The Joint Helicopter Command (JHC) is a typically British fudge which is intended to provide more a efficient cooperative working environment but is all about allowing all three services to maintain their own capabilities, inter service rivalry at its best. Whilst working well, it is self evidently resource inefficient.
Support helicopters are strategic assets; they often need to integrate with complicated airspace and the experience of airspace management within the RAF means they should stay. The RAF are also the acknowledged experts on the Chinook, both, from an operational and engineering perspective whilst these are persuasive arguments for the maintenance of the status quo but it is not sufficiently strong not to have support helicopters with the Army Air Corps so they can be better integrated with the Land component.
This should not be an overnight move and only when the AAC and supporting REME Regiments can support and manage the aircraft to the same level, personnel issues will also have to be carefully managed. Inevitably some RAF personnel will not wish to transfer to the AAC and this would be an unfortunate by product of the move but with careful and considered management its impact could be minimised.
Attack Helicopter has shown that the Army Air Corps can operate in an air minded manner with very complex equipment in a multinational airspace and the aim of any transfer should be to take the best from the FAA, RAF and AAC, combining it into a single, Army led, capability.
The Army Air Corps have also demonstrated that SNCO aircrew can effectively manage and operate more than just simple utility helicopters so in the long term, running costs can be reduced.
The Fleet Air Arm operates Merlins, Sea Kings and Lynx. In later posts we will propose that the Royal Marines and RAF Regiment are bought within the Land domain so for the RM specifically, much of the Fleet Air Arm helicopter capability supports the RM with comparatively few in what would be termed fleet helicopters, those that carry out anti submarine and anti surface roles. The largest challenge to overcome will be that of crewing/retention and training for both aircrew and systems operators but a single service for all rotary assets should be a long term goal in order to maximise efficiency and minimise duplication. The instances of aircrew in non aircrew roles should be closely examined and an adequate career progression path for all ranks, whilst still in aircrew roles should be a priority.
All three services rotary communities have much to offer in one way or the other and strong arguments could be made for consolidation in either of them
This would create a single entity with a common manning and training framework that would be able to achieve economies of scale and greatly enhanced flexibility.
Merging the existing rotary communities, beyond that offered by Joint Helicopter Command, would be a significant challenge but tradition has to go by the wayside and hard nosed operational efficiency has to be the order of the day.
There is no doubt that helicopters provide a significant advantage in all types of conflict but it could be argued that in the type of conflict we will most likely be involved in that importance will be greatly amplified. Our poor decisions and scrimping has resulted in an overly expensive and poorly utilised fleet of too many types and marks.
In our previous post on rotary fleet coherence we suggested a consolidation of types and the recent news on Puma and Chinook upgrades along with reports of a significant Chinook buy are encouraging but simply do not go far enough. One of our central themes in the FDR is the cancellation of CVF and JCA, some of the funds freed up from this should go towards a significant uplift in rotary capability.
Chinooks are fast, can operate in adverse conditions and have a significant payload capacity but they do not operate well in a marine environment, the airframes are not fully marinised and the rotors do not fold making them difficult to handle. The Future Medium Helicopter programme was designed to replace the ageing Sea King and Puma so that any airframe could be used for both land and marine environments. The Puma upgrade and possible Chinook upgrade seems to have been knocked into the long grass.
If one examines the specifications of the Merlin and Chinook they seem to be quite similar and in an ideal world we would have one or the other, the Royal Naval anti submarine variant of the Merlin throws a spanner into the works of this type consolidation. In a similar parallel with the Lynx, the naval Merlin is a very effective aircraft but the land based utility version is much less so, it is hugely expensive and a little wheezy with much less payload than the similarly sized Chinook.
The Puma and Chinook life extension programmes are good examples of being forced to spend big because modest spending decisions were deferred. The Puma programme particularly appears quite poor value for money but does hold out the prospect of getting aircraft for Afghanistan. When the various upgrade programmes are complete we will have upgraded Lynx, Sea King, Puma, Merlin (HC3 and HC3a variants) and Chinook (multiple variants).
No wonder the aircraft maintainers are going bald!
We do not recommend further purchases of Merlin or Chinook at this stage because these will simply perpetuate this mix of aircraft types. The short term expedients are designed to generate airframes for Afghanistan but they do not solve medium or long term coherence requirements.
What would the fleet look like if a blank sheet of paper was the starting point?
* An attack helicopter that could also be deployed in a naval and land role
* A specialist maritime anti submarine and airborne early warning helicopter
* A Light/Medium utility helicopter that was common to naval and land roles
* A heavy lift support helicopter that could be used both in a naval and land role
Our proposal is to do just that, it is radical and very expensive but in terms of our overall FDR proposal, consistent with the overall direction.
Timing would be a challenge, this simply articulates a vision.
In the Attack Helicopter role the existing AH.1 Apache is a natural fit, especially the UK version which has many attributes that are far superior to the US versions and in other posts we will discuss air launched weapons and availability/maintenance of high value equipment. All 67 airframes should be bought to a single common specification.
In the specialist anti submarine role the existing Merlin HM.1 (or upgraded HM.2) is also a natural fit. The airframes that are not being upgraded to HM.2 standard should be used as donor airframes for the future airborne early warning programme, a replacement for the significantly underrated Sea King ASac.7 aircraft as they go out of service.
Replacing the Lynx Wildcat would be a utility variant of the Agusta Westland AW149, this is much more suited to the role of land based utility helicopter and could also be used in the maritime roles with some of the mission equipment from existing Lynx and planned Wildcat. Existing Lynx would be disposed. As the FIND role is now carried out by UAV’s and other airborne ISR platforms the specification can be moderate for the land role. The two variants would have a high degree of commonality and both be marinised with folding rotors are other modifications to make them suitable for naval deployments.
The Naval variant would be split across the 6 Type 45’s and C2/C3 Future Surface Combatant, in addition to training, fleet rotation and attrition spares. The utility variant would be split between a number of field regiments with some dedicated solely to the casualty evacuation role in dedicated units in order to retain them in that dedicated and specialist role.
Merlin HC3 and HC3a (the ex Dutch airframes) would be disposed as replacements become available.
For the heavy lift Support Helicopter role we propose to join the USMC Heavy Lift Replacement programme to replace the Merlin and Chinook with a single type, the CH-53K.
The CH-53K is currently in advanced development and will provide the USMC with a significant uplift in their rotary capabilities, larger and more powerful that the Chinook and Merlin it can also be deployed aboard ships. A single type to fulfil all support and maritime heavy lift requirements, the CH-53K is expected into service starting in 2015 although deliveries for the UK would not likely be possible before 2020. Within this time frame the LPH (HMS Ocean) replacement should be either in advanced design or early service so it should be designed and built with the size of the CH53K in mind.
It will have a large cabin, high speed and payload (up to 16tonnes for short distances) and is designed for low maintenance. Additional features include extensive avionics and sensors, an in flight refuelling probe and excellent hot/high performance. The USMC have ordered over 150 of them and with a UK order of 80 airframes some additional economies of scale should be achievable.
A number should be converted to a long range special-forces variant.
The UK rotary capability needs a radical step change in capability to maximise the relatively small but highly skilled force.
QUICK SUMMARY
1. Consolidate all rotary aircraft in the Army Air Corps or some renamed Army formation
2. Bring all 67 AH.1 to a common standard
3. Retain Merlin HM.1/HM/2 and convert 6 unconverted airframes to an AEW variant
4. Cancel Lynx Wildcat and dispose of existing Lynx variants
5. Purchase approximately 40 AW149 for naval role
6. Purchase approximately 80 AW149 for Land light/medium utility and CASEVAC
7. Withdraw and dispose all Merlin HC3 and HC3a
8. Withdraw existing Chinook fleet
9. Purchase 80 CH-53K airframes
10. Dedicate a small number of CH-53K to special-forces use
Digg it!
Add to Delicious!
Share on Facebook!
Share on Reddit!
Stumble it
Add to Technorati
19 Comments
Hmm! There quite a lot I cannot agree with in this post although there is much I can agree with, I agree that rotary assets should ideally being controlled by the Army but only the assets belonging to the RAF and AAC. As the Admin will know my thinking is very naval centric therefore I cannot agree with the amalgamation of the FAA so I think the FAA should become more independent and should not come under the control of the amalgamated helicopter force. The only part of the rotary fleet that should be fully amalgamated as it is now is the basic training on the Squirrel conversion should be done within the FAA and amalgamated helicopter force. I think I’ll break most of this down by helicopter type to better explain what I would like to see done within the rotary fleet.
Apache: I agree obviously with the idea that the Apache should be brought up to a common standard as this would be a wise move and simplify support and deployment of the aircraft.
Merlin: On the Naval side I agree with the plan to carry out the HM2 upgrade and convert the remaining airframes to AEW* as this would be a sound plan for an excellent helicopter. The HC3 and HC3a (Danish btw) should be either disposed of or in my opinion handed over to a paramilitary coastguard for SAR roles with additional airframes procured and all of them brought to the same standard. The Merlin would make an excellent SAR helicopter thanks to its massive cabin as well as a long range and endurance this role would be a better fate rather than just binning part of the Merlin fleet. I would also advocate more airframes to be bought to replace the Sea King HC.4 aka the Junglies as this would maintain a very common fleet across the FAA and would be much easier to support when deployed far from home. These airframes would of course be marinised and a close copy of the ASH in the Italian navy therefore little development would be needed. Although they should be able to carry out CSAR and Special Forces missions when needed.
Future Lynx: I think the Future Lynx has progressed too far to be cancelled and would be very tough to do politically therefore I would simply advocate all the airframes are finished to a Naval standard and given to the FAA to quip the future C3 fleet. Furthermore the Future Lynx could have export success in future as the lynx line has always proven popular in the export market and won some small orders. Concentrating the Lynx fleet in the FAA should lower the support burden and would mean the FAA would only operate 2 manned rotary platforms the Merlin and Future Lynx.
AW-149: I agree that this helicopter should form the backbone of the support helicopter fleet within the rotary fleet and should be acquired in large numbers to allow for adequate number available for deployment. I would also consider acquiring some for the FAA to fit between the large Merlin and small Lynx although this would add another type that would have to be supported aboard a ship. I would suggest a fleet size of around 160 for the helicopter force as this should allow for a decent number to be deployed while allowing for training, maintenance and attrition. Although the more the better considering all the aircraft that are getting replaced around 90 odd lynx, 30 odd puma, 28 Merlin and many Gazelles so I’m pretty sure a large fleet could be supported without extra manpower. Furthermore buying them in a large number should bring the purchase cost down and possibly encourage export orders by doing so. The one problem I can see is that if the AW-149 wins the Turkish order the design AFAIK will be owned by the Turks and they would have the design and production rights I could be wrong on this but I’m reasonably sure I check to be positive.
Heavy Lift: I’ve not named the platform because if an order is placed for more Chinook it would dampen the prospects of changing to a new platform. If no new Chinooks are forthcoming then I would fully support the purchase of a CH-53K fleet as it would be a flexible solution for the heavy lift role with its large capacity and ability to operate for ship and land in varying conditions. Some of these airframes should definitely be converted to CSAR and Special Forces roles to fill a current capability gap. The problem for my plan is that how would the FAA gain access to a joint fleet I would suggest specifying that the FAA must have a certain number of aircraft allocated to them at a time.
Training helicopter: The training helicopter fleet would stay the same and there would be no change apart from fleet replacement further down the line when they are getting older and costlier to maintain.
In the wider scheme of things all other rotary platforms e.g. Puma, Gazelle, Army Lynx etc would all be retired or disposed of in some other way basically as the aim and opinion of the Blog and me is to reduce the numbers of different makes, marks and models in service. The Dauphin and A109 in service could be kept or replaced with the AW-149 but I am reluctant to screw around with the Special Forces equipment as they generally get what they want or know will work. The Dauphin’s are on hire to ferry FOST around and that should continue as commonality matters little when they are a commercial contract hire therefore not our responsibility.
To conclude if the plans of the blog post were to be followed there would be 4 aircraft types owned and operated by the military Apache, Merlin, AW-149 and CH-53K going by what I have written there would be one additional type in service the Future Lynx making 5. Furthermore under the blog post plans there would be a single amalgamated helicopter force responsible for all rotary assets, tactics, support, deployment, purchase and strategy. Under my plans there would be 2 separate forces one with all the Army support rotary aircraft and capabilities alongside another with all the naval based rotary support assets and capabilities.
*I suspect my fellow commenter’s already know my stance on the CVF and its air group if not here we go quickly. There should be a single fast jet type of the CATOBAR variety therefore the carrier should in my opinion be converted to CATOBAR which would allow the acquisition of a proper AEW system in other words the highly capable E-2D Hawkeye.
Eeeek – there is so much wrong with this fantasy that I dont know where to begin – OK, money, lets start with money.
Ditch the Lynx Wildcat which you really hate, well we have discussed that before, and I agree.
Ditch the Chinook and the Merlin because, well why exactly, because they cost us millions in time, effort, training for aviators and maintainers, but we should just chuck them away and slowly introduce the smaller AW149 (how much can it carry to altitude with burdened with the same defensive aids system as a Merlin) and the as yet non-existent Super-super-Jolly Green Giant ? Hmph,
By the way, I truly have to get the pre-emptive strike in – “Royal Marines brought into the land domain” – WTF ? Yep, thats thinking out side of the box alright, don’t want to be around when you have to telly a Bootneck that he is going to be a Pongo in future…. :-)
Gents
I knew this was going to draw some fire.
Jed, yes it is a flight of fantasy or hair brained scheme!
The coherent and sensible thing to do would be what we discussed in the last post of the subject, more Chinook, Merlin (with tail fold) to replace Puma and Sea King Junglie and the AW139/149 to replace the Army Wildcat with the RN Merlin and Wildcat staying as is.
Sensible, achievable, yes
But it retains the high degree of types and versions. When I thought about the direction to take with the post I decided to start with a clean sheet of paper, being radical.
In Afghanistan our lack of strategic and tactical mobility is contributing to us being fixed in place by the Taleban and IED; lack of mobility means a low operational tempo, lack of momentum and ceding the advantage to them.
Helicopters give us back an advantage that leverages our low numbers of infantry.
Afghanistan characterises a type of conflict we are more likely to be in so it is absolutely vital that we take a long term view and be radical, nothing short of radical is going to do.
Radical means investing to save, looking at all options and not being afraid to cull a few sacred cows.
AMALGAMATION
This is one of those sacred cows where even reasonable arguments like the FAA being slightly different to the AAC and RAF, whilst valid, don’t trump the reason for doing it. Like UAV’s, like infantry, like fast jets, logistics, EOD, police and ISR we have to many stovepiped but shrinking empires that suck up too many resources.
TYPES
AW149/139 we all know makes sense to replace Pumas, Junglies and Lynx. It is in fact our equivalent to the US Blackhawk.
Merlin in its utility guise is massively overpriced for what it does and how big it is, the Chinook is of course excellent but it cannot be used in a naval guise (at least very well) so this means we have two aircraft to do largely the same job witho both of them having some limitations.
I want one aircraft to do the same job with as few limitations as possible, this leads to the CH53K
In the same way that the USMC uses it for over the horizon movements from ships with both infantry, stores, artillery and even light vehicles so should we. We have nothing that can lift the new PPV’s or similar type vehicles and it will be an all new type, able to replace Merlin and Chinook whilst delivering a very real uplift in capacity.
I thought you would see this uplift in amphibious assault capability as a bonus!
Bold, radical and very expensive, yes of course but this is what is needed.
RM/RAF REGIMENT
The RM used to be in the Land component, uses Army units for much of its combat and service support and uses an Army unit as part of its ORBAT now anyway. Again, its wasteful to maintain light infantry in the three services. You will see the proposal later, it isnt to disband but keep largely as is whilst moving it to the Land domain to achieve some economies of scale and streamline overly complex joint HQ’s. Same with the RAF Regiment.
Remember what I am trying to do, stimulate debate by looking at ways of doing more with the same or less, investing to save and culling sacred cows.
Our insistence on trying to squeeze more out of the defence budget whilst still keeping all our sacred cows intact is a spiral into the abyss (sorry for the melodramatics)
So as I said, I knew this would set the cat amongst the you know whats but hey, its only a blog and if you think this is bad, just wait till you see thoughts on the RN :D
Single Helicopter Service
I understand the reasoning, but, the same argument could be made for bringing the 4.5″ Naval guns under the command of the Royal Artilery.
A Helicopter on a Frigate is a weapon system of the Frigate, even though it can leave the Frigate.
I cant imagine many people who joined the Army to be a helicopter mechanic would be happy if they were dumped on a frigate for 9 months a year, every year.
Is deploying on a ship for 9 months any different to doing pre-deployment training, an OPTAG and then 6 months in Afghanistan?
Or a Falklands tour
RN personnel routinely deploy to Afghanistan now
Jointery is the order of the day, this is merely a logical extension of that and a means to carefully manage dwindling resources whilst driving out duplication.
I am not that wed to the idea though and there are many reasons for not doing something as radical as this but it is worth punt!
Oh no its a good idea, but it cant really work if we maintain three independant services.
As long as you walk into a recruiting office and sit down at the RAF desk to join the RAF regiment, or RAF accountants if your me, tri sevice stuff is going to be dfficult, if you walk into an MoD recruitment office and say you want to fix helicopters, then you cant complain if the MoD stick you on a carrier or in a desert.
Anyway, my point was more, every ship in the fleet, almost, would have 20 Army personel on it, which seems weird.
Jointery is fine, Joint Helo Command makes sense. Collapsing capabilities into a single service in the name of savings does not.
You ask if a nine month deployment on board a ship is any different from a deployment to Afghanistan. I now presume that you have no military service background. Hell yes its different ! Believe me, I have done a 9 month gulf deployment on a bloody mine sweeper (2 weeks at home in the middle !) and I have slept in tents in Germany in minus 20 and feet of snow – and in a bivi bag under the stars in rather more mild conditions – it is very different indeed.
Ask the RN squadron personnel who spend most of their recent deployments in the sandbox if they enjoy it and whether they will be leaving the service ? We can talk about kit all we like but retention of talented people will be hit hard.
If you want to go to sea and maintain helicopters you join the navy, if you want to be a solider first, and helicopter maintainer second, you join the army. In the old days, if you wanted a fairly static job on a single air station for years, you joined the air force (not really the same now admittedly).
So, the RAF Regiment has a long history of defending the airbases, manning the AAA and SAM batteries etc Most of this has gone. I see their future as helo aircrew in the Joint Personnel Recovery role (almost SOF).
However if our future defence strategy as discussed in previous postings is strategic raiding (not long term nation building) messing with the RM would make no sense at all, and what even makes you think the Army would want the amphibious commando role ?
Anyway, to return to limited amalgamation, the U.S. model or the Dutch model ? U.S. Army aviation has more helicopters the UK has aircraft in total, and has been even bigger in terms of sheer numbers in the past (Vietnam error numbers of UH1 and AH1), so for them it makes sense for the Army to own and operate the army support helicopters.
The Dutch have less than we do, with all their helo’s belonging to the Air Force, including their AH64 Apaches.
So which model ? Culturally I think moving RAF personnel who spend a lot of time with the Army makes more sense, so I would remove all rotary wing tasks from the RAF and let the Army Air Corps take over. “Joint Helicopter Command” would still exist to task the RN Support Helicopter force. I keep this separate because a green Merlin without 360 deg radar or sonar can be just as useful on an RFA for delivering stores, or just as useful on a T45 or C1 / C2 frigate if its on an anti-piracy deployment.
Anyway as for the kit.
Merlin, Merlin and More Merlin. Multi-year procurement with a steady drumbeat would reduce the price. As discussed before I dont believe anything smaller can carry the heavily laden modern infantryman, a suite of defensive aids and defensive armament. Of course a common avionics architecture for all RN, RM (junglie replacement) and existing RAF Merlins would also reduce through life costs.
I just don’t see the AW149 as being big enough. But if you insist then replace the Lynx AH9 and the WildCat with AW149′s if you could swing that one past the Treasury. Pass all Lynx’s to the RN as the sole service.
Yes in the long run the CH53K, with folding tail and rotors makes more sense than the Chinook, but to me its just a cash thing, even though you characterize it as invest to save.
“Anyway as for the kit.
Merlin, Merlin and More Merlin.”
God I’m glad you said that, I’ve written an epic on future defence to make the UK an atlantic power with global strike capability, and it had something like 90 merlins, I even said we should trim down CVR(T) to under 5 tons for it to be merlinable
I’m a new reader to this blog, but I’ve read through quite allot of it with especial emphasis on the FDR section which I’ve so far largely agreed with. So it is somewhat surprising to me that I disagree so strongly with today’s article.
Like several other commentators I am also in disagreement with handing over control of frigate-based helicopters to the army. While I agree with the concept of unifying all battlefield helicopters into one service, the Merlin HM1 and Lynx HMA8 are very specialised as anti-submarine weapons. The dipping sonar, under mounted radar dome and crew stations to operate them are integral to the aircraft and take up almost all of it’s lifting capacity and to use said aircraft to transport anything more than a few people without heavy baggage would take major structural work.
These helicopters are the primary weapon system on the type 23 frigate for anti-submarine warfare, they are not meant to be used as battlefield transport helicopters and never will be, the only similarity to the helicopters used by the army is the whirly thing at that top. By the same argument that all rotary wing aircraft should be used by one service because they use the same technology, I could argue that because the army use the Starstreak, Javelin, and LASM as anti- air, tank and infantry weapons respectively, they should also have control of AMRAAM, Brimstone and CRV7, as they use the same technology, despite them being weapons on the Typhoon.
Lastly on the subject of the FAA, while in an ideal world there would be no inter service rivalry, there is. The army would have almost no incentive to spent any money at all on helicopters that were only ever going to be deployed at the behest of the royal navy, and only capable of doing tasks the royal navy wants done. Handing over a frigates helicopter t other army could end up crippling the ability of the royal navy to attack submarines from anything other than another submarine.
I am otherwise in agreement with the handing over of royal navy and RAF transport helicopters to the army.
Now onto aircraft types. I most definitely agree with dropping the Wildcat for the AW149, I especially like the winch I presume it carries (the AW139 does at least) as this is a capability the current fleet lacks. I’d also like to see all navy frigates use the Merlin HM1/2 only, don’t bother bodging lynx/wildcat specific equipment onto the AW149.
On the subject of the CH-53K, I like it as an aircraft, however while cutting down on the number of different aircraft types is a good idea I can’t help but feel that if we’re going to replace both medium and heavy lift roles with a single airframe, it shouldn’t be the second largest operational helicopter in the world. The CH-53E is already famous for the tremendous down draft it’s main rotor causes (if I recall USMC deck crew refer to it as the hurricane maker) and the CH-53K is going to be an uprated version. With helicopter dust clouds already a major problem in the sandbox I can see the CH-53K having even worse problems than the Chinook.
Also while it’s lift capacity is undoubtedly impressive, I can’t see the CH-53K being particularly manoeuvrable. The Merlin is reportedly a pilot’s aircraft which I take to mean it being rather nimble for it’s size, and the twin rotor design of the Chinook (giving it a far superior power to thrust ratio than a similarly sized tail rotor helicopter) makes it very quick to accelerate for it’s size. With Afghanistan being a rather violent and dangerous place for helicopters I’m hesitant to use helicopters that are bigger or easier to hit when aircraft need to enter and exit a danger zone as quickly as possible.
I’m also hesitant to give up the Chinook on the basis of it’s service history. It forms the backbone of the RAF’s helicopter fleet because time after time it’s proven that it’s got the lift capacity to haul everything smaller than armor, it has more than space for a full platoon or space for casevac teams to work on a casualty, and it’s not to slow to be somewhere dangerous.
Also in regards to navalisation I would rather see us do with the Chinook what we did with the Apache. Give it folding rotor blades so it can be stored on ships temporarily, but otherwise accept it won’t be a permanent fixture.
In a single airframe scenario, the Chinook can do the job of the Merlin, but the Merlin can’t do the Chinook’s job. Otherwise I’m with Merlin, Merlin and more Merlin.
I like the Merlin but not really as a land based support helicopter as having seen the pictures recently of how tight a fit it is inside a C-17 that really makes me question its deployability. In future with a larger fleet of Merlin the only thing able to move them could be the C-17 fleet although I think the A400M could move it but I’ll check. If the switch was made to the smaller AW-149 then they could be moved by A400M’s and by C-17’s and a few at a time in the C-17’s. I would rather have the Merlin’s based on ships where transport is not a problem as they shall go with the ships wherever they shall go and this means the Navy will only have to worry about supporting 2 helicopters types most of the time. Therefore to that end the FAA would be the sole military operator of the Merlin, there would be 2 versions. The current ASW version upgraded to the HM.2 standard and a second junglie replacement version similar to the Italian navy Amphibious Support Helicopter. I don’t fully agree with handing over the Junglies or their replacement to the Army as I feel they should be part of the Royal Marines to support them wherever they go. If they were handed over they would arguably have the same problem as the specialist naval helicopters and that is the crews and control of the assets.
The main reason I don’t support lot’s more Merlin HC.3’s is that they are too large to acquire in numbers as they cost quite a bit to buy and quite a bit to maintain. Also that third engine burns more fuel, fuel may seem trivial but in Afghanistan if you follow the Fuel trail you will soon change your mind. In the longer term lower maintenance and fuel costs should save money over the possible saving of having a large common fleet of one expensive helicopter. If the AW-149 seems a bit small then the next options are the NH-90 and UH-60 both of which are around 10-11 tons and might be a better fit and both can use the same engine as the Merlin and Apache. I think the AW-149 is a decent size as it would allow people to be moved and retrieved while the larger heavy lift helicopters concentrate on lifting cargo to where it is needed. The AW-149 is also an Augusta Westland design with a bright future and could be built in the UK and should be of reasonable cost and if built in numbers more could also be produced for the export market if the cost was brought down by a large UK order.
If we wanted to go for commonality with a clean sheet the NH-90 would have to be the clear option as it could replace almost everything and could be operated alongside Apache and a heavy lift type. The largest current helicopter fleet by type that would get the Axe that is not already would be naval Merlin which could be converted to SAR birds as that’s what happened to the old Sea Kings and these would be operated by a paramilitary coastguard. The NH-90 can do all the roles as it already is and could arguably be built in the UK, it also uses the RTM322 the same as the Apache and it is also common with all Major European allies. So going by this we would have three helicopter types in service with the Armed Forces one less than what the blog proposes and two of these types would have common engines. Oh! and the best thing is It does not really cause that much pain as the Chinook would be kept and the Merlin would find a new job doing SAR.
A few other thoughts on something other than the Merlin which were mentioned. The RAF regiment could be amalgamated within the Army as a guard or security force and could be equipped with the Air Defence equipment to defend airfields. The only main difference would then be who gives the orders an Army commander instead of an RAF one so it’s debatable whether or not it is wise. The RAF regiment could always be told to do its old role and that is defending airfields with air defence equipment and protect them from skirmishers on the ground. As it stands the regiment has a wider role as stand in soldiers and this is mainly because Afghanistan has no front line so they look like a force with little purpose. In traditional conflicts then I feel they would be needed to do the job they normally do and that is defence of an airfield from enemy air attack and attack from the ground by light forces. Simply put our views and opinion are skewed to a large degree by Afghanistan as it is a non-traditional conflict in tough unique terrain where we do not speak the language and where we do not have the manpower to win.
Next, Dominic said he would like us to become an Atlantic power with global strike capabilities and I very much agree what has to be discussed if it is to be discussed is how best to achieve this goal. I feel we must become an Atlantic power as we will have to fill the void left by the US swinging back to the Pacific as they try to counter a rising China. I don’t think the US swinging back to the Pacific is something that could happen it’s something that must and will happen, the United States of America will have to reallocate resources away from the Atlantic side back towards the pacific to maintain its influence and power in the Pacific Rim. If we decide not to fill the void left then someone will and it will either be the UK, France or Russia and I would much rather it was the UK that decided to fill part of the void. We will have to do more in the Atlantic or not get involved as the US may no longer decide to be as active where the once were. Furthermore we must as a nation realise that the centre of the world has moved or is moving rapidly from Europe to Asia so I feel we must prepare to essentially move back east of Suez fail to do that and we lose influence and respect.
Nice to see we have a new reader so a big Welcome to Ashley.
First off, thanks for everyone’s comments; brilliant, thoughtful and insightful as ever
Secondly, a big welcome to Ashley
OK, have to admit to never having served on a ship so my view might be a bit land centric but I do strive to see the big picture. My comment was flippant, apologies for that; I was referring to the time element.
Retention is a big issue that is often overlooked when we talk of kit. One of the issues with a shrinking aviation world in all three services is that in a small unit the promotion and career options become limited and this is much more likely to cause retention issues than serving in different environments. If one looks at the RAF experience of serving onboard the CVS it is always positive. As for the Naval Strike Wing in Afghanistan, must admit to not being up to date with that but comments from friends indicated it was quite positive so who knows what the right point of view on that would be.
Consolidation means a larger pool from which to choose deployments from meaning greater intervals between them, retention positive. A larger force also means greater promotion and career opportunity, retention positive. A single force means being able to experience a variety of postings, retention positive.
I do see the argument as to why naval aviation can sit aside from land, all good points but, with shrinking force, recruitment and retention looms its ugly head again. This is a problem that the FAA Harrier force experienced.
There may be an argument about perishable skills, particularly with specialist areas such as anti submarine warfare.
If a separate FAA were still maintained how would commenters resolve the career and retention issues that are magnified in a small force (the FAA isn’t going to be getting any larger any time soon) given that T45 is pegged at 6 and C1/C2 is likely to be no larger than 16, that’s a very small force (accepting the RM aviation element goes to the joint force) in which to have a meaningful promotion and career path.
Re maintenance crew, currently in the Army its aircraft are maintained by REME detachments and it is likely that groundcrew will in the future be from the Royal Logistic Corps, again I can see how having a detachment of REME on board a ship, just to maintain its helicopter/s would seem unusual but are we really talking about a problem or a scared cow.
This does show one thing, there are no easy answers to complex problems.
Re Merlin and its ability to carry weight, without discussing specifics for the recent deployment to Helmand it has had to forego so things that might be considered useful because of weight issues. The Merlin in general is underpowered and whilst a very similar size to the Chinook can only sling half the load. The Merlin will not be able to lift a Jackal, the future LPPV, any of the FRES variants (neither would a CH53K either), a Bronco and would even struggle with a Theatre Entry Spec Viking or Land Rover WMIK. If you look at the CH53-K v the Chinook, there size difference is not that significant and given the trend in increasing vehicle weight the Chinook becomes less and less useful, a bit like the C130 v A400 argument so whilst payload is not the be all and end all, it’s an important factor.
The AW149 would replace Lynx and Puma and the CH53K would replace the Merlin and Chinook, with the specialist AH.1 and Merlin HM.1/HM.2 staying as is.
Yes, it is a cost thing, this proposal isn’t specifically about saving money but providing a step change in capability whilst maximising efficiency over a long period, not the usual piecemeal penny pinching short term approach that has got us to the point where we are now.
On the Light Infantry of the RM and RAF Regiment, lets keep our powder dry on that, another post, another rumble :D
Thanks again everyone, the comments are excellent, perhaps merging all the rotary into one is a bridge too far.
Greetings to Ashley, a well thought out comment sir !
Admin, old chap, the beauty of this being “your” blog is that you never have to say sorry…. :-)
Your opinions are entirely valid, but you must expect us to be just a little thuggish in filling them full of holes when we disagree ! Lets face it, we dont really get into flame wars on here, because although I am just a simpleton who no longer even lives in the UK, Euan, Dominic and Ashley obviously think about what they write before hitting the send button…. :->
Complete unification of rotary assets sounds effective from a cost and management perspective but fills me with dread. The thought of the crabs (or a crab-like organisation) getting hold of the FAA (again) would see it take the brunt of any cuts. The truth is none of the service arms can be truly trusted to manage the rotary assets of the other. The FAA needs to manage its own assets and be left to it, apart from maintenance and training issues where there are type similarities e.g. Merlin.
With regards to AAC versus RAF and who merges/gets swallowed by who is a different matter. Rotary assets need to be controlled by the Army, they are the main end users after all. Rather than force one into the other, it would be better to scrap both and form a new organisation out of both. Call it the Royal Tactical Army Air Force or something/anything to try and retain personnel.
One thing that must be disposed of in any new organisation is the RAF ethos of officer only aircrew. Plenty of RAF aircrews in the Battle of Britain were SNCO’s, it worked then, it will work now.
As for the CH-53K, it sounds like a highly capable machine, or it will be when it eventually flies. Enough comments have been made on this blog about the MOD purchasing kit off the drawing board as opposed to buying it off the shelf. Plus the costs of buying a new airframe would be prohibitive in these austere times, the Chinook is old but it does the job and will do for decades to come.
One thing the Chinook fleet would benefit from though would be the development of a four-bladed main rotor head to reduce the acoustic signature. The original CH-47F featured this, but it was dropped as a cost saving measure.
As for the Wildcat, its here, we might as well accept it but only in its naval guise. Why pay another £1billion to develop a different aiframe to do the same job?
In addition:
1. Stick with the Merlin, all variants, and add a few for good measure, just make sure they have a folding tail.
2. Purchase AW149 for Land light/medium utility and CASEVAC as above post.
3. Purchase a few AW109/EC645′s for liasion etc – always useful to have a few handy.
This will mean additional types of airframe, but apart from creating a few maintenance/management/logistics issues, it won’t cause the rotary world to grind to a halt.
Side note: Air mobile armour
Admin said: “The Merlin in general is underpowered and whilst a very similar size to the Chinook can only sling half the load. The Merlin will not be able to lift a Jackal, the future LPPV, any of the FRES variants (neither would a CH53K either), a Bronco and would even struggle with a Theatre Entry Spec Viking or Land Rover WMIK. If you look at the CH53-K v the Chinook, there size difference is not that significant and given the trend in increasing vehicle weight the Chinook becomes less and less useful, a bit like the C130 v A400 argument so whilst payload is not the be all and end all, it’s an important factor.”
All true, especially the last bit, but your sort of contradicting your self by listing the kit a Merlin can’t lift, but then saying a CH53K could not lift the heaviest either, but does the heaviest armoured equal the most useful ???
A movement in the U.S. finally got them to name the M113 APC family the ‘Gavin” after a famous U.S.A General who evangelised for air-mobile armour, which was why the M113 was made of lightweight aluminium armour. However the helo needed to lift it was the CH54 Tarhe (the Sikorsky SkyCrane to civvies), not the MH47 Chinook or the CH53 Jolly Green family. The Tarhe / SkyCrane had no cabin and could hoist the vehicle ‘close in’ on a special platform. They even carried Scorpion CVR(T) in trials.
Things have moved on a bit since those days (50′s and 60′s). Any helo carrying an underslung load is a target, a slow and unmanouverable one at that.
So the Merlin could carry a Wolf WMIK – why would you want anything heavier ? Let it carry the old 3 x 3 SupaCat nternally, or the new 1 tonne payload light armoured truck – but the question is – what is the requirement ?
Nothing airportable by helo is going to be IED or anit-armour mine proof, its not going to be HEAT RPG proof, or 14.5mm AP proof. It will provide protection against 7.62x39mm and mortar and maybe even heavier artillery fragments. No helo is every going to carry any FRES variant (be it CV90 for recon or Boxer as ‘battle taxi’).
So are we going to buy German Weasel light armoured vehicles, which were designed for internal carriage in German CH53G’s ? Why replicate a capability the Germans bring to NATO.
A CH53K derivate SkyCrane could carry a Stormer class APC, or both parts of a BVS10, but that’s a fantasy piece of kit, it does not exist.
No, the arguements for the CH53′s ability to carry large (outsize) heavy underslung loads might be required for future USMC kit.
So more AW101 to replace Sea King Mk4, fast and manouverable with almost a platoon worth of heavy, body armoured infantry carrying shed loads of ammo with them, Chinooks bringing in very light armoured vehicles, or non-armoured vehicles to a LZ cleared by the infantry, or at least being actively suppressed by said infantry and Apaches.
JLTV
I stand corrected, apparently the lightest versions of the U.S. Joint Light Tactical Vehicle, which is an armoured vehicle, are designed to be carried by both MH47 and CH53 families:
http://www.army-technology.com/projects/jltv/
but why would we just buy that off the shelf when we can have our own competition for our own vehicle (LPPV)
http://www.army-technology.com/projects/ocelot-lppv/
DOH !
Hi Jed
The M113 has never and will never be called a Gavin, that was a campaign by some internet weirdo called Mike Sparks (look him up) and friends don’t let friends quote Mike Sparks :D
On to your other points
My argument for the CH53K is similar in many ways to the argument for the A400, increasing bulk and weight of vehicles. Accepted that it wont be able to lift FRES but it will be able to lift, if only for modest distances, a wider range of vehicles than the Merlin (5 tonnes) and even the Chinook (10 tonnes)
Slinging vehicles is not something you do every day for some of the reasons you state but having the ability to gives you options, tactical mobility gives the advantage of unpredictability. Just because it is heavy does not automatically make it useful so a WMIk may be more suitable for a particular task than an CR2. Chinook has slung CVR(T) but cannot now because the CVR(T) in its theatre entry spec is too heavy. The Wiesel is an interesting vehicle and the Germans have deployed it in Afghanistan but its not a coalition asset, just because the Germans have it would not mean we shouldn’t. The CH53K is also designed to carry 2 Humvees or JLTV side by side internally as well.
Our air mobile doctrine has always been light because of helicopter lift limitations, the USMC who are doctrinally years ahead in some aspects understand the concept of vertical envelopment and ship to shore movement so for them the CH53K makes perfect sense.
Are our requirements any different from the USMC and if so why.
Hmm, bit confused here.
If the 53K can carry 15,000kg, and the CVR(T) Family weigh between 7000kg and 9000kg, shouldnt it be able to carry them easily?
The Casspir weighs about 11,000kg and the Ridgeback is somewhat over at 17,000kg.
Your not going to get mine and missile defended troop transport in a helicopterable package, but you should be able to get one or the other.
Again, I suppose it depends what you expect the army to be doing.
I think the army should be fighting quick high intenisity conflicts, so the ability to helicopter in large vehicles, negating the need for capturing a beach is something I’d deem useful.
If your fighting an insurgency in Afghanistan, its not.
LOL – don’t think I have ever heard of “he who should not be qouted” but obviously picked the meme up somewhere – DOH !
OK, so in principle I agree with both Admin and Dominic J – the ability to carry a decent weight vehicle, albeit under slung can be useful in a ‘high intensity, short duration’ strategic raiding context, getting stuff from ship to shore without a beach etc
BUT, oh yes, there is always a but…..
Is it cost effective for us to dive into this program (CH53K) with such a limited budget ? Same as my F35 / A400M arguments, all we can afford right now is non-developmental, Military off the shelf (MOTS) items that we know work – Merlin and Chinook. If the CH53K is on time, on budget and accrues some decent and reliable operational service with allies, then when the Chinooks wear out in ten years or so, buy into it then, straight commercial MOTS purchase. But right now we need to consolidate and thats why I am all for buying more of what we have, what we have experience flying and maintaining. Not because its the best, or even because it could potentially be the best option to fulfill the requirements post next-SDR (our FDR), but because it fits the 80 / 20 rule and does not break the bank (but going over time and budget due to unforseen circumstances).
For the same reasons I would have the C1 be a ASW optimised variant of the T45 hull, and the C2 as a version of the Danish Absalon, but more on that at a future date I expect :-)
Jed brings up an interesting point. We have otherwise neglected to factor in that the CH-53K isn’t due until 2015 and final deliveries will be in 2022. I can’t see us getting priority over the USMC.
So even if we wan’t the CH-53K, we probably won’t be getting any for at least a decade. So for now it’s Chinook or nothing, but having said that, given the rate we’re using/loosing Chinooks in the sandpit, they may well need replacing in ten years.
The other thing that came to my mind which didn’t while writing my initial essay, is the NH90.
It’s bigger than the AW149, but it’s still small and light, it has a side winch and also of use to CASEVAC it has a tail ramp with all of it’s seats folding away to the sides. Apart from the lack of anything better suited to the job, one of the reasons the RAF use the Chinook for CASEVAC is that it has enough space inside for a wounded or two to lay in the centre of the hold with half a dozen people working on him and still have space for a few extra troops to act as protection once on the ground.
The AW149 has several centre mounted seats (by the doors) and has only door access. The NH90 is also larger (able to carry 14-20 troops) so better able to fill the medium role (troops/supplies rather than heavy vehicles which are the forte of the heavy lift).
There are also two extra boons. Firstly it uses the same engine as the Apache, and it already has a naval version, complete with belly radar, dipping sonar and torpedoes.
So if we were to replace the merlin, I would suggest we do so with the NH90, not the AW149. It fulfils the roles better and would be able to replace naval Merlins as well as land based ones. This provides a common airframe for aircrews to transfer between and reduces the number of airframe types to only three.
If however we decide not to throw away otherwise useful Merlins (that is to say, we don’t burn them all out in the desert) I’d say take the AW149 as a light role only helicopter, still with my initial proposition that we don’t develop a naval AW149 and use more naval Merlins.