FDR – The RAF and Airpower, Introduction

It is often said that the RAF has an excellent PR department that always manages to unfairly maintain its share of the defence budget. There is no doubt the RAF always presents its public face in a very professional manner; one might argue that it has to, after all no other arm has to face constant calls for its disbandment.

Before pushing on with the post a quick word on merging, the Canadians tried it and it was a disaster, the application of offensive and defensive air power requires a dedicated force whose whole reason for existence is control of the air and the effect that can have as a means both unto itself and in support of maritime and ground operations.

A couple of quotes worth highlighting

Air power is indivisible. If you split it up into compartments, you merely pull it to pieces and destroy its greatest asset – its flexibility.

— Field Marshall Bernard Mongomery

If we lose the war in the air we lose the war and lose it quickly.

— Field Marshall Bernard Montgomery

Given that we should maintain the RAF as a separate and dedicated combat arm what is its future, how should it be structured, what should we be buying?

There exists a confusing, illogical and wasteful duplication of control over airborne assets between the three services. The RAF owns support helicopters but the Army Air Corps has Attack Helicopters and Light Utility Helicopters, all three arms have fixed aircraft and unmanned systems are or soon will be operated, again, by all three services and in the Army’s case, by the Royal Artillery.

Inter service rivalry has always trumped sensible division of capabilities and in a shrinking force this becomes ever more wasteful. All three services must swallow their pride and accept that a re-organisation is needed. There are very good reasons why one service should have this or that system but however good these reasons are, they do not trump the need for operational efficiency and financial prudence.

There is also the ever present ‘if it’s not broken, let’s not fix it’ argument which is persuasive but again doesn’t trump the need for efficiency. As we have blogged a number of times, there are tough times ahead for defence and budgets are going to be under pressure for a long time, the culling of sacred cows should not be shied away from.

In thinking about what to do the first thing is to think about the nature of conflict, what outcomes air power is required to provide and what requirements underpin those outcomes.

• Air Dominance
• Strike
• Intelligence
• Sustainment

The RAF faces a number of problems; a reduced number of Typhoons on order, delays in the Meteor missile, programme delays and significant cost increases in the JCA, delays in the A400, massive overstretch in the strategic and tactical transport fleet, reduced numbers of MRA4, no realistic funding for a Tornado replacement, uncertainty on UAS development, manning issues and problems in the support helicopter fleet that we have recently done to death.

The following set of proposals is based on a number of principles;

1. Invest to save; short term investments can produce significant long term savings. Commonality and standardisation must be the mantra by which our armed forces are equipped

2. Requirements are changing; more transport and ISR at the expense of fast jet combat aircraft

3. A common theme that we often discuss is that of standardisation, even at the expense of some utility. One of the significant areas of cost inflation is that of through life support, equipments are expected to be in service longer and the proliferation of different airframes, engines, avionics, sensors and weapons add significantly to this through life cost. Decisions should be taken for the long term and over the long term; ruthless standardisation will reduce cost significantly.

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