A conventional Mechanised Infantry Brigade has a mix of armoured, armoured infantry, mechanised infantry and light role infantry in addition to HQ, combat support and combat service support elements.
One of the central debates preceding the order of battle or establishment of Army formations is what are they required to do, this come from strategy and doctrine. Strategy and doctrine often lag real time events and no matter how units are organised there are likely to be unforeseen events that make that structure sub optimal. For all their much vaunted military prowess, the Israeli experience in Lebanon was that they had prepared for the wrong option and were found seriously wanting. Instead of poorly trained insurgents then encountered small highly effective teams that had lots of firepower and a sophisticated appreciation of terrain and manoeuvre. The Israelis had concentrated too much on counter insurgency or anti terrorism and unlearned the lessons of combined arms close combat, not realising that the enemy had evolved. They didn’t make the same mistake in Gaza.
The Israelis have the advantage of knowing intimately the terrain they will be fighting on and even then they got their choices wrong, this illustrates the difficulty of matching strategy, doctrine and organisational structures. It also highlights the dangers of neglecting combined arms close combat because Lebanon might have been classed as an asymmetric conflict against non state actors but the fact is that those non state actors needed an old fashioned combination of indirect fires, close combat manoeuvre and concentration of armour to provide protected mobility.
The distinction between traditional armoured, armoured infantry, mechanised infantry and light role infantry is disappearing with composite brigades that incorporate all types, although many of the armoured regiments and armoured infantry battalions are now either based on Mastiff or provide drivers for such. The Future Army Structures (Next Steps) seems to be reinforcing this composite approach although this may be as a result of shrinking numbers, ongoing commitments and cost concerns rather than any grand doctrinal shift.
When we look at these issues it is easy to come up with simple answers to simple questions but the reality is that seemingly simple questions usually require complex answers beset with uncertainty and messy compromise.
So this is one idea amongst many.
In our proposed structure the idea was presented to retain a traditional mix of armoured, mechanised and light role formations with some changes in composition and equipment. Conservative, perhaps, but the structure has served well and still provides a reasonable basis on which to flex up or down depending on need.
In summary, the armoured brigades reverted to a more traditional 2×2 square formation (2 armoured regiments and 2 armoured infantry battalions) with a single FR regiment in order to concentrate combat power yet in a smaller overall package and the mechanised infantry brigades had 3 mechanised infantry battalions and a medium armour support/ reconnaissance regiment. In line with UK doctrine the armoured vehicles in general provide protected mobility rather than as fighting platforms, dismounted infantry generally engaging with the enemy whilst support fires are provided by vehicles.
The choice of vehicles is an interesting conundrum; generally speaking we should be pushing for FRES types but as Afghanistan has shown, there may be a requirement for vehicles that provide enhanced protection against IED’s, that conventional tracked vehicles cannot provide unless some scientific or engineering breakthrough occurs.
The proposal here then is to recognise that one vehicle simply cannot provide the mix of protection and mobility that suits every threat environment and to keep moving towards this Holy Grail (the old FRES concept) will result in huge amounts of wasted time, wasted money and a solution that meets neither requirement in its entirety. As I mentioned in a previous post, the IED is not going away any time soon but then neither is the 30mm canon or 155mm shell fragment.
This means that FRES and its variants will still be introduced into the mechanised infantry brigade but the existing vehicles like Bulldog and Mastiff will remain. There is plenty of life left in both types.
The mechanised infantry battalion will be based on the innovative Commando 21 organisation. This is a relatively conservative proposal, no masses of high technology but, a straight forward reorganisation to provide greater firepower at the battalion level.
Command Company; will consist of a pair of HQ groups, reconnaissance troop, indirect fire troop, anti tank troop and machine gun troop.
The reconnaissance troop will have 4 FRES Scout, 2 FRES Sensor Platforms (in our previous post) and 2 protected mobility FRES that will carry sniper/forward air controller sections. The troop will be supported by a recovery variant. Depending on prevailing requirements the FRES variants may be replaced with lighter wheeled vehicles such as the Light Protected Vehicle or other similar types.
The indirect fires troop will consist of 8x 81mm mortars. I have kept the 81mm in this formation because its true advantage is its light weight and logistics footprint, to go with the heavier 120mm strips the weapon system of its principal advantage. In of the earlier posts in this section I proposed SPIKE-NLOS as a possible supplement to 81mm mortar for organic precision fires but its range is longer than would be needed across a typical battalion area of operations and the US NLOS seems to be heading for failure. 81mm precision mortar rounds seem to be showing promise but the main concern is the proportion of the bomb weight that is taken up with guidance equipment reduces the combat effect on target. The ‘missile in a box’ idea has great potential but would not be able to moved by foot, which again, makes the 81mm so useful. There are many options here but in general I would propose to stay with the 81mm and migrate to supplement (not replace) with precision systems as they mature.
Anti tank troop will be equipped with the Javelin guided missile, either being carried in FRES protected mobility, Bulldog or lighter vehicles.
Machine Gun Troop, the sustained fire role for GPMG continues to demonstrate its relevance and should be retained.
Logistic Company; will provide engineering support and logistics for the battalion.
Close Combat Company x2; will comprise a company HQ and 3 close combat platoons (1 more than existing)
Stand Off Company x2; will comprise a company HQ, one close combat platoon, a heavy machine gun platoon and an anti tank platoon. Vehicles for both close combat and stand off will be either Bulldog or wheeled protected patrol i.e. Mastiff and related vehicles.
I will be looking at vehicles in more detail in the next post.
The close combat companies seem to be a direct equal to a current rifle companies, so that’s a Coy HQ and 3 rifle platoons – no change.
An infantry battalion, as it currently stands, has a support company, with a fire support platoon, an Atk platoon and a mortar platoon.
With the current establishment, there are enough fire support and Atk sections to spread them out, one per company. It is debatable that rendering one manoeuvre sub-unit more static is actually an advantage, despite the increase in firepower. The suggested organisation actually seems to have 3 fire support platoons, 3 Atk platoons and 8 manoeuvre platoons. When you factor in the rest of the specialists, then the close-combat platoons are outnumbered in the battalion.
Going for the current 3 plus support organisation allows a bit more depth – you can use two up and one in reserve. With the square organisation, you have 1 up with one in support and 2 in reserve or 2 up and no reserve.
One thing that the organisation above is missing, IMHO, is GMGs. These weapons are proving very useful.
2x CC and 2x SOC, that’s UKRM Cdo structure, I can live with that
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Fred – GMGs in HQ Co and SO Coys.
Edit: meant to say that GMGs can be exchanged for the GPMGs and HMGs one a one for one basis, as is commonly done now.
I’ve no in depth knowledge of the Spike family of ATGW’s, but: Spike-NLOS and Javelin? Wouldn’t Spike-NLOS and Spike MR/LR be better suited, there must be some commonality advantage.
the Spike makes so much sense it is incredulous that we didn’t go for it.
Ranges from ultra short to non line of sight, various guidance options, various warhead options, combat proven and even helicopter/naval launch capabilities.
My thinking on this was just to have a lightweight vehicle borne non line of sight precision fires capability that crucially, is organic to the battalion. The 81mm is a an incredibly effective weapon and almost perfect, but some precision would be nice to have.
I was being pragmatic and keeping Javelin, but ideally Javelin, Hellfire and NLAW would be replaced with Spike.
Bulldog needs to go ASAP, they twice as old as the average squaddie they cart about – way too old, needs to go !
Jed, you must be equating age to lack of capability. These vehicles may be old, but they have been updated significantly with new engines, transmissions and armour to name but a few. The only thing remaining that is old is the steel hull.
As a comparison, the Dakota may be an old aircraft but its still in use, as the BT-67 updated with turboprop engines and modern electronics, it is still quite effective in the role it is used for. Suprising as the some of the aircraft may be entering their 70th year.
But Richard, is that true ? I have TA friends who were cold war warriors in BAOR who said that FV432 was a maintenance pig in the 1980′s !
Have they really been completely re manufactured ? Is it really just the hull steel that remains ? If so I stand corrected, but personally it appears that Bulldog is yet another coat of lipstick on an already heavily made up pig, all for budgetary reasons. But of course I could be wrong because non of my mates deployed to Basra ever got to ride in one, so I have no evidence one way or the other
I do recall hearing that the RM were no longer happy with the “square” commando, but cannot remember the source. Further, the posited establishment isn’t square, it is decidedly lopsided in favour of support weapons.
Whilst firepower is not a bad thing, it doesn’t win battles unless the enemy is as dumb as bricks and sits there to take it.
What is more puzzling to me is that this is a mechanised formation. It already has a support weapon of some kind on every vehicle, some on stabilised mounts with electro-optics and fire control, so adding further dismounted teams seems almost perverse.
The Bulldog has an uprated engine and transmission, so that should solve the bulk of the maintenance problems. The running gear and suspension remains the same.
Spike does seem very promising, but both the British and now the French have had it in competition against the Javelin and in both cases the Javelin has won out. There may be something not in the brochures that makes Spike less attractive.
not exactly connected with this post, but close enough, just seen that BAe have signed an agreement to jointly produce an IPV for malaysia with FNSS, a turkish company. They are buying the PARS 8×8 which beat the patria in trials. Main reason i’m posting this is it comes in 4×4,6×6 and the 8×8 (the post said 10×10 as well but it isn’t on the fnss website). Now i don’t know ow good this vehicle is but doesn’t answer some of the questions on here about common chassis etc etc. It looks a bit like the BAe wheeled IPV, SES. it’s turning circle is 7.8m due to all wheel steering which is not bad seeing as it’s 7m long! (not a neutral turn i know before the track queens start).
Anyhow if someone has more info or an opinion on this vehicle jump in, if BAe are involved maybe get it built here, or at least trialled, i’m all for competition and not just looking at what the states have got.
“A conventional Mechanised Infantry Brigade has a mix of armoured, armoured infantry, mechanised infantry and light role infantry in addition to HQ, combat support and combat service support elements.”
I know you partially correct yourself later in the article but this statement really is not true. This is a very unconventional brigade, unlike that found in any other army (unless anyone can correct me on this?). A commentator on another web-site said this structure has been adopted simply for the convenience of rotating brigades through Afghanistan. One would not normally group units together in the same brigade when those units possess greatly differing degrees of firepower, protection and mobility.