Think Defence hopes to start sensible conversations about UK defence issues, no agenda or no campaign but there might be one or two posts on containers, bridges and mexeflotes!
2,889 thoughts on “Open Thread – Land, Sea and Air II”
Chris.B.
How much will the support for those tankers cost though? Not a big fan of Voyager PFI, but the contract does include a lot in the costs that wont be included in the US tanker deal.
Topman
@ x
Has the final negotiations been completed with BAE?
X, that will be the compromise tanker the USAF rejected in favour of the more capable A330 but the bidding process was reopened after Congress interevened.
Topman
I don’t which one was the best, but it was interesting Boeing offered a different built to the IAF. I know that the Italians had quite a few problems bringing it into service. Compare that to the Germans their Airbus tankers have been good, I understand they are very impressed with them and with Airbus. I can’t say that ours have been that great yet, still teething problems with ours, although they are different.
x
Yes. Even with those costs Chris pointed they are still getting nearly 20 aircraft for every one of ours for twice the cost of our programme. If I understand the figures right because every time I see them I still think I am missing something because they just doesn’t compute. And it can’t be much worse than Voyager as a platform for that to happen it would have to be made out of wood, wire, and canvas.
Topman
@ x
It’s all the running costs, it wasn’t the deal wanted by the RAF but that’s all in the past now. They pay for all sorts of stuff over the contract, running aircraft isn’t cheap, but no doubt they’ll make a killing still. I think the trick is to flog them to death, get rid of civ charters and get max use out of them.
x
I know they aren’t cheap. But 20 airframes for our one?
Topman
@ x
Bulk buying brings it down, biggest cost on anything is running it alot of it is now Airtankers cost. Not the best deal but it’s the one we’ve got.
This “Makes sense, a permanent ability to intervene is not the same as a persistent commitment to stabilise, so one-in-five is not necessary.” was the point I was making (badly, it seems!)
= we have to learn to count in threes, instead of fives
- it does not matter if the elements in readiness are bns/ BGs/bdes, obviously a bde to arrive in three months is in a different degree of readiness than the more permanently higher readiness of the lead units
- just that 3 of each is the minimum number to achieve that on-going, and it was unfortunate with the abbreviation that I used to try to exclude the propagandistic renaming of the 4th Commando, leading you to think that I tried to exclude the whole 3 Cdo Bde
ArmChairCivvy
A good summary by Phil:
“It is a simple concept, you keep what is hardest to make which also happens to be able to do most of the missions [perhaps not most, but those missions which with other force structures would be undoable, or too costly in terms of casualties and thereby non-starters?]. It is really simple. Really simple.
The problem is you cannot grasp that peacetime organisation is not deterministic.”
BTW, Phil, where do you get that one BG within the (rotating)readiness bde at higher readiness, to match the other intervention force elements? Analogy, or a source? If the latter, I’ve missed it and would be an interesting read
Observer
Maybe an extension of the “one in 3″ force readiness operating procedure common to a lot of armies? “2 on standby, 1 in reserve” is a fairly common posture.
Phil
“BTW, Phil, where do you get that one BG within the (rotating)readiness bde at higher readiness, to match the other intervention force elements? Analogy, or a source? If the latter, I’ve missed it and would be an interesting read”
Source. It’s in this link and also in the CGS speech.
CGS Speech: ” three armoured infantry brigades – each with resilient peacetime establishments and equipped with upgraded Challenger tanks and Warrior infantry fighting vehicles, and the new Scout vehicle – to produce VHR and HR force elements at prescribed levels”
Sky News: “One armoured battle group and a parachute battle group would be on standby for immediate dispatch to a global emergency.”
So you have the HR Bde and the VHR BG within the Bde.
jedibeeftrix
cheers phil, it is finally starting to come together.
now just want to understand how these seven adaptable infantry brigades will work.
6x to work the schedule
1x to work the guards duties, and provide a high-readiness battalion
?
Phil
“perhaps not most, but those missions which with other force structures would be undoable, or too costly in terms of casualties and thereby non-starters?”
I’d say most. If we look backwards
1991 – armoured infantry needed
1992 – Bosnia – British forces were based around armoured infantry
1999 – Kosovo – Core of armoured infantry again with 4 Bde onwards
2003 – armoured infantry
2006 – in Afghan still a role for armoured infantry and the rest of the bn can dismount with little enough fuss.
They couldn’t do the Sierra Leonne rapid intervention and they couldn’t have done the operations in Afghan before HERRICK but we maintain the ABTF and ARG and UK Con Bn for such light roles now.
So not only are they hardest to regenerate by far, they can do most of the likely jobs, not all, but most.
Phil
Adaptable Brigades, my hunch is they will all be different sizes with maybe 1 having responsibility for public duties and one having responsibilty for the overseas standing tasks. The rest will be at various levels of strength, I predict some will generate augmenting forces for the Reaction Force should they be needed (light role infantry) and others will be at extended readiness (12 months) to generate a brigade for an enduring operation.
So you’d have 3 Reaction Force Bdes (that’s 18 months of deployment) and then 2 Adaptable Force Bdes at extended readiness to take over after 18 months and 2-3 Adaptable Force Bdes acting as a pool of augmenting reinforcements for the 5 brigade cycle needed to get the tour interval of 24 months we seem to be set on.
So the Adaptable Brigades I think most will have more in common with the regional brigades of now but we could generate something akin to the 11th Light Brigade deployment on H11 but on a more organised basis. We’e not intending to deploy to brigades at the same time so there’d be 12-18 months notice to mobilise the TA and work them up and integrate and work up the Bde (which takes 12 months for HERRICK).
Methinks that’s the plan. I doubt they will have much in the way of kit I imagine that TA formations will fall in on regular kit or already in place kit in theatre like now. So apart from perhaps a sprinkling of combat units held at a higher readiness the AF will mostly have training scales of kit and conduct lower levels of collective training.
Phil
“Can on one of the Army types perhaps illustrate how this new structure would have supported recent Ops. For instance GW2 H hour, enduring Ops Afghan etc. That would make it much clearer for this “land blind” sea dog.”
WARNING! Educated Guess.
GW2 – the Reaction Force could have deployed 16X and 7X under a divisional HQ along with the necessary Theatre troops from the new Theatre Troops organisation and they would probably be augmented by selected units from the Adaptable Force for missions like base security, prisoner of war guarding that sort of thing.
Afghan – the Reaction Forces using AF personnel would deploy to Afghan and start to conduct ops and the 2 remaining RF brigades would rotate through and after 18 months the AF Bdes would be worked up and would rotate through too. So you’d have a 3 RF 2 AF Bde cycle giving you the 24 month tour interval – the other 5 AF Bdes will augment, perhaps the 3 RF and 2 AF Bdes needed for the cycle will have a further shadow AF Bde to beef them up. The CGS speech does say that the AF Bdes will be of varying sizes so one assumes they will do different missions.
So it could be for enduring operations
1 RF Bde + 1AF shadow Bde
1 RF Bde + 1AF shadow Bde
1 RF Bde + 1AF shadow Bde
1 AF Bde + 1AF shadow Bde
1 AF Bde + 1AF shadow Bde
Or it might be
1 RF Bde
1 RF Bde
1 RF Bde
1 AF Bde (for enduring ops)
1 AF Bde (for enduring ops)
1 AF Bde (to augment the RF + augment enduring ops)
1 AF Bde (to augment the RF + augment enduring ops)
1 AF Bde (to augment the RF + augment enduring ops)
1 AF Bde (Public Duties aka London District)
1 AF Bde (overseas standing tasks)
ArmChairCivvy
The reserve forces report declared an average 1/8th mobilisation as a planning target (the cycle must be indicated in order to be able to sell the new contract to employers?)
No point calculating on the total TA manpower, but when we get to see the total bn/sqdrn/ battery count, then 12.5% (planning purports to be a precise science as opposed to the reality, which is the art of improvisation)gives a good indication of how much kit will be transferred from the regulars
When you look at the latest MoD plans, there seems to be a concurrency between upgraded Warriors, SV Scouts and “FRES UVs” all coming in c. 2018-2022
- so make and mend till then
- and no mention of Chally upgrade (maybe it is not a big enough item, considering the just 100 or so of them)
RE ” I doubt they will have much in the way of kit I imagine that TA formations will fall in on regular kit or already in place kit in theatre like now. So apart from perhaps a sprinkling of combat units held at a higher readiness…”
x
The Russians are sending 2 LSTs and a small landing force to Syria just in case there is a need to evacuate their naval base.
Surely their airforce could fly eveybody out? Just fly around all that closed air space dudes!!!
And I am sure all those central Asia states would quite happily let a Russian army column drive to Syria, make the evacuation, and then drive back.
You mad Ruskies using ships and marines!!!!!!!
Phil
Well I am sure 30 years ago they’d have driven an armoured infantry column through Iran, flown right through into Syria and sent a naval TF to their base all under the very menacing watch of the Strategic Rocket Forces and the threat of an enormous loss of arms deals if anyone so much as looked at them funny.
But in any case, to my mind, it does make sense to evacuate a naval base from the sea. Call me strange. If it was an inland airbase I’d imagine they’d have flown them out. But I guess this proves the concept of the United Kingdom Marine Corps.
Challenger
@Phil
Thanks for the information yesterday.
I’m not too bothered about 16th AAB and 3rd Commando losing a battalion each, of course people gravitate towards the ‘bigger is better’ concept but being rapid reaction ‘kick in the door’ units I’m happy to accept this loss of quantity as long as their quality isn’t diminished.
I am beginning to understand the proposed set up, 3 armoured brigades being the full strength and deployable elements (and as you say armour is the hardest to regenerate).
7 infantry brigades of various states and strengths, made up off different regular/reserve ratios. As you say perhaps out of these 1 could be focused towards public duties, 1 on standing overseas rotations and out of the others a couple that are earmarked to generate a deployable force after several months notice, with the rest being similar to the current regional brigades.
I understand what sort of structure they are aiming for now, but I still haven’t brought myself to agree with it.
I think I have a real problem with this because for the last 10 years (except for a couple of weeks in the Iraqi desert) we have been told that light infantry is the way to go, that they are the most useful element to bring to the table, that the current Army is far too ‘heavy’ for 21st century realities.
So why are they heading down the road of armoured in favour of everything else?
I was happy with the idea of 2 rapid reaction and 5 multi role brigades (id even be happy with 4 if they had trouble finding enough for a 5th). It seemed a far more sensible approach when thinking about long term rotation of assets.
Id keep 2 armoured regiments to provide a brigade of almost 120 Challengers for the very odd occasion that we may need them (keep a few more mothballed somewhere for regeneration if required). I wouldn’t slot them permanently into the brigade structure because 95% of the time flexible infantry units are the way to go.
jedibeeftrix
@ AAC – “The reserve forces report declared an average 1/8th mobilisation as a planning target (the cycle must be indicated in order to be able to sell the new contract to employers?)”
Taking this with:
@ Phil – “Adaptable Brigades, my hunch is they will all be different sizes with maybe 1 having responsibility for public duties and one having responsibilty for the overseas standing tasks.”
I am wondering if we might not be moving to a 1/4 deployment (half the TA ratio) for regular forces, therefore:
4x Adaptable brigades for persistant duties
1x Guards
1x Foreign postings
1x HR/VHR
With the latter three rotating.
this tea-leaf business is entertaining at least.
Phil
You’re missing an AF bde though there. But sounds plausible certainly. Aren’t we supposed to find out around today?
paul g
changing direction slightly (well it is an open thread) it seems ATK have developed a “bolt on” GPS for 155mm, miles cheaper than an excalibur round and accuracy to 50m. Could be a game changer in the long range snipers world.
“I was happy with the idea of 2 rapid reaction and 5 multi role brigades (I’d even be happy with 4 if they had trouble finding enough for a 5th). It seemed a far more sensible approach when thinking about long term rotation of assets.”
Yes, I was more than happy with that concept too. I thought the British Army was light years ahead in its thinking involving Multi-Role Brigades. I just hope that the reactionary, conservative element within the Army has not had too great an influence. I certainly did not want to get rid of MBTs and heavy armour. They might well prove essential if another Gulf War type conflict were to blow up. However, the heavy armour/MBT elements within the MRBs could have trained together at times (e.g. in BATUS) and probably 2 regiments of MBTS would suffice to deploy and cope with most contingencies.
Was the change owing to a lack of CS and CSS resources to spread around the MRBs, do you think?
The Army might come to regret this decision. Ah, well, we shall just have to see what the Aussies make of their MRB experiment. I bet they’re successful.
ArmChairCivvy
Hi Mike, before I make my comment, I must say that for any defence force of 70k in all, they are down there in Oz doing a splendid job.
But RE “just have to see what the Aussies make of their MRB experiment” would you like to see
- SPG element cancelled altogether
- as the regular element then is short of guns (and the reserves are still equipped with antiquated pieces), reserves become mortar-only equipped
I guess the overall idea is the same as in Denmark, that in low intensity conflicts you can make up the numbers needed for rotation by having a heavier regular and a lighter reserves bn working side by side
- in a short and sharp, high intensity conflict you would not have the time anyway, so at least the regulars are ready to go (without undue dilution of combat power/ kit which could only be brought to bear through mobilisation, taking precious time)
jedibeeftrix
@ Phil – “You’re missing an AF bde though there. But sounds plausible certainly. Aren’t we supposed to find out around today?”
There are only seven infantry (adaptable) brigades in the new plan, are there not?
Gareth Jones
@ Paul g – Interesting find. “Already proven on the 155-mm howitzer, the 105mm PGK incorporates 99 percent of the existing 155mm PGK design, ATK says. The only difference is a single mechanical part.” Very large degree commonality.
IXION
Have been banging on for a while now about, How in effect the RM used to be called ‘Millets Marines’ coz they bought all their kit form said shop.
Nowadays Maplins Marines Might me more appropriate.
There is a lots of stuff now on Civvy street that makes super secret military stuff of 5 years ago look old.
Lord Jim
It seems to me that the force structure as described is a way for the Army to prioritise the funding for its Armoured/Armoured Infantry formations after Afghanistan. I can see a two tier procurement plan evolving where the Reaction brigades recieve the bult of the planned procurement programme with the adaptable formations having to rely on UORs when committed to operations. It is as if the MoD wants to burn its bridges with any lessons from Afghanistan, being determined never to carry out such an operation for such a long period of time again. This new plan also reduces the number of new platfroms that were needed under the old MRB programme, making more use of existing ones.
Lord Jim
It seems to me that the force structure as described is a way for the Army to prioritise the funding for its Armoured/Armoured Infantry formations after Afghanistan. I can see a two tier procurement plan evolving where the Reaction brigades recieve the bult of the planned procurement programme with the adaptable formations having to rely on UORs when committed to operations. It is as if the MoD wants to burn its bridges with any lessons from Afghanistan, being determined never to carry out such an operation for such a long period of time again. This new plan also reduces the number of new platfroms that were needed under the old MRB programme, making more use of existing ones.
Phil
“I just hope that the reactionary, conservative element within the Army has not had too great an influence”
Really I am thinking the opposite. I think the whole uniform brigade group thing was a very conservative idea. I know they were spun as MRB but as I have said (just to flog a dead horse) they were nothing more than infantry brigade groups. The army would have dismantled the hardest to regenerate force element yet in this model, we have Bde enduring operation model and a heavy force. You accept lower readiness in all other units but that is not such a big deal when you realise that the deployment levels are lower than the entire force by some degree.
I think its an innovative, kind of Germanic, solution.
Millets Marines?! Good God you’d not see a Marine in anything like that these days. And to be frank, a lot of the newer stuff is just fad. The blokes bought assault vests, the army issued assault vests, the blokes then bought man bags, the army issued man bags, the blokes then bought MOLLE plate carriers the Army issued MOLLE body armour, then the blokes went back to webbing and now the Army issues MOLLE belt kit to. It’s fashion. CS95 will be ally as fuck in 6 years you watch.
“being determined never to carry out such an operation for such a long period of time again.”
I don’t get it, its very clear the Army wants to be able to conduct a medium enduring operation in the future. The Army knows that the politicians are batshit, they’ll send them anywhere anytime any place and screw the force generation models. So this time, they seem to have finally twigged, just organise the bare minimum and leave the rest to be generated in due time with the plenty of notice you’d get before the 3 reaction force brigades go through their tour.
And jedi, you have 6 AF Bdes: there’s supposed to be 7 AF Bdes + 3 armoured infantry + 1 air assault. 11 in total. Although I suspect some AF brigades are going to be brigades in name only and just be admin HQs to work up force elements to augment the RF as I’ve said.
“But RE “just have to see what the Aussies make of their MRB experiment” would you like to see
- SPG element cancelled altogether”
No, I would certainly not like to see the SP Gun element cancelled. I know that the Aussies are not certain whether they can afford to place SP Guns alongside their light guns in the MRBs but surely in the British Army we still have 90 plus AS90s in service, in addition to well over 100 Light Guns. Plenty to go around five MRBs, I would think.
The Danish idea seems an intriguing one.
Phil
No the HR/VHR brigade is from the Reaction Force pool of 3 x armoured infantry brigades.
ArmChairCivvy
Guessing past the first layer (3+1, and not to forget 3 CDO) will not take us far,
as in:
” jedi, you have 6 AF Bdes: there’s supposed to be 7 AF Bdes + 3 armoured infantry + 1 air assault. 11 in total. Although I suspect some AF brigades are going to be brigades in name only and just be admin HQs to work up force elements to augment the RF as I’ve said.
jedibeeftrix says:
June 18, 2012 at 15:58
4x Adaptable brigades for persistent duties
1x Guards
1x Foreign postings
1x HR/VHR”
There will hardly be a bde to look after just three company-level ceremonial postings.Would also be strange if there was a dedicated “garrisoning” bde so while back in the UK they could asleep at the barracks for 2-3 years?
What I found interesting is the emphasis on not rolling out any new major AFVs (as in numbers) before 2018: has the army taken a hit on investment monies, or are there other categories that have been speeded up?
- we’ll soon find out
In the above “3+1″ some commentators talk about AAB as light. Sure the infantry element is light. But as for numbers it is bigger than any other bde, and also the Apache may not weigh the same as a Chally2, but in this comparison “punches above its weight”
- can also be flown in easier than any meaningful number of Challies and accompanying IFVs
Phil
“There will hardly be a bde to look after just three company-level ceremonial postings.”
Public and London duties take up 3 Bns.
“Would also be strange if there was a dedicated “garrisoning” bde so while back in the UK they could asleep at the barracks for 2-3 years?”
There’s going to be no regional brigades anymore so these AF Bdes are also going to have ADMINCON of a lot of units and will be busy doing that. Some of them are going to be nothing more than the old regional brigades with a different name and number.
jedibeeftrix
“No the HR/VHR brigade is from the Reaction Force pool of 3 x armoured infantry brigades.”
I was thinking more of the ready-battalion (some jargon name?) as desired for the FF2020 outputs.
“Public and London duties take up 3 Bns.”
Yes
ArmChairCivvy
Hi Mike,
This is how I have read it (overnight, our visitors from Oz can correct), RE
” the Aussies are not certain* whether they can afford to place SP Guns alongside their light guns** in the MRBs but surely in the British Army we still have 90 plus AS90s in service, in addition to well over 100 Light Guns***.”
==============
* cancelled altogether
**probably because they were sensible enough to get the LW 155 pieces that the RA also wanted; however, my reading is that all their other pieces will be replaced by mortars now
*** if you take away the RM & AAB specialist support, that is close to a 1:1 ratio, and if it is true that the crews are cross-trained (or will be), then it is possible to take whatever matches the task & the terrain (a good thing; if they only could provide some lighter GMLRS platforms as well; tactically it is very mobile, but strategically could be more so)
Phil
“I was thinking more of the ready-battalion (some jargon name?) as desired for the FF2020 outputs.”
You know as much as me but I had interpreted it as the BG coming from one of the RF brigades otherwise you’d need another 3 BGs to rotate. Hmm, they should just tell us!
Mike W
@Phil
“I know they were spun as MRB but as I have said (just to flog a dead horse) they were nothing more than infantry brigade groups.”
Yes, Phil, you argue very persuasively and admittedly there is a strong similarity between the proposed MRB formation and that of a Mechanised Brigade (I have made that point on this site more than once). However, the point surely is that a Mechanised Brigade would lack Light Infantry (often the hub or essence of any intervention force (“boots on the ground”, remember)and the light artillery and other units to support that element.
As for the latest proposed force composition being innovative and Germanic (do you mean original/ingenious in thought by the latter adjective?), I see nothing ground-breaking in retaining the same balance as has been present in the British Army for the last God knows how many decades. In recent wars there has been a marked emphasis on drones, helicopters, protected patrol vehicles, mine and IED clearance kit etc. etc. The latest plan does not seem to allow the balance to move towards these things. “Janes Defence Weekly” has just reported, for example, that Fire Shadow will not be deployed to Afghanistan (a precursor to its being cancelled outright?)and in another article I read that Watchkeeper might never deploy to the same country. If you are going to cancel or not use such forward-looking equipmemt, we might as well all remain in a state of mental stasis.
Mike W
ACC
Yes, sorry, ACC. You must have read a more recent report than I have. I did not know that the Aussies have cancelled th use of SPGs in their MRBs. They’ve got M777s now, haven’t they? About time the British procured them as well, then maybe they could afford to drop the AS90s.
Your point about the crews being cross-trained, and that making it possible to take whatever matches the task and the terrain is a very good one, as is the point about the need for lighter GMLRS platforms.
Phil
Light infantry can be attached from the AF I imagine.
I think it’s imaginative because finally it integrates reserves and employs focus. I’m a big fan of focus, think of all the effort we’ve diffused into maintaining structures and formations that have been useless in their primary role, I’m talking especially about the ARRC framework and more than one complete division when we never had any plans to deploy more than one in a warfighting conventional manner.
It’s Germanic because for some time German Army units have been divided into reaction forces (light) intervention forces (heavy) and stabilisation forces (mechanised, mountain, jäger).
Mike W
Phil
Good point about structures and formations which have proved useless in their main role.
Hoiwever, I still have reservations about whether we can a) recruit enough and b) fully integrate reserve forces. I know that you believe that we can but there have been an awful lot of knowledgeable doubters expressing their thoughts in the media recently.
However, I do sincerely hope that you are proved right.
ArmChairCivvy
Hi Phil,
Are you sure this “It’s Germanic because for some time German Army units have been divided into reaction forces (light) intervention forces (heavy) and stabilisation forces (mechanised, mountain, jäger).” is a parallel?
- light = to screen & fall back
- intervention = counter-strike
- stabilisation = hold territory, once the heavy, initial blow has been thwarted?
I think we might be dealing with a translation error here? Anyway, that piece you wrote on the restructuring of the Danish forces (to fall in line with the new mission) was both very informative and enjoyable.
- I can’t say I could make much sense out of the next piece on TA
- at the same time, the official report was also very difficult to decipher
- how about Take Two; when the detail on the army restructuring comes out… to make sense of the TA/ reserves part (will take to 2015/2018 to even start to look like it)
Phil
ACC
I think I’m right on the German Army it’s a force that’s interested me for some time and I have some very detailed ORBATs. The post Cold War force from about 2000 or so split into the light forces like the airborne and airmobile forces, the intervention forces were meant for forced entry – say the first stage of Kosovo should it have happened and the stabilisation forces were just there for peace enforcement like Bosnia. I think we kind of agree though.
The TA piece was just a thought exercise and has been shown to be bollocks now! If they reveal the details I could certainly write about it.
Mike: can the TA step up to the plate. Potentially. Will it? I’m not as certain it can but I hope it does. Improve the leadership, stiffen units with more permanent staff and keep instituting the Whole Force doctrine.
ArmChairCivvy
Hi Phil
I know absolutely nothing about it (that’s why I am interested), but surely this “stiffen units with more permanent staff and keep instituting the Whole Force doctrine” would be the key
RE: Germany, I think there have been many transformations, and most of them have not happened:
” light forces like the airborne and airmobile forces”
- a whole division!
- all those dinky Wiesels ( a chartered 747, with a stiffened up floor kit, taking seven)… and many 747s going to??
- was soon cut to a bde
Then, taking the force away from Somalia, after the Mogadishu disaster, gave *an* impetus to a ship that could insert and extract such a force
- been on the designers’ board ever since (even costed!)
- may be funded and entering service around 2035!
Sounds a bit like us?
x
Do we know if HMG as ever done study into TA retention? I would say that everybody likely to join the TA probably has. But how many do they loose in the first year and why? Until there is some work done collecting such information all this enlarged TA stuff is pissing in the wind.
Also a set of comparison studies needs to be done in NATO states collecting similar information for comparison.
Phil
The statistics won’t reflect true wastage because a lot leave before they get a service number. I doubt they can be tracked. But then you can argue that it’s perfectly reasonable for blokes to turn up on drill nights for a few months and decide no thanks. TA will almost certainly have a higher turn over as its simply more accessible. Joining the regs means jumping through some big hoops, joining the TA is simply a matter of keep turning up and pass security and not be a cripple.
Lots of tiny little things need to be done. Send all TA candidates to Litchfield for regular selection, have the same medical standards (TA medicals whilst not as bad can be less rigorous) this will weed out the ones who are likely to jack or just don’t fancy it.
There’s so many little things like that. And you need decent leadership to grip it all and make sure it happens.
I don’t know if the Army has this but there also needs to be an inspectorate of TA courses over and above the corps inspectorates to make sure the courses are fit and proper for the TA.
Money will solve a lot of problems that stem from simple resource shortages but the devil is in the detail and in the leadership. And as I bang on constantly about, the same goes for any human organisation.
How much will the support for those tankers cost though? Not a big fan of Voyager PFI, but the contract does include a lot in the costs that wont be included in the US tanker deal.
@ x
Has the final negotiations been completed with BAE?
http://www.airforce-technology.com/news/newsboeingkc-46a-tanker-production
X, that will be the compromise tanker the USAF rejected in favour of the more capable A330 but the bidding process was reopened after Congress interevened.
I don’t which one was the best, but it was interesting Boeing offered a different built to the IAF. I know that the Italians had quite a few problems bringing it into service. Compare that to the Germans their Airbus tankers have been good, I understand they are very impressed with them and with Airbus. I can’t say that ours have been that great yet, still teething problems with ours, although they are different.
Yes. Even with those costs Chris pointed they are still getting nearly 20 aircraft for every one of ours for twice the cost of our programme. If I understand the figures right because every time I see them I still think I am missing something because they just doesn’t compute. And it can’t be much worse than Voyager as a platform for that to happen it would have to be made out of wood, wire, and canvas.
@ x
It’s all the running costs, it wasn’t the deal wanted by the RAF but that’s all in the past now. They pay for all sorts of stuff over the contract, running aircraft isn’t cheap, but no doubt they’ll make a killing still. I think the trick is to flog them to death, get rid of civ charters and get max use out of them.
I know they aren’t cheap. But 20 airframes for our one?
@ x
Bulk buying brings it down, biggest cost on anything is running it alot of it is now Airtankers cost. Not the best deal but it’s the one we’ve got.
http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/the-usafs-kcx-aerial-tanker-rfp-03009/ Shows a price of $51 Billion for the programme. Still £35 billion for 179 works out better than we did.
Hi Jedi,
This “Makes sense, a permanent ability to intervene is not the same as a persistent commitment to stabilise, so one-in-five is not necessary.” was the point I was making (badly, it seems!)
= we have to learn to count in threes, instead of fives
- it does not matter if the elements in readiness are bns/ BGs/bdes, obviously a bde to arrive in three months is in a different degree of readiness than the more permanently higher readiness of the lead units
- just that 3 of each is the minimum number to achieve that on-going, and it was unfortunate with the abbreviation that I used to try to exclude the propagandistic renaming of the 4th Commando, leading you to think that I tried to exclude the whole 3 Cdo Bde
A good summary by Phil:
“It is a simple concept, you keep what is hardest to make which also happens to be able to do most of the missions [perhaps not most, but those missions which with other force structures would be undoable, or too costly in terms of casualties and thereby non-starters?]. It is really simple. Really simple.
The problem is you cannot grasp that peacetime organisation is not deterministic.”
BTW, Phil, where do you get that one BG within the (rotating)readiness bde at higher readiness, to match the other intervention force elements? Analogy, or a source? If the latter, I’ve missed it and would be an interesting read
Maybe an extension of the “one in 3″ force readiness operating procedure common to a lot of armies? “2 on standby, 1 in reserve” is a fairly common posture.
“BTW, Phil, where do you get that one BG within the (rotating)readiness bde at higher readiness, to match the other intervention force elements? Analogy, or a source? If the latter, I’ve missed it and would be an interesting read”
Source. It’s in this link and also in the CGS speech.
CGS Speech: ” three armoured infantry brigades – each with resilient peacetime establishments and equipped with upgraded Challenger tanks and Warrior infantry fighting vehicles, and the new Scout vehicle – to produce VHR and HR force elements at prescribed levels”
Sky News: “One armoured battle group and a parachute battle group would be on standby for immediate dispatch to a global emergency.”
So you have the HR Bde and the VHR BG within the Bde.
cheers phil, it is finally starting to come together.
now just want to understand how these seven adaptable infantry brigades will work.
6x to work the schedule
1x to work the guards duties, and provide a high-readiness battalion
?
“perhaps not most, but those missions which with other force structures would be undoable, or too costly in terms of casualties and thereby non-starters?”
I’d say most. If we look backwards
1991 – armoured infantry needed
1992 – Bosnia – British forces were based around armoured infantry
1999 – Kosovo – Core of armoured infantry again with 4 Bde onwards
2003 – armoured infantry
2006 – in Afghan still a role for armoured infantry and the rest of the bn can dismount with little enough fuss.
They couldn’t do the Sierra Leonne rapid intervention and they couldn’t have done the operations in Afghan before HERRICK but we maintain the ABTF and ARG and UK Con Bn for such light roles now.
So not only are they hardest to regenerate by far, they can do most of the likely jobs, not all, but most.
Adaptable Brigades, my hunch is they will all be different sizes with maybe 1 having responsibility for public duties and one having responsibilty for the overseas standing tasks. The rest will be at various levels of strength, I predict some will generate augmenting forces for the Reaction Force should they be needed (light role infantry) and others will be at extended readiness (12 months) to generate a brigade for an enduring operation.
So you’d have 3 Reaction Force Bdes (that’s 18 months of deployment) and then 2 Adaptable Force Bdes at extended readiness to take over after 18 months and 2-3 Adaptable Force Bdes acting as a pool of augmenting reinforcements for the 5 brigade cycle needed to get the tour interval of 24 months we seem to be set on.
So the Adaptable Brigades I think most will have more in common with the regional brigades of now but we could generate something akin to the 11th Light Brigade deployment on H11 but on a more organised basis. We’e not intending to deploy to brigades at the same time so there’d be 12-18 months notice to mobilise the TA and work them up and integrate and work up the Bde (which takes 12 months for HERRICK).
Methinks that’s the plan. I doubt they will have much in the way of kit I imagine that TA formations will fall in on regular kit or already in place kit in theatre like now. So apart from perhaps a sprinkling of combat units held at a higher readiness the AF will mostly have training scales of kit and conduct lower levels of collective training.
“Can on one of the Army types perhaps illustrate how this new structure would have supported recent Ops. For instance GW2 H hour, enduring Ops Afghan etc. That would make it much clearer for this “land blind” sea dog.”
WARNING! Educated Guess.
GW2 – the Reaction Force could have deployed 16X and 7X under a divisional HQ along with the necessary Theatre troops from the new Theatre Troops organisation and they would probably be augmented by selected units from the Adaptable Force for missions like base security, prisoner of war guarding that sort of thing.
Afghan – the Reaction Forces using AF personnel would deploy to Afghan and start to conduct ops and the 2 remaining RF brigades would rotate through and after 18 months the AF Bdes would be worked up and would rotate through too. So you’d have a 3 RF 2 AF Bde cycle giving you the 24 month tour interval – the other 5 AF Bdes will augment, perhaps the 3 RF and 2 AF Bdes needed for the cycle will have a further shadow AF Bde to beef them up. The CGS speech does say that the AF Bdes will be of varying sizes so one assumes they will do different missions.
So it could be for enduring operations
1 RF Bde + 1AF shadow Bde
1 RF Bde + 1AF shadow Bde
1 RF Bde + 1AF shadow Bde
1 AF Bde + 1AF shadow Bde
1 AF Bde + 1AF shadow Bde
Or it might be
1 RF Bde
1 RF Bde
1 RF Bde
1 AF Bde (for enduring ops)
1 AF Bde (for enduring ops)
1 AF Bde (to augment the RF + augment enduring ops)
1 AF Bde (to augment the RF + augment enduring ops)
1 AF Bde (to augment the RF + augment enduring ops)
1 AF Bde (Public Duties aka London District)
1 AF Bde (overseas standing tasks)
The reserve forces report declared an average 1/8th mobilisation as a planning target (the cycle must be indicated in order to be able to sell the new contract to employers?)
No point calculating on the total TA manpower, but when we get to see the total bn/sqdrn/ battery count, then 12.5% (planning purports to be a precise science as opposed to the reality, which is the art of improvisation)gives a good indication of how much kit will be transferred from the regulars
When you look at the latest MoD plans, there seems to be a concurrency between upgraded Warriors, SV Scouts and “FRES UVs” all coming in c. 2018-2022
- so make and mend till then
- and no mention of Chally upgrade (maybe it is not a big enough item, considering the just 100 or so of them)
RE ” I doubt they will have much in the way of kit I imagine that TA formations will fall in on regular kit or already in place kit in theatre like now. So apart from perhaps a sprinkling of combat units held at a higher readiness…”
The Russians are sending 2 LSTs and a small landing force to Syria just in case there is a need to evacuate their naval base.
Surely their airforce could fly eveybody out? Just fly around all that closed air space dudes!!!
And I am sure all those central Asia states would quite happily let a Russian army column drive to Syria, make the evacuation, and then drive back.
You mad Ruskies using ships and marines!!!!!!!
Well I am sure 30 years ago they’d have driven an armoured infantry column through Iran, flown right through into Syria and sent a naval TF to their base all under the very menacing watch of the Strategic Rocket Forces and the threat of an enormous loss of arms deals if anyone so much as looked at them funny.
But in any case, to my mind, it does make sense to evacuate a naval base from the sea. Call me strange. If it was an inland airbase I’d imagine they’d have flown them out. But I guess this proves the concept of the United Kingdom Marine Corps.
@Phil
Thanks for the information yesterday.
I’m not too bothered about 16th AAB and 3rd Commando losing a battalion each, of course people gravitate towards the ‘bigger is better’ concept but being rapid reaction ‘kick in the door’ units I’m happy to accept this loss of quantity as long as their quality isn’t diminished.
I am beginning to understand the proposed set up, 3 armoured brigades being the full strength and deployable elements (and as you say armour is the hardest to regenerate).
7 infantry brigades of various states and strengths, made up off different regular/reserve ratios. As you say perhaps out of these 1 could be focused towards public duties, 1 on standing overseas rotations and out of the others a couple that are earmarked to generate a deployable force after several months notice, with the rest being similar to the current regional brigades.
I understand what sort of structure they are aiming for now, but I still haven’t brought myself to agree with it.
I think I have a real problem with this because for the last 10 years (except for a couple of weeks in the Iraqi desert) we have been told that light infantry is the way to go, that they are the most useful element to bring to the table, that the current Army is far too ‘heavy’ for 21st century realities.
So why are they heading down the road of armoured in favour of everything else?
I was happy with the idea of 2 rapid reaction and 5 multi role brigades (id even be happy with 4 if they had trouble finding enough for a 5th). It seemed a far more sensible approach when thinking about long term rotation of assets.
Id keep 2 armoured regiments to provide a brigade of almost 120 Challengers for the very odd occasion that we may need them (keep a few more mothballed somewhere for regeneration if required). I wouldn’t slot them permanently into the brigade structure because 95% of the time flexible infantry units are the way to go.
@ AAC – “The reserve forces report declared an average 1/8th mobilisation as a planning target (the cycle must be indicated in order to be able to sell the new contract to employers?)”
Taking this with:
@ Phil – “Adaptable Brigades, my hunch is they will all be different sizes with maybe 1 having responsibility for public duties and one having responsibilty for the overseas standing tasks.”
I am wondering if we might not be moving to a 1/4 deployment (half the TA ratio) for regular forces, therefore:
4x Adaptable brigades for persistant duties
1x Guards
1x Foreign postings
1x HR/VHR
With the latter three rotating.
this tea-leaf business is entertaining at least.
You’re missing an AF bde though there. But sounds plausible certainly. Aren’t we supposed to find out around today?
changing direction slightly (well it is an open thread) it seems ATK have developed a “bolt on” GPS for 155mm, miles cheaper than an excalibur round and accuracy to 50m. Could be a game changer in the long range snipers world.
http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/ATKs-PGK-Turning-Shells-into-Precision-Artillery-07430/#more-7430
edited to add seems they can use same system on 105mm as well!
http://www.insidegnss.com/node/762
@Challenger
“I was happy with the idea of 2 rapid reaction and 5 multi role brigades (I’d even be happy with 4 if they had trouble finding enough for a 5th). It seemed a far more sensible approach when thinking about long term rotation of assets.”
Yes, I was more than happy with that concept too. I thought the British Army was light years ahead in its thinking involving Multi-Role Brigades. I just hope that the reactionary, conservative element within the Army has not had too great an influence. I certainly did not want to get rid of MBTs and heavy armour. They might well prove essential if another Gulf War type conflict were to blow up. However, the heavy armour/MBT elements within the MRBs could have trained together at times (e.g. in BATUS) and probably 2 regiments of MBTS would suffice to deploy and cope with most contingencies.
Was the change owing to a lack of CS and CSS resources to spread around the MRBs, do you think?
The Army might come to regret this decision. Ah, well, we shall just have to see what the Aussies make of their MRB experiment. I bet they’re successful.
Hi Mike, before I make my comment, I must say that for any defence force of 70k in all, they are down there in Oz doing a splendid job.
But RE “just have to see what the Aussies make of their MRB experiment” would you like to see
- SPG element cancelled altogether
- as the regular element then is short of guns (and the reserves are still equipped with antiquated pieces), reserves become mortar-only equipped
I guess the overall idea is the same as in Denmark, that in low intensity conflicts you can make up the numbers needed for rotation by having a heavier regular and a lighter reserves bn working side by side
- in a short and sharp, high intensity conflict you would not have the time anyway, so at least the regulars are ready to go (without undue dilution of combat power/ kit which could only be brought to bear through mobilisation, taking precious time)
@ Phil – “You’re missing an AF bde though there. But sounds plausible certainly. Aren’t we supposed to find out around today?”
There are only seven infantry (adaptable) brigades in the new plan, are there not?
@ Paul g – Interesting find. “Already proven on the 155-mm howitzer, the 105mm PGK incorporates 99 percent of the existing 155mm PGK design, ATK says. The only difference is a single mechanical part.” Very large degree commonality.
Have been banging on for a while now about, How in effect the RM used to be called ‘Millets Marines’ coz they bought all their kit form said shop.
Nowadays Maplins Marines Might me more appropriate.
There is a lots of stuff now on Civvy street that makes super secret military stuff of 5 years ago look old.
It seems to me that the force structure as described is a way for the Army to prioritise the funding for its Armoured/Armoured Infantry formations after Afghanistan. I can see a two tier procurement plan evolving where the Reaction brigades recieve the bult of the planned procurement programme with the adaptable formations having to rely on UORs when committed to operations. It is as if the MoD wants to burn its bridges with any lessons from Afghanistan, being determined never to carry out such an operation for such a long period of time again. This new plan also reduces the number of new platfroms that were needed under the old MRB programme, making more use of existing ones.
It seems to me that the force structure as described is a way for the Army to prioritise the funding for its Armoured/Armoured Infantry formations after Afghanistan. I can see a two tier procurement plan evolving where the Reaction brigades recieve the bult of the planned procurement programme with the adaptable formations having to rely on UORs when committed to operations. It is as if the MoD wants to burn its bridges with any lessons from Afghanistan, being determined never to carry out such an operation for such a long period of time again. This new plan also reduces the number of new platfroms that were needed under the old MRB programme, making more use of existing ones.
“I just hope that the reactionary, conservative element within the Army has not had too great an influence”
Really I am thinking the opposite. I think the whole uniform brigade group thing was a very conservative idea. I know they were spun as MRB but as I have said (just to flog a dead horse) they were nothing more than infantry brigade groups. The army would have dismantled the hardest to regenerate force element yet in this model, we have Bde enduring operation model and a heavy force. You accept lower readiness in all other units but that is not such a big deal when you realise that the deployment levels are lower than the entire force by some degree.
I think its an innovative, kind of Germanic, solution.
Millets Marines?! Good God you’d not see a Marine in anything like that these days. And to be frank, a lot of the newer stuff is just fad. The blokes bought assault vests, the army issued assault vests, the blokes then bought man bags, the army issued man bags, the blokes then bought MOLLE plate carriers the Army issued MOLLE body armour, then the blokes went back to webbing and now the Army issues MOLLE belt kit to. It’s fashion. CS95 will be ally as fuck in 6 years you watch.
“being determined never to carry out such an operation for such a long period of time again.”
I don’t get it, its very clear the Army wants to be able to conduct a medium enduring operation in the future. The Army knows that the politicians are batshit, they’ll send them anywhere anytime any place and screw the force generation models. So this time, they seem to have finally twigged, just organise the bare minimum and leave the rest to be generated in due time with the plenty of notice you’d get before the 3 reaction force brigades go through their tour.
And jedi, you have 6 AF Bdes: there’s supposed to be 7 AF Bdes + 3 armoured infantry + 1 air assault. 11 in total. Although I suspect some AF brigades are going to be brigades in name only and just be admin HQs to work up force elements to augment the RF as I’ve said.
4x Adaptable brigades for persistent duties
1x Guards
1x Foreign postings
1x HR/VHR
Isn’t that seven?
ACC’
Sorry, have only just seen your reply.
“But RE “just have to see what the Aussies make of their MRB experiment” would you like to see
- SPG element cancelled altogether”
No, I would certainly not like to see the SP Gun element cancelled. I know that the Aussies are not certain whether they can afford to place SP Guns alongside their light guns in the MRBs but surely in the British Army we still have 90 plus AS90s in service, in addition to well over 100 Light Guns. Plenty to go around five MRBs, I would think.
The Danish idea seems an intriguing one.
No the HR/VHR brigade is from the Reaction Force pool of 3 x armoured infantry brigades.
Guessing past the first layer (3+1, and not to forget 3 CDO) will not take us far,
as in:
” jedi, you have 6 AF Bdes: there’s supposed to be 7 AF Bdes + 3 armoured infantry + 1 air assault. 11 in total. Although I suspect some AF brigades are going to be brigades in name only and just be admin HQs to work up force elements to augment the RF as I’ve said.
jedibeeftrix says:
June 18, 2012 at 15:58
4x Adaptable brigades for persistent duties
1x Guards
1x Foreign postings
1x HR/VHR”
There will hardly be a bde to look after just three company-level ceremonial postings.Would also be strange if there was a dedicated “garrisoning” bde so while back in the UK they could asleep at the barracks for 2-3 years?
What I found interesting is the emphasis on not rolling out any new major AFVs (as in numbers) before 2018: has the army taken a hit on investment monies, or are there other categories that have been speeded up?
- we’ll soon find out
In the above “3+1″ some commentators talk about AAB as light. Sure the infantry element is light. But as for numbers it is bigger than any other bde, and also the Apache may not weigh the same as a Chally2, but in this comparison “punches above its weight”
- can also be flown in easier than any meaningful number of Challies and accompanying IFVs
“There will hardly be a bde to look after just three company-level ceremonial postings.”
Public and London duties take up 3 Bns.
“Would also be strange if there was a dedicated “garrisoning” bde so while back in the UK they could asleep at the barracks for 2-3 years?”
There’s going to be no regional brigades anymore so these AF Bdes are also going to have ADMINCON of a lot of units and will be busy doing that. Some of them are going to be nothing more than the old regional brigades with a different name and number.
“No the HR/VHR brigade is from the Reaction Force pool of 3 x armoured infantry brigades.”
I was thinking more of the ready-battalion (some jargon name?) as desired for the FF2020 outputs.
“Public and London duties take up 3 Bns.”
Yes
Hi Mike,
This is how I have read it (overnight, our visitors from Oz can correct), RE
” the Aussies are not certain* whether they can afford to place SP Guns alongside their light guns** in the MRBs but surely in the British Army we still have 90 plus AS90s in service, in addition to well over 100 Light Guns***.”
==============
* cancelled altogether
**probably because they were sensible enough to get the LW 155 pieces that the RA also wanted; however, my reading is that all their other pieces will be replaced by mortars now
*** if you take away the RM & AAB specialist support, that is close to a 1:1 ratio, and if it is true that the crews are cross-trained (or will be), then it is possible to take whatever matches the task & the terrain (a good thing; if they only could provide some lighter GMLRS platforms as well; tactically it is very mobile, but strategically could be more so)
“I was thinking more of the ready-battalion (some jargon name?) as desired for the FF2020 outputs.”
You know as much as me but I had interpreted it as the BG coming from one of the RF brigades otherwise you’d need another 3 BGs to rotate. Hmm, they should just tell us!
@Phil
“I know they were spun as MRB but as I have said (just to flog a dead horse) they were nothing more than infantry brigade groups.”
Yes, Phil, you argue very persuasively and admittedly there is a strong similarity between the proposed MRB formation and that of a Mechanised Brigade (I have made that point on this site more than once). However, the point surely is that a Mechanised Brigade would lack Light Infantry (often the hub or essence of any intervention force (“boots on the ground”, remember)and the light artillery and other units to support that element.
As for the latest proposed force composition being innovative and Germanic (do you mean original/ingenious in thought by the latter adjective?), I see nothing ground-breaking in retaining the same balance as has been present in the British Army for the last God knows how many decades. In recent wars there has been a marked emphasis on drones, helicopters, protected patrol vehicles, mine and IED clearance kit etc. etc. The latest plan does not seem to allow the balance to move towards these things. “Janes Defence Weekly” has just reported, for example, that Fire Shadow will not be deployed to Afghanistan (a precursor to its being cancelled outright?)and in another article I read that Watchkeeper might never deploy to the same country. If you are going to cancel or not use such forward-looking equipmemt, we might as well all remain in a state of mental stasis.
ACC
Yes, sorry, ACC. You must have read a more recent report than I have. I did not know that the Aussies have cancelled th use of SPGs in their MRBs. They’ve got M777s now, haven’t they? About time the British procured them as well, then maybe they could afford to drop the AS90s.
Your point about the crews being cross-trained, and that making it possible to take whatever matches the task and the terrain is a very good one, as is the point about the need for lighter GMLRS platforms.
Light infantry can be attached from the AF I imagine.
I think it’s imaginative because finally it integrates reserves and employs focus. I’m a big fan of focus, think of all the effort we’ve diffused into maintaining structures and formations that have been useless in their primary role, I’m talking especially about the ARRC framework and more than one complete division when we never had any plans to deploy more than one in a warfighting conventional manner.
It’s Germanic because for some time German Army units have been divided into reaction forces (light) intervention forces (heavy) and stabilisation forces (mechanised, mountain, jäger).
Phil
Good point about structures and formations which have proved useless in their main role.
Hoiwever, I still have reservations about whether we can a) recruit enough and b) fully integrate reserve forces. I know that you believe that we can but there have been an awful lot of knowledgeable doubters expressing their thoughts in the media recently.
However, I do sincerely hope that you are proved right.
Hi Phil,
Are you sure this “It’s Germanic because for some time German Army units have been divided into reaction forces (light) intervention forces (heavy) and stabilisation forces (mechanised, mountain, jäger).” is a parallel?
- light = to screen & fall back
- intervention = counter-strike
- stabilisation = hold territory, once the heavy, initial blow has been thwarted?
I think we might be dealing with a translation error here? Anyway, that piece you wrote on the restructuring of the Danish forces (to fall in line with the new mission) was both very informative and enjoyable.
- I can’t say I could make much sense out of the next piece on TA
- at the same time, the official report was also very difficult to decipher
- how about Take Two; when the detail on the army restructuring comes out… to make sense of the TA/ reserves part (will take to 2015/2018 to even start to look like it)
ACC
I think I’m right on the German Army it’s a force that’s interested me for some time and I have some very detailed ORBATs. The post Cold War force from about 2000 or so split into the light forces like the airborne and airmobile forces, the intervention forces were meant for forced entry – say the first stage of Kosovo should it have happened and the stabilisation forces were just there for peace enforcement like Bosnia. I think we kind of agree though.
The TA piece was just a thought exercise and has been shown to be bollocks now! If they reveal the details I could certainly write about it.
Mike: can the TA step up to the plate. Potentially. Will it? I’m not as certain it can but I hope it does. Improve the leadership, stiffen units with more permanent staff and keep instituting the Whole Force doctrine.
Hi Phil
I know absolutely nothing about it (that’s why I am interested), but surely this “stiffen units with more permanent staff and keep instituting the Whole Force doctrine” would be the key
RE: Germany, I think there have been many transformations, and most of them have not happened:
” light forces like the airborne and airmobile forces”
- a whole division!
- all those dinky Wiesels ( a chartered 747, with a stiffened up floor kit, taking seven)… and many 747s going to??
- was soon cut to a bde
Then, taking the force away from Somalia, after the Mogadishu disaster, gave *an* impetus to a ship that could insert and extract such a force
- been on the designers’ board ever since (even costed!)
- may be funded and entering service around 2035!
Sounds a bit like us?
Do we know if HMG as ever done study into TA retention? I would say that everybody likely to join the TA probably has. But how many do they loose in the first year and why? Until there is some work done collecting such information all this enlarged TA stuff is pissing in the wind.
Also a set of comparison studies needs to be done in NATO states collecting similar information for comparison.
The statistics won’t reflect true wastage because a lot leave before they get a service number. I doubt they can be tracked. But then you can argue that it’s perfectly reasonable for blokes to turn up on drill nights for a few months and decide no thanks. TA will almost certainly have a higher turn over as its simply more accessible. Joining the regs means jumping through some big hoops, joining the TA is simply a matter of keep turning up and pass security and not be a cripple.
Lots of tiny little things need to be done. Send all TA candidates to Litchfield for regular selection, have the same medical standards (TA medicals whilst not as bad can be less rigorous) this will weed out the ones who are likely to jack or just don’t fancy it.
There’s so many little things like that. And you need decent leadership to grip it all and make sure it happens.
I don’t know if the Army has this but there also needs to be an inspectorate of TA courses over and above the corps inspectorates to make sure the courses are fit and proper for the TA.
Money will solve a lot of problems that stem from simple resource shortages but the devil is in the detail and in the leadership. And as I bang on constantly about, the same goes for any human organisation.