Although the theme of these articles is the future it is worthwhile looking back at how the RN has changed over the last twenty years or so. Of course, its decline started much earlier as with the other arms. This decline has coincided with the changing strategic context in which the UK operates, control of the high seas has been seen as less important that air and land power.
The 1998 SDR defined the transition from North Atlantic anti submarine force to that of an expeditionary capability, able to project power great distances.
The Royal Navy has very little scope for cost reductions that don’t involve ship reductions, it is capital intensive and the rising costs of the Type 45, Astute and CVF have shown that defence inflation is exacerbating the problem.
The Royal Navy has maintained a zealous commitment to the CVF and JCA, it would seem, to the detriment of its other capabilities. The middle bulk of the RN has withered whilst funding has been maintained for the high end, carriers, submarines and destroyers. Escorts, patrol and mines countermeasures have suffered withering reductions in either capability or numbers.
The diagram above visualises the shape of the Royal Navy in the last 20 years, it is narrowing whilst the top end is retained, even though it is the middle section that seems to be in most demand. The true picture is actually worse than shown because it does not show vessels at so called extended readiness and the 2009 figures do not show the recently announced reductions. The future is looking even worse with planned numbers of destroyers, SSN and RFA vessels smaller than the class they replace.
Future Surface Combatant and other studies have sought to address this mismatch, recognising that there will be a need for the high end but the reducing numbers of all purpose escorts is going beyond breaking point, a reduced spec general purpose C2 and C3 class is a recognition that the RN can’t have number AND capability.
Is the RN turning into an ‘all fur coat and no knickers’ force, dangerously top heavy with no width?
In line with the other FDR proposals I am going to look at options for sacrificing some capabilities, retaining a smaller high end core yet having a greater number of capabilities that suit the more prevalent and likely tasks the RN is doing today and likely to have to do tomorrow.
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1 Comments
I’ve come to the same conclusion with my recent series on the Falklands. I am a believer in the capabilities of the aircraft carrier and amphibious power, but having such big and expensive assets without the escorts to work with them is asking to be caught on the hop. Not only that but the frequency with which RFA’s are being used for escort duties or patrols illustrates the crippling shortage of Frigates and Destroyers.
Mike Burleson on New Wars has used an interesting concept – the triangle, whereby a fleet should ‘pyramid-shaped’ in terms of make-up.