The escort fleet of destroyers and frigates provides the combat backbone of the Royal Navy. Whilst capabilities have certainly increased the so called ‘tyranny of distance means that however more capable the Type 42 is than the Type 45, it cannot be in two places at once. It might be obvious but worth saying anyway, ships do not deploy at the speed of aircraft, so reducing numbers has a dramatic affect on the ability of the Royal Navy to fulfil its missions.
Increasing costs and reducing budgets conspire to produce a procurement ‘death spiral’ where increasing cost means fewer can be purchased which increases costs again and so on. The Type 42‘s replacement, the Type 45 is a good example. The Type 42 was arguably too small and too ill equipped for its primary mission of air defence, its ultimate replacement is the Type 45. An all too familiar tale of acquisition blundering means that each Type 45 is in the order of a billion pounds, we have only ordered 6, replacing 14 Type 42’s
However capable they are, they can only bring this capability to bear if they are where they are needed. Six is a dangerously low number and full 50% of the planned order.
Compounding this problem is the ever widening mission and geographical nature of what the RN is being required to fulfil. When the Type 45 was conceived as part of the ultimately doomed NFR-90 programme in the mid 1980’s the Cold War was still the only game in town. The asymmetric nature of warfare has impacted the maritime domain as much as any other with missions and threats being more diverse.
Traditionally the Royal Navy has concentrated on high end escorts as befitted its role in the Cold War but the changing nature of missions and threats has led, at last, to the recognition that a single fleet, optimised for high intensity war fighting but in small numbers because of economics, would no longer be viable. Various design studies have led to an acceptance that a two tier fleet is required; the culmination of these studies is the Future Surface Combatant.
The FSC describes two classes of flexible vessels to replace the existing Type 22 and Type 23 Frigates.
C1, Task Enabled Surface Combatant for force Anti Submarine Warfare and Precision Strike in high threat environments and medium to large scale warfighting operations
C2, Stabilisation Surface Combatant (General Purpose), this is a lower cost and lower capability design designed for lower threat environments or where smaller scale war fighting operations are required. It will also be able to contribute in a meaningful way to the larger operations.
C3, a common small design to replace the various mines countermeasures, patrol and survey ships, these are not included in the FSC concept but are worth including here
The key to FSC is timing, a reduced Type 45 requirement, CVF build and the Type 22/Type 23 decommissioning presents an obvious construction management problem, another way in which military requirements are subverted by the needs of industry.
With the reduction to 6 Type 45’s the pay off was an earlier introduction of the FSC but the newest Type 23 is only 8 years old. The Type 22 Batch 3 frigates will of course be withdrawn sooner although when exactly is not clear. It was hoped that FSC would be entering service in 2019 to coincide with the first withdrawal date of the Type 23’s (the Type 22’s having gone by then).
Subsequent to this the out of service dates for the Type 23’s have been extended, the first one planned for 2023 and the last, 2036.
The Chief Executive of BVT stated that building could start as soon as 2013 to coincide with the 2019 expected first entry into service. The dangers of creating a large gap between shipbuilding contracts are writ large in the Astute programme so if the UK wishes to retain any semblance of ship building industry, even if it is to all intents and purposes a publically funded private monopoly, then we have to take account of the timing.
It is a complex game of three dimensional chess, where the shape of the board keeps changing and someone regularly steals the pieces.
The FSC programme has attracted little public attention but arguably is more important to both the Royal Navy and the UK’s security than CVF or perhaps even, Trident.
Our earlier discussion on cancelling CVF/JCA all together was primarily around costs, removing this significant cost area would free up a significant portion of the RN and wider defence budget.
I think the FSC programme, along with Type 45, Astute, the RFA and C3 has a greater strategic significance for the UK and RN than naval fast jet aviation and it is along this principle that the next series of posts will examine options for a more numerous, useful and relevant surface and sub surface fleet.
Quality vs Quantity is a well used argument in defence procurement which is often used by politicians to justify cuts and we all know that Quantity has a Quality all of its own. Another counter argument is that while Air Defence technology has advanced considerably, offensive weaponry has not exactly stood still. Unit costs and numbers are indeed a death spiral it is one that perpetuates when politicians fiddle with contracts rather than placing the contract and leaving it alone until it is complete. Costs rise, politicians fiddle, costs rise again and then numbers are cut resulting in much smaller production runs with no economy of scale ending in a end product that is extremely expensive and too few in number.
I don’t think things have to be this bad for instance if we look at other nations they seem to be doing a better job with some innovative thinking and manage to get more for their money. It would have been wiser for the RN to use the same missiles and launchers as the USN due to much lower costs. Developing PAAMS was extremely expensive and the missiles are European products not British so there would have been no loss of missile manufacturing capabilities while saving substantial sums of money and having access to large US missile stocks. I’m not saying we should have bought Aegis but should have done something similar to the Dutch and Germans using indigenous combat and radar systems off the shelf missiles and launchers.
Any future for the RN must be as a two-tiered force the top tier consisting of major fleet units such as Carriers (or no carriers) and amphibious units such as the Albion class as well as any future LPH replacements. These will be escorted by Type 45 destroyers and C1 class frigates, if there is only ever one major surface unit deployed or if the carriers are cancelled the 6 T45’s should suffice. In my opinion a bare minimum of 2 additional Type 45 destroyers need to be ordered if the carriers are not cancelled. This would give a possible high end naval force of 2 CVF, 2 LPD, 2 LPH escorted by 16 high end escorts split between AAW and ASW, this would maintain the core capabilities of the RN. The lower tier would consist of around 12 multi-purpose C2 class vessels alongside 12 (Ideally double that number) C3 class vessels. Depending on what is chosen for C2, C3 these vessels could be cheap and numerous or they could suffer from capability creep and end up being expensive vessels available in only small numbers.
From the shipbuilding perspective even with the currently projected low future orders the possibility exists for at least 20 new large escorts which should keep shipyards busy for almost a decade if they are launched at 2 per year. If work started on the first C1 and C2 simultaneously in 2017 the last ship would be launched around 2027 by which time HMS Ocean would need replaced. This should provide some security in theory but in reality schedules will no doubt be pushed back and at least for the sensible numbers could not be cut any further. A slight niggle in my view is that my choice of C2 would be an Absalon class clone which I would rather be built and fitted out in the same yard in Denmark. The reason is yard that built them is a well renowned commercial yard and would most likely deliver on time and on cost as they have already done an excellent job building 2 of them and would essentially be under contract. I realise that it would be difficult politically but I’m confident it would be a better decision than letting Big And Expensive and MoD project management near what is essentially a sound ship design. I would place the order with an incentive for on time cost and delivery then leave the yard alone to do what it knows how to do without some bureaucrats fiddling with the contract.
A random guestimation on costs, The Absalon cost roughly £200 Million per ship “The actual cost for the entire Absalon class program, completely equipped, is quoted as 2.7B Kroner (Cdn $565M).” That quote is taken from CASR http://www.casr.ca/id-danish-naval-projects-absalon.htm. Even if it is out by a few tens of millions it is still what seems like an excellent price of course the systems used were essentially of the shelf. The cost for a C1 is anyone’s guess but I would be aiming for no more than £400 Million if it were based on an existing hull design at this price it should be possible to include Sampson. The cost guestimation for a C3 would be in or around £100 Million based on what Oman paid for the project khareef class OPV’s, BVT has developed a C3 proposal from this design.
I agree with Euan here, the navy needs to be double tiered. An upper “strategic raiding”/”war fighting” fleet of CVF, T45, C1, LPH and LPD, which would be the main component of any large fleet but in times of peace would be able to offer assistance to patrolling, anti-piracy ops, humanitarian aid, evacuation of citizens ala Lebanon etc, especially if someone has the good sense to give C1 two helis.
Then the navy needs it’s lower tier of cheaper ships, the need to be cheap because we need many. C2 doesn’t need bells and whistles it needs low crew requirements, two heli’s and preferably some armed sea boats a little more substantial than some dinghies (Iran hostage situation would have looked different if the boarding party had been driving something CB 90 H ish, ie fast, armoured and bristling with guns.) C2 needs to be a ship in numbers that can be sent somewhere just to be a navy ship, could be escort for merchant shipping around Somalia, could be counter narcotics operations, the more C2 the better. On the other hand, we probably want them to be some use at war if only to boost numbers. A cargo deck would be useful for carrying stuff to reduce dependence on civilian charters, heli’s can do ASW and they should probably have some missile point defences along with some anti shipping missiles of only because if we need to launch a few we won’t want to distract the T45 or C1 from their places in the fleet.
Also of note are a few hansard links with the latest plans for ship decommissioning.
For the carriers and amphibious ships followed by T23 and then T22.
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200708/cmhansrd/cm081106/text/81106w0011.htm
For T45 in service dates, sub and T22 (identical to first) out of service dates
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200809/cmhansrd/cm090303/text/90303w0014.htm
and for T23 (identical to above) and T42 out of service dates
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200809/cmhansrd/cm090303/text/90303w0015.htm
Admin – thoroughly agree with your assessment of the strategic and tactical importance of the surface fleet.
Euan – your right, if T45 had the same Radar / missile combination as the Dutch Seven Provinces class they would have been much cheaper, but what is, is.
I don’t like talking about “tiered” fleets – I would rather talk about a spectrum of capabilities, because while it might not be as cost efficient as a el cheapo C3, a T45 can do anti-piracy patrol, similarly the C2 should be able to be an important integral part of a task group taking on a peer or near peer adversary – Ashley notes this point when taking about the C2 as well.
With respect to ship building, if we cut the F35 JCA completely, then I hope we could afford at least 2 more T45. One reason I suggested basing C1 on the T45 is lever the sunk costs, and move straight into making the most of experience gained building the T45′s in order to quickly replace the remaining T22′s. Also provide a ship, while modified for open ocean towed array ops, that could have a cheaper anti-air system than PAAMS (no L1850, fixed phased array cheaper then SAMPSON) but still carry Aster 15, thus reinforcing the low number of T45′s somewhat.
Replacing the excellent general purpose T22B3 with the C1 must therefore be the ship building priority. Of course if we agree on at least 8 (maybe 10) C1′s, then some T23′s could be sold off earlier (with some useful life left in them). Then C3 should be next, because there is still a vibrant market for second hand Hunt and Sandown class MCMV’s.
If T23′s are being kept longer, then 3 years from now to 2013 (a date you mention for beginning of construction) to reconfigure the Absalon design for the RN seems reasonable !
Ref building them in Denmark, maybe we should split any such procurement, with the MOD(N) being the UK design authority NOT a commercial entity such as BAe – MOD could then tender and various dockyards could compete for the orders ???
Finally if the Absalon is roughly 200 million pounds per fully equipped ship (not including embarked Helo’s) then with projected F35 unit price increases to $100 million U.S. (about 61,920,000 pounds according to FT.com) it appears to be somewhere between 3 and 4 F35′s for 1 very useful general purpose warship !!
Yeah Jed that was an example of the wonders of hindsight
I disagree I think the concept of a two-tiered fleet is a good idea in theory at least, I’m not suggesting there be a complete disconnect between the two tiers. C2 for example would still be a highly capable ship in its own right but the capability would have a broader spread covering many areas of interest. The emphasis in both training and design would be on presence, multi-role capability and supportability rather than on focused mission sets like the C1 or T45. For example the C2 and C3’s should ideally stick to using large commercial diesel engines that have lower running and purchase costs although they have disadvantages from a military point of view such as noise. The higher end escorts would be trained primarily for the task group escort role so that they become proficient in this role something that could be argued has been neglected in recent years as they have been forced to act alone. They would also be equipped for this role with CEC alongside other network enabled capabilities being of importance as well as being designed from the start to fulfil this function for example high sustained speeds and survivability. These warships could be used for lower end operations however it would as you have pointed out be inefficient compared to using a C2 or C3 class vessel.
One thing I keep coming back to in my own mind is how the vessels could be employed, I can see a strong case for pairing 2 C3 with a C2 and an RFA tanker for quite a few situations. The C2 would act as the hub for the action group providing C&C and defence as well as possibly providing space for maintenance of equipment at sea. It would also have the space to accommodate additional manpower or equipment such as mission modules for the C3’s allowing them to be re-roled in theatre at a small port. For example with the current anti-piracy deployments of Somalia the C3’s would be the end effectors doing the actual pirate catching and once the pirates are caught they are transported by Merlin to a C2 for processing. The pirates would then be held until a decision is made upon their fate and then either taken by helicopter or by the ship itself to a final destination. During larger fleet operations the C2’s would fill out the task group providing facilities for special forces operations and bulking up protection to important assets by providing close escort. The C2 could also carry out mine warfare by deploying offboard systems however this is best left to the smaller cheaper and more numerous (hopefully) C3. If the C2 could be equipped with CEC for a reasonable cost then it would be more useful in a fleet situation however this is capability creep in my eyes which leads to lower numbers and inappropriate taskings for an asset. C3’s would have little use within a fleet apart from mine warfare under the fleet’s protective umbrella or as supply chain escorts although they would definitely need additional equipment.
In response to building the Absalon class in Denmark when I say Denmark the hulls are actually built in blocks and if the build follows the same pattern as the frigates under construction these blocks came from Lithuania and Estonia. So the chances of a BAE built Absalon being anywhere near the cost of what the Danish paid are nil I could not even begin to guess how much it would cost to build the vessels in the UK. Another reason for wanting them built abroad is that fact that Odense is a commercial yard so if HMG started fiddling the contract the yard could turn round and say no, deal with it or go elsewhere we have plenty of work to be getting on with. One odd problem is that the yard may want to build them 3 or 4 at a time like what they are doing with the current frigates because they actually have an order book. The RN could end up getting its 12 frigates within as little as 3-4 years after the dotted line is signed this is a problem as how the heck are the RN going to train that many people that quickly. Being pretentious there could even be a shock to the system if 12 ships arrived on time and close to contract cost BAE would look like idiots if they made a mess of the C1 order.
I think I’m with Jed on not talking about tiered systems, if we call C1/T45 the upper tier and C2/C3 the lower tier then we’ll end up with a brain drain as anyone capable goes straight for the upper tier and spends their entire career sitting in port waiting for the big one while the “lower” tier actually goes and gets experience. Not to mention the moral implications of the upper tier staying at home and the lower tier going and doing stuff.
Talk about deploying in a fleet and deploying independently/in a small group. T45 and probably C1 need to be trained to defend and lead a fleet, C2 needs to be taught how to operate independently, in a large fleet and lead a small group of other C2/C3/resupply ships. C3 will mostly work as independent patrol and small groups of C3 and C2.
In other words, we need a buzz word for low intensity operations that makes them sound better than sitting in port, waiting for a big war that may never come.
Ashley, rest assured with the poxy remnant of a ‘fleet’ that we are going to be left with, that the last bit of this just aint gonna happen:
“In other words, we need a buzz word for low intensity operations that makes them sound better than sitting in port, waiting for a big war that may never come.”
The buzz words are “Maritime Domain Security Operations” – this encompass anti-piracy, anti-drug smuggling, anti-people smuggling, anti-everything smuggling….. we don’t need to invent it, its the bread and butter peace time work of western navies. Do we need to make it more sexy – well I seem to remember RN recruitment adverts at the cinema and on telly in the UK before I left which made it drug busting seem quite sexy !
The reason for the two tiers is mainly down to cost which is the biggest driver in defence and the biggest driver in everything these days. Basically the escorts would concentrate more on the fleet aspect so that they are better prepared for when not if the shit hits the fan at some point. Of course they would still have to do maritime security operations we don’t have enough assets for them not to do so but it would not be the Raison d’être. The lower end should concentrate more on the maritime security bread and butter their Raison d’être while still spending some time doing fleet op’s so that they still know what to do.
C2 is of course the crossover point depending on what is chosen, it will need to be competent at both roles with a broad mix of capabilities in high and low of the spectrum. However if it leans too much towards the fleet side of things it will be another class of fleet escort via the back door no doubt meaning more expensive that what is needed. More expensive or more capable means fewer hulls which would essentially negate the whole point of having the C2 class in the first place you may as well order some additional C1 and be done with it. The reason I’m a big fan of the Absalon and the reason why I keep harking on about it is because I feel it has a good balance needed for the C2 role. Once someone has read all the information available and see the visual media if they are not convinced that the Absalon would be the ideal off the shelf choice then I don’t know what else to say. I’ve been lucky enough to see them a few times up reasonably close (I’m on the shore it’s a few hundred feet offshore) so maybe I’ve fallen under its spell.
What I think we should try to avoid in future is the situation the USN and RN are in currently, they send a proper warship with all the gongs and whistles to chase pirates or patrol the Caribbean. This is a role that should and could be filled with something much smaller chugging along on 2 commercial diesels burning far less fuel and being much cheaper to maintain, operate, crew and procure in the first place. Such vessels are also far more relevant for training with locals as the last time I checked there are not many islands or small nations with the aspiration to get hold of a type 23.
Either way Ashley I can be certain there will be very little sitting at home doing nothing we will still be in the trap of having more taskings than we have ships, if this changes the Op tempo could be lowered from running around like a headless chicken to something a little calmer. However politicians love signing the RN up for these things and the RN wants to look busy so politicians won’t cut ships but they seem to do it anyway.
Euan – I totally undestand ‘tiers’ is all about cost. The reason I don’t like to discuss a ‘tiered’ force is because we actually can not afford a fleet of OPV’s to do maritime security ops that have no role at all in medium or high intensity operation. That does not mean every vessel has to be an exquisite and thus expensive, gold plated T45 variant though…
I totally agree ref Absalon. Try discovery.co.uk as in the Discovery Channel and see if you can get the episode of “Mighty Ships” that was filmed onboard Absalon while she was Commander CTF150 in the Gulf of Aden.
Also check out these excellent phots on Photobucket, including some internal schematics:
http://s296.photobucket.com/albums/mm200/fsorensen/Ships/Absalon/?start=all
I think I will do a detailed article and send it to Admin on why Absalon derivative would be the perfect C2
Erm! i think C2 just got ditched.