Sorry for the length of this post, it’s difficult to summarise a topic that is so detailed.
Put the kettle on and bear with me.
You don’t see them these days but spot the difference competitions used to be very common in newspapers and magazines, so in a nod to nostalgia, I thought it would be a good idea to resurrect the idea.
The three images show the two FRES Scout contenders and a Warrior with a new turret, do they look remarkably similar?
I thought so too.
The basic CVR(T) design has stood the test of time and been battle proven in numerous theatres over the last 40 odd years that they have been in service. It is a testament to the original designers, users and maintainers, that they have remained a military useful vehicle.
The original concept for the Combat Vehicle Reconnaissance (Tracked) or CVR(T) was for a small, air portable, armoured vehicle that could carry out a range of reconnaissance tasks. The family of vehicles was designed and introduced in the early seventies. Although some variants have since been withdrawn, the basic design has been in constant use since then. Despite a series of upgrades that have kept the vehicles relevant, the basic design is now considered too small to house equipment that a modern vehicle should be fitted with as standard.
The lack of mine protection has been exposed in Afghanistan and reliability issues caused by their age and the extra weight imposed by upgrades has confirmed yet again, that they are desperately in need of replacement.
To understand how the UK has got to the point of ordering a 34 tonne vehicle to replace an 11 tonne vehicle one first has to look back several years into what is without a shadow of a doubt, the most convoluted, confused and wasteful equipment procurement debacle of modern times and that includes Nimrod AEW.
1960′s and 1970′s
The Armoured Vehicle Reconnaissance project is started in 1960 and came in at 13 tonnes, beyond the air transport limits of the time so in order to reduce weight, aluminium armour was proposed. Key design criteria were a small size, low weight and sub 5PSI ground pressure. The need for low ground pressure meant relatively wide tracks which impinged on the crew compartment, given the maximum width constraint, this meant that a Jaguar 4.2 Litre petrol engine was the only one small enough.
In 1967 Alvis are awarded a contract to develop produce 30 CVR(T) prototypes.
The Scorpion is accepted in 1970 and enters service with the Blues and Royals in 1972. The Scimitar was another variant that used the 30mm RARDEN cannon that fired high velocity APDS rounds designed to defeat the Russian BMP’s. Other variants include recovery, anti tank missile, ambulance, command, armoured personnel carrier and air defence.
Whilst the first vehicles were coming into service, the soldiers using them might have driven a Morris Marina or listened to ‘All the Young Dudes’ by Mott the Hoople.
Mott the Hoople in 1972
1980’s
The CVR(T)’s light weight, exceptional mobility and ease of deployment mean they are deployed to the Falklands in 1982 with the Blues and Royals, both Scorpion and Scimitar provide infantry fire support and a solitary Sampson provides recovery capabilities. The CVR(T) was well suited to the boggy terrain of the Falklands because of its very low ground pressure, less than a booted squaddy. A Scimitar was damaged by a mine but was recovered by the sole Chinook in theatre, repaired by the attached REME section and returned to service in short order.
Scorpion CVR(T) in the Falklands in 1982
The CV90 project starts its development phase in 1985, a joint venture between Hagglunds and Bofors called HB Utvecking AB obtains the order and Hagglunds create the first 5 prototypes in 1988.
Production of the Warrior begins in 1986.
In 1988 15 British companies entered into a collaborative deal with Royal Armament Research and Development Establishment to develop an integrated fighting vehicle electronics system for demonstration purposes. Known as VERDI (Vehicle Electronics Research Defense Initiative), this resulted in the showing at BAEE (exhibition) of a Warrior tracked vehicle configured for the reconnaissance role equipped with two VERDI consoles. Even at this stage we had recognised the potential of electronic systems and the Warrior in the reconnaissance role.
Also in 1988, the CVR(T) is upgraded at a cost of approximately £50million with a new disel engine and other improvements.
In 1989 the Future Family of Light Armoured Vehicles (FFLAV) study identified a number of roles that would eventually inform the CVR(T) replacement and identified 13 roles and fifty sub roles with a weight range of between 3.5 and 24 tonnes.
FFLAV marks the start point for CVR(T) replacement, remember the year, 1989, by which time CVR(T) had been in service about 18 years.
1990’s
The CVR(T) goes into action in Operation Granby, the liberation of Kuwait, after a series of upgrades have been implemented.
CVR(T) Scorpion Iraq 1991
In 1992, the ASCOD prototype begins trials
In 1993, production of the CV90 begins at Hagglunds in Sweden as the CVR(T) begins a long engagement in the Balkans.
In response to the FFLAV study, Mowag of Switzerland and GKN team up to create the GKN Piranha, Hagglunds propose their CV90 and others such as Alvis with a CVR(T) derivative, Panhard with their VBL and the Krauss-Maffei with the Puma, all pitch in as well.
After disappearing without trace the project reappears in the ISTAR capability pillar, along with Watchkeeper and the answer is thought to be the TRACER programme, or Tactical Reconnaissance Armoured Combat Equipment Requirement (back then they always came up with better acronyms as well)
Three UK industrial consortia participate in a joint MoD/Industry study that is initially due to report in 1994.
In the same period, the US Army is looking at a replacement for its Bradley M3 in Cavalry squadrons and the M1114 HMWWV in scout platoons in a programme called, the Future Scout Cavalry System (FSCS)
The TRACER and FSCS programmes are harmonised and a joint project created, these national requirements would be met by a single vehicle; the Armoured Scout and Reconnaissance Vehicle (ASRV) which was specified in a Memorandum of Understanding, signed by both governments in July 1998, the original Operational Requirements Document having being agreed in December 1997.
By the end of 1998 the MoD has spent £7.3million on TRACER.
Contracts are signed for an initial study phase with two consortia in January 1999. At this early stage the UK and US had slightly different requirements but the project is still initiated amid hopes for a rapid introduction and reduction in costs.
TRACER is intended to not only to provide intelligence, but also to act as a deterrent, monitor opposing forces, help maintain freedom of movement and provide a credible offensive capability by directing direct and indirect fire onto enemy forces.
The two competing consortia are SIKA International (British Aerospace, Lockheed Martin, Vickers Defence and General Dynamics) and LANCER (Marconi, Alvis, United Defence and Raytheon)
The studies progressed and are planned to undergo an affordability review in early 2001, after which a number of subsequent options would be open for discussion, including completion and report in 2002. Estimated cost at this point is £118million at 1999 prices.
At about the same time the UK and other European nations are starting the process of creating the Organisation for Joint Armament Cooperation, as is usual with these things it wasn’t called OJAC but the French translation;Organisation conjointe de coopération en matière d’armement or OCCAR.
Although created in 1996 it wasn’t legally constituted until January 2001 and one of its lead programmes is the Multi Role Armoured Vehicle or MRAV. This is a joint programme between the UK, Germany and France.
MRAV is our entry ticket to OCCAR because one cannot simply take part without bringing cash.
France leaves the programme in 1999 to create the VBCI
2000
In February 2000, the estimated cost of the UK’s participation in TRACER is reduced to £90million.
There are rumours that the US will terminate the programme and in the same month Mr Quentin Davies MP tables a question about the consequences of the US withdrawing. Yes, that is the same Quentin Davies that crosses the House in 2007 and is now Parliamentary Under Secretary of State for Defence, responsible for Defence Equipment and Support, oh the irony!
In response to the question, the estimated cost has risen to £130million, up from £118million only a couple of years before and different to a parliamentary answer given only months before.
2001
In April 2001, a statement to the House of Parliament reveals that the future of the US FSCS is in doubt, describing how the new Future Combat System (FCS) vision as envisioned by General Shinseki and others in 1999 will need funding and some previous programmes will be cut to make room for it, one of these is the follow on engineering development phase of FSCS/TRACER.
A number of small scale studies introduce the FRES concept.
At the DSEi show in London in September a SIKA representative states
Rumours that the project had stalled completely and was about to be overtaken by FRES are grossly overdone, the project continues to meet its milestone development phases and we have already started cutting metal on the first prototype
In October 2001 an announcement is made in Parliament that in a joint US/UK decision, the TRACER programme will come to a close in July 2002 at the end of the assessment phase with the information gained used to inform FCS and FRES respectively, both programmes are to effectively absorb TRACER and FSCS.
Total cost to the UK is confirmed at £131million
The selection process starts for the Future Command and Liaison Vehicle, a competition that is to result in the Panther vehicle being selected.
The competition is very controversial because the shortlisted vehicles do not include the Panther (Iveco LMV) but consist of the RG31, RG32M, Alvis Scarab and the French AMCAT. Panther is inserted after the short listing process has concluded, some say because of a desire for a common European design for the European Rapid Reaction Corps.
It is interesting to speculate on the relative contribution to casualty rates in Iraq if the Panther was in fact not selected but the much cheaper and survivable RG32, for example. It is also reported that one of the acquisition members of staff at the MoD subsequently go to work for Iveco in a repeat of the familiar revolving doors scenario between industry and the MoD.
The Netherlands joins the MRAV programme.
2002
The TRACER technology demonstrations take place towards the end of the programme in June and July 2002 and involves the prototype vehicles from each consortium.
They are widely regarded as impressive vehicles and include many advanced concepts such as a hybrid electrical drive that provides a limited silent capability, band tracks from Soucy , mast mounted elevating sensor head, unmanned turrets, open electronic architectures and the just off the drawing board 40mm Cased Telescopic Ammunition (CTA) cannon from CTAI (in the SIKA version), the very same weapon that will equip the Warrior CSP and FRES Scout.
They are only demonstrators of course and many of the technologies are nowhere near mature enough for deployment but they show considerable promise and innovation.
LANCER TRACER
SIKA TRACER
Later in the year, BAe, at the request of the FRES IPT in the MoD, form a relationship with Alvis, whereby Alvis will contribute the AFV domain knowledge and skills and BAE Systems would manage the System Engineering for FRES. A non-competitive contract is let to Alvis in September 2002 to determine plans for the Assessment Phase of a FRES programme with a target ISD of 2009.
2003
The BAe contract is terminated in July 2003 by the DPA after the Procurement Strategy for a non competitive approach was not approved by the Investment Approvals Board, incredibly the contract is cancelled by the very same organisation that let it in the first place.
The UK orders 401 Panther’s from Alvis Vickers, with final assembly (a new roof that is) in Telford. They are designated the Future Command and Liaison Vehicle or CLV when in service. , the winning vehicle is the Iveco LMV, to be called Panther. 401 will be supplied, all armoured and 362 equipped with the Selex Galileo Enforcer overhead weapons station with 7.62mm GPMG. Panther is to be deployed in 15 role specific variants as a command vehicle for anti tank/mortar platoons, Royal Engineer recce/liaison, armoured/armoured infantry regiment liaison officer and radio rebroadcast. Users will be Royal Armoured Corps, Infantry, Royal Artillery, Royal Engineers, Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers and the RAF regiment. The programme was intended to replace the Ferret but as this has been out of service for some time these roles have been variously carried out by Land Rovers, Saxon, FV430 and CVR(T)
Even at the time it is difficult to see this as a logical or coherent acquisition given the status of FRES, the background of Iraq and as they enter service it emerges that the already very expensive capital cost (£193million) is to be inflated even more, by £20million, as the ones designated for service in Afghanistan (less than 70) will need extensive modification for theatre entry, with the remainder being retained for training roles and secondary roles. The whole thing seemed rushed.
CVR(T) goes into combat in Iraq, again.
Scimitar - Operation Telic
The UK withdraws from MRAV in 2003 to pursue FRES, citing the weight of MRAV, at around 31 tonnes, as far too heavy for the medium weight rapidly deployed FRES concept.
Lord Bach, the Defence Procurement Minister said
“The SDR (Strategic Defence Review) New Chapter, and our experience on recent overseas operations, have shown the need for lighter armored vehicles that can be quickly sent by air to a trouble spot when a crisis breaks”
During this period the US Future Combat System (FCS) and Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) is postulating that a lightweight but rapidly deployed force, with networked information superiority can afford to sacrifice armour weight and do the job of a 60 tonne tank in a package no heavier than 20 tonnes.
Germany and the Netherlands are left as sole partners in the MRAV programme.
The cost of the UK participation in MRAV is £48million in 2003 money, from which we get zero benefit, although this will rise in subsequent reporting and the prototype Dutch command version is completed.
2004
In August 2004, Atkins is confirmed as the chosen Systems House to lead a 2 year initial Assessment Phase (iAP) for FRES.
Atkins is also tasked to let competitive Technology Demonstrator Programme contracts to industry as part of a FRES Integrated Technology Acquisition Plan (ITAP).
BAE Systems creates a dedicated FRES team in September 2004 in response to the MoD’s burgeoning FRES vision.
This period is characterised by the world and his dog falling for military fashion as embodied by the medium weight dream, in which forces would be deployed by air, see the enemy before they left their mud huts (we tended to concentrate on African type enemies rather than the politically sensitive Arabic type), fix them with advanced sensors, arrive in a hail of air portable allyness, destroy the enemy (who would have obligingly decided to face us mano a mano) then build a few schools and be home in time for tea and medals.
Of course, Iraq and Afghanistan intervened in that PowerPoint fuelled fantasy.
In December 2004 a number of ITT’s are issued to industry for nine technology demonstrations including 2 chassis (SEP and AHED) concepts, gap crossing, stowage and capacity, hard kill defensive aids, 2 electronic architectures, electric armour and integrated survivability.
FRES was going to be one hell of a technology fest, kerching!
Meanwhile, back in the real world, UK forces in Iraq are still using Snatch Land Rovers but nothing is allowed to stop the FRES juggernaut.
These demonstration phases are won by BAe, Insys, General Dynamics, Akers Krutbrug, Lockeehd Marin, DSTL (i.e. the MoD) and Thales, jam for all.
In all fairness, some good work was done, still no CVR(T) replacement though.
The initial FRES requirement calls for a vehicle to fit within the C130 load profile, i.e. around 17-18 tonnes, much less than the MRAV which at over 30 tonnes is deemed far too heavy. OCCAR places a contract with ARTEC for the continuing development of MRAV.
2005
The Defence Industrial Strategy is published in December 2005 and includes this, in Chapter 3
“The most likely solution (for FRES) will be a team in which national and international companies co-operate to deliver the FRES platforms, including the required sub-systems, led by a systems integrator with the highest level of systems engineering, skills, resources and capabilities based in the UK.”
“We expect to see a significant evolution of BAE Systems Land Systems both to deliver AFV availability and upgrades through life, and to bring advanced land systems’ technologies, skills and processes into the UK. If successful in their evolution, BAE Systems will be well placed for the forthcoming FRES programme”
The MoD indicates that FRES will likely to be for the order of 3,500 vehicles at a total cost of £14 billion.
BAe is awarded an £84 million contract to upgrade approximately 500 FV430 vehicles to the Bulldog standard, for use in Iraq, a singularly good value for money deal that provides a genuine uplift in capability and shows what can be achieved if one takes a sensible attitude to platform upgrades.
2006
Although BAe are often maligned they make considerable investment in FRES and the activities needed to fulfil on the DIS, including a Platform Development Centre at Newcastle and a Systems Integration Laboratory in Leicester.
These initial phases conclude in 2006 but before then it becomes clear that the MoD favours an 8×8 wheeled vehicle to fulfil the first tranche of FRES, not as one might think the Scout, but the Utility variant. Unfortunately BAe does not really have anything in its portfolio to fulfil this requirement except the Swedish SEP programme (since cancelled) being worked on by BAe owned Hagglunds.
The Spitterskyddad Enhets Platform (SEP) vehicle is an advanced concept that uses a modular chassis available either in a wheeled or tracked variant with hybrid propulsion. BAe invest their own funds, again, to spin out of the SEP programme a conventionally powered 8×8 demonstrator for FRES.
At the end of 2006, the MoD announces that the acquisition strategy for FRES will comprise a three tier approach, with a Systems of Systems Integrator, Platform Designer, and a Vehicle Integrator/Manufacturer.
Whatever possessed the MoD to entertain this fundamentally flawed, complex and impossible to manage approach is not quite clear but I bet some consultants somewhere are still enjoying their villas in Tuscany off the back of it.
In evidence to the Defence Select Committee in December 2006, Sir Peter Spencer (Head of Defence Procurement) defends TRACER and MRAV against accusations of being abandoned with nothing to show for it.
Sir Peter Spencer: Neither was abandoned halfway through. Both were abandoned because the end user decided, in the case of the Americans TRACER was not what they wanted and we were left stranded, and in the case of Boxer the British Army decided that against the evolving threat this was going in the wrong direction and was not the right vehicle for the medium weight force, so from a procurement point of view we responded to that and we exited from that programme and then we ramped up the work on FRES.
So we were abandoned by the US, great.
The Dutch and Germans approve a production order for 472 vehicles between, for the Boxer (MRAV) at a rough cost of £2.25 million each (a number of variants and including all the support/training costs that mask the actual vehicle cost)
2007
In response to the select committee’s report, the MoD, in February 2007, states that the UK cost of TRACER and MRAV was £188million and at this stage, specific pull through into FRES has been limited. Of course ‘has been limited’ in MoD speak means more or less nothing, except some nice drawings and the confirmation that heavier vehicles with more armour are generally more survivable.
The immortal phrase, ‘lessons have been learned’ makes a grand entry in the MoD’s response to Point 5 in the committee report. Around this period the MoD finally realises what everyone in the programme knew from day 1, that the weight limit imposed by insisting on C130 transportability was too low for a vehicle to be survivable in an 8×8 conventionally designed armoured vehicle form. The weight range is raised from 17 tonnes to between 27 and 30 tonnes, for the Utility Variant.
This is still within A400 weight limits so although it might not have been as rapid to deploy as if it were in the more numerous C130 (at the time) at least it would still be air portable. The R is FRES stands for Rapid, deployability that is, not time from concept to reality. The response concludes that
Transportability by A400M is recognised as a risk to the programme but is being carefully managed with appropriate mitigation strategies.
An appropriate risk mitigation strategy; that’s a good one, must remember that for later.
As Iraq and Afghanistan have shown, the reality is that the dream of networked sensors providing enough protection is nothing short of fantasy against an enemy who might be simple but is smart enough to realise the way to fight this concept is not by entering into an unwinnable technology race, but to deploy simple countermeasures and rather unsportingly, fail to play by our rules.
The IED is proves to be a game changer that despite all efforts by the defence establishment, is not realised until much time, effort and money has been wasted on the medium weight sacred cow, FCS or FRES, depending on where you live.
Continuing with the response, the MoD at this point undergoes a sea change.
We agree we should not pursue unrealistic levels of capability for FRES. We are seeking a pragmatic solution that delivers, at the earliest opportunity, the capability that the Army needs with the potential for further improvements through life.
The question of the relative priority of force protection in theatre and air deployability has been resolved. Whilst both are important, protection in theatre is a higher priority than air deployability by A400M/C17.
Our intention remains to pursue the delivery of the FRES UV at the earliest possible time while providing significantly improved capability and sustained operational effectiveness through life in comparison with relevant vehicles in the current fleet (eg the FV 430 Series and SPARTAN).
At this point it is interesting to note that the priority is the introduction of the Utility Variant to replace the Saxon, FV430 series, which are even older than CVR(T) and Spartan. Is this because the Panther (as it is now called) had been introduced and US forces have introduced the Stryker, we wouldn’t want to be seen falling behind our cousins.
In the same response to the Select Committee the MoD made it clear that it will take a consistent line on intellectual property and design authority.
Absolute clarity on the ownership of Intellectual Property Rights and technology transfer issues will be essential in ensuring we can upgrade FRES vehicles throughout their life, thereby securing operational sovereignty. Agreement that all intellectual property and design authorities should reside in the UK is a pre-requisite for companies participating in FRES competitions.
The so called ‘Trials of Truth’ for the Utility Variant are planned to take place in the summer of 2007, and will involve the General Dynamics Piranha, Nexter VBCI and ARTEC Boxer, yes, the same Boxer we rejected a few years earlier.
It is rumoured that the head of DE&S, Lord Drayson, wants the VBCI because it will be quickest into service, getting kit to ‘our brave boys’ in the light of the continuing Snatch controversy is an obvious political influence. The slowest into service will be the General Dynamics Piranha Evolution, the favoured military option.
After a series reported ‘blazing rows’ Lord Drayson resigns.
The MoD seems to be overly concerned with upgradeability, noting that all platforms were required to accommodate increases in armour, sensors and weapons over their lifetime. This is the principal factor in rejecting off the shelf solutions because they do not offer this growth potential.
With Lord Drayson out of the way the MoD announce the General Dynamics to be the preferred bidder i.e. winner.
Despite the statement in the MoD’s response to the Defence Select Committee the deal and whole Utility Variant programme collapses in a hail of acrimony after it emerges that the MoD and General Dynamics can not come to agreement on intellectual property issues.
One might think it would be reasonable to get these things sorted before announcing a winner but this is the MoD we are talking about. The MoD quite rightly comes in for serious criticism on this issue, how the competition could have proceeded without this being absolutely crystal clear is nothing short if incredible, and not in a good way.
Despite agreement on IP being a pre requisite, GD are still allowed to compete. One has to wonder if they were allowed to compete because the prospect of having a competition that involved a French and Dutch/German company was politically unacceptable, especially given that the UK had wasted £31 million on MRAV after we rejected it because it was unsuitable and here it was, possibly the best choice in the Trials of Truth. The alternative would have been a French vehicle that also came out of the MRAV programme.
The escalating conflict in Afghanistan needs considerable resources at DE&S to manage the introduction of a wide range of UOR vehicles and equipment, in response to various needs, the most pressing being the threat of IED’s and in the meantime the Mastiff and Bulldog had been introduced for service in Iraq to great effect, both platforms showing considerable utility.
Things go quite on the FRES front.
BAe is awarded a £28 million contract for support services on the Panther vehicle, to provide better availability and lower costs. The Panther is reported to be a maintenance intensive vehicle with very poor availability.
2009
CVR(T) receives a £19million upgrade package for 100 vehicles to incorporate a number engine and armour enhancements so they can better cope with the demands of Afghanistan. Additional upgrades include ECM equipment and an AEI Odin one man turret for the Spartan
Scimitar in Afghanistan
After the debacle over the Utility Variant the next in line for the MoD is the the FRES Specialist Vehicle which comprises three blocks of reconnaissance vehicles, Medium Armour and Manoeuvre Support. Up to 1300 could be required in total. Recce Block 1, which consists of Scout, Repair, Recovery and Protected Mobility variants, is the biggest and now seen as the highest priority.
It is announced that the two contenders to replace the sub 15 tonne CVR(T) are the CV90 and ASCOD2 from BAe and General Dynamics respectively.
Both will involve elements of offshore manufacture and UK based integration work and each bidder of course makes various claims about jobs and the industrial benefits of their respective bid.
In other news, Mott the Hoople reunite for two concerts in London, have the years been as kind to CVR(T)
Mott the Hoople Reunion Tour 2009
2010
There has been a leak in the Financial Times that the GD ASCOD2 is likely to be the winner, this may have been very carefully timed to ensure that BAe sharpen their offer and ensure that both 100% of the build is in the UK and the cost reduced, which they now seem to have done, more or less.
So Where are We Today?
It seems that in order to accommodate the required armour, power generation, sensors, air conditioning and weapon systems, a small chassis just doesn’t have the capacity.
With size comes weight and so we find ourselves in the position of replacing a vehicle that started out at 8 tonnes and ended up at less than 15, with a vehicle that is well in excess of 30 tonnes and likely grow beyond that, i.e. Warrior class.
The MoD have taken the pragmatic decision to start with a known platform and work out from there, in many ways this would normally be a positive thing to do but does this approach mean too many compromises and a fundamental shift in our formation reconnaissance doctrine?
Certainly there will be no more sneaking around in compact vehicles like CVR(T) and the strategic deployability challenge will become formidable in comparison.
We often make too much of deployability by air but the weight of the proposed vehicles makes them very much slow to deploy, even by road; hardly rapid and hardly medium.
To compensate, at the smaller end of the weight spectrum the UK does have a range of vehicles including Jackal/Coyote, Viking, WMIK and even the new Light Protected Patrol Vehicle that could form part of the ‘scout’ matrix but they are not heavily armoured and are wheeled, which presents a number of mobility and survivability challenges.
Let’s have a look at the options from the contenders.
The BAe option is a shortened CV90. The basic vehicle will be constructed at Hagglunds in Sweden and shipped to Newcastle for final assembly and integration but this may change. It will feature a stabilised main weapon and a number of advanced sensors. The CV90 has been sold to six countries and is currently in service in Afghanistan.
The General Dynamics offer is based on the Austrian-Spanish Cooperative Development or ASCOD vehicle which is in service with Spain and Austria, as the Pizarro and Ulan respectively.
Both are based on mature designs with many variants, including fire support or light tank, recovery and repair to name but a few. It is probably fair to say that as of now, the BAe option is the more mature and even has its own YouTube video. BAe have carried out considerable testing and fully integrated the 40mm main weapon so on paper it would seem the CV90 offers the most.
Whichever is chosen the end result will be nowhere near as innovative as even the TRACER concepts of nearly a decade ago.
Neither are fundamentally British designs, although both organisations have guaranteed the intellectual property and design authority will remain in the UK, mmm, that sounds familiar.
It is rumoured that the Army prefer the BAe option and the Treasury the GD option, oh dear.
Where are General Dynamics and BAe listed?
In looking at costs one has to consider this and weigh up the cost of losing skilled jobs/paying social protection benefits to workers made redundant. This should not be the overriding concern but it should be factored in to the decision making process, as should the recent US reaction to the Falkland Islands issues, F35 source codes and the EADS tanker bid.
We are no blithe defender of BAe and they are often cast as the villain of the piece but as can be seen by the history presented above they have both invested their own money and been variously shafted by the MoD. What about the Defence Industrial Strategy and one could hardly blame them as a commercial entity for taking their ball away if they don’t get the order, they exists to make a profit for their stakeholders, as do all commercial entities.
Are There Other options?
Although CV90 has nominally more combat experience than the ASCOD, neither has anywhere near as much as the Warrior, a vehicle design that has been proven in conflicts such as Afghanistan, Bosnia and Iraq (twice.) It has proven to be exceptionally reliable and extremely tough. Warrior 2000 was a design that contested the Swiss programme that was won eventually by the CV90. If we accept that the concept now calls for something larger than the TRACER/CVR(T)/Stormer 30 then would it be a reasonable option to investigate using the Warrior 2000 as a base platform?
Commonality would not be that high with the existing Warriors but it would be higher than for the ASCOD or CV90. Whilst we may call it FRES Scout the reality is that the vehicle will be an ‘armoured personnel carrier’ with knobs on.
The Warrior, ASCOD and CV90 are almost identical in size so we will be creating a parallel fleet of largely similar vehicles from very similar backgrounds.
Would a bespoke design still be the optimal solution?
The UK used to be a world leader in armoured vehicle design with considerable export success, especially in the light and medium weight categories, with some 5,000 Saladin, CVR(T) and Warrior sold overseas. Today we find ourselves having to use warmed over overseas designs that are over 20 years old, the very same designs, at least in part, that were proposed for the very first CVR(T) replacement study, FFLAV, over 20 years ago.
In fact, the VERDI Warrior might even be considered a relative of the contenders and that was out in 1988.
No definitive study has ever been carried out on the amount of money wasted on abortive programmes, delays, resultant upgrades to existing vehicles and UOR’s but even a conservative estimate would be several hundreds of millions, a figure we can ill afford. The MoD and opposition parties continually harp on about underfunding but the MoD, both civilian and military must shoulder some of the burden for the FRES debacle.
Although it was ambitious, if we had persisted with TRACER after the US bailed out in favour of FCS, we would no doubt have had a world beating vehicle family that would be in service now and being sold all over the world.
Sadly, the Warrior 2000 and bespoke option would seem to be non starters for a variety of reasons so we are stuck with a choice between what is on the table now.
Summary
The UK has made several ham fisted and very expensive attempts at replacing CVR(T) yet it is still in service, fighting in Afghanistan.
These programmes have been hampered by combinations of inappropriate acquisition strategies, hopelessly clinging to military fashion, inability to rapidly change, planning far too far in advance, changing too often, suffering at the hands of our allies, indecision and confusion.
It is a Grade 1, Weapons Grade Cockup.
Meanwhile, users of CVR(T) will have to wait even longer to see a replacement, 2012 to 2014 at a guess, thus pipping the post at over 40 years hard service.
A driver of the original CVR(T) might have joined the army, progressed to Warrant Officer, retired at the 22 year point, been replaced with another Trooper that has also since gone on to serve his 22, and commissioned as a Late Entrant officer, who may well retire before any meaningful replacement is actually in service.
World War II was 6 years long during which time we progressed from biplanes to jet fighters, it’s a good job there isn’t a war on, oh, wait a minute.
The fundamental dilemma we now face is that of time, the CVR(T) is about 20 years past its sell by date yet despite hundreds of millions of pounds, various studies and 20 years, we are now in a position of desperation, casting around for the least worse option from equipment that is already on someone else’s shelf. We no longer have the luxury of developing a bespoke, fit for purpose and innovative vehicle family that would have enormous export potential, that passed us buy with TRACER.
Several people have discussed the export potential of FRES Scout, I am not sure what they are smoking because if they think in 10 or 15 years, that anyone is going to be in the market for a vehicle based on a 30-40 year old design then they are sadly deluded.
We have been forced to settle for a conservative design that will rapidly show its age and have limited export potential, how different things must have looked to the TRACER designers.
Once again the MoD conspires to snatch defeat from the jaws of victory.
When will we ever learn?
##UPDATE##
Several of those commenting on this article make very interesting points but one raised by Richard Stockley concerns the acquisition approach. This is a crucially important programme, would a sensible approach to obtain a small number of prototypes of both design and in addition to the normal user acceptance trials, get them out to Afghanistan for a real ‘trial of truth’
If normal acceptance trials have in the past allowed vehicles like the universally loathed RB44 into service then we should investigate additional options.
Good point
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Yeah i think i’m gonna go put the kettle on.
what an article, fantastic. i am now convinced the new vehicle will be yellow with red doors and a big squeezy horn on the drivers side, and the bonnet will fly off in a cloud of smoke after 10 yards (and it will cost £10 million each)!!!
so many excellent points in that article i think my comment would be as long as the post if i addressed them all.with regard to the panther, as reccy, i see the dutch and the germans again have a joint venture in the fenneck,fast low profile, light so why aren’t we looking along those lines,hardly sneaky at xmetres high and 40 tonnes is it! I digress, good good post think i shall just go into the corner of theroom and laugh, or cry not sure which
But how much would the development cost be if you were to design something completely novel and fantastic which actually does meet the expectations of today’s generals? Just a ballpark figure, I genuinely want to know if anyone happens to be working in the arms industry?
As interesting as the article was, I found it hard to concentrate long enough to manage it all (I think I got 2/3 of the way). Hopefully others (who haven’t had to spend all day reading academic journals on sediment transport and deposition) will have more luck.
…I’ll camp here and make for the summit tomorrow.
sorry for the length, its hard trying to squeeze 30 years of MoD mismanagement into a single post !
Have made some ammendments
Ok read that through now, excellent research into the facts and figures of the past of this debacle congratulations. One thing that got me in the end is what does Think Defence think should happen what would you do if it were you making the tough decisions to end this debacle.
There has always been a doubt in my mind that we need a Scout variant especially since the options are basically Warrior like vehicles not exactly ideal for scouting. Then there is also the whole thing about what do they actually mean by Scout? UAV’s can do a large part of the ‘Scouting’ basically I don’t think there is a need for a specialised vehicle. Scouting could and should be distributed using alternatives including technology to gather information for commanders and when someone on the ground is needed a standard vehicle with all the modern bells and whistles should be capable. This could just be my lack of knowledge showing but anyone feel free to enlighten me.
I don’t really have an idea what we should do that would be least worse thing to do if we decide to buy something now it’ll partly end this stupid debacle however it will be flawed in many ways. For one it will be essentially obsolete sooner than we would like and we might not be able to incorporate new technologies. However if we don’t try and end it now we will be stuck with a vehicle essentially falling to bits massively outdated and dangerous for its occupants in the next conflict. Part of the problem with trying to get a new design is people changing their minds all the time so there really is no end unless someone competent is given the power to bulldoze through something that is good enough. 13th Spitfire since I decided to refresh the page while writing this I would say money is not the real problem it’s balls and power if we had someone or a group of someone’s with balls and power things could get done.
I’ve avoided talking about specific platforms and attributes etc but as it’ll no doubt appear I will comment back later in response to other commenter’s. BTW I hope to hell that this get’s noticed it would make interesting reading for many people.
Wow – long indeed, and may I dare to say it, slightly rambling in places…..
Anyway Recce versus ‘full armour’ is as old as the Roman Army (who’s different classes of cavalry came from different ‘client states’ within the Republic / Empire) just as the debates over weight of armour versus mobility go back to the Greek Hoplites and Roman legionnaire, and even before …. and 34 tonnes is ‘medium’ if 70 tonnes is ‘heavy’ !
A couple of points ? Why do you think that most of the Panther CLV are to be used for ‘training’ ? Not what I am hearing from colleagues in the Army. The clue to Panther is in the TLA – CLV – Command and Liaison Vehicle – in other words this is a light ‘armoured car’ replacing soft skin LandRover FFR’s. It’s not an MRAP – but its not supposed to be, and neither is is the ‘patrol’ vehicle BUT I would content it could be used at the ‘light end’ of scout / recce.
Why not Warrior 2000 – because its not in production?
Admin states: “Whilst we may call it FRES Scout the reality is that the vehicle will be an ‘armoured personnel carrier’ with knobs on” – not quite – that is why the CV90 variant is a ‘short wheelbase’ variant.
Euan – ref your request for enlightenment… :-) Here we go, this based on the fact that my Dad is ex-Blues and Royals, and so was one of my TA colleagues. So firstly don’t get fixated on the term SCOUT as applied to the FRES vehicle. The Army’s dedicated armoured reconnaissance units are now called “Force Reconnaissance Regiments”. (Challenger tank regiments and Warrior based armoured infantry regiments also have CVR(T) based recce squadrons.)
There are many elements to ‘reconnaissance’ in the army, from guys in ghillie suits sneaking through the tree’s to ‘recce by fire’ – a limited attack to gauge the enemy’s response and hopefully learn something about his dispositions and deployments, with much else in between. The Armoured Recce regiments have also traditionally been used as screening units for MBT and armoured infantry, flank guards and rear guards etc. SO when considering that the FRES SCOUT contestants are not very sneaky – you have to consider Army doctrine and how the vehicles will be used. Of course there is a place for UAV’s, as there is also a role for the radar equipped AH67 Longbow Apache, and the Recce Platoon squaddie with his binoculars. But no single platform can do everything.
It is sad to think that whatever vehicle is picked might not be as good as the TRACER vehicles from all those years ago, but hopefully further phases may add mast mounted EO/IR or radar sensors.
If the Ocelot LPPV lives up to its apparent potential, this could provide for wheeled armoured scout / recce alongside the winner of the current competition.
I changed my mind “slightly rambling in places…..” that was out of order, it is well researched and very useful piece of writing !
Good article,, sounds about right.
The UK defence industry has been kept hanging with very small contracts with the promise of ‘the big one’ just around the corner for around 15years, if not longer. It surprises me that we still have a UK defence industry at all, it’s only because all the big private companies have been propping themselves up from their overseas businesses.
So to understand and summarise on the FRES Scout business;
BAE appear to have a reasonably developed solution that’s been out and about, testing and at exhibitions. This is based on a further development of the CV90 (MK11 or MK111?) and the initial concept chassis has been built and undergone a programme of testing according to BAE website
(http://www.baesystems.com/Newsroom/NewsReleases/autoGen_110217131214.html).
BAE have also integrated this new CTWS 40mm cannon into more than one turret over the past 2 or 3 years and have previously proven firing on the move capability.
GD are suggesting the use of a Spanish/Austrian ASCOD2 hull with loads of new kit (engine, transmission,,) that doesn’t appear to have been built or tested yet and probably only exists on paper. There appears to be only a basic computer representation on the web which sometimes has the driver hatch on the right and sometimes on the left. From everything I have read they don’t appear to have integrated a CTWS 40mm cannon properly yet as Lockheed Martin (GD’s named turret integrator) have only apparently fired their warrior cannon on one occasion from a static position using test equipment.
It would seem on the face of it that GD are seriously behind the curve on development of both the chassis and turret. I can’t see how BAE and GD are aiming at the same in-service date. This only really makes sense if GD are going to suggest a date about 3 years after BAE.. The more articles I read the more it appears that the alleged leak was a ploy to get more favourable terms from BAE. With the announcement of moving manufacture of the hulls to the UK it would appear that everything is now stacked in BAEs favour especially since other news reports indicated that the MoD wanted BAEs offer before the treasury got involved.
From what I can tell, if this contract isn’t given to someone it’s looking quite likely that the entire UK defence industry is going to fold. I would imagine that BAEs supply chain consists of the majority of the UK defence equipment suppliers, if BAE pulls out of the UK land industry I would think it likely that a lot of the smaller suppliers would disappear as well. Giving the contract to GD might keep the industry going in the short term (5-10 years) but GD have been known to pull the plug when things get too hard, I’m not sure they would hang around when the initial FRES money has run out.
I completely agree with the comments on Tracer. The development of these platforms should have continued. I can’t imagine they were anywhere near ready back then but with an additional eight years slow-time development I’m sure they would have been near an in-service level of performance by now. I see that the MoD have recently released word of their new Future Protected Vehicle Capability Vision
(http://www.science.mod.uk/engagement/cp/capabilityvisions_default.aspx?ThemeId=de03419e-1b57-4ca7-8d9d-1a09ffbb7bf6&ThemeType=cv&ActivityId=5f5b5e09-a1c3-46eb-94fb-941e3c29e133&ActivityType=cv& )
It does seem a little ‘pie in sky’ type stuff with comments like, The challenge is “To deliver a vehicle in 4 years that is able to out-perform all current wheeled and tracked designs. It is to offer the firepower, mobility and protection of a main battle tank, but within a 30T weight limit. It will utilise a two man crew but also be able to carry a section of eight fully armed troops”. I’d love to see this happen but there would have to be a serious change in the ethos of the engineering companies and the MoD project managers for this to even come near to possible.
I’m a bit sceptical about the lost export potential of TRACER, at least in comparison to something like the Scorpion family.
TRACER was anything but simple and therefore cheap, being a sophisticated, dedicated recce vehicle with lots of advanced features:
- an integrated reconnaissance surveillance & target acquisition mission equipment package and an advanced C3I electronics suite
- a hybrid electrical drive
- an unmanned turret
etc. etc.
Which CVR(T) users (besides the British army) would be interested in something like TRACER? Those 3rd world or other countries which bought Scorpion etc. wanted exactly what that vehicle was: a small, light and simple tracked vehicle which carried some punch without the size and price tag of a real tank.
Something like the CV90 Reconnaissance System (a CV9035 with an extendable sensor mast mounted in the infantry compartment) based on the Warrior 2000 might make sense. However, I fear the costs of resurrecting a basically dead programme, which the Warrior 2000 basically is.
A very informative article stating some very pertinent and interesting facts. One in particular!
If a proposal based on Warrior 2000 was put forward (a re-hulling of the existing Warrior, re-using major components) this may well prove a superior solution to both FRES SV and WCSP. Any additional costs of resurrecting the programme would then be split, but I suspect the reduction of logistical costs (having two different vehicles to train in and support) would more than outweigh this. In producing a new hull, we can also tailor it to the actual requirements necessary, something that is inherently difficult to do when buying off-the-shelf, and may ultimately lead to deficiencies or trade-offs in mine protection, transportability, stowage and more.
Very informative post, very well researched but my post is going to echo jed here.
The CVR(T) was originally concieved as a tracked counterpart to the CVR(W) which as I recall was a very traditional armoured car. Scimitar was designed to sneak (compared to a MBT) arround western europe looking for large soviet tank formations in as situation where we could not garuntee air superiority. In this situation no ammount of armour is going to help when staring down the barrel of a 125mm tank gun, the only way to survive is to be small, be light, be fast and be going the other way. In this role the CVR(T) was probably very useful.
However that isn’t what we use scimitar for today. As mentioned by jed the formation reconasance regiments are used as fighting units and afaik several armoured regiments are converting a troop to use scimitar becauce autocanons are really usefull at infantry support. This is what CVR(T) is used for now, it’s probably why it’s 5-6 tons heavier than before and to be blunt it isn’t very good at it. This role is a medium armour role, it needs a larger vehicle with heavier armour and a stabilised large autocannon.
BAEs entry for fres scout, as horrible and maligned as the rest of fres is, looks like it would be quite good at this.
Also remember that since the end of the cold war or simply because we’ve reached the peak of technology in tracked vehicles, technology in tanks and afvs hasn’t moved very much. Despite being 20 years old the CV90 chasis is stil relatively modern as most as most development has been in up armouring and better turrets.
Thanks for all your comments chaps.
On a couple of points in response
1.
Jed was right, it was probably a bit rambly so I have done a spot of pruning and hopefully it now reads a bit better, although I want to retain the depth in the history parts of the post. have another read if you can afford the time.
2.
The comment about most of them being used for training and non combat use came out of a parliamentary answer. They fit only a few personnel and then only if they have been greased up and wearing rubber underpants. They are used by a number of units including for example, the Royal Engineers on a gap crossing recce so in some respects I suppose they are of use but taken in the round they are horrendously over priced and to my mind, a round peg in a square hole that should be corrected by a single family of Land Rover replacements, hopefully the Ocelot
3.
Force/Formation/Brigade recce forces do seem to be evolving quite rapidly, as one would expect in an operational context, to involve all sorts of roles that might be considered non traditional, even to the extent of forward air control and sniping so the comments about the removal of the need for a small vehicle are fair enough to some extent.
4.
Privateer makes a good point about potential export potential for TRACER but don’t forget when we sold CVR(T) abroad it was as advanced as anything we were using and could be considered state of the art. These same countries are now fielding relatively advanced equipment so I stand by my comments that TRACER could have been a significant export success.
5.
Ashley, yes CVR(T) was the tracked component of a two element package, the wheeled variant was the Fox, well out of service now and for good reason, it was very dangerous and not that good. The original concept for CVR was for a series of vehicles that could operate forward and on the edges but a critical element of this was the provision of overwatch and protection by the Striker, equipped with long range anti tank missiles, again long since gone.
6.
My overall position is one of slopey shouldered resignation, the CV90 seems to be not only the best proposition on offer but also very good in its own right but we have squandered several golden opportunities, hundreds of millions of pounds and possibly a small handful of soldiers lives in the process.
Whow! what a great post… Right up my street!!! Loads to say… Will post later I feel a long one comming on!!!
First quick thoughts. It must be hard to develop vehicles when the customer has no bloody idea what its wants, The MoD and government of the day have no real interest in paying for anything, and finally the general public has no idea and even less interest in anything military.
Big problem now is that we have wasted so much time and money and the general public is finally waking-up to the sorry state of our armed forces that we are in very grave danger of having to buy something… Anything ASAP, hence we have moved from cutting edge bespoke designs to Off-The-Shelf designs.
A small ray of hope is that the LPPV looks like being a very good vehicle (especially Ocelot) the Universal Engineering RANGER looks to be just what is needed, I think it could just about do any Peace keeping or COIN role and still be half decent for conventional wars. I just hope this is not ignored by the Army. I can see a scenario in a few years time where UK troops are being blown up in Piranha V (due to lack of mine protection), whilst another Army working along side (lets say Australia) are equipped with RANGER’s and are NOT being killed!!!!
I can see the headlines in the SUN now!!!!
I’ll be back (later)
The whole FRES/MRAV/TRACER/FFLAV saga is indicative of MoD and the Army in particular. It would be easy to blame the individual companies for not delivering the goods. However, it’s not the simple. For decades the Army has bought vehicles and then kept it for ever. Compared to other nations (particularly the French), we simply do not refresh or update our military equipment often enough, let alone update them or improve them.
So why is that? I big reason is cost, obviously, but it is also a conservatism within the military and the fact that the population until recently had zero interest. In fact in my experience many of the general public thought our troops were the best equipped in the world! I think part of this is the confusion of best troops compared to best equipped troops.
I personally believe that there was a deliberate plan NOT to buy new vehicles (due to the cost) and that the endless series of failed programmes was a stalling technique! That and the generals had no fcuking idea what they wanted and were too keen on trying to copy the Americans (a recipe for disaster if ever there was one).
The biggest problem was when (on the back of the European Rapid Reaction Force) the Army adopted this idea of a medium weight mobile force. This just muddied the waters even further and without that I think we might have actually got the MRAV/Boxer in service.
By lumping all the outstanding requirements (CVRT/FV432 and Saxon replacements plus the new requirement for medium weight vehicles) it just got far too complicated. The other factor was the new requirement for MRAP type vehicles. I firmly believe that the generals deliberately did NOT ask them sooner for fear of costs coming out of the budget set aside for FRES, and for that the treasury must take a large slice of the blame. They have created a culture where the generals start behaving like politicians rather than concentrating on the military issues and requirements.
So, where does this leave us? Admin you are right in that we have now run out of time and money for an bespoke offerings and are forced to take vehicles off someone else’s shelf, so what should be done?
I hate to say it but before we throw good money after bad the government, no, the country needs to clearly state what capability it wants its armed forces to have. If we look back 25 years, we can see just about every scenario you can imagine from peace-keeping in Bosnia, amphibious expeditionary actions in the Falklands through to high-end mechanised tank on tank battles in the Gulf wars. To me, this dictates that we have a large Army equipped with a wide range vehicles to cope with all those scenario’s. Until that debate takes place and the appropriate funding is guaranteed we are in real danger of buying totally the wrong vehicles.
If I was to make a selection now I would want the Army to have some along the lines of the following:
LPPV (Ocelot) in 4×4 and 6×6 configuration and produced in many variants to include utility and support roles as well as the patrol role. I would see these vehicle replacing all the Landrover variants (including ambulance, WMIK and of course snatch) Pinzgauer (including Vector), RB44, Panther CLV, Jackal and Coyote including MWIK.
Ranger in 4×4/6×6 and 8×8 configurations, again produced in a wide range of versions frpm APC, Ambulance. Command, Air-Defence, Direct and Indirect fire roles, plus the TSV type roles. This would replace SAXON, Ridgeback, Mastiff and Wolfhound, I would also see this vehicle replacing many of the Bulldog vehicles and possibly performing most of the FRES Utility Variant role. It could also be used in place of some of the SV (Support Vehicle fleet) as many of these are really not adequately protected at all.
We still need the Warrior and/or a vehicle of its size, as there appears to be considerably life left in the hulls then carry on using them but supplement with CV90s (although I personally would prefer the German PUMA).
There is still a need for a light tracked vehicle (aka Viking), I would get BAE to develop a Viking with a V-shaped hull that has both mine protection and ballistic protection designed in from the start. I would want to see as many different versions as there are with the LLPV for which this would be the tracked equivalent.
If there is still a need for a vehicle that sits between the LPPV/Vikings and the heavy RANGER/CV90 then we should look to continue with the SEP programme, maybe trying to get collaboration with others that have similar requirement.
Finally both the AS90 and the Challenger 2 (CR2) need to ultimately be replaced but short-term both are in need of upgrading. The CR2 has had some additional armour and RCWS added, the main gun is about to be changed, the engine is long overdue for a change, at 1200bhp this is now 600bhp light compared to the latest Leo2 A6. The AS90 lacks the auto-loading facility and aiming system to achive MRSI (Multiple Round Simultaneous Impact) and like CR2 its 650bhp Cummins is a bit on the small size for such a large and heavy vehicle.
phil, just to add weight to your hanging on theory, i was in a REME wksp for gulf 1 and we had petrol centurion ARV’s and the vehicle electricians had a bedford RL!!!
I like all your theories but instead of ranger i would look at the BAe RG family as the RG 35 is in 4×4 and 6×6 the 6×6 can hold 1x driver and up to 15 troops more importantly proper space for medevac. the interesting feature is the side mounted engine, which can be changed rapidily, Bae also say with this a hybrid is feasible. This vehicle is out there and driving now.
this would also leave the ocelot (i like) in the light role, on the challenger points funny how 15 years ago the chally 2 export came with a 1500bhp engine and we never fitted/asked for it. with regard to the viking i would sit back and see how the warthog fares, i had the rare oppotunity to ride in that nearly 10 years ago at a vehicle show in aldershot and was very impressed, plus singapore ind are a jump ahead with a drops trailer and mortar platform as part of the package.
to summerise i’m in your camp on your ideas, shame the pen pushers in puzzle palace don’t read this
13th spitfire,
You wanted to know how much it would cost to design a completely new vehicle to meet the needs of today’s generals. Alas, you would need to answer the following (10 off the top of my head, there will be loads more):
1. How long are you prepared to spend defining “what the Generals want”?
2. Can the Generals change their mind after the solution is “frozen”? How often?
3. What is it that the Generals want?
4. How many do they want?
5. When do they want them?
6. How important is it that they are built in the UK? Which parts must be built in the UK?
7. Is it a UK or a joint programme?
8. Do you want a support package included? If so, what sort?
9. Do you want training included? If so, what sort, how much?
10. What else do you want to include in the cost e.g. Bowman, theatre entry standard kit, technical publications, post design support etc?
Phil and PaulG
Viking does not need an MRAP style V hull – it may not be possible and it would probably wreck the ampibious capability. The Viking is a RM vehicle and once again we are back to the mobility versus protection argument. The raisin d’être of the Viking is lightly protected (small arms and shrapnel) amphibious mobility.
The knee jerk reaction to Viking losses to IED-mines in AF was to procure Warthog / Bronco. Don’t forget a 2000lb fertilizer bomb will take out a Merkava or M1 so just buying a larger heavier version with more scope for additional belly armour was hardly “thinking out of the box” .
However as PaulG notes, Warthog has a lot of potential ! I think we should buy as many as we can afford to replace FV432 / Boxer / Stormer etc. There are many existing rear module designs, and the simple APC variant carries 16 troops – 2 full squads. It would be great if we could get the 120mm mortar variant but I don’t see that happening !
But the IED isn’t going away any time soon so all vehicles are going to have to evolve.
Some are more difficult to protect than others, for example with the Viking, if they could change the configuration so the front section moved the drivers position to the centre they could then build a v shape protection cell. Yes you sacrifice the passenger position and the transmission tunnel may not even allow this but these are the kind of evolutions we are going to have to consider
PaulG I take you comments about the RG series but I think their design is now looking a little dated. I don’t know about the RG35 but I am guessing its based on its predessors. On the other hand the Ranger is ALL NEW. I guess either would be better than what we have now, which is turning in to a real dogs breakfast. There are so many new vehicles all with different running gear. It must make logistics and training a nightmare. This needs addressing as well.
Jed my comments about the Viking were not to change what the marines wanted which was a light amphibious protected vehicle. There is obviously a need for a light tracked vehicle and the Viking has been used in that role, however its protection was nevver designed for the scenario it is now being used for. I believe it would be more than possible to redesign the hull with much greater mine protection without compromising its other qualities. For example it was only a few years ago that people were saying you could not get adequate mine protection on a vehicle the size of a landrover. The LPPV project amongst others have overcome that issue.
Tony Steele you are so right about the complexity of designing anything for our armed forces. As I have said before, I am no fan of Big And Expensive, but what chance do they have, faced with that lot.
Admin, I wouldn’t worry about the length of the post, some of the comments are nearly as long!
Having read Phil Darley’s comments, I think he hits the nail on the head. The Warrior’s got plenty of life left, supplemented by CV90′s and complemented by Ocelot/Ranger should do the trick. Although not a perfect combination, it is an achiveable aim.
Personally I would like to see a FV430 Bulldog fitted with a CTA 40mm turret just to see how effective the resulting monster would be!
Phil – I don’t think RG35 is based on predecessors, I think its brand new design, but as noted either this or Ranger would do just fine.
Admin, I have to disagree with your statement on redesigning Viking I’m afraid: “But the IED isn’t going away any time soon so all vehicles are going to have to evolve”
No, not so. We are back to the right vehicle for the right job again. Using Viking to run convoys down Main Supply Routes (MSR) which the enemy know your going to have to use because of where your ‘combat outposts’ are, and your lack of helicopters is inviting them to put thousand pound class fertilizer bombs in culverts. I read an article recently that stated that the AF IED’s are much less sophisticated, the majority being blast bombs with pressure plates, no EFP types, and very little radio or wired command detonation. In fact the U.S. army is going back to the old technology of the mine roller.
So given this scenario, it is not so much that every vehicle has to have MRAP Cat II type survivability, V shaped hulls and all. It is about evolving doctrine, strategy and tactics, NOT just vehicles. The British Army top brass could have jumped on the MRAP band wagon earlier, or could have leased Mi17 class helo’s.
So, if you want to run supply convoys down MSR’s that you can’t guarantee are IED free, you use Mastiff, Ridgeback and Wolfhound, and big trucks with armoured cabs etc. If you want to make a flanking attack on an insurgent compound by coming across the desert, then use Viking (or Warthog). There is no one size fits all.
Of course, this does not do much for fleet commonality or the budget for that matter, hence an RG35 or Ranger type vehicle that can be standardized to replace Mastiff and Saxon at different ends of the spectrum is a good idea.
The IED has caused a paradigm shift in the way opponents of technologically superior forces approach combat operations. This isn’t going to change for a long time and the same way that I think small boats and mines will define the next naval shindig. Political pressure will play its part here as force protection issues take a larger element of the intellectual capital employed in design projects.
The next generation of vehicles, any military vehicle, is going to have to have passive protection against underbody explosions an order of magnitude better than they are now.
I have been toying with the idea of covering IED’s again and specifically TALISMAN but have held off for obvious reasons, might have another look and offer it around to you lot before publication.
Did you see the other articles I did on IEDS’s a while ago
http://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/2009/08/on-the-subject-of-ieds/
http://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/2009/08/mine-and-ied-resistant-vehicles/
PS
Sorry for using Paradigm Shift, I know that’s a ten pointer in bullshit bingo :D
spot on jed just done a bit more digging and it is a new design, looks like they bought the SA company that designed it, it has been touted for the new SA IFV.
the bit i like (being ex reme) is the side mounted engine can be removed/replaced in 30 mins! the advantage i find with this is the common chassis if you go for the 4×4 as well plus it can be uparmoured to 33 tonnes from it’s original 14 tonne weight like jed says it’s horses for courses and i’d rather be bangingdown the MSR at 115Kmh in that than a viking. if BAe had any sense they would volunteer it for trials in the sandy place, good for the chaps on the ground free advertising for them, end of the dayas much as we talk sense on here new vehicles are needed out there now!!!
ps according to the BAE website it comes in cmmd, ambulance, 105mm gun and my personnal favourite 120mm mortar there’s lovely!!!
Looks like the Ocelot is everbodys fav at the mo, but i have spotted this little gem the TMV 6x6M. It should completement it quite well and get rid of the pingauzer,RB44,Duro III.
There are quite a few of them around, JCB even made one
Jed, according to the interweb the RG35 is based on the RG31 hull design, but I am not going to fall out over it. I am sure both the RG35 and Ranger are superb vehicles. With these do we need anything like Piranha V? I think we might, only if you want a wheeled vcehicle to do high-end war fighting, where the height of the RANGER would be a distint disadvantage!!!!
Personally I would make do with Warrior/CV90 types and keep wheels essentially for peace-keeping and/or COIN.
I would still like to see the SEP bought to production. I think there is a need for a medium weight vehicle of this type, just not at the expense of everything else! Which is where FRES went wrong amongst other things.
Phil for high end warfighting we will still have the Warrior as well as the FV430 series of vehicles so they should suffice if they are upgraded in large enough numbers. Add to that the fact that the CV-90 is in the same class we should have plenty of vehicles for everything but large scale operations which are pretty unlikely. Therefore I don’t think we really need anything else on top of those vehicle families especially not something wheeled that others are starting to realise is not all it’s cracked up to be. From what I understand anyway the FV430 series will still need replaced at some point in the next decade unless we want another 40yo vehicle in service and be left behind technology wise. Hopefully SEP or something similar could be worked on and considered to replace this vehicle family in a few years time incorporating lessons learned from the current conflicts and emerging technology. Although that might require some brain cells and from what Admin has detailed in this post the MoD has very few of them able to do anything.
The Ranger or RG-35 could be procured to replace the array of vehicles procured under UOR’s basically to consolidate the vehicle fleet which would have its advantages. Ideally a hybrid version of either for the advantages offered with that technology BAE has said it is something that they can do. However with money so tight I don’t think anyone will be willing to scrap a large number of UOR vehicles which they would see as quite a waste when they are relatively young vehicles. Basically these would be useful for what you said peacekeeping and COIN operations but not much more than that. I’m a supporter of tracks over wheels for combat vehicles as they have huge real advantages not something to scoff at when someone is trying to kill you. By the way Phil how come you’re such a solid supporter of the universal engineering Ranger? are you associated with the company or anything like that.
Jed thanks for the educating :-) from the impression I get it is more about the doctrine and employment of the vehicle rather than the vehicle itself. I agree with you about the Viking and Warthog I think they should be kept as they are because they have a purpose suited to the Royal Marines. Although obviously if their key attributes can be kept without detriment while further improving protection then protection should improve and I know you’ll agree with that. In places where the vehicles abilities are not quite in as much need then the marines should be able to switch to using something else.
Given the potential impact of the kind of vehicle we procure, whether it be CV90 or ASCOD, the costs it will incur and how it will affect operations over the next 25 years, why have we not extensively field trialled the respective vehicles? I understand that the CV90′s and ASCOD’s currently in use aren’t the same as the one’s we will eventually receive, but they are representative.
I believe that Israel trialled two Chieftain MBT’s back in the early seventies and actually fielded them under combat conditions. The sale fell through, but they had a serious understanding of how the vehicle performed. Given the importance of the FRES Scout programme it seems foolhardy basing such a shift in doctrine without utilising true-life conditions. I accept other army’s use the vehicles and have combat experence with the CV90, but that doesn’t necessarily guarantee it will fulfill British expectations.
Given our current ops in Afghanistan, why are we not fielding a unit of leased/borrowed CV90′s and ASCOD’s?
My previous comment regarding the FV430 with a CTA 40mm turret may have been given slight regard, but the RARDEN has been in use for some 40 years. What we’re doing now is shifting up to 40 mm, but based on what? Lets get the 40mm turret in the field and see how the troops feel about it. Whether its bolted on top of a Bulldog, or we build a limited number of upgraded Warriors is it too much to ask that we try before we buy?
These vehicles are mere metal. The really interesting thing isn’t the vehicle itself but the doctrine for its use.
The Desert Storm experience taught the British that long-range sensors are of great importance in open terrain. The Scorpions were worse recce assets than the Challys.
It was simply ntural that a new tracked scout vehicle would be heavier than Scorpion. Heavy lift helicopters have greater payloads, sensors and other new electronics add weight and volume.
This brings us to the weight class of Stormer.
Well, Stormer wasn’t well-protected. IEDs taught he lesson that no matter how stealthy and agile you are, your unit will eventually get hit – and your survival requires passive more protection than a mere bullet shield.
That justifies a move up to a bit less than 20 tons (still in the range of amphibious potential).
I cannot really explain the tons above 20 mt, but I guess it’s related to conventional warfare protection (protection against BMP autocannon).
Additional weight is not necessarily a problem; I would look at the T-72 weight class for a combat-oriented scout vehicle. I would look at the French 15 mt 6wd vehicles for a stealth-oriented scout vehicle.
Both approaches make sense – given a proper doctrine.
It makes also sense to give scouting a much greater role than during the 20th century. Force densities are smaller than during the 20th centuries in modern war scenarios. You can slip through non-existing lines and infiltrate more easily than even in mobile war phases of WW2.
The scouting ability coupled with a decent combat capability could wreak havoc on unprepared enemy support units and scouts can call in rocket artillery fires; GUMLRS has about 80 km range, ATACMS up to 300 km.
The really interesting parameters of scout vehicles are usually difficult to learn about: In the case of tracked vehicles I’d ask for
* mean range between necessary maintenance,
* MTBF for electronics,
* real road and offroad range,
* volume for personal equipment,
* smoke dispenser ammunition qty,
* VESS?
* main sensor target ID range(personnel & vehicle ID),
* extreme climate preparedness (hot/cold/high),
* repair times for key components (tracks mostly),
* ability to repair engine without repair shop,
* radio comm range (satellite, short wave?),
* IR camouflage (netting?),
* protection of sensors against damage (bullet, frag) & ability to replace glass shields with on-board spares.
Scout vehicles differ from normal combat vehicles in their requirement for a greater independence. They need greater endurance and less dependence on recovery & repair support.
Euan we are in agreement, we need to retain Warrior or similar sized tracked vehicle for high end war-fighting, maybe supported by Bulldog (think I would rather see this transferred to the TA and the Regs equipped with more NEW CV90 types).
I have nothing to do with the RANGER, I like it based on what it is designed to do. It seems to offer the protection (no better protection than a COUGAR/MASTIFF/RIDGBACK) with the mobility of the Jackal and the flexibility of being produced in many configurations. It seems to be the perfect vehicle for peace-keeoing, COIN and low end war fighting i.e. just what we need ast the moment. The fact that it can replace many vehicles purchased under UOR is another benefit. This could also be its downfall in that it might be hard to argue we need to replace recently purchased vehicles with another NEW vehicle. I really hope that the Army and the MoD not to mention the treasury see sense and all this vehicle to be purchased.
The final point is do we need a vehicle of the sort described and trialled for the FRES UV i.e. PIRANHA V/VCBI/BOXER? I am really not sure we do.
We need heavy tracked (Warrior/CV90) we need light wheeled (Ocelot and the like) I think we need something like the Viking/Warhog, but do we need anything in the middle? Only if it is in the 15-25t class (i.e. along the lines of SEP). A 30-40t wheeled vehicle for war fighting I don’t think we need, hence my support of RANGER or RG35.
As I stated before I think there are new vehicles just about to go in to production that could radically reduce the types of vehicles we need viz:
Ocelot (in many falvours 4×4 and 6×6) replacing all the Land rovers, Pinz’s, Jackal’s RB44 and Panther and even Husky and elements of CVRT.
Ranger/RG35 (gain procured in many versions) this can replace Saxon, Ridgeback, Mastiff some of the more bespoke versions of Land rover, some of the CVRT and FV432/Bulldog roles.
Warrior/CV90 for everthing else plus of course CR2 and AS90 and the engineering types Trojan/Titan and Terrier.
So essentially 3 vehicle types can replace in excess of 10 to 15 existing vehicles including (WMIK,Snatch,Jackal 1&2, RB44,Coyote,MWIMK,Ridgback,Mastiff,Husky,Standard HMT 400/600 supacats,Pinzgauer,Vector and panther).
Just think od the savings in terms of logistics, stock levels and training, not to mention better vehicles for everyone.
FRES contract announcement in the budget according to the sunday papers
[...] the excellent review of British Scout modern history in FRES Scout – Spot the Difference on [...]
I was the MOD FRES desk officer 2002-2004, and wrote the initial gate business case as well as the paper which cancelled our MRAV participation.
The fundamental problem at the time was the political direction from the Strategic Defence Review – written by the MOD but signed off politically without an understanding of what we were letting ourselves in for.
Back then, in the light of Gulf War I, Bosnia, Kosovo, Sierra Leone, we had cobbled together as rapid interventions as we could manage, and felt pleased with ourselves and our ‘agility’. In retrospect, we were falling for the oldest error in the book – that of planning to fight the last war again.
The fundamental mathematical problem that if you protect a vehicle to war-fighting standards then you don’t fit it into an aircraft (at least, not within a sensible budget and with no aircraft that we own) rapidly hit home, and it became a battle between the visionaries who overtly wished to compete with the US, and the progamtics, led by DRAC, who wanted to make sure that we kept some armoured troops alive to fight the battle.
Then the scale of the necessary FRES buy became apparent through the AV Rationalisation process. The number of vehicles we would need to buy to make the project work had shot up by over 400%, and we were looking to backload the second 10 years of the procurement budget with billions of non-existent money.
After that there was little hope for a coherent programme.
The point about the time lag in the procurement process is right, in that it is ponderous at best. Of course there are such massive integration complexities out there nowadays that rapidity is challenging. Maybe this could be speeded up by the adoption of openly published standardisation, to encourage entrepreneurialism. The latter quality is a very expensive investment, and advantages those already in the defence industry circle.
Thanks Andy, very interesting comment
We seem to have been seduced by the latest in military fashion and self evidently failed to realise there is a world beyond PowerPoint. MRAv and TRACER seemed rooted in reality and stood a good chance of creating something useful (Boxer is evidence of that) the money we have wasted is scandalous
Fascinating insight from a MOD person, thanks AndyP !
In many ways these problems can still be rectified. Where we have missed out is in the fact that use by the British Army would almost certainly enhance export potential of a variety of equipment so the MOD need to get into an effective deal with BAE, Supacat, Universal Engineering. Non-American equipment would be of interest to a number of nations and could be expected to pick up a number of orders. Whilst making a loss, equipment maybe not up to task like the Panther could be sold on and replaced by more suitable equipment.
Take FRES. In addition to exisiting variants of the CV90 there is now the Armadilo. The SEP design has evolved into the Alligator and BAE also have the RG41. All would have enhanced export prospects if bought by the MOD, and with a potential requirement of 5000 vehicles – including the replacement eventually of Warrior – this would certainly look attractive in future overseas competitions.
Force Protection seem to have almost exclusivity in heavily armoured vehicles, with the Tempest, Warthog, Wolfhound and Husky as well as the Ocelot. Why not offer up a British competitor in the 4×4 and 6×6 Ranger, and the SP400 – economies of scales with export orders might make these more affordable and there would certainly be an economic justification in buying British.
The French, Korean and other nations seem to be able to create an effective defense industry which supports their armed forces. We need to stop thinking of always buying American and actually start putting into service some excellent designs that the like of BAe and Qinetiq have developed recently.
Very interesting recap and fills in a lot of the backstory that I wasn’t aware of.
One thing that seems to be missed in the debate is why are we trying to counter IEDs and RPGs with land vehicles. Yes, if you want to do that with a light AV, you need to add tons of armour, which pushes you into the Warrior (or even Challenger) weight classes and all the air-lift/terrain problems those entail.
But the simple fact is that you can take out even a 70-ton MBT with the right mines or shells, so just jacking up the armour isn’t going to cut it. It’s going to have to be the Northern Ireland solution: get off the roads and use helicopters for all logistics and troop movements.
Yeah, that’s not very palatable given how p*ss-poor the support helicopter situation is, but it’s something that will actually work, rather than getting into an arms race of armour weight vs IED size, which we’ll lose.
King of Wrong , Welcome to TD
Have a look here for some further thoughts on defeating the IED
http://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/2010/07/fdr-land-logistics-and-combat-service-support-1/
http://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/2010/07/flails-and-the-pookie/
http://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/2010/06/is-talisman-too-little-too-late/
http://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/2010/02/makes-a-change-from-a-vallon/
http://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/2010/02/actions-on-ied/
http://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/2009/08/on-the-subject-of-ieds/
http://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/2009/08/mine-and-ied-resistant-vehicles/
Cheers!
Lots of amazing articles there – seems like this is something that’s been solved, and then forgotten about, time and time again. Presumably because every time it’s solved, the enemy gives up on that tactic and does something else, so it’s no longer a capability we need… until we get rid of it… I particularly like the Pookies :)
(Oh, and my favourite was #14 – the REME approach – though #15 was a close second)
The King of Wrong
“It’s going to have to be the Northern Ireland solution: get off the roads and use helicopters for all logistics and troop movements.”
This will never happen due the huge helicopter resources needed and also the Americans tried it in vietnam with the Air Cav and got cut to pieces. With the heavy calibre russian machine guns and cheap and effective SHORAD (even RPGs) have made unprotected and tactically unplanned mass helicopter trips suicide so i am afraid vehicles are here to stay.
Admin whats the consensus in what is going to replace the bulldog/saxon in the Mech brigades now FRES has hit the buffers, will it be a tracked vehicle ASCOD/CV90/SEP/WARTHOG, a wheeled apc BOXER/PIRANHA etc or a protected mobility vehicle such as BUSHMASTER/WILDCAT/MASTIFF/RANGER.
@IanB:
I agree that it won’t happen, but not because it’s impossible – because we’ll have pulled out long before we could get sufficient helicopters into theatre.
Vietnam was a long time ago – complex weapons have improved a great deal since then. That’s not to say SHORAD isn’t a threat, it most certainly is, and a severe one. But it’s also a known threat – the MANPADS likely available to the Taliban, Stingers and RPG7s, are old and known… they’re what modern defensive aid suites are designed to beat.
Critically, Terry Taliban can’t improve on them – he has no access to the technology needed to build those weapons. IEDs? Sure. He can add more explosives to those – double, triple, how big a crater do you want? But the MANPADS are (at best) 1980s tech, limited in number, and of fixed capability.
Heavy machine guns are a problem, but a 50 cal would make a mess of most ground vehicles, too… Only way to be safe there is to find and destroy them(!)
But, yeah, it’s not going to happen that way.