To set the scene for this post, our earlier suggestion of cancelling CVF and JCA was nothing short of a brutal cost saving measure. Some may argue that significant costs have already been sunk and contracts signed, to cancel now would not result in any savings. This is simply not the case, yes, there would be a great deal of waste but to continue means even more cost for both the RN and RAF because you can’t have an aircraft carrier with no aircraft. The pressure on the defence equipment budget as a whole will also inevitably mean reductions in capability elsewhere, across all three services, something has to give. It also fails to recognise the reality of the mono culture in UK military shipbuilding, cancelling would need some compensation and tough negotiating combined with a solid commitment to future business but would not be the disaster many paint it as being.
As an attempt at a more balanced fleet the suggestion on Think Defence was a slight increase in the Astute numbers to 8, keeping Type 45 at 6, a small quantity (6) fully specified C1 and a couple of novel C2/C3 concepts from a number of our contributors. Obviously with the loss of maritime fast jet aviation we would be out of the forced entry amphibious game although the combination of UAV’s, FLAADS/CAMM, Attack Helicopter and Type 45 might mitigate some of the loss of capability.
That is not to say that we could not still engage in amphibious operations because not all operations are in the teeth of advanced jet fighters so we should accept a capability reduction and recognise that future operations may have to be conducted in conjunction with allies that can provide the fast jet component.
To bring our FDR Maritime section to a close the next few posts are on amphibious/logistics capabilities and a look at a few innovative concepts.
The Royal Navy currently has 2 Landing Platform Dock (LPD), HMS Albion and HMS Bulwark and together with the Landing Platform Helicopter (HMS Ocean) form the forward element of an amphibious operation. Supporting assets are the 4 Bay class Landing Ship Dock (Auxiliary) and the RFA Point class RORO vessels (although these are not strictly amphibious in the truest sense of the word)
Bay Class LPD(A)
HMS Bulwark (Albion Class)
HMS Ocean
Hurst Point (Point Class RORO)
Taken together it is a reasonably sized and capable force although as can be expected, short in some areas.
The Albion class do not go out of service until 2033 and 2034 but HMS Ocean in 2022, acting in the auxiliary LPH role the 2 remaining CVS are also due out of service in 2012 and 2015. No plans have yet been made public for a replacement for HMS Ocean but it is widely thought that the second CVF will act in this role, although one might consider the QE class to be rather large.
If we are to cancel CVF there exists an obvious need to replace HMS Ocean.
There is an ongoing debate about the utility of specialist LPH and LPD versus the general purpose LHD. Many of the newer types of vessels coming into service with other navies seem to favour the general purpose LHD route with enhanced aviation and well decks; it is probably fair to say though that these are coming into service with navies that have smaller amphibious fleets than the RN so their vessels have to be jack of all trades. However, the RN is shrinking and these vessels will be operating alone more often than not so the flexibility offered by a LHD may well be worth accepting the inherent compromises.
With the inexorable rise in vehicle weight and volume as evidenced by the likes of FRES and PPV the specialist LPH becomes increasingly unable to support anything other than a light force. This light force would still be considered a Royal Marines area but even the Royal Marines have been subject to the weight trend. The Viking and Jackal being cases in point, both cannot be lifted by anything other than Chinook. This fact won’t change because there is a well deck, obviously, but the well deck means that a single vessel can support a more rounded and capable force alone, without the support of a Bay or Albion. The UK needs to get more out of its force so whilst the compromises imposed by having jack of all trades vessels are recognised, they are worth accepting.
The Spanish and Australian Navies have ordered similar designs in their Juan Carlos and Canberra class; at approximately 27,000 tonnes the Navantia BPE design is much larger than the Illustrious class and HMS Ocean. The design is inherently flexible and could operate F35B’s or helicopters; with hangar space for 12 aircraft, accommodation for over a 1000 troops, a well deck slightly larger than the Albion class, extensive hospital and command facilities. The design flexibility allows it to be used as an aircraft carrier although without the ability to generate sustained sortie rates or for an extended period.
Canberra Class
Juan Carlos Strategic Projection Ship LHD
If we were to replace to replace Ocean and the CVS class with a pair of these then the through life costs savings would be considerable, especially in crewing. As funds permit it might even be possible to obtain a third or fourth and operate them as a compact carrier with 6-8 F35B’s per ship, much less that the CVF of course but at least the RN could retain some fast jet aviation capability.
At a reported cost of less than 500 million Euros they would also seem excellent value for money.
The Bay class have proven to be exceedingly useful and versatile, they are relatively new so their replacement is somewhat out of scope for this post, perhaps more of the same would be useful.
Although strictly not an RFA asset the Point class, operating under a 25 year PFI, provide an excellent capability. Based on the Flensburger 2700 RORO design it has 2,700 vehicle lane metres, 10,000nm range and two access ramps. A total of 6 vessels are available for use, 4 manufactured at Flensburger and 2 at Harland and Wolff. Interestingly the project was completed 20 months ahead of schedule, the last of the class, Anvil Point, being launched in 2003.
Although the PFI concept seems to offer capability at a greater cost than outright purchase this one does show how they can be effectively operated, with little fuss or drama. The commercial charter market has seen significant shifts in the last couple of decades with the greater prevalence of the large and usually highly utilised pure car pure truck carrier, which cannot carry explosive cargoes because they do not have open decks (IMO regulations) so when the armed forces need vehicle and container shipping capacity the commercial market is less likely to be able to find suitable vessels.
As a part of this project only of 4 out of the 6 ships are used for the strategic joint rapid reaction force (JRRF) on a daily basis. The last two are chartered out on the commercial market but obviously available for MoD use when demand dictates. The Danish military have a similar concept (ARK), except they have a number of vessels on permanent charter.
The benefit of the UK approach is that the design can be dictated, for example the Point class have twin screws, rudders and bow thrusters which provide extreme manoeuvrability, have a shallow draught and reinforced and extended loading ramps for loading and unloading in a wide variety of locations. The double and strengthened hull increases build costs but given the monetary and operational value of likely cargoes mean this is a wise investment; something of note for those that seem to think that commercial off the shelf is always the answer.
As with the Bay class, their replacement is many years away.
Hi Steve – I suggested pretty much the same in this article:
http://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/2009/12/fdr-supporting-articles/
The consensus among our commentors is that we just could not play nicely enough with the French on a political level to make a go of it !
How about a crazy idea? Complete the 2 CVF’s to French specs for CATs and TRAPs exchange the second CVF for 3 MISTRAILS and a wing of RAFAEL-Ms this would allow both countries to maintain shipbuilding jobs and if the UK and France co-operated on refits would ensure that the EU would have 2 CVFs always available and allow joint carrier training between the UK and France.
Pick away please, I’m a stop learning start dieing kinda guy, I’d rather look like an idiot once than constantly, or at least not constantly for the same point…
I realise I’ve been saying Juan Carlos a lot, but I’ve also been looking at the diagram of Canberra, I’m not hugely set on a current design, its just those two carry more troops.
If the Cavour class can be modified to carry 800-1200 RM’s with the option of a little helicopterable armed (as opposed to armoured) vehicles, half a dozen F35B’s, some transport Helicopters, preferable enough for the fleet to empty itself in an afternoon, or overnight and some attack helicopters, I’m happy
Dont we use Merlins as big ASW platforms?
Lynxs are fine in that role, but Merlins are bigger, could we do without them?
You have hit upon the fundamental problem with the UK’s medium/heavy SH problems. Our equipment choice dictates TWO platforms (Merlin and Chinook) which as we know is a ‘bad thing’ exactly because one can be operated aboard ships and one can’t (at least properly)
Although I might have classed it as a ‘hair brain scheme’ at the time the more I think about the CH53X the more it makes sense from a long term investment and through life cost perspective. One common airframe for all SH taskings
Dominic, in the spirit of brainstorming, no ideas are bad, and I am certainly not picking them apart “on badness” as my boy would say !
However why spend the cash to redesign the Juan Carlos to NOT have a well deck, when the Cavour does not have one in the first place ?
On helo’s – unless the UK spends money on being the first Chinook operator to have folding blades capability, your never going to have more than a couple of them at sea whatever the platform. Even parked on the deck of the CV(F) it would take up a lot of space.
Lack of Helicopters is a problem, although we should soon have a fleet of 70 Chinooks, assuming we dont lose anymore and the current order isnt cancelled.
I would want (for plan later) 16-20
My guess for Oceans carrying capacity came from the picture above, in which it looks like there is space for two rows of six. I’d guess, “will fit on the deck” and “can be operated” are quite different things.
If you ruin my plan and say only 4 could be on deck at one time, could 4 not load, take off, 4 that are flying nearby land, load, take off, to be followed by another 4?
Or, could you launch 4 from each ship, which would land a full compliment of 800 marines, without seats during the flight.
If its just an issue of fitting Helicopters into the Ship, surely we could modify whatever light carrier design we settle on to carry the requisite number.
Its hardly an expert opinion, but if you sealed the Well deck and used it for stores/crew quarters, that would leave the top two decks as a large hanger for 8 F35’s or 16 Chinooks.
Just ideas, feel free to correct them
DominicJ said: “15 Chinooks could empty Ocean or a JC in a single flight, with 6 such ships and 30 helicopters we could have a Brigade landed in an afternoon.”
And there-in lies part of the problem, which we have discussed a great deal on this site, the lack of helicopters. However neither the Ocean nor Juan Carlos can carry 15 Chinooks ! Ocean carries 12 Sea King MK4 (Junglies) which can lift as two waves of 6 from her deck. If we replace them with AW101 and have all your Marines sat in seats for the assault, thats 6 x 24 = 144 sets of boots on the ground per wave, roughly a Company. Of course with less Lynx or Apaches onboard you could cram a couple more troop carriers ! However if its ‘critical mass’ of infantry for an assault your after, you need USMC not RN / RM, because we will never have enough decks, docks or helos. So, more limited use cases / scenarios for our capabilities I think.
I’m basing my opinion on the all mighty Wikipedia, so you’ll have to forgive me, but I dont see much difference between the two except that the Juan Carlos has a much bigger embarked marine force.
Your right we have plenty of other Well Decks for landing heavy vehicles, presumably it wouldnt be difficult to convert that to something else?
I suppose my worry is we have very little capacity for landing infantry at the moment, especialy at speed.
15 Chinooks could empty Ocean or a JC in a single flight, with 6 such ships and 30 helicopters we could have a Brigade landed in an afternoon.
With dug in ground troops and 20-25 aircraft providing air cover the vulnerable landing docks could start landing heavier equipment.
The only alternative I see is to land 800 a day and keep the rest on a requisitioned cruise ship…
While I agree in principle, I don’t see the need to add more dock and more heavy vehicle lane space. The Aussies, Spaniards (and too a lesser extent) the Italians and French don’t have the well rounded amphib force that we do. So I would like to see 4 x Cavour type ships instead, so that at any time we could have one as LPH and one as support carrier (with the remaining Harrier GR9). We are not going to kick any doors down with that force, but think Sierra Leone type ops.
Of course the other reason to properly fund logistics / amphib capabilities is soft power / diplomacy scenarios. Think of the Asian Tsunami and now Haiti. The USN has the biggest amphib / military transport force in the world by a long way, and we are never going to get anywhere near it, but if the next big natural disaster was to hit a Caribbean ex-colony, that is a member of the Commonwealth, then an ARG including an LPH, and Albion, 2 x Bay and 4 x ro-ro, a Fort (II) class and the Argus in casualty receiving mode is NOT a force to be sniffed at!
In such a scenario the Dutch JSS type ship as a replacement for the Forts, as mentioned in the next article on replenishment, would also be a very valuable asset.
So while using ‘robust’ kinetics in Helmand province is an absolutely valid operational concept, any Government which under funds these kinds of capabilities is shooting itself in the foot.
This is kind of where I’ve been heading with my thinking on a Strategic Raiding Force.
In reality, we should be able to fund four of these in place of a single CVA.
Could one of these carry 4 F35’s, 800 Royal Marines, half a dozen heavy helicopters and a couple of Apaches?
If so, those 4 could deploy 16 F35B, 3600 Royal Marines, with some helicopters for transport and a reasonable number of Apaches.
Add in the Bay and Albion Class ships, and we have a serious fighting force deployable very very quickly.
Not enough to invade anyones homeland on our own, but more than enough to win when both sides are fighting an expeditionary war.
If you can double up the airgroup at the expense of troop carrying, they make acceptable Light Carriers, and presumably ASW Helicopter Carriers.
We arent going to be able to land a force in the face of heavy, sustained resistance from fast jets and national armies alone, but thats what friends with white elephant carriers and Armoured Divisions are for.
No doubt the Ocean has “put some hours in” but when shecreaches her official retirement date, do you think she might have enough life left to be transfered to the RFA to replace the Argus ????