Think Defence hopes to start sensible conversations about UK defence issues, no agenda or no campaign but there might be one or two posts on containers, bridges and mexeflotes!
2,889 thoughts on “Open Thread – Land, Sea and Air II”
Observer
One question I would like to know is “Can a viable warload of Tomahawks be carried on such a small platform?”
No point intergrating it all only to find that it can only fire 2-4x the whole campaign.
tsz52
Observer: It’d be 16 TLAM, assuming that we could ever afford something so extravagant. IIRC, the thing that’d be lost within the ship, by installing the two additional Mk 41s, would be the officers’ gym.
x
European stuff isn’t that bad. SeaViper is awesome. Mk41 doesn’t need Aegis. RSN frigates are an example of how things should be done. We just always back the wrong horse. But what makes it worse is our horse is often beaten by tin of cat meat.
Basically compare the layout of this with the Flyer and tell me which seems more sensibly laid out.
x
@ Gareth J
Looks like more like!
I have this love hate thing with Hummers. I remember the first time I sat in one. There was this huge vehicle and they had seemingly removed all the internal space. From the driver’s seat the passenger seemed to be about two fields away. The driving position has more in common with an SJ than a Land Rover. I do like the chassis though and the engine. We had one fitted to a Range Rover. You could drive around in third all day, it would accelerate in fifth. The Range Rover has gone but we still have the engine.
Interesting link TD. This caught my attention – “Both parts of the Army will share resources from a new element called Force Troops And Logistics Support.This will include one artillery, an engineer, a surveillance, a medical, two signals and two logistics brigades – many of these made up of reserves.”
Gareth Jones
@ x – ” The Flyer is a Non-Developmental Item (NDI) containing 80% COTS and HWMVV platforms. The Flyer has a state of the art diesel 1.9L 150 Hp six-speed power train, cooling, brake and fuel systems with a low fuel consumption rate of 24mpg when traveling at 40mph.The Flyer maximizes the use of HWMVV NSN parts such as: differentials, steering rod ends, tie down rings, light system, alternator, suspension ball joints, air compressor and tires.”
Do they really mean armoured when they say mechanised here?
“The airborne brigade and one mechanised brigade, armed with Warrior fighting vehicles, will be capable of deploying inside three months. ”
That is bigger stick of rhubarb than Multi-Role-Brigades. It seems the Army just love their tanks as much as the RAF love fighters and the RN love CVF.
That is so piss poor I can’t believe it. Well I can. It is the MoD.
What the fudge do we need 3 armoured brigades for? Wow.
x
@ Gareth J said “differentials, steering rod ends, tie down rings, light system, alternator, suspension ball joints, air compressor and tires.”
Commonality of parts doesn’t make it a mini-Hummer. Especially those parts. Differentials in an off road vehicle are consumables, well nearly. Did you know VW have every part that goes into their cars catalogues on to a database so that industrial designers can order bits they think will be useful? Every from rubber grommets upwards.
The tires on a Hummer are interesting too in that they are an odd size not available for civilians vehicles. Stops the tyres, sorry tires, being pinched…….
Observer
IIRC, the LSV was designed in a way where there is minimal superstructure above the body to reduce the profile for being targetted. It was a fad in that time period, complete with a “laser tag” trial of LSV vs MBT. Not sure of the validity of methods, but they found that for every 1 time the LSV got “tagged” it usually “tagged” the MBT back twice (simulating ATGMs).
This even led to the development of a flat tank, I can’t remember the designation now.
So the LSV layout wasn’t an error, it was a fad which passed. Just FYI. It was a weird time.
paul g
i would think the foxhound with it’s open top “pod” would be the next LSV type vehicle. Although not exactly light in the true sense of the word the days of a ¼ tonne landie bombing about are gone.
x
Observer said “So the LSV layout wasn’t an error, it was a fad which passed. Just FYI. It was a weird time.”
You say tomato, I say, well, tomato.
Gareth Jones
@ x – I wasn’t claiming I was right, just providing info. In reality I’d say we were both partly right. It’s the bastard love child of a LAV and a Hummer.
James
A recce wagon needs something where the commander’s head is out, unrestricted vision for him, and 360 degree traverse on whatever weapon system you have. Hearing is also important, which adds to the “head in the open air” need. Our vehicle commanders only ever wore soft hats as well, to make it much easier to take your staff user headset off and to listen. Gunners and Drives had to wear the bone domes for elf’n'safety. I had real difficulty with adapting to MBT when I had to close down and wear a bone dome for the BG attacks – just felt weird looking at life through fag packet vision blocks and unable to hear much. I’d rather have taken my chances with the head out, but there had been an Israeli study showing commanders being targeted by snipers, so we had our orders.
Ideally, it should be low and quiet, and have the Gucciest optics known to the MoD budget. Lots of dismountable toys as well like LRFs. Being low and lightweight, it will probably have decent cross-country performance and on road speed.
So, anything like a LSV, DPV, Jackal or even a stripped down WMIK LR. If you step up the scale to a proper armoured box, it must have a turret to give you the same heads out capability.
A vehicle with an enclosed cab and the commander being unable to see to the sides / rear or to hear the direction of sound from outside is not a recce wagon, it is a liaison vehicle. It may be OK for something like ATGW overwatch, but I’d still prefer the open aspect for that as well as commonality.
Phil
Christ that’s very different from what we were all expecting. 11 smaller brigades. Interesting. Adaptable brigades. What the hell are they? Fascinating. Seems like as I predicted(!) the brigades will get their logistic support from pooled resources. I wonder if these adaptable brigades are nothing more than the regional forces? So we’d basically have four real brigades and 7 reserve ones that would be mobilised for an enduring operation.
x
@ Gareth J
Sorry. I didn’t mean anything by it.
@ James
Are both you and the gunner heads out then 90% of the time? Or just the commander? And what can you hear above the vehicle engine? (CVR(T) isn’t quiet if memory serves.) Or is it drive, stop, shufty, drive, stop, shufty? All Flyer would need is for the commander to sit on a raised seat where the back seats seem to be positioned. I thought it seemed to be an ideal vehicle for FRR and as weapons carrier for light infantry.
SOP was Gunner down when in reasonable expectation of contact. Commander 100% heads up, except when firing. In my second troop I had a gunner who could load RARDEN by himself from the centre bin, so even that problem went away a bit, except for the coax that he couldn’t reach.
Yes, it is drive fast, slow down to crawling speed, stop, stand up to look over ridge (“sights down” in RAC parlance) or often dismount to approach on foot, engine off, then rinse and repeat. I often used to wear a man pack VHF radio full time so that I could jump out and go 100 yards from the wagon and still be able to report on the Squadron net (but I was more of a slimster in those days – not sure I’d be able to do that now and still slip in and out of the turret like a greased up thing).
CVR(T) was not that loud, but could have been quieter. You could often hear the suspension and track slap further than you could hear an engine, especially in fog (something about low frequency sounds carrying further).
Any recce vehicle commander who has his arse welded to a seat needs his arse kicking.
James
Gareth Jones,
it’s a Toyota. Far too reliable, at least if Top Gear are to be believed (viz their “indestructibility” tests of a Hilux). It’s also silver….
But yes, at a pinch, something like that. You’d want (well, at least I would) to appoint a decent LCpl as the vehicle 2IC and navigator / radio operator / BV operator in the passenger seat, and the commander up top. It would be better if the top was more open so you didn’t have to stand up to get in and out.
It’s odd how some seriously skinny Africans reinvented the concept of the “Technical” from a back street welding lash up shop in Mogadishu about 15 years ago, some 30 years after Pinkies and Dingoes were last in service, and now western defence contractors are churning them out, far too over-engineered and costing a million apiece, as though they are the newest military idea going.
x
James said “Any recce vehicle commander who has his arse welded to a seat needs his arse kicking.”
If you were the kicker and not the kickee wouldn’t that hurt your foot?
Any how so I am right about how you operated then? So I think Flyer would do. Solomon has a Polaris video on his site with tacticool ATVs where the crew are even more exposed….
@ Gareth J re offence
Nowhere near. I might throw a wobbly here every now and again but that is more to do with my mental state and not anything really real…
Phil
Prediction on The Agile Force: 2 of the 7 brigades will be larger and can be mobilised at notice to back up the three armoured infantry brigades in an enduring operation. 1 or 2 will be designated as reinforcement pools for the other 5 brigades (3 AI and 2 AF ones) and the other 4 or 3 will basically be regional brigades that the Army will pretend could be part of an expeditionary force.
x
Have the RA been shafted? It all seems to be tanks and infantry. What of the gunners?
It is cods wallop.
Phil
How can you call it cods wallop when the details haven’t been given yet? It’s obvious the Army is trying to maintain a combined arms manoeuvre capability and a pool of further forces that can be cobbled together for enduring operations. There are 3 brigades because that’s a minimum needed to rotate them through HR state in an enduring manner.
x
I reserve the right to prejudge everything the MoD does in a poor light.
It’s that phrase again “Enduring Ops”. So what sort of war will the armoured brigade be fighting? Are you envisaging high-end Cold War armour tasks? Or Afghanistan style OPS? Surely in the first one brigade wouldn’t last long against a (near) peer enemy? And in the second wasn’t Warrior of limited use in Afghanistan once the locals started building IEDs? Did a solitary Challenger ever get East of Iraq? Or do you think the MoD sees war against somebody who isn’t a pear, but can’t impovise explosives devices? A medium enemy as it were? Perhaps we need medium, not heavy or light, brigades then?
Concentrating on armoured formations is the wrong way if “enduring ops” or “wars amongst the people” or to use that distasteful phrase “wog bashing” is still seen as the future. And those were infantry heavy operations so if 4 battalions couldn’t cut in Afghanistan how will 2 do it in the future?
The only thing they have right is the airborne stuff. Now will 16ABB retain the 2 line regiments or loose them and become an all maroon affair? Also will the new 16AAB, the light formation, remain at 4 batts while the heavy will be light on infantry? And isn’t that lopsided?
Finally you know bugger all about what the MoD intend to do as well. So if I can’t comment on scant information perhaps you shouldn’t either?
James
X,
possibly. I remember giving my squadron (or more specifically the vehicle commanders) a shock when I scheduled a 4 day tactical exercise for Mon-Thurs of one week, when on the Friday we had our annual REME PRE exam of the vehicles. Massive complaints tactfully delivered by the SSM as everyone expected that all of the boys would spend all of the time bulling up the wagons and making sure the paperwork was all OK. On Monday morning, we paraded for the exercise, then I took only the vehicles commanders only with me for a four day dismounted exercise, and left the boys under the gunners to get on with the wagons. Result – four days of good training, and we passed our PRE. Some of the vehicle commanders had been in my Troop years before when I was a young Troop Leader, so knew of my penchant for getting down into the mud and making use of the legs God gives you, but some were slightly outraged at the idea.
I do recall the CO however telling me that I was in for a sacking if we failed PRE. He was quite generous later on and addressed the Squadron, telling them that he fully expected every Squadron to react to the unexpected, and be good at the barracks bullshit, and that we’d more than passed his test. Bought me a bottle of fizz in the Mess as well, which was decent of him.
Phil
“So if I can’t comment on scant information perhaps you shouldn’t either?”
“Are you envisaging high-end Cold War armour tasks? Or Afghanistan style OPS?”
I’m not envisaging anything. The Army wants to be able to undertake all types of mission since it hasn’t any more of a bloody clue what it might need to do tomorrow than anyone else.
It is maintaining a core manoeuvre combined arms capability that can be used from high end to low end interventions and it wants an adaptable pool of forces to bring up the rear and do enduring operations if they are needed. So we can do small complex interventions (ABTF, the VHR BG in the AI Bde), larger complex operations (HR AI Bde at 3 months notice) or single effort complex operations (3 AI Bdes and a divisional HQ), or enduring complex operations (AI bdes + the Adaptable Force), smaller non-complex operations (UK Contingency Bn) and standing military tasks (MACA, FI, Cyprys, Brunei and Public Duties).
So it is keeping at its centre the hardest thing to do and the hardest thing to re-generate because nobody knows what it will be doing. Makes perfect bloody sense to me. You don’t cut the forces that are hardest to re-build when you don’t know if you’ll need them tomorrow or in a decade.
Clue is in the name, Adaptable Force. I imagine that a lot of those units in the AF will have a core peacetime task but will be capable of taking pooled equipment and using it so for example a Recce Regiment in the AF could ramp up to use CR2 if it needed. Or a Light Role unit to an AI unit. Essentially crystallising and organising for what happens now with HERRICK.
James
Phil,
with you entirely on the main thinking, but as an observation, but no criticism, of your examples, it’s more complex. Having myself gone from FR to MBT, it is an entirely different skill set, and more one to do with people and thinking than kit and training. Having also done the NATO Unit OPEVAL for a MBT Regiment that went to FR, it’s a longer process, so FR to MBT is more of a ramp down than a ramp up.
My instinct: takes 2+ years to go from MBT to FR, 1+ year from FR to MBT. In each case, the kit conversion takes about 2-3 months, so that’s not the problem. Unscientific, but I’m sure I’m not wrong.
A Squadron of my Regiment went from MBT to recce for a tour in Afghanistan – they did very well in the role, but I don’t think any of them thought they were FR, as opposed to crewing recce wagons. It’s a whole different mindset.
Observer
“The enemy IFV has spotted us!!! Run!!!!”
“You’re in a Challenger, idiot.”
“Oh…”
ArmChairCivvy
From Phil’s linked document, page 4-13
“Combat power should be concentrated in the force to
match high threats from the outset, as opposed to reliance upon a modular approach that dilutes the combat power across the force. Rapid deployment of a robustly configured force …will be critical.”
Together with the 11 “dwarf bdes” is exactly what Wall and Carter said when the former gave the task to the latter:
-to be able to fight also a more conventional enemy in a high intensity environment
- maintain expeditionary capabilities
- configure into about ten, smaller than the MRB-construct (in the above, read: modular across the force, diluting fighting power)units to be able to have enough readineness for being rapid, when required
I guess there will be some more concrete announcement, the predicted emphasis on battlefield networking will only come through in the detail
jedibeeftrix
Cheers for the link TD, and to Phil for the doc which i suspect has more detail. Will get to that.
“Under plans drawn up by Lieutenant General Nick Carter the regular Army will number 82,000 by 2020. Reserves will be expanded to 30,000. It will be split into Reaction Forces and an Adaptable Force. Reaction Forces will be made up of a division of three armoured brigades, each with a tank regiment and two armoured infantry regiments plus an airborne brigade.”
Interesting, seems like the notion of permanent ability to intervene / persistent ability to sustain have now become official canon. Been wittering about tha for ages.
ArmChairCivvy
Hi jedi, RE “permanent ability to intervene / persistent ability to sustain”
- for the former, there is a healthy recognition that that the BGs by air/landing are just lead elements, and to be able to bring the army into play at all may require going in heavy right at the beginning (rotation for readiness: 3 Cdos excl. Fleet protection even though 4th in the name, restructured AAB will also probably have 3 infantry elements… and 3 heavy bdes)
- ability to sustain; well, the detail is coming I guess. The interesting mention is that Logistics Rgmnts will be equipped so that they won’t tie up too many combat units when operating in or through contested territory
x
@ Phil
I am not chippy. I was speaking my mind. Free speech and all that.
As for “Adaptable Force” I read compromise not because they think they need to cover all threats, more because they aren’t sure what to do.
ALL Politicians are the Same
Can on one of the Army types perhaps illustrate how this new structure would have supported recent Ops. For instance GW2 H hour, enduring Ops Afghan etc. That would make it much clearer for this “land blind” sea dog.
Cheers.
Phil
“As for “Adaptable Force” I read compromise not because they think they need to cover all threats, more because they aren’t sure what to do.”
Well precisely. The Tea Leaf Reading Regiment was cut in Options for Change.
Phil
James
I am sure you are right when converting from FR to MBT on a regiment basis. But what I meant was a squadron sized uplift as I imagine there’s trouble if we need a tank regiment still in an enduring operation. I know units for HERRICK were (I imagine every unit who is going now knows it) being warned off NLT 12 months before so I would have thought 12 months would be enough time to train up to CT3 on CR2 and then do whatever OPTAG they’d need to do when there’s virtually a blank cheque for training and priority for training stocks, mileage, ranges and driving courses.
paul g
picture of the “commando” version of foxhound. It’s plus points over the flyer for me are, an in service vehicle (almost!) so all the support is in place, v shape hull and no sitting over the wheels. as thi is a module vehicle, james’s points could be taken and adapted for slightly more armour and a commanders hatch up top. (BTW i can’t believe i passed your sqn in fally, must’ve been bought beers in the copper kettle!!)
@ ACC – “for the former, there is a healthy recognition that that the BGs by air/landing are just lead elements, and to be able to bring the army into play at all may require going in heavy right at the beginning (rotation for readiness: 3 Cdos excl. Fleet protection even though 4th in the name, restructured AAB will also probably have 3 infantry elements… and 3 heavy bdes)”
Sorry, i’m not quite following your short-hand!
“BGs by air/landing”
Are you referring to the readiness elements in both 16AAB and 3Cdo?
“rotation for readiness: 3 Cdos excl”
Why are they excluded? I mean; of course intervention forces need to be out of regular rotation, but surely no different to 16AAB which has a similar intervention role (other side of the coin effectively).
“Fleet protection even though 4th in the name, restructured AAB will also probably have 3 infantry elements… and 3 heavy bdes”
Are you suggesting that the plan is to shift all intervention forces to a one-in-three roulement, therefore:
3Cdo = 3x Commandos as the principle elements
(16?)AAB = 3x Battalions (Para) as the principle elements
3x Heavy brigades (with Arm/BR/ArmInf/ArmInf)
Makes sense, a permanent ability to intervene is not the same as a persistent commitment to stabilise, so one-in-five is not necessary.
tremendous, can we buy thousands of the foxhound family please?
x
Phil said “Well precisely. The Tea Leaf Reading Regiment was cut in Options for Change.”
There is making pragmatic choices based on recent conflicts and potential future likely conflicts and just returning to the out moded and familiar because you are bereft of ideas and/or are giving into vested interests within.
As for your mantra of “force generation” well as I said we have been deploying formations based on 4 battalions into the field in Afghanistan. Formations using MRAPs and light vehicles, rarely Warrior and no Challengers. We have fought 2 armoured wars in the last 30 years, 3 COIN campaigns, and one conventional light infantry war. Seeing as Warrior and Challengers aren’t suitable for the infrastructure in Third World and if they were suitable for COIN we wouldn’t have bought all those MRAPs. Nor are they suitable for rapid deployment and heavy logistical train (the bit we are cutting back on). How long do you think the British armoured brigades in GW1 would have lasted if the war had gone for much longer against a (near) peer enemy? 2 days? 3 days? Do you know how much a struggle GW1 was logistically for the Army?
So I am sorry if heavy formations that are infantry light in a time we are cutting back on logistics are suddenly going to be core of the army, basis for “force generation” or not, seems illogical.
Challenger
I really need to get my head around this new Army structure, just when we think 5 MRB’S is the deal they throw this new idea out there.
So we end up with 11 brigades, and I think I’m right in saying that it won’t be a mix of regular and regional anymore?
So 16th AAB and 3rd Commando stay relatively the same, as rapid reaction ‘kick in the door’ units.
Are the 3 armoured brigades full strength, intervention units? Capable of short, sharp conventional operations at short notice?
If this is the case then does it also mean that the 7 infantry brigades are a mix of regular and territorial, primarily there for home duties and only deploying if they had enough notice and it was on a lengthy, rotational deployment like Afghanistan?
I would appreciate clarification from anyone who knows. They don’t make it easy!
Phil
“So I am sorry if heavy formations that are infantry light in a time we are cutting back on logistics are suddenly going to be core of the army, basis for “force generation” or not, seems illogical.”
It’s not, TAF (adaptable force) will be able to reinforce and support the reaction forces it seems from what I am reading and hearing now. The Army peacetime structures have never been determinstic, they have never limited our options, if we need to deploy a different mix of force elements then we do. The whole point behind this is precisely that. To have an adaptable force!
The 3 brigades simply concentrate capabilities that are hardest to re-generate into 3 formations that can then rotate around the force generation cycle on a day to day basis with convenience. If the balloon goes up TAF can reinforce and bespoke the force.
In my mind its very simple. And its simply the recognition and planning for what we have been doing since Op Banner.
Phil
“So we end up with 11 brigades, and I think I’m right in saying that it won’t be a mix of regular and regional anymore?”
Yes this is looking certain now.
“So 16th AAB and 3rd Commando stay relatively the same, as rapid reaction ‘kick in the door’ units.”
16X will be “modified” I suspect by loosing a battalion. I suspect 3X will lose The Rifles too. 16X will provide ABTF and 3X will provide the ARG Cdo.
“Are the 3 armoured brigades full strength, intervention units? Capable of short, sharp conventional operations at short notice?”
The brigades will cycle around the force generation cycle with one brigade at High Readiness (HR – 90 days) with one BG within that brigade rotating through as Very High Readiness. They can do short and sharp, or they can go there and rotate through like in Bosnia or Iraq as each Bde hits the appropriate point in the force generation cycle.
“If this is the case then does it also mean that the 7 infantry brigades are a mix of regular and territorial, primarily there for home duties and only deploying if they had enough notice and it was on a lengthy, rotational deployment like Afghanistan?”
It looks this way. Each brigade is going to be of a “varying” size so I imagine some will be at a higher state of readiness and require less preparation and some will provide units to augment the reaction forces and the remainder will maybe have a core mission like doing Public Duties or providing the 3 overseas Bns (2 Cyprus, 1 Brunei). They will absorb the role of the regional forces and it seems certain will be at extended readiness.
“They don’t make it easy!”
To be fair they haven’t made the announcement yet. They have been waiting since May to get the political authority to announce it, it has been signed off internally for some time.
x
@ Phil
Well of course the Army always sent what is needed. But that still doesn’t explain why the Army believes the core of the mid-21st century needs to built around 3 armoured brigades. Basically you are saying that they, your former superiors, have no need to specify what equipment or weight a brigade has. But you also saying that they are completely correct with this proposed structure. Which one is it? Are you really saying less than one months total armoured warfare outweighs Afghanistan, Iraq (after the war ended), the Balkans, Sierra Leon, Ulster, and the Falklands? Heck not including Aden, Borneo, Malaya, Cyprus, really all of Suez and Korea too? You can’t say we will send what is needed and then advocate specialisation is needed (which it is) for high end armoured warfare and that has to be core to keep a capability that really died the day somebody pressed a button in Neveda on July 16 1945. And then compound it by saying we will use the back-up division to form what we want?
Make your mind up. Then again you thinking on military matters has been formed by the same organisation that influenced who ever came up with this new model so up surprising that you don’t see any flaws.
Phil
“But that still doesn’t explain why the Army believes the core of the mid-21st century needs to built around 3 armoured brigades”
Because it is the hardest capability to re-generate and it can conduct a wide swathe of the spectrum of likely operations.
“Are you really saying less than one months total armoured warfare outweighs Afghanistan, Iraq (after the war ended), the Balkans, Sierra Leon, Ulster, and the Falklands? Heck not including Aden, Borneo, Malaya, Cyprus, really all of Suez and Korea too?”
It is the hardest capability to re-generate and it can conduct a wide swathe of the spectrum of likely operations.
“Then again you thinking on military matters has been formed by the same organisation that influenced who ever came up with this new model so up surprising that you don’t see any flaws.”
Check me out, the little indoctrinated robot.
Seriously, I’m sick of the little swipes just because I argue more about the Army because I know more about it than the other services. I leave all the debates about what radar such and such should have or how long a rotor blade should be because I know fuck all about it.
It is a simple concept, you keep what is hardest to make which also happens to be able to do most of the missions. It is really simple. Really simple.
The problem is you cannot grasp that peacetime organisation is not deterministic. You think that the brigade will just rock up organised to fight the Soviets when history tells you we generate bespoke force elements.
But whatever hey, I’m just a loyal little pooch fighting the men who like to mentally masturbate over the idea of a United Kingdom Marine Corps.
This was bought to you by the Chris B school of TD meltdowns.
x
Apparently scrapping Nimrod netted the MoD £500,000. Or one hour of “fighting” in Afghanistan.
And Boeing have started building the new KC-46A tanker for the USAF. It is $30billion (£20billion) programme that should deliver 179 airframes up to 2028. They will have 18 by 2017. Um. That can’t be right. We have just leased 9 aircraft for £9billion…..
One question I would like to know is “Can a viable warload of Tomahawks be carried on such a small platform?”
No point intergrating it all only to find that it can only fire 2-4x the whole campaign.
Observer: It’d be 16 TLAM, assuming that we could ever afford something so extravagant. IIRC, the thing that’d be lost within the ship, by installing the two additional Mk 41s, would be the officers’ gym.
European stuff isn’t that bad. SeaViper is awesome. Mk41 doesn’t need Aegis. RSN frigates are an example of how things should be done. We just always back the wrong horse. But what makes it worse is our horse is often beaten by tin of cat meat.
From Solomon’s site,
http://snafu-solomon.blogspot.co.uk/2012/06/combat-reconnaissance-armoured-buggy.html
It is still the same weight approx as CVR(T)
On his page Sol has a piece about Mv22 ITV,
http://snafu-solomon.blogspot.co.uk/2012/06/us-military-miht-field-3-different-v-22.html
The General Dynamics Flyer at the bottom caught my eye as it seems to address to me all what was wrong with LSV.
http://www.gd-ots.com/Flyer/FlyerVideo.html
http://www.gd-ots.com/2011%20Brochures/Flyer%20(Unarmored).pdf
http://www.gd-ots.com/2011%20Brochures/Flyer-(Armor).pdf
It is light enough to be lifted by Merlin. And 2 will fit inside the Chinook.
What was wrong with the LSV? (Besides the fact that LSV is a type of vehicle, and that the “Flyer” is a LSV too.
)
I posted a link about the Flyer in another thread. A shrunk HMMV I believe…
When I say LSV I mean this,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Light_Strike_Vehicle
Basically compare the layout of this with the Flyer and tell me which seems more sensibly laid out.
@ Gareth J
Looks like more like!
I have this love hate thing with Hummers. I remember the first time I sat in one. There was this huge vehicle and they had seemingly removed all the internal space. From the driver’s seat the passenger seemed to be about two fields away. The driving position has more in common with an SJ than a Land Rover. I do like the chassis though and the engine. We had one fitted to a Range Rover. You could drive around in third all day, it would accelerate in fifth. The Range Rover has gone but we still have the engine.
Latest in selective leaking
http://news.sky.com/home/uk-news/article/16247804
Interesting link TD. This caught my attention – “Both parts of the Army will share resources from a new element called Force Troops And Logistics Support.This will include one artillery, an engineer, a surveillance, a medical, two signals and two logistics brigades – many of these made up of reserves.”
@ x – ” The Flyer is a Non-Developmental Item (NDI) containing 80% COTS and HWMVV platforms. The Flyer has a state of the art diesel 1.9L 150 Hp six-speed power train, cooling, brake and fuel systems with a low fuel consumption rate of 24mpg when traveling at 40mph.The Flyer maximizes the use of HWMVV NSN parts such as: differentials, steering rod ends, tie down rings, light system, alternator, suspension ball joints, air compressor and tires.”
http://www.gd-ots.com/flyer.html
Do they really mean armoured when they say mechanised here?
“The airborne brigade and one mechanised brigade, armed with Warrior fighting vehicles, will be capable of deploying inside three months. ”
That is bigger stick of rhubarb than Multi-Role-Brigades. It seems the Army just love their tanks as much as the RAF love fighters and the RN love CVF.
That is so piss poor I can’t believe it. Well I can. It is the MoD.
What the fudge do we need 3 armoured brigades for? Wow.
@ Gareth J said “differentials, steering rod ends, tie down rings, light system, alternator, suspension ball joints, air compressor and tires.”
Commonality of parts doesn’t make it a mini-Hummer. Especially those parts. Differentials in an off road vehicle are consumables, well nearly. Did you know VW have every part that goes into their cars catalogues on to a database so that industrial designers can order bits they think will be useful? Every from rubber grommets upwards.
The tires on a Hummer are interesting too in that they are an odd size not available for civilians vehicles. Stops the tyres, sorry tires, being pinched…….
IIRC, the LSV was designed in a way where there is minimal superstructure above the body to reduce the profile for being targetted. It was a fad in that time period, complete with a “laser tag” trial of LSV vs MBT. Not sure of the validity of methods, but they found that for every 1 time the LSV got “tagged” it usually “tagged” the MBT back twice (simulating ATGMs).
This even led to the development of a flat tank, I can’t remember the designation now.
So the LSV layout wasn’t an error, it was a fad which passed. Just FYI. It was a weird time.
i would think the foxhound with it’s open top “pod” would be the next LSV type vehicle. Although not exactly light in the true sense of the word the days of a ¼ tonne landie bombing about are gone.
Observer said “So the LSV layout wasn’t an error, it was a fad which passed. Just FYI. It was a weird time.”
You say tomato, I say, well, tomato.
@ x – I wasn’t claiming I was right, just providing info. In reality I’d say we were both partly right. It’s the bastard love child of a LAV and a Hummer.
A recce wagon needs something where the commander’s head is out, unrestricted vision for him, and 360 degree traverse on whatever weapon system you have. Hearing is also important, which adds to the “head in the open air” need. Our vehicle commanders only ever wore soft hats as well, to make it much easier to take your staff user headset off and to listen. Gunners and Drives had to wear the bone domes for elf’n'safety. I had real difficulty with adapting to MBT when I had to close down and wear a bone dome for the BG attacks – just felt weird looking at life through fag packet vision blocks and unable to hear much. I’d rather have taken my chances with the head out, but there had been an Israeli study showing commanders being targeted by snipers, so we had our orders.
Ideally, it should be low and quiet, and have the Gucciest optics known to the MoD budget. Lots of dismountable toys as well like LRFs. Being low and lightweight, it will probably have decent cross-country performance and on road speed.
So, anything like a LSV, DPV, Jackal or even a stripped down WMIK LR. If you step up the scale to a proper armoured box, it must have a turret to give you the same heads out capability.
A vehicle with an enclosed cab and the commander being unable to see to the sides / rear or to hear the direction of sound from outside is not a recce wagon, it is a liaison vehicle. It may be OK for something like ATGW overwatch, but I’d still prefer the open aspect for that as well as commonality.
Christ that’s very different from what we were all expecting. 11 smaller brigades. Interesting. Adaptable brigades. What the hell are they? Fascinating. Seems like as I predicted(!) the brigades will get their logistic support from pooled resources. I wonder if these adaptable brigades are nothing more than the regional forces? So we’d basically have four real brigades and 7 reserve ones that would be mobilised for an enduring operation.
@ Gareth J
Sorry. I didn’t mean anything by it.
@ James
Are both you and the gunner heads out then 90% of the time? Or just the commander? And what can you hear above the vehicle engine? (CVR(T) isn’t quiet if memory serves.) Or is it drive, stop, shufty, drive, stop, shufty? All Flyer would need is for the commander to sit on a raised seat where the back seats seem to be positioned. I thought it seemed to be an ideal vehicle for FRR and as weapons carrier for light infantry.
@ x – No, I was worried I’d offended you!
@ James – Something like this?
http://xmb.stuffucanuse.com/xmb/image.php?&aid=2296&Czech-toyota.jpg
X,
SOP was Gunner down when in reasonable expectation of contact. Commander 100% heads up, except when firing. In my second troop I had a gunner who could load RARDEN by himself from the centre bin, so even that problem went away a bit, except for the coax that he couldn’t reach.
Yes, it is drive fast, slow down to crawling speed, stop, stand up to look over ridge (“sights down” in RAC parlance) or often dismount to approach on foot, engine off, then rinse and repeat. I often used to wear a man pack VHF radio full time so that I could jump out and go 100 yards from the wagon and still be able to report on the Squadron net (but I was more of a slimster in those days – not sure I’d be able to do that now and still slip in and out of the turret like a greased up thing).
CVR(T) was not that loud, but could have been quieter. You could often hear the suspension and track slap further than you could hear an engine, especially in fog (something about low frequency sounds carrying further).
Any recce vehicle commander who has his arse welded to a seat needs his arse kicking.
Gareth Jones,
it’s a Toyota. Far too reliable, at least if Top Gear are to be believed (viz their “indestructibility” tests of a Hilux). It’s also silver….
But yes, at a pinch, something like that. You’d want (well, at least I would) to appoint a decent LCpl as the vehicle 2IC and navigator / radio operator / BV operator in the passenger seat, and the commander up top. It would be better if the top was more open so you didn’t have to stand up to get in and out.
It’s odd how some seriously skinny Africans reinvented the concept of the “Technical” from a back street welding lash up shop in Mogadishu about 15 years ago, some 30 years after Pinkies and Dingoes were last in service, and now western defence contractors are churning them out, far too over-engineered and costing a million apiece, as though they are the newest military idea going.
James said “Any recce vehicle commander who has his arse welded to a seat needs his arse kicking.”
If you were the kicker and not the kickee wouldn’t that hurt your foot?
Any how so I am right about how you operated then? So I think Flyer would do. Solomon has a Polaris video on his site with tacticool ATVs where the crew are even more exposed….
@ Gareth J re offence
Nowhere near. I might throw a wobbly here every now and again but that is more to do with my mental state and not anything really real…
Prediction on The Agile Force: 2 of the 7 brigades will be larger and can be mobilised at notice to back up the three armoured infantry brigades in an enduring operation. 1 or 2 will be designated as reinforcement pools for the other 5 brigades (3 AI and 2 AF ones) and the other 4 or 3 will basically be regional brigades that the Army will pretend could be part of an expeditionary force.
Have the RA been shafted? It all seems to be tanks and infantry. What of the gunners?
It is cods wallop.
How can you call it cods wallop when the details haven’t been given yet? It’s obvious the Army is trying to maintain a combined arms manoeuvre capability and a pool of further forces that can be cobbled together for enduring operations. There are 3 brigades because that’s a minimum needed to rotate them through HR state in an enduring manner.
I reserve the right to prejudge everything the MoD does in a poor light.
It’s that phrase again “Enduring Ops”. So what sort of war will the armoured brigade be fighting? Are you envisaging high-end Cold War armour tasks? Or Afghanistan style OPS? Surely in the first one brigade wouldn’t last long against a (near) peer enemy? And in the second wasn’t Warrior of limited use in Afghanistan once the locals started building IEDs? Did a solitary Challenger ever get East of Iraq? Or do you think the MoD sees war against somebody who isn’t a pear, but can’t impovise explosives devices? A medium enemy as it were? Perhaps we need medium, not heavy or light, brigades then?
Concentrating on armoured formations is the wrong way if “enduring ops” or “wars amongst the people” or to use that distasteful phrase “wog bashing” is still seen as the future. And those were infantry heavy operations so if 4 battalions couldn’t cut in Afghanistan how will 2 do it in the future?
The only thing they have right is the airborne stuff. Now will 16ABB retain the 2 line regiments or loose them and become an all maroon affair? Also will the new 16AAB, the light formation, remain at 4 batts while the heavy will be light on infantry? And isn’t that lopsided?
Finally you know bugger all about what the MoD intend to do as well. So if I can’t comment on scant information perhaps you shouldn’t either?
X,
possibly. I remember giving my squadron (or more specifically the vehicle commanders) a shock when I scheduled a 4 day tactical exercise for Mon-Thurs of one week, when on the Friday we had our annual REME PRE exam of the vehicles. Massive complaints tactfully delivered by the SSM as everyone expected that all of the boys would spend all of the time bulling up the wagons and making sure the paperwork was all OK. On Monday morning, we paraded for the exercise, then I took only the vehicles commanders only with me for a four day dismounted exercise, and left the boys under the gunners to get on with the wagons. Result – four days of good training, and we passed our PRE. Some of the vehicle commanders had been in my Troop years before when I was a young Troop Leader, so knew of my penchant for getting down into the mud and making use of the legs God gives you, but some were slightly outraged at the idea.
I do recall the CO however telling me that I was in for a sacking if we failed PRE. He was quite generous later on and addressed the Squadron, telling them that he fully expected every Squadron to react to the unexpected, and be good at the barracks bullshit, and that we’d more than passed his test. Bought me a bottle of fizz in the Mess as well, which was decent of him.
“So if I can’t comment on scant information perhaps you shouldn’t either?”
You’re so chippy.
http://www.mod.uk/NR/rdonlyres/98670ABC-0F28-4893-8081-8F2912D84407/0/20120607jcn_2_12_floc_2.pdf
“Are you envisaging high-end Cold War armour tasks? Or Afghanistan style OPS?”
I’m not envisaging anything. The Army wants to be able to undertake all types of mission since it hasn’t any more of a bloody clue what it might need to do tomorrow than anyone else.
It is maintaining a core manoeuvre combined arms capability that can be used from high end to low end interventions and it wants an adaptable pool of forces to bring up the rear and do enduring operations if they are needed. So we can do small complex interventions (ABTF, the VHR BG in the AI Bde), larger complex operations (HR AI Bde at 3 months notice) or single effort complex operations (3 AI Bdes and a divisional HQ), or enduring complex operations (AI bdes + the Adaptable Force), smaller non-complex operations (UK Contingency Bn) and standing military tasks (MACA, FI, Cyprys, Brunei and Public Duties).
So it is keeping at its centre the hardest thing to do and the hardest thing to re-generate because nobody knows what it will be doing. Makes perfect bloody sense to me. You don’t cut the forces that are hardest to re-build when you don’t know if you’ll need them tomorrow or in a decade.
Clue is in the name, Adaptable Force. I imagine that a lot of those units in the AF will have a core peacetime task but will be capable of taking pooled equipment and using it so for example a Recce Regiment in the AF could ramp up to use CR2 if it needed. Or a Light Role unit to an AI unit. Essentially crystallising and organising for what happens now with HERRICK.
Phil,
with you entirely on the main thinking, but as an observation, but no criticism, of your examples, it’s more complex. Having myself gone from FR to MBT, it is an entirely different skill set, and more one to do with people and thinking than kit and training. Having also done the NATO Unit OPEVAL for a MBT Regiment that went to FR, it’s a longer process, so FR to MBT is more of a ramp down than a ramp up.
My instinct: takes 2+ years to go from MBT to FR, 1+ year from FR to MBT. In each case, the kit conversion takes about 2-3 months, so that’s not the problem. Unscientific, but I’m sure I’m not wrong.
A Squadron of my Regiment went from MBT to recce for a tour in Afghanistan – they did very well in the role, but I don’t think any of them thought they were FR, as opposed to crewing recce wagons. It’s a whole different mindset.
“The enemy IFV has spotted us!!! Run!!!!”
“You’re in a Challenger, idiot.”
“Oh…”
From Phil’s linked document, page 4-13
“Combat power should be concentrated in the force to
match high threats from the outset, as opposed to reliance upon a modular approach that dilutes the combat power across the force. Rapid deployment of a robustly configured force …will be critical.”
Together with the 11 “dwarf bdes” is exactly what Wall and Carter said when the former gave the task to the latter:
-to be able to fight also a more conventional enemy in a high intensity environment
- maintain expeditionary capabilities
- configure into about ten, smaller than the MRB-construct (in the above, read: modular across the force, diluting fighting power)units to be able to have enough readineness for being rapid, when required
I guess there will be some more concrete announcement, the predicted emphasis on battlefield networking will only come through in the detail
Cheers for the link TD, and to Phil for the doc which i suspect has more detail. Will get to that.
“Under plans drawn up by Lieutenant General Nick Carter the regular Army will number 82,000 by 2020. Reserves will be expanded to 30,000. It will be split into Reaction Forces and an Adaptable Force. Reaction Forces will be made up of a division of three armoured brigades, each with a tank regiment and two armoured infantry regiments plus an airborne brigade.”
Interesting, seems like the notion of permanent ability to intervene / persistent ability to sustain have now become official canon. Been wittering about tha for ages.
Hi jedi, RE “permanent ability to intervene / persistent ability to sustain”
- for the former, there is a healthy recognition that that the BGs by air/landing are just lead elements, and to be able to bring the army into play at all may require going in heavy right at the beginning (rotation for readiness: 3 Cdos excl. Fleet protection even though 4th in the name, restructured AAB will also probably have 3 infantry elements… and 3 heavy bdes)
- ability to sustain; well, the detail is coming I guess. The interesting mention is that Logistics Rgmnts will be equipped so that they won’t tie up too many combat units when operating in or through contested territory
@ Phil
I am not chippy. I was speaking my mind. Free speech and all that.
As for “Adaptable Force” I read compromise not because they think they need to cover all threats, more because they aren’t sure what to do.
Can on one of the Army types perhaps illustrate how this new structure would have supported recent Ops. For instance GW2 H hour, enduring Ops Afghan etc. That would make it much clearer for this “land blind” sea dog.
Cheers.
“As for “Adaptable Force” I read compromise not because they think they need to cover all threats, more because they aren’t sure what to do.”
Well precisely. The Tea Leaf Reading Regiment was cut in Options for Change.
James
I am sure you are right when converting from FR to MBT on a regiment basis. But what I meant was a squadron sized uplift as I imagine there’s trouble if we need a tank regiment still in an enduring operation. I know units for HERRICK were (I imagine every unit who is going now knows it) being warned off NLT 12 months before so I would have thought 12 months would be enough time to train up to CT3 on CR2 and then do whatever OPTAG they’d need to do when there’s virtually a blank cheque for training and priority for training stocks, mileage, ranges and driving courses.
picture of the “commando” version of foxhound. It’s plus points over the flyer for me are, an in service vehicle (almost!) so all the support is in place, v shape hull and no sitting over the wheels. as thi is a module vehicle, james’s points could be taken and adapted for slightly more armour and a commanders hatch up top. (BTW i can’t believe i passed your sqn in fally, must’ve been bought beers in the copper kettle!!)
http://scbiznews.s3.amazonaws.com/1314362506-ocelot_Weapons_variant.jpg
@ ACC – “for the former, there is a healthy recognition that that the BGs by air/landing are just lead elements, and to be able to bring the army into play at all may require going in heavy right at the beginning (rotation for readiness: 3 Cdos excl. Fleet protection even though 4th in the name, restructured AAB will also probably have 3 infantry elements… and 3 heavy bdes)”
Sorry, i’m not quite following your short-hand!
“BGs by air/landing”
Are you referring to the readiness elements in both 16AAB and 3Cdo?
“rotation for readiness: 3 Cdos excl”
Why are they excluded? I mean; of course intervention forces need to be out of regular rotation, but surely no different to 16AAB which has a similar intervention role (other side of the coin effectively).
“Fleet protection even though 4th in the name, restructured AAB will also probably have 3 infantry elements… and 3 heavy bdes”
Are you suggesting that the plan is to shift all intervention forces to a one-in-three roulement, therefore:
3Cdo = 3x Commandos as the principle elements
(16?)AAB = 3x Battalions (Para) as the principle elements
3x Heavy brigades (with Arm/BR/ArmInf/ArmInf)
Makes sense, a permanent ability to intervene is not the same as a persistent commitment to stabilise, so one-in-five is not necessary.
All strangely reminiscent of my previous attempt to define permanence and persistence:
http://jedibeeftrix.wordpress.com/2010/07/29/983/
@ Paul – re commando foxhound
tremendous, can we buy thousands of the foxhound family please?
Phil said “Well precisely. The Tea Leaf Reading Regiment was cut in Options for Change.”
There is making pragmatic choices based on recent conflicts and potential future likely conflicts and just returning to the out moded and familiar because you are bereft of ideas and/or are giving into vested interests within.
As for your mantra of “force generation” well as I said we have been deploying formations based on 4 battalions into the field in Afghanistan. Formations using MRAPs and light vehicles, rarely Warrior and no Challengers. We have fought 2 armoured wars in the last 30 years, 3 COIN campaigns, and one conventional light infantry war. Seeing as Warrior and Challengers aren’t suitable for the infrastructure in Third World and if they were suitable for COIN we wouldn’t have bought all those MRAPs. Nor are they suitable for rapid deployment and heavy logistical train (the bit we are cutting back on). How long do you think the British armoured brigades in GW1 would have lasted if the war had gone for much longer against a (near) peer enemy? 2 days? 3 days? Do you know how much a struggle GW1 was logistically for the Army?
So I am sorry if heavy formations that are infantry light in a time we are cutting back on logistics are suddenly going to be core of the army, basis for “force generation” or not, seems illogical.
I really need to get my head around this new Army structure, just when we think 5 MRB’S is the deal they throw this new idea out there.
So we end up with 11 brigades, and I think I’m right in saying that it won’t be a mix of regular and regional anymore?
So 16th AAB and 3rd Commando stay relatively the same, as rapid reaction ‘kick in the door’ units.
Are the 3 armoured brigades full strength, intervention units? Capable of short, sharp conventional operations at short notice?
If this is the case then does it also mean that the 7 infantry brigades are a mix of regular and territorial, primarily there for home duties and only deploying if they had enough notice and it was on a lengthy, rotational deployment like Afghanistan?
I would appreciate clarification from anyone who knows. They don’t make it easy!
“So I am sorry if heavy formations that are infantry light in a time we are cutting back on logistics are suddenly going to be core of the army, basis for “force generation” or not, seems illogical.”
It’s not, TAF (adaptable force) will be able to reinforce and support the reaction forces it seems from what I am reading and hearing now. The Army peacetime structures have never been determinstic, they have never limited our options, if we need to deploy a different mix of force elements then we do. The whole point behind this is precisely that. To have an adaptable force!
The 3 brigades simply concentrate capabilities that are hardest to re-generate into 3 formations that can then rotate around the force generation cycle on a day to day basis with convenience. If the balloon goes up TAF can reinforce and bespoke the force.
In my mind its very simple. And its simply the recognition and planning for what we have been doing since Op Banner.
“So we end up with 11 brigades, and I think I’m right in saying that it won’t be a mix of regular and regional anymore?”
Yes this is looking certain now.
“So 16th AAB and 3rd Commando stay relatively the same, as rapid reaction ‘kick in the door’ units.”
16X will be “modified” I suspect by loosing a battalion. I suspect 3X will lose The Rifles too. 16X will provide ABTF and 3X will provide the ARG Cdo.
“Are the 3 armoured brigades full strength, intervention units? Capable of short, sharp conventional operations at short notice?”
The brigades will cycle around the force generation cycle with one brigade at High Readiness (HR – 90 days) with one BG within that brigade rotating through as Very High Readiness. They can do short and sharp, or they can go there and rotate through like in Bosnia or Iraq as each Bde hits the appropriate point in the force generation cycle.
“If this is the case then does it also mean that the 7 infantry brigades are a mix of regular and territorial, primarily there for home duties and only deploying if they had enough notice and it was on a lengthy, rotational deployment like Afghanistan?”
It looks this way. Each brigade is going to be of a “varying” size so I imagine some will be at a higher state of readiness and require less preparation and some will provide units to augment the reaction forces and the remainder will maybe have a core mission like doing Public Duties or providing the 3 overseas Bns (2 Cyprus, 1 Brunei). They will absorb the role of the regional forces and it seems certain will be at extended readiness.
“They don’t make it easy!”
To be fair they haven’t made the announcement yet. They have been waiting since May to get the political authority to announce it, it has been signed off internally for some time.
@ Phil
Well of course the Army always sent what is needed. But that still doesn’t explain why the Army believes the core of the mid-21st century needs to built around 3 armoured brigades. Basically you are saying that they, your former superiors, have no need to specify what equipment or weight a brigade has. But you also saying that they are completely correct with this proposed structure. Which one is it? Are you really saying less than one months total armoured warfare outweighs Afghanistan, Iraq (after the war ended), the Balkans, Sierra Leon, Ulster, and the Falklands? Heck not including Aden, Borneo, Malaya, Cyprus, really all of Suez and Korea too? You can’t say we will send what is needed and then advocate specialisation is needed (which it is) for high end armoured warfare and that has to be core to keep a capability that really died the day somebody pressed a button in Neveda on July 16 1945. And then compound it by saying we will use the back-up division to form what we want?
Make your mind up. Then again you thinking on military matters has been formed by the same organisation that influenced who ever came up with this new model so up surprising that you don’t see any flaws.
“But that still doesn’t explain why the Army believes the core of the mid-21st century needs to built around 3 armoured brigades”
Because it is the hardest capability to re-generate and it can conduct a wide swathe of the spectrum of likely operations.
“Are you really saying less than one months total armoured warfare outweighs Afghanistan, Iraq (after the war ended), the Balkans, Sierra Leon, Ulster, and the Falklands? Heck not including Aden, Borneo, Malaya, Cyprus, really all of Suez and Korea too?”
It is the hardest capability to re-generate and it can conduct a wide swathe of the spectrum of likely operations.
“Then again you thinking on military matters has been formed by the same organisation that influenced who ever came up with this new model so up surprising that you don’t see any flaws.”
Check me out, the little indoctrinated robot.
Seriously, I’m sick of the little swipes just because I argue more about the Army because I know more about it than the other services. I leave all the debates about what radar such and such should have or how long a rotor blade should be because I know fuck all about it.
It is a simple concept, you keep what is hardest to make which also happens to be able to do most of the missions. It is really simple. Really simple.
The problem is you cannot grasp that peacetime organisation is not deterministic. You think that the brigade will just rock up organised to fight the Soviets when history tells you we generate bespoke force elements.
But whatever hey, I’m just a loyal little pooch fighting the men who like to mentally masturbate over the idea of a United Kingdom Marine Corps.
This was bought to you by the Chris B school of TD meltdowns.
Apparently scrapping Nimrod netted the MoD £500,000. Or one hour of “fighting” in Afghanistan.
And Boeing have started building the new KC-46A tanker for the USAF. It is $30billion (£20billion) programme that should deliver 179 airframes up to 2028. They will have 18 by 2017. Um. That can’t be right. We have just leased 9 aircraft for £9billion…..