that KIDS DON’T JOIN THE RAF TO GO TO SEA. THEY DO IT TO AVOID THE SEA. AND RUNNING AROUND OUTSIDE IN THE COLD, DIGGING THE OCCASIONAL HOLE TO LIVE IN, AND PLAYING WITH BANG-BANGS. JFH isn’t a good example. The Harriers spent more a lot time ashore than deployed to the carriers. I think your “light blue at sea” point of view is more to do with making your model of no FJ for the FAA work. Exchanges are a novelty in a long career service. An 18 year old signing on the dotted line thinks he will be pending his service time will be spent in Lincolnshire or the Home Counties with perhaps a tour in Bastion. He isn’t expecting a life on the Oggin with RN frequency of deployments. He wouldn’t join else. That is the modern youngster.
ArmChairCivvy
Now we need to do the 5 minutes during the Midway encounter that sealed the Pacific war’s outcome, as a fraction of the time elapsed from Pearl Harbour to Nagasaki bombing, RE
“there have been 3484 weeks since 1945, of which aircraft carriers have proven “vital” (which I don’t really believe, but most do) for 6 of them. That is 0.17% of the time.”
Chris.B.
“with Rapier, Blowpipe, Sea Slug, Sea Dart and Sea Cat all effectively useless”
I don’t understand why this myth persists. Blowpipe proved to be a bit of a dog and the others had their problems, but missiles shot down more attacking Skyhawks than the Harriers did, so I’d say they had a pretty good hand in protecting the landings. The majority of Harrier kills were the higher flying Dagger escorts.
ArmChairCivvy
Hi Mr. fred, RE
“Bog standard Stryker?”
- $3.5m lately, much cheaper to begin with
-” Waste of time and money” Agreed
” Patria AMV”
- $2m, add turret and any advanced sensors
“£3m for an APC is pushing it.”
- if those two were meant (cheaper is better?), how come?
Chris.B.
@ X
I would say your characterisation of young people seems to be rather more service driven than anything based in reality. One kid from my school (alright, we’re going back a while now) joined the engineers because he thought it would set him up for life in trade skills. Another joined the RAF because he liked planes but wasn’t smart enough to fly them.
I cant imagine people actually joing certain services because they plan to just sit around in Oxford for the next few years or because they don’t want to get their hands dirty. That just sounds to me like you’re doing precisely the same thing you’re accusing TD of doing; constructing an argument from nothing to fit your preferred profile.
James
wf,
you make my argument for a properly constructed Brigade-sized ARG beautifully. Yes, we need loads of lovely loggies coming ashore in quick time with whatever it is that loggies carry. Scoff and bullets, presumably.
Why does “loggies” default on my Apple spell check to loggias, as in bosky Italian flower-decked love nests? Perhaps I missed out in my service years by not being a loggia? I am concerned that there are service teachers, QARANCs at Rinteln and WRACs that got away unmolested.
Not a Boffin
The reason the carriers and SHAR were fundamental is simple. On April 2nd 1982, had the Navy been asked “can you assure a landing of 3 Cdo and follow on forces against an air force of 200+ based in Argentina?”, without the SHAR, the answer (from all senior naval officers) would have been “no”. Had the answer been “yes”, both CGS and CAS would have asked some fairly pointed questions along the lines of “how?” – probably because back then, the air threat was something that all services thought about and understood – particularly as they had not grown used to it being dealt with by “someone else” back then. Result, no deployment of what I absolutely agree was the required “effect” – the infantry and also no Op Corporate, end of. Hence fundamental, like it or not.
TD – Causeway may well have brought a shedload of Wessies & SK, but Hermes brought 845 and half of 846 from the off. She also had the AE department and facilities to sustain them, which Causeway did not. She also didn’t get there till four days after the first landings, by which time 845/846 and the HAS SK squadrons had got the Rapier and 105 batteries ashore to provide some defence for the FOB.
James
NAB,
good thing that the Navy were not asked then, but instead one man. The only Admiral with balls since Nelson – Leach – stood up and said it could be done. Much against his staff’s advice.
As it was, SHAR was useful but not critical.
I do feel like I’m slightly banging my head on a brick wall with this “fundamental” definition. It is one capability only. If you really want to say that the Falklands could not have been retaken without a carrier launched fast jet capability, say so, but it appears that every piece of evidence is completely against that.
Or to put it into your court, if SHAR was fundamental, how did Sharkey and the Far East Fleet plan to capture the Argentinean trenches on East Falkland? Would they have gone for the riskier right flank at Goose Green? What about that tricky SF position on the northern side of Longdon? And how good is Harrier at crawling through the mud silently before the attack on Tumbledown, and can it hook in there for over 24 hours in a battle group attack, or does it need to bugger off for some fuel at some point? It would also be useful to know of your logistic calculations for how many pallets of 105 ammo SHAR can under sling, or even if the young pilot on board has any concept of the land tactical battle. Certainly in 1982, the SHAR pilots had none. Junglies yes, SHARs no.
wf
@James, you are deliberately tilting at windmills. @NAB and I have no issue with land forces being those that finish it, but since SAM and AAA managed to knock down less than half AR’s fighter aircraft losses, you are looking at rather a lot of additional aircraft that would have been dropping bombs on amphibs. We’re not a pair of Sloane’s begging for some cavalry goodness you know
Dunservin
@James
You feel like you’re banging your head against a brick wall? There is simply no question about it. Any idea of mounting an opposed landing 8,000 miles from the UK without a scrap of air cover against an enemy possessing considerable numbers of aircraft equipped with ASMs, bombs, cannon and rockets would have been a non-starter, even with Leach.
The campaign was a close enough run thing as it was but, thanks mainly to SHAR and with one notable exception, at least the ships managed to deliver the troops and most of their kit ashore relatively unscathed. However, they paid a hideous penalty in the process, mostly owing to the lack of a proper fleet carrier with fast, long-range FJ and AEW. I pray that we never risk being placed in such an invidious position again.
Dunservin
P.S. That’s for the Army’s sake as well as the RN’s.
James
Dunservin,
SHAR were useful, no doubt. But there is not a scrap of evidence that the landings could not have proceeded without them. The landing sites were mostly (on a 24/7 basis) unsupported by CAP, but the landings went ahead anyway. There is plenty of video and documentary evidence that SHAR were not actually that successful in keeping the Argies away from the landing sites (i.e. several ships attacked and sunk, without SHAR getting involved). There is an easy mathematics that says “but SHAR took out more than 20″, but if you analyse the evidence, most were Mirage flying “top cover”, and many of the rest were not actually attacking the landing sites. And on the day the Sir Galahad was hit, where were the SHAR? Nowhere to be bloody seen. That is mostly explained by the fact that someone deemed it not to be flying weather as far east as the fleet was, but as far west as the Argentine Squadron airbase, it was good enough to get airborne. So the SHARS were socked in, the pilots eating cheesy eggy hammy, sand Carlos Fandango had a free run in. It doesn’t matter that the Army were stupid and should not have remained aboard, the Andrew for technical weather reasons were stuck on deck. So don’t give me this “without SHAR it would have been impossible” crap,
So it wasn’t mainly thanks to SHAR. SHAR did their job, but their job did not win us back the Falklands by themselves and with no other help, and without them we’d have been helpless. Or do you really want to pretend that they did?
Observer
@James
Despite your desire to see all FJs turned into tin cans (very useful tin cans mind you) and my corresponding desire to do so just to put one in the eye of APATs, I have to say that FJs still have a very important part to play in the battlefield. Sure, they can’t hold land, but they are incredible “enablers” that allow other forces to operate with much more ease.
Just think off the AH force you recommended on the JC LPHs. They’re wonderful CAS, but against FJs with BVR missiles and look down radar, they fare fairly badly. A friendly FJ force allows your AHs to go tank hunting without having to worry about enemy FJs as they would either have been shot down or engaged in a contest for air superiority instead of turkey shooting helicopters.
@APATS
Did you hit your head? Most of what you brought up are just smoke and mirrors, red herrings, strawman arguments and innuendo, not to mention the severe decline in your spelling.
Your ships come with SYLVAR 70s? No? Then you can’t do TLAMs either, and Mk 48s? Your carrier comes with them? No? Then why are you claiming that CVFs will suddenly give NGS ability? Or that changing CVFs to CVEs will suddenly disable T-26 4.5 inchers? You got enough red herrings to feed Africa for a decade. My only conclusion to all this nonsense is to either conclude that you
1) Have just hit your head and have lost your faculties to reason or
2) You don’t really have a good answer to the question and are trying to obfuscate the issue to your CVF bias.
x
James said “The only Admiral with balls since Nelson”
Beatty? Cunningham? Vian?
Not a Boffin
James
Which bit of “what I absolutely agree was the required “effect” – the infantry ” did you not understand? Your references to “Sharkey & the Far East Fleet” are therefore absurd – as is your denigration of naval admirals.
However much you dislike the fact, without SHAR plus carrier, the “infantry effect” would not even have loaded aboard ship and it would have been CGS making that decision, never mind 1SL or CDS, probably because all of them understood threat assessment.
I can help you with “fundamental” – the definition of which is “adjective – forming a necessary base or core; of central importance”. Sounds pretty much like the contribution of SHAR plus carrier, plus RFA & STUFT, plus (of course) 3 Cdo & 5 Inf. Or did you just want to suggest that the land forces did all the work and that the most intense naval war since WW2 was an unimportant sideshow?
Is it not fair to say that every component of the task force and its supporting elements was fundamental, essential, important etc?
How much of this debate is actually about definitions of words on the head of a pin.
How would the RN have managed if RAF Hercules weren’t doing regular stores drops, how would Army Rapiers have maintained operations without daily supplies of fuel from Navy Sea Kings and how would RAF operations from Ascension coped without fuel supplies from the US?
The whole thing was intimately interconnected.
James makes the point that the final effect was delivered by land forces which is of course true, and equally true of the majority of operations, but as others have said, they would not have got into that position without other elements of all three services.
NaB, Causeway wasn’t just a ferry, helicopters carried out over 4,000 landings in the very short time it was operational and the FOB delivered 50,000L of fuel per day (not just for aircraft) and 120 movements per day. I am not disputing what the carriers did in terms of rotary but they were not the only game in town.
1982 is an object lesson in what happens when you fail to achieve control of the air but lets not forget, control of the air is not just about aircraft carriers, fighters or AEW.
In any objective analysis we failed to achieve that control and the price should be obvious to all.
James
@ TD and all,
the point I am trying to make – not very successfully, it appears – is that in all military matters there is one capability without which strategic success cannot be imagined, and that in the case of the Falklands, it was land combat power. That is NOT to say that everything else was unimportant or only there for the ride. This is a concept that has been around for hundreds of years, and is codified by all militaries that I know of in their doctrine. It can be captured by several names – Main Effort, Schwerpunkt, Centre of Gravity, etc. At a tactical level, the Army for instance also follows this in the names of types of artillery support: Direct Support, General Support, General Support Reinforcing, that tell both the Artillery and Combat Commander what to expect at certain phases of the battle.
It makes a mockery to suggest that everything is “fundamental”. It is also true to say that very many things were very important, and in this case I include everything that I am aware of that the Navy did. It has not come up in the discussion, but I personally believe that the three SSNs were the key naval asset, as they were able to keep the Argentine Navy bottled up in their ports.
Would the Falklands have been re-captured without an infantry force? I suggest the answer is no. Would they have been re-captured without carrier air? I suggest that it would have been much more bloody and less certain, but not impossible. Would they have been recaptured without the deterrent effect of the SSNs, and if the Argentines had come out for a proper naval battle? Much less likely.
Honestly, anyone would think that questioning the role of fast air in the Falklands is heresy. It’s really not.
James
Just to add that if carrier fast air had not been available (and leaving aside any considerations as to whether the task force would have been sent at all without fast air), then what would have changed? I suggest that there would have been even more emphasis on taking out the Pucaras that were on the islands (more SF raids, and NGS onto the grass airstrips), and that the landings would have been made in north east Falkland, a further 50 miles away from the Argentine bases on the mainland. The biggest single mistake the Argentines made was not to put fast air on the islands themselves. Once the Pucaras were neutralised, if neither side had no fast air in the vicinity of the landing site, then air threats and the need to deal with them become a non-problem.
Simon
James,
Can I presume from your lack of value of carrier jet aviation that you like the idea of the air being dominated by the enemy dropping cluster bombs all over the front line and removing every UK helicopter that pops up with a sidewinder? I say this based on your 98% of 98% rather than the stuff said above.
You don’t need CAP over the landing site. You put CAP in a place to make sure enemy aircraft don’t get to the landing site.
I’m not sure 1982 is a good example of “fundamental” air power – we only just scraped by. But generally the foundation for a successful military conflict (or at least the one’s I’ve seen) is to dominate the air either with air-supremacy jets or by taking out the enemies capability to control the air (SEAD). MANPADS and Sea Viper/Ceptor have only a limited coverage.
As for 1982, if we had lost a carrier would we not have used the other one but closer in? If we lost that one too would we not have nuked the Argentinian airbase? Black Mamba backed into a corner and all that!
APATS,
I’d have procured 4 x WASP – 2 active, 1 as carrier, 1 as LHD.
Also, you just said “…CVF launching 24 F35b from 200NM…”. Have you changed your tune? You wanted to put it 50nm with the ARG last time we spoke. Anyway, wouldn’t the initial strike wave come from ~400nm (100+ sorties a whole day before the landing).
I like your sub-fired TLAM strike!
TD,
Please don’t brand me with the “sortie rate” thing. I never said RATE! It’s total sorties or bombs and, unless statistics has changed, a comparison does actually provide meaningful information.
All,
I’d join the RAF or the FAA to fly jets – nothing else. If you’re recruiting people with long-term career visions, you’re recruiting the wrong people.
Dunservin
@James
How about the view of the Yanks who seem pretty switched-on about joint operations? This is the heading at the top of Page I-1 of Chapter 1 (INTRODUCTION) of JP3-01 (Joint Doctrine for Countering Air and Missile Threats) (http://www.fas.org/spp/starwars/docops/jp3_01.pdf) endorsed by the US Navy, USMC, US Army and US Air Force:
“If we lose the war in the air, we lose the war and we lose it quickly. (Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery)”
(I didn’t realise he was American – I thought he was one of yours )
These are the second and third sentences of Para 1 on the same page:
“…Air superiority delivers a FUNDAMENTAL benefit to the joint force. It prevents adversaries from interfering with operations of air, space, or surface forces and assures freedom of action and movement…”
Still quibbling about the use of the term “fundamental” with regard to the SHAR during CORPORATE? They may not have constituted ‘Air Power’ (if only) but they were able to provide local ‘Air Superiority’ at critical times. No matter how much you demur, the TF would never have sailed without them.
As you should be well aware, the positioning of the carriers was driven by the lack of AEW and consequent inability to run CAP on an optimised risk basis.
IIRC the SHAR component got 20+ kills – something like half the total Argentinian losses (excluding the Pucara/Skyvans destroyed on the ground at Pebble Island). That also excludes the number of A4/Mirage/Dagger that jettisoned ordnance when they saw SHARS in the area.
To suggest they were not fundamental to overall victory is stretching credulity in the extreme I’m afraid. Don’t forget that the carriers were also home to most of the helos, providing ASW as well as lift. Without the carriers, even less tactical mobility than we ended up with.
If you think they weren’t really doing very much, then I’m afraid the Joint warfare bit of the joint staff course syllabus is or was sadly lacking.
APATS,
(positioning) – let’s hope not, but equally let us also institute a doctrine where carrier task group commanders get repeatedly battered with baseball bats to the mantra of “it’s not about your carrier group, it is about what you are here to do, and that might involve the carrier paintwork getting scratched”.
I’m still sceptical about the political aspect of a carrier sinking. Once they were down there, we weren’t going to sail away if we lost a carrier, so the risk should have been taken. That’s a decision that should have been immediately obvious in the South Atlantic, taken by Sandy Woodward, and no need to refer back to Northwood at all, let alone Downing Street.
You want to hear Gen Julian Thompson on Sandy Woodward. Let us say that scathing does not do it justice. Also Gen Brian Pennicot, who had under command the guns (“Fires” in today’s parlance), including NGS, and the Air Defence assets.
Going back to what James said about the UK only needed carriers for 6 weeks since WW2. We will forget Suez, the Soviet threat…
Any how can you imagine what would have happened if we didn’t have the carriers and couldn’t get the islands back? The government would have fallen. The skids would have gone under a shakey recovery. Doesn’t bear thinking about it….
NAB,
you appear to have a very broad definition of “fundamental”. How were SHARS “fundamental” to victory? Were they the single point upon which everything else relied? No, they were not.
What was fundamental to victory were two Brigades of infantry. Everything else was enabling. Do not think that enabling implies some secondary status, or is not allowed to be important. But fundamental is a sole capability, one thing only, without which everything else is a waste of time. And SHARS in 1982 did not fall into that category.
I’m not much fussed about your judgement as to how much I listened to the joint staff course, after that little intervention.
james, I am sympathetic to your view point but remember that losing Hermes and her embarked staff and air group would have been the worst single loss since task force Z and in terms of manpower may have been worse.
Incorrectly as it may have been Hermes was seen as the UK COG by some Politicians.
@ James
All the brigades were weapons fired by the TF. I have no doubt the 3 RM Commandos could have walked to the FI carrying everything they needed, fought the war, invaded Argentina, and walked home again. But HMG made them take some army bods too which meant ships…..
APATS,
there were about 7-10,000 men potentially getting the crap bombed out of them in San Carlos Water, and 2,000 on Hermes which was nearly 300 miles east. Hermes could have been a bit closer, given that it was known by that stage that there were no fast attack jets at Stanley, the Pucaras had been pretty much wiped out, the combat radius for any Argentine jet from the mainland gave them negligible reach beyond West Falkland, and the on-station time for SHARS on CAP was ten minutes, with a total out and back transit of 80 minutes.
You will not be able to persuade me that there was a horrifying lack of judgement by Sandy Woodward. I don’t know why you try. More importantly, his subordinate commanders also felt it was a terrible lack of judgment, and they were all there and in his confidence.
X,
ha ha. Don’t forget that the Paras wanted to fly in (but too far away), the Gurkhas to crawl in sneakily but can’t swim very well, and the Guards wanted to march in open order, doing the left form on Fanning Head. But it was all a bit wet. So Andrew rules for a while, until normal service resumed when they got ashore.
James, the average on station time for a SHAR during the FI campaign was close to 40 mins!
@James
Think there is a bit of doublethink in your argument, if the carrier wasn’t such an important asset in the war, why then are you saying that men were being bombed due to it’s mispositioning? If it was so useless, it would not have mattered if it was parked next to Port Stanley or in the Channel. The fact that you made such a big deal of it’s positioning implies the opposite, that the carrier WAS fundamentally important in the campaign.
I for one, think that it did serve a big role then, the AAW frigates then appeared to have been a little less AAW and more “bomb target” than was initially expected, and Fleet Air did pick up some of the slack in air defence.
Of course, that was then. Now? Hard to justify the cost of a full up carrier. Wonder how a cat equipped LPH would fare? Through-deck LPH carrying a single squadron for area defence? Cheap enough that it might be risked on dangerous ops, enough planes to make a difference.
Observer, or a CVF launching 24 F35b from 200NM behind a TLAM strike, F35B utilising JSM and laser guided bombs to finish of the AAW and C2 network, cueing SF and satellite and then the ARG closing the coast under an F35b umbrella and T26 5 inch vulcano rounds form an Oto Breda lightweight out to 70NM. What a difference in capability.
@ James re Ghurkas and swimming
I remember reading a story about a platoon of Ghurkas being transported in one of HM’s ships. I think it was in the Far East. It was a nice day and the captain decided to give the ship’s company an opportunity for a swim. The ship was brought to a halt and “Hands to bathe” was piped. There was much consternation amongst the mountain men who thought they were being ordered to swim. They were up for it, but none too happy.
Observer,
not doublethink (I don’t think, but you’ll be the judge).
CAP was important, so therefore a carrier also important. But CAP was not vital: it cannot be demonstrated that the amphibious landings would have been impossible without CAP. So if CAP is important but not vital, let’s do it. If the balance of risk is between 7-10,000 who are the ones to actually go and win the war, and temporarily are variously offloading and ARG-ing or providing an AA screen, and 2,000 who are supporting CAP, then move the carrier closer.
APATS,
I got the 10 mins from a reasonably recent TD post (was it about the FOB? Can’t quite recall). I do know that Rupert Uloth who commanded one of the Blues Troops was incensed after being razzed up by a Pucara when a Harrier arrived about 10 minutes too late, that Arthur Denaro commanding an SAS Troop could get no air cover for a raid, and that there is a massively over-engineered story about air cover at Goose Green that is designed for political purposes to stop any discussion at all of Julian Thompson’s anger with the Fleet for leaving 2 Para balls out in the scrub. If you read the soldier’s accounts of the battle, or even the official log record kept by 2 Para of radio messages, there is literally Zip reference to air. And yet, the 2 stars claim there was. Hmmm.
X,
heard similar, delete ship insert aircraft and parachuting and not enough parachutes to go around. A cousin of mine was a Ghurka (you know what I mean), and tells of a time when he was on OP duty in the HK New Territories. He received a written report that 2 Chinese policemen were observed playing ping pong outside their guard post with no arms. Another time a Ghurka came back from a bicycle patrol along the frontier with a freshly severed human hand, and a report that a Chinese man had been trying to climb the fence, but he had “told him to go back to his village”. There’s telling, and then there’s “telling” while waving a ruddy great kukri about, I suppose.
James hence my earlier point about HF comms, there were relatively few aircraft covering the area. the army had persistent HF comms issues with requesting direct support via Hermes. In the age of tacsat that would not happen.
APATS,
actually, I think that’s a bit hopeful. Skynet struggles to provide the comms that far south and right down in the corner of the orbits (it’s all a bit single point of failure). But it is possible if all works well. You will of course tell me of fantastic data transmissions from MPA happening dozens of times daily, to which I will only say “concrete pad, constant electrical power, engineering and a large fixed dish”. It is a bit more dodgy on the side of a hill at night, under fire with some nearly futzed batteries, and the rain pissing down.
What we all need is Stratsat, a deployable comms rebro airship that sits up at 80K and is pretty much immune to any form of attack, short of dozens of suicide U2s. It’ll do 30 knots as well so can deploy above the Task Group. But it is optimised for station-keeping well above the weather.
James when was the last time you were down South, we have a few more satellites now!
APATS,
2000, and then only for a fortnight. Skynet 5 was not yet in service.
However, digging my “Schoolboy’s Guide to the Cosmos” big book of pictures out of the back of the loft, there is a difficulty with latitudes above 57 degrees north or south (please don’t ask me why 57 is important and not 58 or 56, because I will have to plead ignorance and being a Cavalryman, which is much the same). It’s pretty damn marginal, and the boffins want to start replacing the standard satellites with ones in polar orbits, but because of techno-reasons that make my head spin, that’s a pretty crap answer, and expensive, and they spin off into space after a while anyway.
So, reading those articles in the Economist about 21st century resource wars in the polar regions and also (when there’s no fighting) the new North West and North East Passages being ice-free year round, I’m suspecting that comms is going to be an issue. Maybe it’s worth investing in a company that has a decent answer to that.
What we want is SKYLON. And then we can put satellites where we want, when we want, and for little cost.
Of course we would have establish a Royal Space Force to operate it with its own ground troops, helicopters, and dog handlers (and dogs.)
Reading my little book of having been there and utilsed SCOT I guess I should nod to the economist? Bloody hell James you base an argument on an economist article?
@James, 3 Cdo and 5 Brigades were the only way of finishing the war, but it’s nonsense to declare that SHAR were not fundamental. They were far and away the most effective air defence weapon, and no landing could have been made without their presence. If you think San Carlos was raining bombs with them, without them, with Rapier, Blowpipe, Sea Slug, Sea Dart and Sea Cat all effectively useless, a chronic lack of AAA other than the GPMG, and no way of interdicting aircraft before they reach visual range of the landings, it would have been the sort of disaster that makes Dieppe look like a minor learning experience.
Thompson and others (including the infamous Sharkey) have been on record for the last two decades that Woodward was the wrong man to command the carrier group, as a man who had specialised in submarines. They wanted Derek Reffell, as someone from a carrier and amphibious background. They are probably right. But he did well enough to allow a successful landing nevertheless.
@APATs
“Or a CVF launching 24 F35b from 200NM behind a TLAM strike, F35B utilising JSM and laser guided bombs to finish of the AAW and C2 network, cueing SF and satellite and then the ARG closing the coast under an F35b umbrella and T26 5 inch vulcano rounds form an Oto Breda lightweight”
I wasn’t aware carriers could launch TLAMs. As for the rest, which part of it could not be done by a pair of the budget carriers that I was suggesting? 24 F-35s are 24 F-35s, regardless of being launched from a carrier or from a rowboat. The only difference which you rapsodised about is the 5 incher, and even that is from a different platform. Unless you’re implying the QE has an inbuilt T-26. Satlink is not dependent on ship but on installations, you can even build it on the helo flight deck of a destroyer and it’ll still work. Though I won’t recommend it.
But it’s a dead issue. Despite what James thinks as “approval”, I actually see the “we’re committed” issue as resigned acceptance. Steel has been cut and assembled, going backwards is going to be more costly than going forwards, and plans with too many people’s approval have been laid out. It’s a dead issue. All we can do is hope that better decisions can be made the next time.
@X
Problem is not with delivery, problem is that recon sats don’t stay still, and after a while, they go off course.
WF,
no, SHAR were useful, not fundamental. It is not really too problematic to see that, nor does it demean the Navy. It does however seem to be some lodestar of faith among many people.
Most of the landings took place without a CAP. Some of the landings took place before the first CAP arrived, and most of the landings occurred at night when neither Argentina nor the UK had planes with night vision equipment. The CAP was in place for less than 90 minutes a day.
The majority of SHAR kills were achieved away from San Carlos Water, although some of the chases certainly started there.
If you really believe the FAA historiography, may I interest you in some KoolAid?
Neither the Argentine airforce or navy had a night capability. Seeing as the landings began at night and the Argentines didn’t know straight away where the landings were there was no need for CAP from the get go.
I can see I am going to have to get Ward’s book off the shelf.
Observer, i aplogise if you didn’t realise I was talking about BG capabilities. As for the rest of your post , I guess you are a Singaporean in service or retired officer, so in terms of making objective comments about RN amphibious capability you are another internet Admiral.
@APATs
And what was the difference in battlegroup capability? That was the point that puzzled me. If the only units that are different is the carrier type, launching the same number and type of aircraft, how does the change reduce the CVBG capability?
Sorry guys, my post initially was more polite until APATs editted his to be more snarky.
@APATs
Less chest thumping, more info. Rank and post reitterations do little to provide facts.
“Thompson and others (including the infamous Sharkey) have been on record for the last two decades that Woodward was the wrong man to command the carrier group, as a man who had specialised in submarines. They wanted Derek Reffell, as someone from a carrier and amphibious background. They are probably right. But he did well enough to allow a successful landing nevertheless.”
Just to point out for fairness that Woodward’s long been on record as saying that himself, and at the time he suggested to his superiors that it would be better to wait until a better commander was available: just another problem that went with the Task Force having to sail immediately.
Can I retell of the result of the recent Army Navy Rugby match?
Just want to get the tone back to mildly joshing, not finger pointing.
(Andrew crapped out, but the Army had about 30 Fijians. Rumour that the Sea Lords have sent around a press gang to Fiji being strongly denied)
Sortie Rates
Trying to draw conclusions from sortie rates is a favourite pastime of those with a pre formed opinion. It is a fool’s errand because the definition of a sortie can be so varied and the definition of a successful sortie even more nebulous. Then of course you have to look at a million and one things to provide context, a successful sortie for a SHAR in 1982 might well have been zero munitions expended, what about recce missions, what about shows of force/presence. Too many variables to make it a meaningful means of measuring ‘worth’
Even using comparisons of munitions expended is not a reliable indicator either, just far too many variables.
If you look at the history of aviation since the end of the war you should be able to reasonably determine when land based aviation has been used compared to sea based.
Light Blue onboard
This seems to be one of those issues which is so decisive and yet seems very simple to resolve. I tend to think people just get on with things and over a period of time, with enough training and commitment from all concerned should be resolved.
Carriers, Risk and 1982
James makes an interesting point about balancing risk. I tend to agree that with the benefit of 20:20 hindsight the decisions that led to a lack of cover for ACO, Sir Galahad and San Carlos in general were arguably incorrect, protecting the carriers rather than the logistics and amphibious forces. But would bringing the carriers in closer have prevented those incidents, dunno.
It is also very easy to see why the carriers were perceived as being so essential, two sides of the coin.
If you read the San Carlos FOB and ACO posts I did recently you should find some of the background details, the FOB in particular should (in my opinion) have been established sooner. The 10 minute time on station was in one of those, double checked sources and have seen that number a few times but of course, we know that sources can sometime be wrong.
NAB, I think most of the helicopters for tactical lift in support of ground forces were staged out of the FOB and Atlantic Causeway.
Obeserver, we are looking ta a BG that can have SGNs in on location CVs in an other an other and FFS in a third we can synchronise tot FOR TLAM and F35B JSM and use a 3rd wave of f35B on top then push escorts inshore to utilise oto breada 5 inch light weight whilst also bringing the ARG in, I know you guys cannot but we can.
@James, come now. After all our friendly discussion as to the importance of landing of supplies, you forget that the support stores for 3 Cdo alone took a week to land, during which time the SHAR’s scored the majority of their kills. I’m all in favour of the bayonet, but it seems a little optimistic to see the RM and Paras taking the islands without ammunition after half their supplies are sunk.
I’m sure you also know that the CAP was planned specifically on the basis that it would not fly over San Carlos, which was to be a fixed wing free fire zone, unless the aircraft concerned approached in a fuel emergency with landing lights on.
TD said “Light Blue onboard”
Did you have much to do with recruiting arm of the Army during your time in?
I was on very good terms with the succession of CPOs and POs out our local office. I had a lot to do with an ex-WO recruiter during my time with cadets (on the UMC side.) And I know the why’s and wherefore’s of how youngsters decide on which service they are going to join. And IMHO based on all that is that KIDS DON’T JOIN THE RAF TO GO TO SEA. THEY DO IT TO AVOID THE SEA. AND RUNNING AROUND OUTSIDE IN THE COLD, DIGGING THE OCCASIONAL HOLE TO LIVE IN, AND PLAYING WITH BANG-BANGS. JFH isn’t a good example. The Harriers spent more a lot time ashore than deployed to the carriers. I think your “light blue at sea” point of view is more to do with making your model of no FJ for the FAA work. Exchanges are a novelty in a long career service. An 18 year old signing on the dotted line thinks he will be pending his service time will be spent in Lincolnshire or the Home Counties with perhaps a tour in Bastion. He isn’t expecting a life on the Oggin with RN frequency of deployments. He wouldn’t join else. That is the modern youngster.
Now we need to do the 5 minutes during the Midway encounter that sealed the Pacific war’s outcome, as a fraction of the time elapsed from Pearl Harbour to Nagasaki bombing, RE
“there have been 3484 weeks since 1945, of which aircraft carriers have proven “vital” (which I don’t really believe, but most do) for 6 of them. That is 0.17% of the time.”
“with Rapier, Blowpipe, Sea Slug, Sea Dart and Sea Cat all effectively useless”
I don’t understand why this myth persists. Blowpipe proved to be a bit of a dog and the others had their problems, but missiles shot down more attacking Skyhawks than the Harriers did, so I’d say they had a pretty good hand in protecting the landings. The majority of Harrier kills were the higher flying Dagger escorts.
Hi Mr. fred, RE
“Bog standard Stryker?”
- $3.5m lately, much cheaper to begin with
-” Waste of time and money” Agreed
” Patria AMV”
- $2m, add turret and any advanced sensors
“£3m for an APC is pushing it.”
- if those two were meant (cheaper is better?), how come?
@ X
I would say your characterisation of young people seems to be rather more service driven than anything based in reality. One kid from my school (alright, we’re going back a while now) joined the engineers because he thought it would set him up for life in trade skills. Another joined the RAF because he liked planes but wasn’t smart enough to fly them.
I cant imagine people actually joing certain services because they plan to just sit around in Oxford for the next few years or because they don’t want to get their hands dirty. That just sounds to me like you’re doing precisely the same thing you’re accusing TD of doing; constructing an argument from nothing to fit your preferred profile.
wf,
you make my argument for a properly constructed Brigade-sized ARG beautifully. Yes, we need loads of lovely loggies coming ashore in quick time with whatever it is that loggies carry. Scoff and bullets, presumably.
Why does “loggies” default on my Apple spell check to loggias, as in bosky Italian flower-decked love nests? Perhaps I missed out in my service years by not being a loggia? I am concerned that there are service teachers, QARANCs at Rinteln and WRACs that got away unmolested.
The reason the carriers and SHAR were fundamental is simple. On April 2nd 1982, had the Navy been asked “can you assure a landing of 3 Cdo and follow on forces against an air force of 200+ based in Argentina?”, without the SHAR, the answer (from all senior naval officers) would have been “no”. Had the answer been “yes”, both CGS and CAS would have asked some fairly pointed questions along the lines of “how?” – probably because back then, the air threat was something that all services thought about and understood – particularly as they had not grown used to it being dealt with by “someone else” back then. Result, no deployment of what I absolutely agree was the required “effect” – the infantry and also no Op Corporate, end of. Hence fundamental, like it or not.
TD – Causeway may well have brought a shedload of Wessies & SK, but Hermes brought 845 and half of 846 from the off. She also had the AE department and facilities to sustain them, which Causeway did not. She also didn’t get there till four days after the first landings, by which time 845/846 and the HAS SK squadrons had got the Rapier and 105 batteries ashore to provide some defence for the FOB.
NAB,
good thing that the Navy were not asked then, but instead one man. The only Admiral with balls since Nelson – Leach – stood up and said it could be done. Much against his staff’s advice.
As it was, SHAR was useful but not critical.
I do feel like I’m slightly banging my head on a brick wall with this “fundamental” definition. It is one capability only. If you really want to say that the Falklands could not have been retaken without a carrier launched fast jet capability, say so, but it appears that every piece of evidence is completely against that.
Or to put it into your court, if SHAR was fundamental, how did Sharkey and the Far East Fleet plan to capture the Argentinean trenches on East Falkland? Would they have gone for the riskier right flank at Goose Green? What about that tricky SF position on the northern side of Longdon? And how good is Harrier at crawling through the mud silently before the attack on Tumbledown, and can it hook in there for over 24 hours in a battle group attack, or does it need to bugger off for some fuel at some point? It would also be useful to know of your logistic calculations for how many pallets of 105 ammo SHAR can under sling, or even if the young pilot on board has any concept of the land tactical battle. Certainly in 1982, the SHAR pilots had none. Junglies yes, SHARs no.
@James, you are deliberately tilting at windmills. @NAB and I have no issue with land forces being those that finish it, but since SAM and AAA managed to knock down less than half AR’s fighter aircraft losses, you are looking at rather a lot of additional aircraft that would have been dropping bombs on amphibs. We’re not a pair of Sloane’s begging for some cavalry goodness you know
@James
You feel like you’re banging your head against a brick wall? There is simply no question about it. Any idea of mounting an opposed landing 8,000 miles from the UK without a scrap of air cover against an enemy possessing considerable numbers of aircraft equipped with ASMs, bombs, cannon and rockets would have been a non-starter, even with Leach.
The campaign was a close enough run thing as it was but, thanks mainly to SHAR and with one notable exception, at least the ships managed to deliver the troops and most of their kit ashore relatively unscathed. However, they paid a hideous penalty in the process, mostly owing to the lack of a proper fleet carrier with fast, long-range FJ and AEW. I pray that we never risk being placed in such an invidious position again.
P.S. That’s for the Army’s sake as well as the RN’s.
Dunservin,
SHAR were useful, no doubt. But there is not a scrap of evidence that the landings could not have proceeded without them. The landing sites were mostly (on a 24/7 basis) unsupported by CAP, but the landings went ahead anyway. There is plenty of video and documentary evidence that SHAR were not actually that successful in keeping the Argies away from the landing sites (i.e. several ships attacked and sunk, without SHAR getting involved). There is an easy mathematics that says “but SHAR took out more than 20″, but if you analyse the evidence, most were Mirage flying “top cover”, and many of the rest were not actually attacking the landing sites. And on the day the Sir Galahad was hit, where were the SHAR? Nowhere to be bloody seen. That is mostly explained by the fact that someone deemed it not to be flying weather as far east as the fleet was, but as far west as the Argentine Squadron airbase, it was good enough to get airborne. So the SHARS were socked in, the pilots eating cheesy eggy hammy, sand Carlos Fandango had a free run in. It doesn’t matter that the Army were stupid and should not have remained aboard, the Andrew for technical weather reasons were stuck on deck. So don’t give me this “without SHAR it would have been impossible” crap,
So it wasn’t mainly thanks to SHAR. SHAR did their job, but their job did not win us back the Falklands by themselves and with no other help, and without them we’d have been helpless. Or do you really want to pretend that they did?
@James
Despite your desire to see all FJs turned into tin cans (very useful tin cans mind you) and my corresponding desire to do so just to put one in the eye of APATs, I have to say that FJs still have a very important part to play in the battlefield. Sure, they can’t hold land, but they are incredible “enablers” that allow other forces to operate with much more ease.
Just think off the AH force you recommended on the JC LPHs. They’re wonderful CAS, but against FJs with BVR missiles and look down radar, they fare fairly badly. A friendly FJ force allows your AHs to go tank hunting without having to worry about enemy FJs as they would either have been shot down or engaged in a contest for air superiority instead of turkey shooting helicopters.
@APATS
Did you hit your head? Most of what you brought up are just smoke and mirrors, red herrings, strawman arguments and innuendo, not to mention the severe decline in your spelling.
Your ships come with SYLVAR 70s? No? Then you can’t do TLAMs either, and Mk 48s? Your carrier comes with them? No? Then why are you claiming that CVFs will suddenly give NGS ability? Or that changing CVFs to CVEs will suddenly disable T-26 4.5 inchers? You got enough red herrings to feed Africa for a decade. My only conclusion to all this nonsense is to either conclude that you
1) Have just hit your head and have lost your faculties to reason or
2) You don’t really have a good answer to the question and are trying to obfuscate the issue to your CVF bias.
James said “The only Admiral with balls since Nelson”
Beatty? Cunningham? Vian?
James
Which bit of “what I absolutely agree was the required “effect” – the infantry ” did you not understand? Your references to “Sharkey & the Far East Fleet” are therefore absurd – as is your denigration of naval admirals.
However much you dislike the fact, without SHAR plus carrier, the “infantry effect” would not even have loaded aboard ship and it would have been CGS making that decision, never mind 1SL or CDS, probably because all of them understood threat assessment.
I can help you with “fundamental” – the definition of which is “adjective – forming a necessary base or core; of central importance”. Sounds pretty much like the contribution of SHAR plus carrier, plus RFA & STUFT, plus (of course) 3 Cdo & 5 Inf. Or did you just want to suggest that the land forces did all the work and that the most intense naval war since WW2 was an unimportant sideshow?
Is it not fair to say that every component of the task force and its supporting elements was fundamental, essential, important etc?
How much of this debate is actually about definitions of words on the head of a pin.
How would the RN have managed if RAF Hercules weren’t doing regular stores drops, how would Army Rapiers have maintained operations without daily supplies of fuel from Navy Sea Kings and how would RAF operations from Ascension coped without fuel supplies from the US?
The whole thing was intimately interconnected.
James makes the point that the final effect was delivered by land forces which is of course true, and equally true of the majority of operations, but as others have said, they would not have got into that position without other elements of all three services.
NaB, Causeway wasn’t just a ferry, helicopters carried out over 4,000 landings in the very short time it was operational and the FOB delivered 50,000L of fuel per day (not just for aircraft) and 120 movements per day. I am not disputing what the carriers did in terms of rotary but they were not the only game in town.
1982 is an object lesson in what happens when you fail to achieve control of the air but lets not forget, control of the air is not just about aircraft carriers, fighters or AEW.
In any objective analysis we failed to achieve that control and the price should be obvious to all.
@ TD and all,
the point I am trying to make – not very successfully, it appears – is that in all military matters there is one capability without which strategic success cannot be imagined, and that in the case of the Falklands, it was land combat power. That is NOT to say that everything else was unimportant or only there for the ride. This is a concept that has been around for hundreds of years, and is codified by all militaries that I know of in their doctrine. It can be captured by several names – Main Effort, Schwerpunkt, Centre of Gravity, etc. At a tactical level, the Army for instance also follows this in the names of types of artillery support: Direct Support, General Support, General Support Reinforcing, that tell both the Artillery and Combat Commander what to expect at certain phases of the battle.
It makes a mockery to suggest that everything is “fundamental”. It is also true to say that very many things were very important, and in this case I include everything that I am aware of that the Navy did. It has not come up in the discussion, but I personally believe that the three SSNs were the key naval asset, as they were able to keep the Argentine Navy bottled up in their ports.
Would the Falklands have been re-captured without an infantry force? I suggest the answer is no. Would they have been re-captured without carrier air? I suggest that it would have been much more bloody and less certain, but not impossible. Would they have been recaptured without the deterrent effect of the SSNs, and if the Argentines had come out for a proper naval battle? Much less likely.
Honestly, anyone would think that questioning the role of fast air in the Falklands is heresy. It’s really not.
Just to add that if carrier fast air had not been available (and leaving aside any considerations as to whether the task force would have been sent at all without fast air), then what would have changed? I suggest that there would have been even more emphasis on taking out the Pucaras that were on the islands (more SF raids, and NGS onto the grass airstrips), and that the landings would have been made in north east Falkland, a further 50 miles away from the Argentine bases on the mainland. The biggest single mistake the Argentines made was not to put fast air on the islands themselves. Once the Pucaras were neutralised, if neither side had no fast air in the vicinity of the landing site, then air threats and the need to deal with them become a non-problem.
James,
Can I presume from your lack of value of carrier jet aviation that you like the idea of the air being dominated by the enemy dropping cluster bombs all over the front line and removing every UK helicopter that pops up with a sidewinder? I say this based on your 98% of 98% rather than the stuff said above.
You don’t need CAP over the landing site. You put CAP in a place to make sure enemy aircraft don’t get to the landing site.
I’m not sure 1982 is a good example of “fundamental” air power – we only just scraped by. But generally the foundation for a successful military conflict (or at least the one’s I’ve seen) is to dominate the air either with air-supremacy jets or by taking out the enemies capability to control the air (SEAD). MANPADS and Sea Viper/Ceptor have only a limited coverage.
As for 1982, if we had lost a carrier would we not have used the other one but closer in? If we lost that one too would we not have nuked the Argentinian airbase? Black Mamba backed into a corner and all that!
APATS,
I’d have procured 4 x WASP – 2 active, 1 as carrier, 1 as LHD.
Also, you just said “…CVF launching 24 F35b from 200NM…”. Have you changed your tune? You wanted to put it 50nm with the ARG last time we spoke. Anyway, wouldn’t the initial strike wave come from ~400nm (100+ sorties a whole day before the landing).
I like your sub-fired TLAM strike!
TD,
Please don’t brand me with the “sortie rate” thing. I never said RATE! It’s total sorties or bombs and, unless statistics has changed, a comparison does actually provide meaningful information.
All,
I’d join the RAF or the FAA to fly jets – nothing else. If you’re recruiting people with long-term career visions, you’re recruiting the wrong people.
@James
How about the view of the Yanks who seem pretty switched-on about joint operations? This is the heading at the top of Page I-1 of Chapter 1 (INTRODUCTION) of JP3-01 (Joint Doctrine for Countering Air and Missile Threats) (http://www.fas.org/spp/starwars/docops/jp3_01.pdf) endorsed by the US Navy, USMC, US Army and US Air Force:
“If we lose the war in the air, we lose the war and we lose it quickly. (Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery)”
(I didn’t realise he was American – I thought he was one of yours
)
These are the second and third sentences of Para 1 on the same page:
“…Air superiority delivers a FUNDAMENTAL benefit to the joint force. It prevents adversaries from interfering with operations of air, space, or surface forces and assures freedom of action and movement…”
Still quibbling about the use of the term “fundamental” with regard to the SHAR during CORPORATE? They may not have constituted ‘Air Power’ (if only) but they were able to provide local ‘Air Superiority’ at critical times. No matter how much you demur, the TF would never have sailed without them.