At the start of the Think Defence Future Defence Review series of posts I asked the question, what do we want the armed forces to do?
As we have progressed through the FDR series and as a result of the excellent discussion/comments on this site and others such as Jedi Beeftrix and Warships 1 there still doesn’t seem to be an absolute consensus on which direction people think the UK should be travelling in.
How about a recap.
The excellent paper by Michael Codner from the Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies set out a series of options.
Global Guardian, continuation of ground operations for robust stabilisation.
Strategic Raiding, limited ground operations but with an emphasis on early presence and sea basing.
Contributory, concentration on specific capabilities at the expense of others that would be provided by allies in a coalition context.
Gendarmerie, contribution to stabilisation operations.
Little Britain, self defence only
I think we can all agree that the last two options are a non starter, we are not Belgium!
The paper seems to be an advocate of the second option, strategic raiding and many think this is the best option, it certainly allows us to retain some of the high end expeditionary capabilities and is strongly supported by those who favour a strong Royal Navy, in essence it is a maritime expeditionary approach.
But what happens after the early entry, who will be there to continue stabilisation operations after we have kicked the front doors in, this position assumes they will be available.
The whole Force for Honour proposal seems to present the options as distinct strategies with no room for compromise. In fact the paper specifically warns against fudging the issue but conflict is a messy business, full of unintended consequences and the reality is that no one can predict the future. In the last 30 years we have been involved in the full spectrum of conflict that the armies of academics at RUSI, Shrivenham and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office failed to predict in any meaningful manner.
We went to war with what we had, not what we wanted to have (Sorry for quoting Donald there by the way!)
I also can’t help thinking that supporters of a strong navy and by definition a navy with CVF, tend to decide on the outcome and then set to work making a strategic justification for the option that secures it.
There are many advantages to picking one or the other options and maybe RUSI are right when they think that we have to make a decision, any decision, but if history teaches us anything it is that a balanced force, as far as is practicable, is able to flex to meet contingent need.
Maybe a bit of messy compromise is actually possible.
So the position I have tried to take with FDR is this.
1. We need as far as possible to maintain a balanced force, if there is any sensible option then this is it.
2. However, we have to be realistic that fully capable ‘mini USA’ force may not be affordable so we have to try and create a flexible force that can still pack enough of a punch to conduct independent small scale operations yet contribute in a meaningful manner to coalition based larger scale operations.
The much vaunted SDR98 actually makes reference to this , small scale independent and medium to large scale as contributory.
Using the language of the RUSI paper and taking the view of comments from JediBeeftrix it is a mix of Global Guardian and Contributory, I would also add a small scale element of strategic raiding as an insurance against the unknown.
Hows that for a fudge?
I am totally for a strong Great Britain but the idea that the issue is to avoid becoming a mini-USA or falling into a pure stabilization force or to retreat to fortress UK is not being realistic in my opinion.
What does make sense (and it pains me to say this) is that the UK should focus on ensuring that it brings capabilities to the table that other European countries do not.
That would be strong expeditionary forces….across the board. Option 2 is the only real answer to future capabilities.
I don’t think that any politician will allow for their country to fall into 8 plus years of nation building any time soon. Except for humanitarian missions the only actions in the future will be those that are indeed for the sake of national security. Again option 2 is the pick.
For starters, it might be a good idea to keep in mind that the UK has alliance commitments in NATO.
NATO is – despite the loss of its mind in 2001 – still an alliance that leads to peace among its members and the greatest collective security deterrence ever.
Keeping up its contribution to NATO should be the basic of any thinking about future UK military power.
Oh, and the Lisbon Treaty is a collective defence (defensive alliance) treaty as well, actually a stronger treaty.
These are two alliances that rank much higher than great power luxury games.
Finally, I think there might be some obligations due to the Commonwealth, but I’m not sure about that.
This means that option 2 is totally crap, for example.
At the very latest the economic and fiscal situation would declare it to be crap.
Sven I afraid I just don’t understand your assertion that option 2 the so called “strategic Raiding” does not fit in with our NATO obligations ?
Some of the UK’ s major NATO obligations throughout the Cold War and since have required the type of forces needed by this option, and earlier rTified by SDR98. For example the commitment of 3 Brigade RM to reinforce the ‘northern flank’ and the armies commitment to the Allied Mobile Force (AMF).
To be honest typing this on my iPhone is a pain, so may contribute more later, but don’t understand and disagree with your assertion.
Sven and Solomon, it’s always a pleasure to get the feedback of fellow bloggers so good to have you along.
Sven, If you go back through some of our posts on this subject you will see a strong thread of recognition of the value of cooperative security arrangements like NATO, the EU and even the Commonwealth and you are absolutely correct to identify that the UK does have certain commitments to our partners but it is not these partners that are paying the bills and if one actually looks at the text of for example, the Lisbon Treaty, it is evident that it talks of collective defence but does not state that the UK or anyone else for that matter has to have a strong navy or 2 brigades of armoured infantry. Interestingly, our European partners were somewhat silent about the subject of collective security when the US was sticking the figurative knife in our back over the recent trouble down South Atlantic way. Look at Article 168 and 42(7) of the Treaty, which explicitly includes the Falkland Islands. If Argentina did engage in military operations against the FI then the UK could legitimately ask the armed forces of Italy, Eire, Germany, France, Belgium and all the other member states to honour their obligations i.e. render aid and assistance by all means in their power. If push came to shove could we really rely on our allies, could you see the Bundeswehr sailing south?
So whilst we must recognise our obligations to allies we also have to be pragmatic.
Solomon, glad to see you have taken a break from Ares bashing!
By concentrating on ‘go to capabilities’ to the detriment of everything else leaves us unable to embark on sovereign operations. This is a dangerous place for a UN SC member to be, especially given my comment to Sven about our partners in the EU and this also applies to the US, so we must retain a rounded capability even if it is relatively small in comparison because the likelihood of us needing anything both that capable AND large is remote. This is why I favour retaining a well rounded and capable force as a central core, even if it is relatively small. Building out from this then yes, we cannot just duplicate this strong core but must concentrate on certain capabilities in which we excel and exert strategic influence by being the preferred partner in a coalition for this type of capability, whatever that might be. This might be airborne operations, out of area projection, ISR or even field catering for that matter.
So whilst I accept that it is a compromise and not particularly neat, the real world isn’t neat either.
Great to hear from you all on this, I thought we hadn’t actually resolved this so it was another another post before moving onto the LAND component of our soirée into the FDR.
I guess we probably won’t agree fully but hey, it’s my trainset
“But what happens after the early entry, who will be there to continue stabilisation operations after we have kicked the front doors in, this position assumes they will be available.”
“No Quarter, No Mercy, No Compromise” is an utterly insane mode of warfare that only came back into existence for the second world war, and only applied to Germany even then.
Ideally, the UK will be acting as part of a broad coalition that, following us kicking the doors down and holding the porch will allow our continental neighbours who need land armies as a defence against invasion can take charge.
But if they cant, that’s fine.
We need to go back further and ask, what is war for?
We go to war to make a foreign people act as we command them to.
One of of doing that is to destroy their government and replace it with direct rule by our own, another is to destroy their government and replace it with a puppet state.
But by far the most common and sensible for the UK acting alone would be to defeat their forces and battle and order their government to act as we command, with threat of further viol;ence if they do not comply
We don’t need to destroy The Taliban, only impress upon them the folly of aiding and abetting those who would dare challenge our wrath.
We didn’t need to destroy Sadams Government, I recall being asked some time ago
“Could we have just seized Basra and left?”
Yes, emphatically so, we could seize a significant asset and refuse to return it until the government agrees to meet our demands.
With a strategic raiding force, we can still contribute to a coalition, we just cant contribute large numbers of men for a long time, but we could contribute something much more valuable, an effective first wave and on site overwhelming airpower.
“I also can’t help thinking that supporters of a strong navy and by definition a navy with CVF, tend to decide on the outcome and then set to work making a strategic justification for the option that secures it.”
I think I would most likely fall into that category if I had it my way the UK would have by far and away the second most powerful navy in the North Atlantic area behind the United States. Perhaps even the most powerful as the US shifts it naval power into the Pacific to counter what some see a threat from a growing China. We would almost always be amongst the top Global Naval powers even once the large developing nations such as China, India, Brazil and maybe Russia build their naval forces. Naturally we would probably maintain a smaller Army than either France or Germany but still a large enough force to defend our interests and take part in GW1 scenarios. I would still have a balanced force all things considered with a powerful Air force and Army alongside a large capable and powerful navy to provide a reasonable balance not just an all powerful Navy. However the definition of a balanced force depends upon whom you ask so it’s rather fluid and open to interpretation what I think is balanced many will not. Traditionally we have always had a large powerful navy just as Germany has generally had a large powerful and capable Army. Surely it must make sense we are still an Island Nation are we not? that is unless thousands of years of history and geography have suddenly been undone essentially overnight.
However if the world were a different place then I would be quite happy with a home defence force albeit one that would give even the largest of powers a bloody good fight if they had a go. A scaled up improved Sweden would have been an example had the Soviets decided to have a shot at invading them.
Sven I don’t agree with what you have said yes we have obligation to NATO so does everyone else as for the EU I’m not a big fan of it and would rather defence cooperation was principally through NATO. Which does include the major European Union military powers if they left NATO things would of course be much different however NATO includes the US and the EU naturally excludes them. So until someone replaces the US as the Worlds and the Western world’s largest military power it in my view makes sense to be close friends. As Admin kind of said Treaties are bits of paper it’s unwise to trust people’s commitment to them when the cards are down so look after numero uno first and foremost.
Onto Dominic’s comment, I agree largely with what you have said and my disagreements if they can be called that are mostly nitpicking so I won’t nitpick this time at least. I wonder what Jed will have to say when he reappears as well as other folk especially any lurkers out there, Hello
My UK Orbat may be a bit dated, but when shuffled it would look like something like this:
1 JRRF (Div), with 16th AASLT Bde combined with 3rd Cdo Bde.
- RRF force, early entry and reinforcement only.
1st RDF Div, with 3 identical brigades, the ‘mech’ part of an early entry force. Following UDP-136, following a 6-month Train, deploy, reset cycle.
Each Bde (~3,000 troops);
1 Arm Recce Bn (FRES) - ISTAR and mech cavalry roles
1 Mech Inf Bn (FRES) - wheeled armored
1 Inf Bn - provides the Bde with an organic mobile force with limited AASLT capability.
Plus CS and CSS elements.
3rd AR Div, with 5 identical Bdes, following FORM-rotation (UDP-156).
Each AR Bde (~5,000 troops);
2 AR BGs – each Battlegroup 2 Challenger Sqns (Coy), 2 Warrior Sqns
1 Inf Bn – limited AASLT capable (1/3).
Plus CS and CSS elements.
This would roughly translate into a permanently deployable force of:
1 Light Bde, either 16AASLT or 3CDO,
1 Mech Bde, from 1st “RDF Div”,
1 AR Bde, from 3rd AR,
plus 1 AR Bde available from the FORM-pool for planned deployments.
This force could be doubled, and theoretically tripled if necessary as long as rotational schedules would allow it.
Meaning, both ‘Global Guardian’, ‘Strategic Raiding’ AND ‘Contributory’ options would be possible simultaneously.
Just my ramblings.
OK, then the long form.
I am convinced that no modern military has been great both at small wars and at great wars at once. In fact, most are rather poor in both instead.
To concentrate on small wars, intervention, force protection on distant continents and such does thus imply to me that you neglect the real purpose of military might: The deterrence/defence against hostile military might.
Then add that I am strictly convinced that overseas adventures of the military kind are stupid nonsense. Even owning colonies did little good to the homelands of colonial powers. Meddling in other’s domestic affairs has even less chance to pay off.
I could write about this for pages, so let’s just sum it up as “Overseas adventures are a waste.”
Overseas adventures are also highly dangerous for the homeland. You stumble into unnecessary conflicts and your forces get occupied with small wars and neglect great war readiness.
Now the intended knock-out blow:
Tell me about ANY factual, hard advantage gained by the UK during the post-Cold War phase from military actions outside of Europe other than exercises.
Next, compare this to the costs – KIA, WIA, social, fiscal, economical – that incurred directly and indirectly due to this extrovert behaviour.
Needless wars are almost always the inferior choice that worsens the situation. Expeditionary forces are accordingly a waste of wealth, life, health and attention.
@admin:
Sometimes not to rattle the sabres in support of an ally is a good favour. Think of Germany and Austria-Hungary Summer 1914. To keep a conflict below the threshold is a better friend service than to be brothers in arms.
By the way; any defence review should take into account that we need to re-think even our approach to conventional warfare. We’re in a situation not unlike the one of the 1900′s. We had no Great War for decades, huge military technology advances and only small advances in military theory. We should better invest our attention and brainpower into getting ready for modern high-end warfare instead of wasting our attention on how to deal with 1% capability opponents such as the TB.
The only useful reforms of Western military establishments at the time are cost-saving and expeditionary capability-cutting ones. The really big reforms and big modernisation plans for conventional warfare would be blind efforts until we learn to understand modern conventional warfare (instead of the Frankenstein’s idea of war from WW2, Near East, desert warfare and small wars).
“Overseas adventures are a waste.”
Interesting point. It is my firm belief that in this globalized world, any and all ‘adventures’ will – by definition – be overseas.
Public opinion, natural disasters, energy resources, famine but also freedom of movement (piracy) can all call for a military intervention, even if none of these many reasons are an immediate threat to the homeland.
One needs expeditionary forces for dealing with these, and I think that the UK – and the West in general – should focus primarily on these deployable forces and not create some ‘national guard’ for territorial defense only.
If the discussion is about how does the UK remain a power and what would allies look to it for then in my view it’s simple – Option 2.Strategic Raiding all the way.
If you are a country looking for allies to bring something to the table then the UK as a strong naval power could play a PRIMARY role in an alliance, and would still have the capability to give anyone a bloody nose anywhere in the world.
Global Guardian in my opinion simply replicates the ability of other potential allies and means in their eyes you bring less to the table. It also limits the UK’s power when it comes to the diplomacy of carrot and stick should we have to fight alone. It leaves us with very little stick to wield.
Global Guardian leaves us unable to project power unless it is with others. I also fear it leaves us with forces that given our experience in Afghanistan no British government would easily commit to any overseas national building.
The last sentence should read – ‘would NOT easily commit to any nation building’
Delighted I am having some useful input on the debate, my thanks to TD.
I agree that there is some room for compromise around the stark doctrines provided by RUSI, and i believe it is because they work under the assumption of keeping a strategic deterrent.
If you treat the deterrent as just another strategic capability that provides political advantage via military means, then it is possible weigh its merit, find it lacking, and look to another capability in its stead.
That is pretty much what i attempted to do in my most recent defence article:
http://jedibeeftrix.wordpress.com/2010/04/01/britain%E2%80%99s-future-strategic-direction-5-%E2%80%93-cant-we-just-fudge-things-and-hope-for-the-best/
Where I also suggest a mix of Global-Guardian and Contributory doctrines as a potential route to follow.
It does appear that TD’s focus on this issue of realistic capability is crystallising, and the suggested route is perfectly viable.
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“Public opinion, natural disasters, energy resources, famine but also freedom of movement (piracy) can all call for a military intervention, even if none of these many reasons are an immediate threat to the homeland.”
@Marcase:
To send a navy against Somali pirates is completely inefficient. It’s a subsidy of shipping lines who evade our taxation anyway. They can solve the problem with armed African guards if they deem it necessary.
Public opinion – never heard of a more stupid reason for war. Such a public(ised) opinion is a symptom of either a too aggressive culture (this should be hanged, not supported) or of real interests (then no reason to consider the symptom separately).
Famine. Seriously, there’s absolutely no need for military action against famine. It would be totally cost-inefficient. Preventive development aid is a much, much better tool anyway.
Energy resources (or resources in general). I did a calculation around 2000 that had an interesting result: It would have been cheaper for the U.S. to accept oil supply shortages and accordingly high oil prices than to maintain presence in the Persian Gulf. The positive side-effect would have been that the nation would have spent some serious effort on saving energy during the past two decades. The related inevitable costs of increasing fuel efficiency are still in the future instead.
Look at PRC: It embarrasses the West with its successful strategy of securing ressources supply from Africa by business and development aid.
I don’t recall them having sent even a single warship to Africa. Their strategy must be working extremely well with civilian efforts only.
The West is on the wrong track with its emphasis on power projection as a political tool to solve troubles. The cost-efficiency is crap.
The cost of a single CVN plus its escorts could secure the supply of all industrially required renewable material resources (including wood) by buying or setting up plantations.
Instead, we buy the CVN and think that being the bully who can threaten and beat up others will give us whatever we need. Meanwhile, we get stretched to the military limits by occupying merely two countries with insufficient force density.
“Look at PRC: It embarrasses the West with its successful strategy of securing ressources supply from Africa by business and development aid.”
Thats an odd of way of saying “arming genocidal militias”
@ Sven
Yes, it IS inefficient to send a navy to counter Somali skiffs, but trade = economy and any threat to that is a *threat*. Defending the merchant SLOCs is also a raison d’etre of any navy.
Public opinion – she’s a fickle beast, and a public call to “do something” when a media frenzy reports about a genocide in some backwater country, may mobilize politicians hungry for election votes. And politicians run the country, and grunts just have to pack up and move out, wether we like it or not.
Famine – same thing. Military action may consist of aircraft, medical and logistics units protected by infantry providing emergency relief. See Haiti.
Energy – as long as the West in general remains dependent on fossil fuels it will remain our Achilles heel.
I totally agree that China’s approach is much more successfull. But we live in democracies, and our respective peoples have certain moral standards when dealing with unsavory regimes.
It will be at least another 25 years untill there will be a smidgen of a viable alternative.
Are *you* driving a Prius?
Cheers.
PS Have a good Easter all.
“Thats an odd of way of saying “arming genocidal militias””
You simplify too much.
Buying 3/4 of Tanzania’s sisal plantations is not related to militias, for example.
@Marcase: I’m driving a ’99 Corsa B and commute by rail. The Corsa’s practical fuel consumption is quite the same as for a Prius. It doesn’t take a 300 kg heavier hyped-up car to save fuel.
This discussion seems to have moved from a “I’d like to have because I like it” to a “is it an efficient answer to a problem?” attitude.
That’s what Western defence policy needs to do in general. Break the mold, think rationally.
Keep non-military answers to problems in mind. The military is a hammer, but not every problem is a nail.
sven
2 points slightly off the beaten track, one i just have to get off my chest.
i think you’ll find the two britons being held hostage at the moment don’t belong to a shipping line, yes they should have thought before sailing a yacht in known pirate waters, but they and others deserve protection, preferably from a well disciplined force.
Secondly, in regards to military forces and famine, I deployed to Rwanada in 1994 and it was chaos but thanks to canadian,australian and british forces it was quickly put back on it’s feet. the military “firm hand” (probably a better phrase than that can’t think of one)was needed I could many examples of the amazing feats by the medical,mechanical and construction arms of the forces but it would be too long and relevant to this thread. suffice to say 3 leading aid angencies said they wouldn’t have aceieved the success without us.
’nuff said!
“You simplify too much.
Buying 3/4 of Tanzania’s sisal plantations is not related to militias, for example.”
But supplying the rape camps in Zimbabwe is.
China just does what the European colonial powers did a few centuries ago, find a local partner who’ll trade for guns and open the flood gates.
Its moving on to the next stages in most places now, providing “advisors” and in some places, most noticeably Sudan, Chinese Soldiers protect Chinese Administrators who control a Chinese Workforce, with only a rubber stamp from the local government.
Now I’m not saying I disagree with their approach, indeed, I’ve pointed out many times that the embargoes that brought down apartheid south africa only work as long as someone else is chomping at the bit waiting to take your place, but characterising it as benign or new is simply false.
“..most noticeably Sudan…”
See, that’s the problem. You use the wrong media. Western media wants to report about Chinese activities in Africa, but only so with the added thrill factor of being able to accuse China of unethical behaviour. The result is no coverage on 90% of Chinese economic actions in Africa, much on Sudan.
The major Algerian infrastructure projects are being built by Chinese companies these days – with Chinese workers.
China became the strategic and economic partner of many (Arab and Black) African countries.
Again, not a single soldier is necessary to win this race.
No matter how much we spend on our military – it doesn’t impede the exclusive access policy of China a bit.
Investing in military power is an unsuccessful and wasteful approach to address raw material supply challenges.
Look at Germany in 1871-1914; its colonies were negligible, but it became a bigger industrial power at that time than Britain and France.
interesting report on COIN in afghanistan:
http://kingsofwar.org.uk/2010/04/coin-and-aid-if-you-build-it-they-will-come-actually-not-really/
Wow, take a break from the computer for easter and you guys are all over the place ! But it is unseasonably warm in Ontario, with temps in the mid 20′s C
Sven, I agree with much of what you say, but also disagree with a great deal of it. China is not acting altruistically in Africa, it needs resources and it is securing them, at the moment without directly using military force. Does not mean it won’t use force in the future, and it is sure building up its forces faster than anyone else at the moment.
However, for Britain, taking into account RUSI papers and the fact that we are talking about a Future Strategic Defence review, what are the priorities for the British military ?
The use of military force is, as the old saying espouses, the continuance of the diplomatic game by other means. So in the near to mid term future what major diplomatic problems may confront the UK as a member of the UN Security Council, a member of NATO and a Sovereign nation with all the rights and responsibilities that entails ?
Personally I don’t see Russia as a threat to NATO, nor at this time do I see the PRC as a possible conventional threat, although that may change over time. However I am neither a diplomat nor a professional intelligence analyst nor futurologist. Some threats which do spring to mind are international terrorism, energy security, cyber security and ‘homeland defence’ (securing possible targets in the UK from terrorist attack, and securing the UK’s borders).
Technically we might defend against the majority of these threats with strong intelligence / counter-intelligence and anti-terrorist capabilities, armed Border police and good Coast Guard. So perhaps the RN could become the coast guard, the rump of the army could provide homeland defence, and the RAF could be reduced to enough fighters to defend the UK airspace. BUT I don’t think any government, nor the UK populace would sign up for that. Also as others have noted, we have treaty obligations, to defend allies if they are attacked, so we need certain force levels to achieve that. Finally we probably want to ‘do our bit’ for the international community by providing ‘peace keepers’ and of course there is disaster response type tasking too.
As Sven said, we don’t really need to be a bully to secure access to resources, but some times it pays to “walk softly and carry a big stick” – conventional forces have a ‘deterrent effect’ too – not just nukes.
Also unless any of you have crystal balls, we have to remember and admit that currently unknown / unrecognized threats can arise or present themselves in short order, it has happened before.
So, having said all that, back to the question of what our strategy should be, in order to shape our land forces.
I disagree with Sven on this one, as I believe “expeditionary forces” for a ‘strategic raiding’ strategy do not automatically make us a bully hell bent on foreign adventures. Politically I don’t think any UK government is going to want to do nation building again any time soon, even if morally we might have thought long and hard about doing some of that in Zimbabwe if we had not been overstretched elsewhere ! (but then they have no oil).
As Admin has said, the RUSI options are all a bit black and white, so we can go for a slightly blended approach without resulting to the normal UK govt. “fudge”.
So, finally…… I believe our land forces should be shaped around ‘strategic raiding’ as the operational strategy / CONOPS (but not this strategy does NOT just mean amphib assault – we can ‘raid’ in many forms). We must also shape our forces for the standard homeland defence, military support to the civil power, and NATO obligations. Finally we must do this in light of at least a static and more likely a reduced budget. Indeed even I would not want to reduce the Army any further, BUT I would if I had to in order to properly fund the Navy. Other European allies, and the US have bigger armies than we ever had, or will have.
In the end, this long post is all just preamble, as I am not going to provide my suggested force structure until Admin has made more of his postings.
Finally – honest (!) if you are going to opine on the future of the Army, I suggest taking a look at this excellent resource for fairly up to date info on the current structures and force levels:
http://www.armedforces.co.uk/armyindex.htm
Happy Easter
The more I think about it the more I like the idea of moving towards a brigade combat team structured army as it would allow us to pursue a strategy suitable to a problem. Basically we are not closely tied into a single strategy for the Army at least as we could contribute a brigade to a nation building peacekeeping type thing. Or we could contribute a well equipped specialised brigade to a major operation so we are not as fixed into one option as some seem to think, it’s flexible enough.
However my preference for Strategic raiding is not just because I favour a much stronger naval capability but the simple plain fact that another nation building counterinsurgency is going to be politically suicidal. If you ask people, you know people who can vote, if they would want to get involved in another protracted war they would most likely say no but in a less polite manner
. What an overall strategy choice will affect is how force levels are split for instance Strategic Raiding is Naval and Air centric the others are less clear to me apart from Global Guardian which is Army centric. I would say that honestly Global Guardian is my least favourite for many reasons not least because in the real world it would be the least popular as well and unlikely to be favoured by politicians. Contributory is perhaps the most balanced as it’s not favouring any of the armed services above the other and would be open to wide interpretation but I would suggest it is not Army centric.
What Sven has been saying about military power not being cost effective I would suggest some of your insurance policies are not cost effective but hey ho they cover for the unexpected. As for energy etc I agree the UK should really move towards far better energy security but it’s very muddy and full of various factions. For a kick off I think the UK should have the capacity to store 90 days of peak natural gas demand alongside 90 days of fossil fuel demand as a national strategic reserve. Industry guidelines and requirements should also be changed to increase reserve supplies of energy these from what I can remember are lower than in other nations so we would not be being relatively tough. Furthermore I would push through new nuclear power stations although they are extremely unpopular they work and provide good sources of mass electricity generation. Nuclear power also has some benefits from an energy security point of view as the fuel lasts much longer and comes from allied nations. New and more efficient Coal powered generating stations would also be a better way forward than Gas which is imported as well as being dual use and better used for heating homes. Coal is also imported but we still mine Coal in this country and it is still available in quantity and could be got at with some incentive and it is not used as much for heating these days therefore not dual use.
If you’re wondering “What about renewable energy such as Wind Turbines?” Well I had you down as more intelligent than that.
If this nation was energy independent and we were much less of a throwaway consumerist society then yeah I would be reasonably content with a defensive military in the scope and form I mentioned.
What is the planned operational rotation for the six-brigade future army structure (next steps)?
i.e.
1x tasked abroad
1x high readiness
1x extended readiness
2x workup
1x recovery
cheers
“What is the planned operational rotation for the six-brigade future army structure (next steps)?”
Thats actualy quite hard to answer without going into a lot of detail about Brigade Structure, but I’ll try
1st Brigade as receiving/recovery, this would be the posting for those just out of basic training or for any companies that have been deployed to any sort of action, be it earthquake or war, and then anyone needing a break.
2nd Brigade would be a Garrison Brigade spread out over the Territories, this would also act as a Training Brigade, why do Cold Weather training in Norway when you could do it on South Georgia?
This would be company level training, maybe a few companies.
3rd Brigade would be ready to deploy, by which I mean they are in body armour, with weapons/ammunition and at the assault ships (or airport) with a few hours notice.
4th Brigade would be on extended readiness, as above but say a week delayed.
5th Brigade would be on extended training/large scale manouveres, if you need to enact a large tank battle in Germany or practice artillery fire in Canada, you’d be assigned to this brigade.
This would be Brigade or Multi Brigade level wargames rather than 8 blokes navigating across dartmoor.
6th Brigade would, like 4th, be on extended readiness.
I suppose you’d rotate 1, 4, 5, 2, 3, 6
You could probably name them so 1st was ready to deploy and 2 and 3 were on short term notice.
Since it should be possible to pull together most of a Brigade from people available in 1, 2 and 5, we’d have a rapid reaction brigade ready to go, two more Brigades ready to go in a week or two, and a fourth brigade ready to step in two weeks after them
Or is that just bonkers?
Dominic asks if his plan is just bonkers ?
Well at least this part is a little bit:
“why do Cold Weather training in Norway when you could do it on South Georgia?”
Mainly because it would take almost the entirety of the RN’s amphibious lift capability to get a whole Brigade to South Georgia ! Cost is an issue here remember – so you take one battalion to Norway, its way cheaper !!
That is another reason why we do things with Battalion size building blocks, not Brigade size, cost !
See I knew I couldnt end it there.
Brigades would be administrative formations rather than sleeping arrangements.
So although Second Brigade is Garrisoning the overseas Territories, it would be ABC Companies from 1st Batt 4th Inf Reg Actualy stood on the Falklands, and 1st Platoon B Company could be detached to monitor Georgia / Train for Winter Warfare
5th Brigade would handle training in large scale battles, and then yes, it would be both Battalions of 4th Inf Reg Along with 1st Armoured and 2nd and 3rd Mechanised who need moving, and Georgia would be a bad choice.
We’d keep Regiments as units you “belong” to, and Brigades would be Ad Hoc Formations built and broken as required
cheers guys, much obliged.
Dominic said: “Brigades would be administrative formations rather than sleeping arrangements.”
So in other words, no different at all from what the army does now then ? Divisions being the bigger admin units, Brigades being groupings of different types of battalion sized capabilities e.g. armour or armoured infantry, or mechanized infantry, that in combat are used to build Battle Groups of the size and shape required by the command.
Expansion to Jed reply
“Mainly because it would take almost the entirety of the RN’s amphibious lift capability to get a whole Brigade to South Georgia”
Thats actualy caused me some serious problems in designing my SR force.
With the increased budget of 3% GDP and the gutting of the army moving to 6 brigades would entail, I’m confident I could afford enough Helicopter Carriers to land a full Infantry Brigade in short order with armoured support landed by beach lander.
However, thats all I could afford, well, there would be a few extra ships, but nothing extensive
How do I then land Brigades Two and Three who are following a week behind.
Conventional Wisdom would be for the first Brigade to sieze a port and sail the STUFT into it.
But the thought of what an enemy section remaining undiscovered with a few dozen anti tank weapons could do to the Caribean Princess as it tried to dock doesnt bear thinking about.
The STUFT fleet could meet up with the Taskforce, but that throws up problems too.
A Navy Fleet protected by 12 T45′s with Harriers providing interceptor cover should be able to shrug off whatever enemy airforce survived the opening missile barrage and the first few days fighting, throw in a cruise liner or two, or four, and suddenly thats much less of a sure thing.
That leaves the option of the Helicopter carriers meeting the STUFT fleet in the deep ocean, but if we assume 12 hours out, 12 hours transfer time and then 12 hours back, thats 36 hours, and would need to be done twice, or half the force, four times taking 6 days.
But I’m reliant on my Helicopter Carriers to mount Harrier Interceptor Patrols, Apache Gunship Close Air Support and to provide resupply and battlefield mobility to the landed forces with Marlins and those giant CH53k things we were discussing a few months back.
Day 7-10 after first landing is not the time to cease resupply, close air support and mobility, and day 7-13 is not the time to cut it in half either.
I realise I’ve probably taken this thought experiment a bit far….
Probably not a huge change no, except Brigade would be the largest peace time admin, and divison would only come into being to fight a war.
Although its my understanding that current Brigades are fixed as to who is and isnt in it, for the most part, along with Brigades actualy.
But I could be wrong.
So in my idea, the 4th Brigade would always consist of an armoured battalion, 3 mechanised infantry battalions and 7 infantry battalions, but it wouldnt be the same battalions or even regiments month to month,
It might not even always consist of those types of battalions, although I suppose it would make sense if it did.
Then, in the event of it deploying, yeah, it would be subdivided into battlegroups of whatever size is appropriate, so B company, 2nd Battalion, 1st armoured regiment could be combine with C and D company 3rd Mechanised Regiment and be tasked with siezing a bridge.
delete south georgia insert anywere else!
Having spent a lovely 6 months down on the falklands (sept 99-feb 00 gee thanks)! It is a nightmare to get to (1300km from FI) it’s not that big (170km by 2-40Km) and there are a shedload of areas of special interest, you need a permit to fart!
Apart from that it’s all bob on!!
I might be bonkers in still planning on maintaining a 100,000 man army based around a Brigade Combat Team structure in other words support is part of each 5,000 man brigade. I was thinking along the lines of at least 12 active brigades split equally between heavy medium and light so at 5,000 men per brigade that is already 60,000 men. Then there would be an Airborne brigade alongside an aviation support brigade in other words the army air corps and then a medical brigade. That’s me up to 75,000 men and I’m sure the 25,000 needed to make up to 100,000 would disappear pretty quickly on other things such as the Admin and headquarters folk etc.
Is that bonkers well I don’t really know much about things so it may well be completely mad.
Dominic garrisoning the South Atlantic Isles other than the Falklands is a bit hair brained to be honest Norway is fine and there are experts there to learn unless Penguins count. Getting folk to Norway is of course much cheaper if it’s for inland training stick them on a commercial flight if Crab air is unavailable.
As for strategic raiding planning you’re not alone with the thinking about things I’ve planned my air force numbers for each aircraft and what my navy would be. Anyhow for a kick off if we went SR then I would get 4 Mistral class type ships built to be in service alongside the 2 Albion class and 4 bay class. Say shit hit’s the fan we need to do a raid 2 LPH’s, 2 Albion and 3 bay is what I would imagine might be available at anyone within a short time frame the others would be busy or something like that. Anyhow they should be able to carry a brigade sized force when in overload capacity alongside equipment the Point class would also be available to carry large amounts of equipment and possibly some men. They could either sail escorted into a captured port or transfer the cargo via mexeflote and landing craft either direct to the shore or to other ships depending upon the situation. So all the Military ships would essentially be wave 1 followed shortly by the point class as wave 2 and later still if needed wave 3 STUFT.
Also since this would be a major raid the RAF would be air lifting an airborne brigade into theatre depending on where that theatre is they may even get there first dropping in airborne forces if possible. There is also the possibility if we were doing a large raid like this we would not be alone even if it were allies providing some additional sea and airlift or simply looking scary such as a US CVBG.
you lot aren’t going to popular with the troops, they want to go to war in a cruise liner a la the QE2 like in ’82!!!
Paul G the problem is the QE2 was a liner (as you said) not a cruise ship, since you said liner I guess you know the difference between them and will know why cruise ships are probably not suitable.
I want a UAV base on SG to harrass shipping crossing south of africa….
Euan
You’d need 7 Invincible/Ocean/Canberra/San Carlos ect type ships to deploy an infantry brigade and provide ongoing support to them.
I’d also want 40 heavy helicopters and 16 Sea Harriers, and probably 16 Apaches, so your looking at 8-10 light carrier sized ships.
Its got to be funded from somewhere, and the only place I can see is the army payroll and its capital budget.
euan,
i’m ex pongo so they’re all boats to me! (flak jacket on standby standby)
Hey Dominic well the 2 Mistral class type ships would hold 900 blokes each in overload and each Albion would hold 700ish in overload coupled with 3 bay class holding 350 blokes. That by my math is 4,250 blokes and my Mistral class type ships are not Mistrals but something like them maybe with more berthing space. There would also be a bunch of Absalon type ships that could contribute in their own comparatively tiny way to the Raiding effort and each frigate and destroyer also has additional berthing. So all in all 5,000 blokes should be an achievable goal under warlike conditions and that is the bulk of the commissioned naval amphibious force allocated. Still available would be 2 additional Mistral class type ships which would come along later to relieve the 2 LPH’s that got their first. The point class would be my main logistics link supporting the landed force a couple of days after ‘D-day’ alongside some RFA tankers providing POL which could be pumped ashore for distribution. Ships taken up from trade would appear soon enough as well providing the bulk of the logistics effort after folks are ashore and it’s a safer environment they would carry food, fuel and anything needed.
Airpower would be provided by one of the CVF’s or possibly 2 depending on the scenario and possibly even the RAF if basing options would allow for them to be sensibly involved. Pre-planned targets would be LAM’ed to bits by the Silent Service and surface units reducing the need for carrier strikes. Each LPH would also be carrying around 18 helicopters so 36 so far, as well as each C2 frigate carrying 2 Merlin sized helicopters, still maybe a bit rotary light for some but adequate enough depending on role. The RAF as mentioned before would not be idle they would be busy with an air bridge to wherever carrying whatever they can and evacuating the critically wounded on the trip home.
I would also make the point that if we found it necessary to deploy the majority of our Naval and air power to deploy a brigade or two in force to kick somebody’s door in we would maybe not be alone. Chances are whoever owns the door is not a very nice person and for them to warrant a visit from us would probably warrant a visit from somebody else even if they are not fully entangled in the door kicking. For instance the US Navy might help LAM the heck out of anything that moves after all how do you know who launched the missile from a submarine when you can’t see the launch platform or the missile. There was a story about the Falklands whereby the Russians had a submarine down there before we did and spooked the Argies something terrible making them be extremely cautious beforehand. There would also be the chance of less covert help maybe we could persuade the Dutch to test the UK/NL landing force under real conditions or the USMC to get in on the Action with even a single MEU.
Paul a cruise liner or an Ocean liner is build for long open ocean voyages and usually has a high freeboard and sturdier construction they also carry large amounts fuel and food etc. They can also generally maintain higher sustained speeds and traditionally have less of the fancy malls and swimming pools etc. Cruise Ships are floating apartment complexes with all the frills like pools malls and various other things like theatres and rock climbing etc the voyage onboard is the purpose rather than a means of transport. Also when the weather gets rough cruise ships generally run and hide in a sheltered port not great when loaded with troops on the way to conflict although they generally avoid the weather using modern technology. You’ve been to the South Atlantic how was the weather? Nice and sunny with a calm tropical sea for a lovely cruise on a block of flats laid flat and made to float. Although I bet it would be fun or disappointing being told sorry you won’t be going to war today the sea is a little too rough we need to make port somewhere the bar will however be open.
Have a guess roughly how many proper reasonably modern Ocean liners there in service never mind possibly available to us to use if we needed to?
Euan
Technicaly, you are right.
However.
To my mind, relying on overload before the war starts is tempting fate a little to much.
If one of your ships suffers some sort of breakdown and requires a week in dry dock, or a month, theres no slack.
Theres also the problem that if your overloading your manning, you cant also overload on material, so your brigades entering a warzone with half its stocks on day one.
Airlifting in a large force would be nice, but we cant keep Afghanistan supplied by air, and thats a low intensity war where we own the air.
Trying to keep anyone supplied when the enemy still has a capable MANPADS threat and we’re fighting all out would require much more airlift than we have now.
Had forgotten about the carrier though, which should be able to provide aircover for the fleet, leaving the less numerous light carriers to concentrate on supply and CAS.
Euan and DominicJ – very interesting thought experiments, so I guess your coming round (coming back round, or always been a proponent of) a maritime centric defence strategy ?
2 Mistral’s to replace Ocean would make sense, but to increase troop capacity for Amphib ops just add two cheap Bay Class derivatives without the cargo parking area forward of the flight deck, but with bigger super-structure like NL and Spanish versions, should get you a full 850 – 900 berths without being too cramped.
However on Brigades versus Divisions and other such Army matters, I urge you to take a look at:
http://www.armedforces.co.uk/armyindex.htm
For a good overview of how things are structured today, which can provide a sound basis for your thought experiments
I’ve always been a proponent of a maritime centric defence strategy a bit like the good old days “He who controls the sea Controls Everything” Themistocles. Maybe not quite completely true but most of the Global powers and powers that have shaped history have been very strong in the naval arena just look at our own history. The UK would be known militarily first and foremost as a naval power especially in Europe where we would be by far the largest naval power although we would still have a respectable army and air force. I’m saying largest naval power in Europe but maybe not to the extent of being a slightly modified two power standard for the European geographical area but it would be close. Essentially a Royal Navy bigger than the Marine Nationale and Armada Española combined, yes they just happen to be the same nations that went toe to toe with the RN at the Battle of Trafalgar. I’m not crazy I swear
I would also add I would still have a well equipped and Armed ‘Coastguard’ for protecting and patrolling the EEZ as well as undertaking SAR roles out as far as possible to 30 West. How this would be funded is simply by drawing together all the fractured roles in this area such as Customs and Border control etc. Basically the RN would be relieved of it’s domestic fisheries duties etc and concentrate on being an armed service securing and monitoring British Interests worldwide.
Thanks Jed additional Bay class vessels with the expanded superstructure would allow for more manpower to be transported also RFA’s will naturally have space on board as well for carrying additional people. Especially since these ships could be funded outside of the main defence and naval budget with additional Hospital facilities etc as we discussed before for all the Humanitarian work. Dominic you have a point relying upon overload capacity is maybe not entirely a wise thing to do however a War is a War and it would have started if we were loading up ships to do a major raid on somebody. There would still be the additional LPH’s which would be returning from routine deployments and exercises to join the action alongside that additional bay class unaccounted for so far. Why did I not include them in the first place simply because I doubt we would have them all available unless we had a few weeks to prepare and get them home ensure they are ready to load up and sail. The point class would be the main equipment carriers and the amphibious ships would still be able to carry a fair amount of equipment as overload I think does not take up vehicle deck space. Also since it is a real operation the Flight decks would also be used as a parking space for vehicles and some of the landing craft would also be preloaded with equipment everything would be packed in. It would be Falklands like throwing the golf clubs overboard and unloading ceremonial decorations and gym equipment getting the ships ready for war rather than a peacetime training cruise.
Airlift admittedly is a different ball game but it would play an essential role depending on where we are headed and my fantasy RAF relies upon A400M’s and a much larger number of A330’s all with DAS. Afghanistan is a bit different as there is not a massive naval force dumping thousands of tons of equipment and supplies onto a secured landing area providing the majority of the logistic support. Flying would also be at surge levels as it would be a relatively short period compared to a decade long Afghan counterinsurgency coupled for a period with Iraq as well still drawing logistics resources. Also yeah naturally I’m all for the 2 CVF although I think UKIP is a little beyond even me by essentially saying 3 please and 200 F-35 to go with them but I do want 4 LPH’s and they want 2 Invincible class maintained. The CVF would mainly be responsible for providing air defence and CAS although it would be supplemented by Apache gunships and plenty of NGFS and land based artillery for CAS. Strike would mainly be fulfilled as mentioned before by surface units and the silent service LAM’ing the heck out of things like airfields etc although carrier air power could deploy Storm Shadow. The RAF might also be in with the Strike game using Eurofighter supported by A330’s depending where in the world all this might be going down, heck Nimrod loaded with Storm Shadow should be able to get anywhere.
Maritime centric by need rther than proclivity
I’d have been an airforce man before reading here.
If you want to project power, I know of no way except nuclear bombers, which we wont use, and a navy task force.
ED: THIS IS A COMMENT THAT I THINK WAS POSTED TO THE WRONG ARTICLE BY RICHARD W, HOWEVER, I HAVE LEFT THE ORIGINAL IN PLACE JUST IN CASE
No, sorry, Michael Codner’s paper (FDR article 3 April) doesn’t get me any closer to a view on the shape of Britain’s forces post FDR.
Away from the abstract, I suspect some more pragmatic issues will have a bearing on the outcome:
- Firstly, what view might be taken of the expected financial constraints. Undoubtedly a period of austerity is to come but is this a short term thing that might last as long as it takes to make a decent dent in the budget deficit incurred bailing out the Banks and then return to a level we are accustomed to, or is it to be viewed as a permanent feature where a future return to posterity will not be shared with defence?
- Cost. Britain is a high cost place to purchase resources. It is obvious to note that a million pounds spent in Britain would probably add, say for example, 20 soldiers to the army whereas a million pounds spent by China would add several hundred. Is then, defence going to be measured in terms of cost input (which would suggest Britain already has one of the largest forces in the world) or outputs which indicate a much lower level of capability. Britain has willingly purchased air defence destroyers and helicopters locally at above market prices. Will the new tankers for the RFA be purchased from Korea at world competitive commercial rates or built in Britain at greater cost.
To what extent is Britain prepared to go offshore to equip its forces?
- Cost saving. What can, practically, be saved from current defence structure without diminishing operational capability – do we, for example, need 80,000 civil servants in the MoD? Do we need two bases in Cyprus? Does the RAF need all the bases it has?
- The often quoted shortfall in current funding, 36 billion pounds, contains a good chunk, 20 billion pounds, to replace Trident. What then is spent on the nuclear deterrent, and equally when it is spent, will majorly impact funding requirements over the term of the FDR.
- If the FDR starts with the question of what Britain specifically wishes to do may well lead to a hybrid of capabilities that don’t fall under any one of Michael Codner’s categories, and would not be irrational for doing that. If for example the FDR supports the wish to defend Britain’s overseas territories that would imply the requirement of maritime expeditionary capability. But the capability to wrestle back the Falklands from the Argentineans doesn’t mean Britain is specifically signing up to full Global Guardian status, it just means it is providing for its unique requirements.
- A committee of MPs has finally said what has been obvious since the British Prime Minister was first described as a Poodle – that the relationship with the USA is no longer a ‘special relationship’. Therefore the long held assumption that any international operation would allow Britain to rely on the USA providing the heavy lifting to Britain’s benefit, is no longer a valid planning assumption.
However, these thoughts are all abstract as well.
What you will get will depend on the party leading the government at the time of the FDR.
Neither main party has promised to ring fence the defence budget:
If Gordon Brown is re-elected, then the future is clear – it will be more of the same. Gordon is no friend of the military and has shown himself happy to inflict surreptitious cuts to defence funding, reducing programs and mothballing assets. His cut of the helicopter budget in 2004 has come back to haunt him so he has responded with his familiar tactic of assuaging the newspaper headlines by championing a raft of other initiatives facing down criticism from a more cautious Opposition. With this, perversely, the person least disposed to the proper funding of Britain’s defences is promising the most – a full replacement of Trident, to press ahead with the two carriers, purchase of the JSF, a guarantee not to reduce the size of the army, additional helicopters and an apparent step towards a new fleet of warships, the T26. Although personally the supposed four year design phase of the T26 looks too much like a device to defer any real costs until either the cost doesn’t matter or he can cancel it without fear of the electorate.
That unkind thought aside, he will certainly follow through all of the initiatives he has personally endorsed, but everything else is at risk of being cut once the unavoidable need to make real savings takes precedence. Moreover, noting the pointed comment in the Green Paper that the future includes striking new alliances to meet defence needs, we will not be too surprised if for example after the FDR there is an announcement of some understanding with France to, say, jointly police the North Sea, which eventually leads to the perfectly reasonable assessment that the navy no longer needs quite so many ships!
The Conservatives have avoided saying anything specific other than that they would provide anything required for Afghanistan. They have made mumblings about wanting to be in the first division of military powers, suggested that the navy be deployed to safe guard shipments of oil and gas, suggested that the size of the infantry be increased, and to pay for it have demanded a reduction of 10,000 MoD civil service places and finding a cheaper nuclear deterrent. More telling than their sparse comments on defence is George Osborne’s centrepiece policy of near manic determination to reduce government deficit. This together with their silence on the whole subject of defence funding suggests heavy cuts are on their agenda.
Accepting that some levels of cuts are inevitable with the Conservatives the FDR could go two ways. One may be your traditional whitewash where there is suddenly a benevolent view of the world with the result that cuts can, they say, be safely made, balanced eventually they hope by some cleaning up of the MoD’s profligate tendency to waste. Or it could be a more honest review that will admit a desire for genuinely adequate capabilities in the longer term, but with a nod to the financial situation, make a pact with the defence establishment to curtail spending in the near term with a guarantee to return to normal funding after three or four years.
The Liberal Democrats will not lead the government after the election. In terms of conventional forces they perhaps have the most honest assessment of force requirements and an FDR with their fingerprints on it may not be a bad thing – except that if they have their way it would be at the price of surrendering the nuclear deterrent. Perhaps then the best outcome of the election for defence would be a hung parliament with the Conservatives governing at the whim of the Liberal Democrats.
Richard W thanks for the comment and Admin thanks for moving it as I agree it fits in better here. Also thanks for spacing it out a bit makes it much easier to read.
-In response to your first point I suppose it really depends how much the current Conservatives still represent the traditional Conservative voter the people who favour a strong nation with strong armed forces. If they are indeed a modern Tory party then who knows but old Tories are usually more friendly to defence than Labour mind you thanks to the current bunch I doubt they could be much worse. One thing people seem to forget about the bank bailouts is that the Government basically owns the shares in the banks which they can then sell later so that money is not totally lost. If by some miracle the Government has the sense to hold onto them and sell them slowly they could recover the money and possibly even make a profit although that is extremely unlikely.
-One thing that always seems to drive me up the wall is when people say we have this massive defence budget when we don’t really in many ways we only spend 2.2% of GDP. This is at a time when Government spending apparently counts for over 50% of GDP 52% of GDP if I remember correctly. Generally budgets are compared in US Dollars and exchange rates fluctuate also we don’t buy things in Dollars we buy things in pounds generally from UK companies. People seem to forget that and that is what really annoys me quite a lot. As for the RFA tankers they really should be bought from Korea as the cost should be multiple times lower than if they were built here in the United Kingdom allowing for savings or more hulls.
-Cost savings well I’ve said it before that I don’t think we need anything like 80,000 civil servants just for the MoD alone, it’s excessive and expensive. Do we need 2 bases in Cyprus well that is not really an easy one as Akrotiri is an RAF Airfield and the Army have facilities all over the place. There is the ex- RAF Troodos radar and communications site further inland in the mountains so there are things all over the place not just 2 bases and all of them have a purpose. I personally am in favour of maintaining the presence on the Island of Cyprus as it is an essential stepping stone for deploying forces abroad and excellent training in good weather.
-Does the RAF need all its bases perhaps not but there are only 14 main RAF flying stations left so how many can we really close and would it be worth it? Not much money in the scheme of things.
-People have already mentioned that the best route would most likely be a fudge of the various options proposed in the report for even I’m not completely sold on Strategic Raiding but a slight mix.
-The Prime Minister is a Poodle the last person with a backbone was Maggie Thatcher who some hate and some like but most agree she was ruthless and had that backbone.
-The reason I see for the relationship problems with the US is more to do with the problem of the EU we are literally in the middle and we need to decide what we want to do as a nation. My preference is to ditch the United States of Europe and essentially do what Norway does quite successfully which is work closely with the EU without being ruled by the bureaucracy.
-If Gordon Brown and Labour get re-elected then this nations electorate is even denser than a lump of rock we will be doomed, doomed I tell ye.
Mind you Labour should have bought enough votes with the astronomical expansion of the public sector and social engineering projects.
In the wider money scheme of things ring fencing is stupid as the Public sector is full of immense amounts of waste and inefficiency which really need a short sharp shock to awake those slumbering. Everything should take its share of the pain including the NHS, Social Security etc the so called sacred cows and especially the gold plated pensions and benefits of the top civil servants time to come into the real world. Fiscal prudence should again be the main order of the day for a very long time until we are back on solid financial bedrock rather than sitting atop an unstable mountain of debt unwilling to do anything. For defence in particular I for one like the idea of agreeing on a plan with the MoD to maybe accept a cut in budget for the next 3 years while also pulling out of Afghanistan or declaring victory and leaving. That single act should save quite a bit of money and save other areas of the defence budget from getting the axe and coupled with MoD civil servant numbers being slashed we have a plan.