Having another read through the most recent Parliamentary Defence Select Committee report what struck me was the use of language, it paints a bleak picture of incompetence and arrogance, inability to learn from mistakes and self evidently treating the scrutiny role of the committee with total contempt.
Has it always been the same, is it the over politicalisation of government departments or is the corrosive effect of simply not enough money?
Alternatively, despite through life capability management, smart acquisition, intelligent customers, PRINCE2 and fast track graduates, are the MoD really are as bad as everyone thinks?
Here are some selected quotes from the reports introduction;
The ability of DE&S to deliver the equipment programme is overshadowed by the existence of a funding gap which the NAO estimates could be as much as £36 billion over the next ten years. The evidence we have received indicates that the MoD’s responses to our questions about the funding gap in our Defence Equipment 2009 inquiry were at best confused and unhelpful and at worst deliberately obstructive.
Over the years we have highlighted the need for key skills in acquisition and procurement, and have received reassurances from the MoD that appropriate training programmes were in place. However, we are unconvinced that DE&S has a properly effective strategy for the training and education of its staff, and believe that it has failed to prioritise this issue.
There has clearly been a change of direction with the armoured vehicle strategy, although it is not evident whether this is just a change of priorities and programme name, or whether there has also been a more fundamental shift in strategy. It is also unclear whether the change in direction is purely a result of the funding gap, or whether it is because of a considered analysis that the original concept is no longer appropriate. We have tried on many occasions in the past to elicit details about FRES from the MoD without ever receiving clear answers. We conclude, with regret, that the MoD has none to give
With regard to the FRES programme, we received no evidence of any systematic attempt by the MoD to understand the reasons for past mistakes or to consider how they could be avoided in the future
The A400M submission for Main Gate approval did not appear to incorporate the lessons of earlier multi-national projects and we ask the MoD to explain why not. The MoD should provide to us by the end of September 2010 a written evaluation of the lessons learned from the A400M experience which will establish the most effective basis for future collaborative projects.
The original announcement indicated that the carrier schedule had been delayed in order to bring it into line with the schedule for the Joint Strike Fighters. The Minister for Defence Equipment and Support has now confirmed that the decision was also driven by a need to make short term savings in the equipment programme. We also note that there still appear to be outstanding issues concerning technology transfer for the JSF, which are of key importance to the success of the programme. The MoD should provide us with details of its carrier transition programme when it is complete, highlighting any areas where there is a risk of a capability gap
Although the MARS programme is in danger of overtaking FRES as the longest running programme failing to deliver any equipment
We are not convinced by the MoD’s explanation that the reduction in the required number of Type 45s from twelve to eight and then eight to six was due to a better understanding of the capabilities of the ship. Any one ship can only be in one place at a time. Whilst new technology may well have provided some better than expected capabilities, the spiralling costs of the ship and the pressure on the equipment programme budget suggest that the reduction in numbers was in fact primarily down to affordability. The misleading explanations provided by the MoD in this case are another example of the unhelpful nature of MoD responses to our questions.
The MoD did not send us a copy of its Future Rotary Wing Strategy Statement until after the start of our oral evidence session with the Minister for Defence Equipment and Support, despite having previously briefed the press and circulated the announcement in public. It is unacceptable for a Departmental Select Committee to be the last to receive a Department’s announcement.
We remain unconvinced of the financial or operational merits of the Puma Life Extension Programme. We believe that the MoD has underestimated the technical and operational challenges of the Puma programme, and that there is insufficient evidence to support the MoD’s assurances of the crashworthiness and the likely delivery dates of the updated aircraft.
During our Helicopter Capability inquiry we expressed concern that commanders in the field were hampered by a lack of helicopters but the MoD would not accept that its helicopter fleet size was too small.
The evidence suggests that at the time that MoD witnesses gave evidence to our Defence Equipment 2009 inquiry, the MoD was in the process of taking steps to manage a funding gap of £21 billion. Witness denials at that time of the existence of such a gap now appear disingenuous. The Minister for Defence Equipment and Support told us he could not provide any information about how the gap was reduced to £6 billion, nor the proportion of expenditure which was merely postponed beyond the planning period. When we pressed in writing for further details, the MoD provided little extra information. We reject the MoD’s arguments for refusing to disclose the measures it took in order to reduce the funding gap to £6 billion. We cannot fulfil our scrutiny role if the MoD refuses to provide such information about its activities.
According to the NAO, in recent planning rounds the MoD’s strategy for managing its unaffordable equipment plan has been to re-profile expenditure by delaying projects so as to reduce costs in the early years of the plan. However this practice increases overall procurement costs and represents poor value for money. It is clear from NAO data that the 2008–09 re-profiling exercise added £733million to the future costs of the core equipment programme.
The Gray report estimates that the ‘frictional costs’ of delays within the equipment programme are in the range £900m to £2.2 billion a year. Although some of the DE&S witnesses did not accept these estimates, they were unable to provide alternative figures. The MoD is spending hundreds of millions of pounds a year on unproductive activities because it has commissioned more work than it can afford to pay for. It is shocking that the MoD has apparently made no attempt to calculate the extent of such costs and that it has therefore taken decisions to delay projects without understanding the full financial implications.
We are sceptical about the implication that the MoD can balance cuts in its own research budget by making greater use of civil research and ask the MoD to explain its proposals for doing this
Over the years we have highlighted the need for key skills in acquisition and procurement, and have received reassurances from the MoD that appropriate training programmes were in place. However, we are unconvinced that DE&S has a properly effective strategy for the training and education of its staff, and believe that it has failed to prioritise this issue.
The ability of DE&S to deliver the equipment programme is overshadowed by the existence of a funding gap which the NAO estimates could be as much as £36 billion over the next ten years. The evidence we have received indicates that the MoD’s responses to our questions about the funding gap in our Defence Equipment 2009 inquiry were at best confused and unhelpful and at worst deliberately obstructive.
There has clearly been a change of direction with the armoured vehicle strategy, although it is not evident whether this is just a change of priorities and programme name, or whether there has also been a more fundamental shift in strategy. It is also unclear whether the change in direction is purely a result of the funding gap, or whether it is because of a considered analysis that the original concept is no longer appropriate. We have tried on many occasions in the past to elicit details about FRES from the MoD without ever receiving clear answers. We conclude, with regret, that the MoD has none to give
With regard to the FRES programme, we received no evidence of any systematic attempt by the MoD to understand the reasons for past mistakes or to consider how they could be avoided in the future
The A400M submission for Main Gate approval did not appear to incorporate the lessons of earlier multi-national projects and we ask the MoD to explain why not. The MoD should provide to us by the end of September 2010 a written evaluation of the lessons learned from the A400M experience which will establish the most effective basis for future collaborative projects.
The original announcement indicated that the carrier schedule had been delayed in order to bring it into line with the schedule for the Joint Strike Fighters. The Minister for Defence Equipment and Support has now confirmed that the decision was also driven by a need to make short term savings in the equipment programme. We also note that there still appear to be outstanding issues concerning technology transfer for the JSF, which are of key importance to the success of the programme. The MoD should provide us with details of its carrier transition programme when it is complete, highlighting any areas where there is a risk of a capability gap
Although the MARS programme is in danger of overtaking FRES as the longest running programme failing to deliver any equipment
We are not convinced by the MoD’s explanation that the reduction in the required number of Type 45s from twelve to eight and then eight to six was due to a better understanding of the capabilities of the ship. Any one ship can only be in one place at a time. Whilst new technology may well have provided some better than expected capabilities, the spiralling costs of the ship and the pressure on the equipment programme budget suggest that the reduction in numbers was in fact primarily down to affordability. The misleading explanations provided by the MoD in this case are another example of the unhelpful nature of MoD responses to our questions.
The MoD did not send us a copy of its Future Rotary Wing Strategy Statement until after the start of our oral evidence session with the Minister for Defence Equipment and Support, despite having previously briefed the press and circulated the announcement in public. It is unacceptable for a Departmental Select Committee to be the last to receive a Department’s announcement.
We remain unconvinced of the financial or operational merits of the Puma Life Extension Programme. We believe that the MoD has underestimated the technicaland operational challenges of the Puma programme, and that there is insufficient evidence to support the MoD’s assurances of the crashworthiness and the likely delivery dates of the updated aircraft.
During our Helicopter Capability inquiry we expressed concern that commanders in the field were hampered by a lack of helicopters but the MoD would not accept that its helicopter fleet size was too small.
The evidence suggests that at the time that MoD witnesses gave evidence to our Defence Equipment 2009 inquiry, the MoD was in the process of taking steps tomanage a funding gap of £21 billion. Witness denials at that time of the existence of such a gap now appear disingenuous. The Minister for Defence Equipment and Support told us he could not provide any information about how the gap was reduced to £6 billion, nor the proportion of expenditure which was merelypostponed beyond the planning period. When we pressed in writing for further details, the MoD provided little extra information. We reject the MoD’s argumentsfor refusing to disclose the measures it took in order to reduce the funding gap to £6 billion. We cannot fulfil our scrutiny role if the MoD refuses to provide such information about its activities.
According to the NAO, in recent planning rounds the MoD’s strategy for managing its unaffordable equipment plan has been to re-profile expenditure by delayingprojects so as to reduce costs in the early years of the plan. However this practice increases overall procurement costs and represents poor value for money. It is clear from NAO data that the 2008–09 re-profiling exercise added £733million to the future costs of the core equipment programme.
The Gray report estimates that the ‘frictional costs’ of delays within the equipment programme are in the range £900m to £2.2 billion a year. Although some of the DE&S witnesses did not accept these estimates, they were unable to provide alternative figures. The MoD is spending hundreds of millions of pounds a year on unproductive activities because it has commissioned more work than it can afford to pay for. It is shocking that the MoD has apparently made no attempt to calculate the extent of such costs and that it has therefore taken decisions to delay projects without understanding the full financial implications.
We are sceptical about the implication that the MoD can balance cuts in its own research budget by making greater use of civil research and ask the MoD to explain its proposals for doing this
Isn’t it depressing…
Given the amount of cock-ups attributable to the MOD, its pretty easy to find fault. There’s got to be a list of things the MOD is good at, if only by accident.
Challenge: Find something positive to say about the MOD or MOD procurement.
My suggestion would be ‘C Vehicle PFI’. Providing the latest construction plant and equipment in a serviceable condition.
I’ve now got my fingers crossed hoping someone doesn’t comment that the whole project is actually nothing more than a badly organised clusterf***!
Sorry Richard, I think you will find lots wrong with ALC, mainly the cost burden on the MoD of having to hand over huge quantities of kit in pristine condition, complete with extremely expensive overhauls, to ALC. Which ALC promptly disposed of!
Then if a unit wants to have a bit of plant for any length of time it has to have it effectively on permanent hire so is responsible for all consumables, tyres and maintenance, again at its, not the PFI’s cost.
Kit crossing the length and breadth of the UK from it depots
The burden often falls on the receiving unit which means they use ALC less and less.
Sorry Richard, back to the drawing board
Unless there is evidence to the contrary, which we certainly don’t seem to see anywhere, it appears the MoD is in denial of its failings, and even being obstructive towards its civil political oversight.
Bureaucracy gone mad ? Safe job for senior civil servants ?? Perhaps we need to dwell a few marching paces, reduce the tempo of ops, withdraw from AF theatre and stop all procurement – and then start again ! Call it the Ministry of National Defence (MND) and put everyone, from the top down on 6 month / 1 year probation – get someone in from the ‘Dragons Den’ to run procurement !!!!
I you what is really depressing about this. They know that they are doing things wrong but nobody has the power to change it. How many damming reports muct have about the MoD,but nothing….nothing changes.
We all know that PFI’s are a disaster but they keep on signing them. More bad news reported in Janes Defence over the weekend:
Nimrod MR4 now reduced to 11 (from 21, then 18, then 12 + possible 3 for R1 replacement) now 11!!
UK has confirmed that it is now only to get 22 A400Ms not the original 25. I assume they price hasn’t changed. I expect this number will also fall as the money finally dies up.
What a thoroughly depressing situation.
One of the biggest problems in DE&S is the continual change, change, change without actually pausing to see what the benefits of the change has been. This should be done as a Post Project Evaluation but they hardly ever happen. This is also compounded by the Military tour lengths of 2 years. It also doesn’t help when in many cases it is the Military who are the Budget Holders and either can’t or won’t make the tough decisions due to the effect it will have on their report.
I am by no means laying it on their door but it gets annoying to just get someone going down the right path to then have to train someone new and on the bigger and longer projects this revolving door scenario will be even worse.
As to PFI’s, they are the worst idea to ever be signed upto by the MoD. As soon as we started effectively privatising part of our business we were gonna come a cropper, we lose any kind of flexibility that we had and we still have the cost burden but now if we want a little change thenits gonna cost extra, bad idea all round but I believe they were pushed by treasury so who are we to argue.
“Nimrod MR4 now reduced to 11 (from 21, then 18, then 12 + possible 3 for R1 replacement) now 11!!”
Phil I don’t know if I should point this out or not but please be calm, no need to go and rage at politicians etc. That 12 included the 3 test aircraft the RAF are now in line for a grand total of 9 MRA4 airframes. The 3 test airframes are floating they could get binned *insert swearing and grumbling here* they could be revised to the service standard and used or they could be equipped to replace the 3 R1’s. However we are no longer and island nation dependent on the Sea so there is nothing to worry yourself about oh hang on a minute, *insert swearing and grumbling here*.
Tank your right it is the revolving door at the top someone new comes in with a brilliant idea convinced it will be the next big thing and that they are oh so clever with their management degree and that it works elsewhere. The people who have worked there for the last 25+ years down the ladder would most likely have seen it all before and try to tell them it was tried before and it went tits up. Convinced that they are oh so clever and it’ll work this time they go ahead anyway ignoring someone that has been doing the job since they were in nappies makes an arse of it and dodges the bullet. Meanwhile the company or organisation is in a mess its cost money and careers especially those with experience that were still working but could retire so have now decided to chuck it or moved elsewhere. That experience and knowledge is lost therefore removing a type of safety check that can help prevent things going to buggery in the first place or can help when things do go to buggery. Oh so clever has moved on elsewhere like Teflon reputation etc still intact most likely with a pay rise, more power and responsibility it’s the same in quite a few places I won’t go on as its bloody depressing. I think I need to calm down now
Euan et al I don’t know if this is wholly accurate but Rumour Control has it that one of the main reason why the Nimrod programme went os horribly wrong was that, all the airframes were different (due to the way aircraft were built back in the 50s); so although they built new wings, they all had to be individually modified to fit. Now I am from a Project Management background and when you get this type of critical change in the project it should be stopped and re-evaluated. I think it may have been cheaper and better to actaully manufacture a NEW airframe that was stanrd and the new wings etc. would have fitted. It seems to me that standard programme and project governance was not being applied OR someone was over-ruling the accepted methodolgy and best practice. Either way 9+3 is way too small and the beauty of the Nimrod is that it is capable of so much. It is not just a maritime aircraft, it could even be used as a long range bomber its bomb bay is so huge, nit to mention land based ISTAR, in-flight refueling and UAV/UCAV control and re-broadcast. The kit for the HELIX (upgrade of the R1s) I believe had already ben purchased its the airframes that were needed. I could be mistaken with that one. In which case not going the Nirmrod option is even more puzzling.
Phil it’s no rumour each Nimrod airframe is different or has its own personality when they were built they were built by people with hammers and hand tools using the human eye with all the quirks of different craftsmen. If something didn’t quite fit then they simply made it fit simple as that no puzzling and grinding to a halt or starting from scratch on a component. The problem began when a team from BAE systems appeared and asked for an airframe that they could have a look at to take datum points from naturally using modern high tech extremely accurate equipment. They then entered all this info into their own CAD suite and made some new wings using lovely computer controlled machinery and modern standards. Tried fitting them to the original aircraft the wings fitted so they then made more wings thinking that they should fit the other airframes. By this time they had the airframes selected for conversion sitting at Woodford and when they tried to fit the shiny new wings they didn’t fit usually at differing points and sometimes by a wide margin. Probably completely confused and dumbfounded they contacted the RAF techies to say all these aircraft are different something the techies knew only too well and said yep so? It’s a breakdown in communications to say the least BAE should have been more cautious and talked to those who had been keeping the mighty hunter flying for the last 40 years. The techies should have had more say in the technical side of the project hell I would even have said if it was re-furb allocate the resources and do it in house.
As we all should know the MRA4 was meant to be a from scratch aircraft but numbers were cut and cut until it turned into re-life and massive update effort which was supposed to be cheaper. Now the MRA4 is an almost entirely new aircraft the only old things on the aircraft are the bare fuselage and empennage. These are relatively simple compared to new wing structures new flight control avionics mission systems blah de blah so could and should have been made new for a 100% new aircraft for less money than what it has now cost. We could also have sold the aircraft or simply done as you pointed out use the airframe for other duties to which it is suited alongside having a decent number of aircraft. We are getting far too few aircraft to really do MP even without the Soviet sub threat in my humble opinion especially since we like to go wandering abroad and allocate new missions to the aircraft. I don’t think the new build option is completely dead If common sense prevailed we got more aircraft it would be worth a gamble and would pay off if the P-8 sinks at some point but who knows.
Another bump that mighty BAE came up against literally was because they had no idea that the bomb bay doors gull winged so never really factored that into the design. The MRA4 has a new wing box and fatter wing as well as nice large round intakes to allow more air into the engines not the smaller ovals of the Spey powered MR2. Hence the bomb bay doors could not be gull winged properly to allow access to the bay which is erm well a boo boo of largeish proportions if you can’t get access to the bay.
Sorry if my comment is a bit boring and long winded, Have I bored you lot enough?
This gets better, BAE listening? Look when the RAF was operating the Lightning I went to Wharton on a course on the beast. First hour of each day was them telling us stuff and us telling them it was wrong. Of course their example was a Saudi one, and we had the RAF version. And 30 odd years later they still know best. Maybe its because they come in with the Subject Matter Expert hat in their eppaulettes. Maybe its wishful thinking. Either way its confusing.
ANother true story, working for GKND at an Army base ‘somewhere in Germany’ Gave my lecture/presentation, this time as the WarriorTrack SME. Any Questions? Pimply faced Officer at the back says, Yes…why is the engine at the front? Cant you move it to the back?
So stupidity can be universal.
Everyone wants to add their little change to everything, result is you never finish changing and never buy a damn thing till its out of date, out of shape and out of budget
after the officer engine at the back, comment i sooo have to add another chapter, i was on temp attachment in canada in 1990 when they were building new workshops for the transition from cheiftain to challanger. my friend (a cpl like myself) was also on attachment from a challenger regiment in germany and he pointed out that the slew bay (a place to test 360 rotation of the turret) was too small cue some pimply faced officer who had a degree in media or something just as worthless in a tech world telling him he was being stupid and to be quiet.
2 months and thousands of pounds later out come the chally IPT and declare the bay to be too small and and needed to be rebuilt, young officer trying to throw blame downwards (no surprise there) until my mate the lowly cpl produced the memo he had written and the response. 1 quick posting later…….