In a previous post on Army structures I suggested that the current 2 division structure was an impediment to agility, not cognisant of the size of the Army and results in instances of top heavy over administration. The US has also recognised this in their transformational approach with the Brigade Combat Teams, whilst the UK should not blithely mimic the US Army the approach has merit and just because it is ‘not invented here’ does not mean we shouldn’t do it.
The British Army has always gone to war with composite formations and with this proposed structure this will not change, the basic building block being a Company or Squadron, for example . But in order to provide enough concentration of combat power this proposition sees the Brigade as the basic manoeuvre element.
There has been a suggestion that the distinction between light role and mechanised (or medium) is somewhat artificial and more flexibility could be obtained by having a single type that flexed up or down depending on requirement. I think this would be difficult to achieve in practice as the training needs, particularly for vehicles might be onerous.
The proposed structure is 2 Armoured Brigades, 4 Mechanised Brigades and 2 Light Role Infantry Brigades. Carrying out the rapid reaction role will be 16 AAB and 3 Cdo.
Overall this is a modest re-organisation and expansion that adds an additional 3 light role infantry battalions (2 Army, 1 RM Cdo) and re-roles/re-equips some of the existing Challenger, Warrior and AS90 based units. Other changes include the reinforcing of engineering, intelligence, medical and other ‘influence’ type capabilities.
This is only a high level overview, more detail on equipment and capabilities in later posts.
Contents
Armoured Brigade (Heavy) x2
There is still a need for the heavy hitters and in military terms (at least on the ground) this is an armoured brigade. The current armoured brigade structure is based on 1 Formation Reconnaissance Regiment, 1 Armoured Regiment, 2 Armoured Infantry Battalions and 1 Light Role Battalion plus supporting units. Existing Mechanised Brigades typically substitute an armoured infantry battalion for a mechanised one.
The Armoured Brigade would revert to the older square structure of 2 Armoured Regiments and 2 Armoured Infantry Regiments plus the Formation Reconnaissance, combat support and combat service support elements.
7th Armoured Brigade would consist of the Royal Scots Dragoon Guards and the Royal Hussars in Challenger 2 with 4th Battalion Royal Regiment of Scotland and 3 Battalion Mercian Regiment in Warrior. Formation Reconnaissance would be carried out by 9/12 Lancers and the existing combat support and combat service support units retained.
20th Armoured Brigade would consist of Royal Dragoon Guards and Kings Royal Hussars in Challenger 2 with 1 Battalion Prince of Wales’s Royal Regiment and 5 Battalion the Rifles in Warrior. Formation Reconnaissance would be carried out by 1 Queens Dragoons and the existing combat support and combat service support units retained.
AS90 would be retained, 1 Regiment per brigade but one of the gun troops will be replaced with GMLRS.
Mechanised Infantry Brigade x4
Whilst the proposal for the Armoured Brigades is relatively conventional the Mechanised Infantry Brigade is a departure from the existing structure in that it sees the removal of Challenger and Warrior, in recognition that traditional state on state armoured conflict whilst still possible is less likely.
One Regiment’s worth of Challengers would be retained as war stock and the three Regiments worth of Warriors would be used as a base vehicle for conversion into the various types that currently use an FV43x series base. The armoured brigades would then comprise solely of Challenger and Warrior based vehicles, plus FRES for Formation Reconnaissance and one or two other smaller types.
The Mechanised Infantry Brigade would be equipped primarily with a range FRES and Protected Patrol Vehicles but could also assume a light role should it be needed. A Brigade would be structured with 3 infantry battalions and a Medium Armour Support/ Reconnaissance Regiment in addition to the normal range of combat support and combat service support elements.
The existing armoured infantry battalions would be re-rolled to the Medium Armour Support Regiments and any excess personnel would be transferred to a new formation concept, the force protection company. This force protection company would be responsible for fixed location guarding and convoy protection to enable the combat power of the Brigade to be applied without being drained by force protection duties, as these tasks are much more likely given the likely asymmetric nature of future conflicts. One of the great weaknesses of the US Brigade Combat Team structure is its leanness, there exists little recognition of the impact that combat losses will have, especially in combat support and combat service support elements. The new UK Mechanised Infantry Brigade concept should be designed so as not to repeat these shortcomings.
Recognising the likely need for more soft power capabilities the new structure would have reinforced engineering, medical and ISR capabilities.
3 AS90 regiments would also be re-rolled with medium weight indirect fires equipment.
Equipment should be deployable by a combination of C17 and A400
Light Role Infantry Brigade x2
The two existing light role Brigades (19 Light and 52 Infantry) would be augmented with an additional 2 Battalions (either Ghurkha or UK based)
The Light Role Infantry Brigade would be equipped with light weight protected mobility vehicles and should be deployable by A400.
Rapid Reaction Brigade x2
Although part of the RN I have included the Royal Marines in the Rapid Reaction capability, alongside 16 Airborne Brigade, pretty much mimicking what we have now.
The Royal Marines should be expanded to form an additional Commando rather than relying on an attached Army unit as is presently the case, 1st Battalion The Rifles would return to the Light Infantry role.
The existing structure of 16AB should be retained (2 Parachute and 2 air assault) but organised on the lines of innovative Commando 21 RM structure of Close Combat and Stand Off companies to promote interoperability and standardisation. The RM Command Support Group concept should also be introduced in 16AAB.
I will cover these in more detail in later posts.
Divisional Support and Headquarters Element
Both existing field army divisional support elements and theatre troops would be held in a flexible formation that can deploy as required.
Typically these would consist of combat support and combat service support elements, for example air defence.
In operations with multiple brigades, a composite headquarters and support force can be assembled and deployed as needed
Nice, but I prefer a “triple three” organization, to follow the established train, deploy, reset cycle.
With todays ‘enduring’ conflicts, PERSTEMPO will dictate availability and that in turn translates into force projection.
With three ARM Bdes, three Mech Inf Bdes and three Light Bde (Para, RM, Lt Inf) there would be a sustained deployable division-sized force available 24-7-365.
The Light Bde would perform the RRF element with a battalion/BG on 72 hours NTM. With both RM and Paras available this will be a flexible force for either early entry or rapid reinforcement. Their vehicles should be limited to Viking/Bronco to keep them Chinook-mobile. The armor and mechanized battalions would, as you said, organize for C-17 transportation.
I went for 2 armoured brigades to concentrate combat power and whilst I accept that three would be better from a sustainment perspective my thinking is that armoured brigades are not likely to be deployed on an enduring basis, unlike the others, so when looking at how to slice the cake I thought 2 would be a better option than 3
Absolutely agree on Chinook mobility for light role and RRF brigades
In my humble view, with 2 Arm, 4 Mech and 2+2 Inf Bdes you might be forced to disassemble an Arm and Mech Bde if you need to keep a sizeable force in theatre for at least a year, or are forced to deploy to (brigade sized) forces to two different theatres. This might have further repercussions for (home) unit training and planned deployments (Belize, Cyprus etc.).
PS thanks for the edit.
Marcase, I agree its not ideal but striping units to create composite formations happens now, its the norm. But in suggesting these changes I have tried to restrict the increases to achievable levels, it would be great to add an additional 2 mechanised brigades on top of what we have but is that really feasible within the context of future defence budgets?
I have been working up some ideas to send you an article, and my structure is not a million miles away from yours, but it is different, and I would actually advocate for more new kit – so my ideas might be less realistic in a budgetary context.
I guess my other point in response to Marcase is that if I was in charge there would be no ‘enduring’ conflicts, because I would not commit us to the political folly of so called “nation building” – so while I would not advocate being completely constrained to RUSI’s “strategic raiding” option, I would build our forces around finding, fixing and destroying our enemies. I know it might be politically incorrect, but screw the expense of building them back up again after we have smote them down !
With the coming budget woes, I wouldn’t be surprised if another armored regiment is lost, regardless who runs the house…
Personally I’m quite enamored with the US BCT approach, although it has its weaknesses. Taking the current UK orbat/TOEs, it would perhaps be best to organize around six (nearly) identical mech brigades (again so 2 train, 2 deploy, 2 reset).
I like your ‘new’ arm regt, which should be standard. In fact, ALL mechanised battlegroups should have an armored squadron. If tanks are deemed excessive, the squadron could ‘double hat’ as a light recce or cavalry unit, with tankers using alternative vehicles such as Jackals or even FRES Scout vehicles. Tankers would become Mounted warriors instead of ‘alternative’ infantry/security guards.
Jed – I hear you mate.
It’s just that there will always be a next conflict around the corner. Nobody expected the Balkans to explode, or Afghanistan. So even if the UK pulled out of nation building, conflicts will be many, persistent, and always in the ‘wrong’ part of the world.
I think that the UK should be able to – at least! – deploy to either two different theatres (brigade size) or be lead nation in one large one (division size). That’s six brigades right there, available from the current standing force pool – possible with a little tinkering, and without any of that army FROM nonsense.
Marcase
“Nobody expected the Balkans to explode”
But why did we care that they did?
Was it really our concern?
We could have armed the Slovenians and the Croats (and probably the macedonians), allowing them to defend themselves, and ignored the rest.
“or Afghanistan”
But is our response to 11/9 the right one?
We accomplished more in the first 6 weeks of the war than we did in the following 8 years.
Oddly enough I agree with you on a 6 Brigade Structure, however I’m of the opinion that a Brigade would be 2x Heavy Armour (including artilery) 4x Mechanised Infantry and 6x Infantry (Heliborne).
It has just occured to me that I’m asking for twice as many havy vehicles as we currently have, and about 80% more medium vehicles.
Bugger, I thought I was cutting the armoured componant.
Dominic – I agree, we cant forsee the future, but we should study the recent past !
Marcase – linked to above, future conflict is undoubtedly far from home base, there maybe many of them, but if Govt won’t fund military appropriately, then UK involvement cannot be ‘persistent’ even if the conflict itself is.
For all – why do you “hate” the concept of the division so much ? The Yanks had to invent the BCT because they are much bigger than us and were indeed heavily organized around the division. British Army not so much, last time we deployed at Division level was liberation of Kuwait. However the Division is there for a reason, and all posts saying we just need Brigades are ignoring this, and yet also ignoring the fact that we deploy flexibly and can ignore the division level if we need to.
First place to cut UK Army is to hand over ‘hosting’ of the Allied Rapid Reaction Corp’s HQ to another NATO nation. We provide the Signals, Engineers, logistics, force protection etc for this Corps levels HQ – let Germany or France do it, they have bigger armies.
If we really, really had to cut more I would reduce from 37 total infantry battalions to 31 – cutting six battalions is reducing the ‘readiness’ formations (3rd Mech Division) by 1 brigade (19th Light Brigade for example) and similarly cutting a brigade from the ‘regenerative’ divisions.
Hopefully if I find time at lunch today (Canada time) I will plonk an article in the mail to Admin with my alternative ideas
“why do you “hate” the concept of the division so much ?”
“last time we deployed at Division level was liberation of Kuwait.”
Thats why.
We’re organising the army based on some fanciful command structure we’ll never use.
If a formation exists on paper, it should exist in the real world.
Organised into Brigades, we could have a Rapid Reaction Brigade, a Deployed Brigade, A Long Term Training Brigade, a Recovery Brigade and Two Short Term Deployable Brigades.
Formations to which battalions could be deployed, and which would represent what they are actualy doing.
Organised into Divisons, we have the First Division, which is nominaly Three Brigades, but one Brigade is in Canada do live fire exercises (B3), ones deployed to Afghanistan(B2), and the other is ready to deploy(B1).
I dont see what calling three Brigades scattered around the world in varying states of availability a “Divison” acomplishes.
If the situation demands it, we can always pull together three of the independant Brigades and promote one of the Brigadier Generals to General, and put him in charge of a formation that actualy exists, in reality.
Usual Caveat, I could be wrong.
Dominic – I don’t want to sound condescending at all, so please poke me with a big stick if I start to sound that way……
Your not ex-Army are you ?
You said: “I dont see what calling three Brigades scattered around the world in varying states of availability a “Divison” acomplishes.” – It does not accomplish anything in and off itself, but its not supposed to.
A Division has the HQ, additional artillery, intelligence, communications, medical, engineer and logistics units “attached to it” that support the 3 brigades – which by the way, with the British system can be any 3 brigades (or more). Believe me it is not an outmoded or out of date structure.
You also said: “We’re organising the army based on some fanciful command structure we’ll never use.”
Not true – how do you know we will never again commit a division level force package ? We have both of our ‘active readiness’ divisions allocated to the NATO Allied Rapid Reaction Corps. Is the Corps also a outmoded and out of date structure, simply because our own army is now smaller than a traditional Corps level formation ?
Also: “If a formation exists on paper, it should exist in the real world.” – It does, but it is ‘flexed’ in that intrinsically British way.
Honestly, abolishing Divisions (or Division HQ’s etc) in favor of “independent” Brigades actually achieves nothing in the “real world”.
DominicJ
There may be exactly ZERO rational reasoning for a given intervention, but public opinion may force politicians to ‘do something’. And since Whitehall holds the strings…
Besides that, genocide is in my humble opinion a good enough reason to intervene with arms. The bugger of the Balkans was that we (the Europeans) took such a soft approach of it from the start, with too much focus on negotiations and the UN – big mistake.
Heliborne infantry (AASLT) is nice, my gripe is that they may be too light when on the ground, especially when the weather may ground the helos, robbing the boots on the ground from much needed air support.
Not of any service, so more than happy to be correted.
I’d either roll the headquarters stuff down to the Brigade level, so a Brigade would have its own medical support, or you could roll it up, I accept the RAF does need the RAF Regiment, but doesn the RAF need RAF doctors? RAF Intelligence?
You could do both.
“Not true – how do you know we will never again commit a division level force package ? We have both of our ‘active readiness’ divisions allocated to the NATO Allied Rapid Reaction Corps”
But we dont.
Because Divisions dont exist.
Take the Guards Divison.
The Grenadier Guards are in Afghanistan, as are the Coldstream Guards, The Scots Guards are in Catterick, The Irish Guards are in pre deployment training, and the Welsh Guards are in Aldershot.
I’m sorry, but that does not exist as a fighting force in any meaningful sense of the word.
Two Battalions are currently at war, ones preparing for the same war, and the other two are recently back from it.
Other Divisons might be in better shape of course, I’m not mapping the entire British army to check, but that indicative.
If the Guards division has support elements for its combnat arms, either the Support Elements are deploying a lot more often than the Combat Elements they support, or he Combat elements are deploying without them.
Or so it would appear to the layman
Marcase
Didnt actualy take into account weather, but I’d want a Power Projection Ship carrying 500 soldiers to also carry 5 CH53K’s and half a dozen Apache Gunships.
True, troops would go in light, but they wouldnt have to stay that way for long
“There may be exactly ZERO rational reasoning for a given intervention, but public opinion may force politicians to ‘do something’”
True, but “do something” to the public means go over bang some heads together and be home for tea and medals next week.
As a raiding force, we should be able to get anywhere fast and start knocking heads together, we jut couldnt maintain a prescence for more than say 6 months, which the public wouldnt stand for anyway.
There’s no reason a Division couldn’t be ‘horizontally organized’, by decoupling assigned brigades.
So instead the Div HQ commanding three brigades which are either training, deploying or stand-down, a Div HQ could focus on commanding deployed forces only.
Say there are six Bdes, with two training, two deploying and two stand-down.
First Div HQ – with CS/CSS attachments – would command the two deployed Bdes, reinforced with a RDF Bde (UKRM/Para) if necessary.
Second Div HQ would ‘run’ the training/work-up Bdes, and the stand-down forces would fall under overall army (territorial?) command.
Div HQs selected staff would deploy for one year tours for command consistency, while combat/CSS Bdes would deploy six months.
Jed – I hear you. Political will is one thing, funding is the crux.
Marcase
Thats kind of where I’m heading, just at a lower level.
Rather than having a ready Division, we would have a ready Brigade.
If only because I can see a world where we can deploy a Brigade unsupported, but to deploy a divison?
Although I do accept any conflict, even a raid, would probsbly need two Brigades landed, I just think it makes sense organise as a ready brigade we could land from military vessels, and a secondary brigade that would land a week later on STUFT vessels.